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PREFACE
Inspiration by Academia forms the basis of any PhD trajectory. Passionate lecturers are 
the primary asset of a university. The RUG professors and lecturers (ca. 1975) Meijer, 
Lokin, Brahn, Brunner and J. Wiarda made me a civil lawyer to the bone. Researchers 
like professors H.J. Scheltema and Kuipers and research with Groenveld and professor 
Degenkamp showed me the fun an academic career had to offer. The outstanding and 
challenging lectures of professor Pen opened a completely new world, that of economics. 
The actual studying of it, although eye-opening, would never impress as much as Pen’s 
teachings.
Jacqueline and I declined an academic career at the time. It was Den Uyl’s era, the chal-
lenge was to find the right model and the right parameters to create a better society 
where all people would have equal rights and be happy. We wanted to contribute to that, 
first in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen, then in Islamabad, later on in Numansdorp. The thought of 
writing a thesis arose in abstract form – maybe I should make an appointment with Pen 
– or more specifically when I worked in labour law and questioned the legal, economic 
and ethic basis of the ‘dissolution compensation’. Finally and by sheer coincidence, Auke 
de Bos and Han Donker offered me the opportunity to return to Academia – although 
incomparable with Groningen’s then Turftorenstraat-quarters – to work on a thesis on 
a part-time basis. The subject which I owe to Han Donker really has the importance for 
society I always – perhaps incorrectly – thought a thesis should have.
Before you lies a book on the role of monitoring near financial distress. I have seen 
a lot of bankruptcies. During the thesis process I have become convinced that every 
entrepreneur would be better off by discussing every now and then with an independent 
challenger his strategy, corporate policy, and even himself. Maybe we would all be. It is 
maintenance, just like going to the dentist twice a year. This does not imply that every 
company should have a supervisory board with independent non-executives, a qualified 
auditor or at least several directors. Hiring counsel on a regular basis, for example one 
of Rotterdam’s highly-qualified management school alumni, discussing with industry 
advisors or bank experts, reading books or articles might help as well. An open mind to 
challenge and change – that is the precondition for success.
I would like to make acknowledgements to Auke de Bos, who offered me this opportunity 
and guided me patiently and with confidence through the process. His critical remarks 
triggered me continuously to make the most of it. To Vino Timmerman who, although 
joining the process at a late stage, arranged time to discuss the manuscript intensively. 
His valuable contributions improved the manuscript considerably. To professors Blom-
maert, Mertens and Assink for finding time to study, discuss and approve this thesis. To 
my colleagues for occasional advice and patience. To Hans Quak for providing search 
and other useful assistance and convincing me that my first research on bankrupt foun-
dations was worth publishing – my first academic publication in EUR service. To Jan 
Adriaanse for the many discussions we had and for opening the failure process and 
informal reorganization field to me. To Gijs Santen who protected me from at least one 
serious statistical error and helped me out on a lot of statistical issues – of course the 
blame is mine if an error occurs. To Elwin Frank and Joline Santen for coaching me when I 
was stuck in the process. To Jacqueline Santen-Reestman, my ‘co-promovenda’ to whom 
I owe a lot of content, from common sense to statistics. And finally, at a personal level, 
to my parents, my family and my friends, and especially to Jacqueline, Gijs, Nina, Joline 
and Hans, who supported me throughout with gestures, attention and their company. I 
owe you all!
When reading this thesis, or glancing through it, I hope the reader will experience the 
joy which I felt during my research and the writing process. I welcome your comments, 
remarks or questions at bernard@santenonline.nl.
Leiden, 22 December 2010
Bernard Santen
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The why, what and how of this thesis
I am drowning here, and you are 
describing the water.
(Jack Nicholson in: As Good as It Gets)
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1.1 InTRODUCTIOn: WHY?
When things turn out wrong for a company, the people involved usually have some idea 
why. With hindsight scholars, judges, journalists, trade union representatives, share-
holders or bankers may conclude that an acquisition was too big, an investment too 
risky, reorganization too late, or that the management was not capable of doing its job. 
Bad faith might play a role. Administrators1 often detect fraud or serious negligence. In 
large bankruptcies like Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat or Lehman Brothers, billions of US 
dollars were at stake. Such cases are rare. Mostly the amounts are much smaller, but there 
are definitely many of such small bankruptcies. Severe losses may be suffered by trade 
creditors, banks, bondholders, the tax authorities and social securities agencies. More 
important than the amount of money involved might be the damage inflicted on human 
beings as a consequence of bankruptcy (Argenti, 1976). Due to unemployment, pension 
loss or commercial losses, the future prospects of employees, pensioners, small service 
providers and product suppliers may be seriously damaged. Thus, human beings as well 
as society will win by decreasing the incidence of bankruptcy.
This thesis focuses on companies near financial distress. ‘Companies’ means private-
sector legal persons, with either a profit or a nonprofit object2. ‘Financial distress’ is the 
subject of chapter 2. Its most widely-known form is bankruptcy. Specifically, this study 
analyses economic and legal mechanisms in situations of near financial distress. These 
prove to be of a rather ex post nature. In chapter 5 the study develops an approach with 
an ex ante character.
This chapter sets out the relevance of the subject and defines the research question and 
method. The macro economic impact of bankruptcy is the topic of 1.2, whilst 1.3 presents 
a micro economic analysis. The legal impact of bankruptcy is the subject of 1.4. These 
analyses show the relevance of this thesis. Section 1.5 defines the research question, 
1.6 is about the applied methodology and 1.7 describes the outline of this thesis. The 
significance of this thesis will be discussed in 1.8.
1.2 MACRO-ECOnOMIC IMPACT OF BAnKRUPTCY
1.2.1 Bankruptcy costs and recovery rates in the netherlands
This section analyses the financial impact of bankruptcy on creditors and on the national 
economy based on previous research and on an analysis of CBS figures (Centraal Bureau 
voor de Statistiek; Statistics Netherlands).
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Couwenberg and de Jong (2008) report for a sample of 137 Dutch companies with ei-
ther at least 10 employees or at least €227,000 debt, an average recovery rate of 37.2% 
(median3: 32.6%), whilst the direct costs of the proceedings are 16.0% (median 11.2%) of 
the total realized asset value (p. 124). This means that the average creditor has to write 
down 62.8% of his debt. The results are even worse if all concluded bankruptcies of legal 
persons in a given year are taken into account4.
Table 1.1 shows for the Netherlands that on average 17.4% of the total debt in a bank-
ruptcy is recovered (column 8). This recovery rate, calculated as in Couwenberg and de 
Jong (2008: 114) by dividing all of the assets of the estate by all of the debt, is a very 
rough estimate. In fact, on average almost 33% of the asset value liquidated by the ad-
ministrator is directly distributed to the secured creditors (column 4; CBS, 2008: 9). This 
distribution diminishes the numerator as well as the denominator in the recovery rate 
calculation, thus leaving less in percentage terms for other creditors. The estate handling 
costs which are part of the ‘total debt’ column 6 have the same effect, because they are 
of a preferential nature by law. CBS calculates the overall recovery rate as net assets after 
deduction of estate handling costs paid, divided by total debt less estate handling costs 
(CBS, 2008: 11, 16). On average this figure is between 5.2% (average 1992-2004) and 7.5% 
(average 1992-2008) (column 9). Table 1.1 presents a sub-average after 2004 because 
the figures of an unknown concluded bankruptcy in 2006 severely influence the average 
of assets and dividend paid. Especially the overall recovery rate (CBS) in column 9 shows 
an all time high of 14.9%. It should be noted here that the CBS figures do not contain the 
(unknown) amount recovered by mortgage and pledge holders by sale under execution 
Table 1.1: survey of concluded bankruptcies of legal persons in the Netherlands 1992-2008 (mln euros)
year
number of 
concluded 
legal person 
bankruptcies
total 
assets
of which (3) 
to secured 
creditors
net assets 
(3)-(4) total debt
total 
dividend 
paid
calculated 
recovery 
rate in % 
(3)/(4)+(6)
overall 
recovery 
rate (CBS) 
in %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1992 1,576 248.5 157.8 90.6 947.3 90.6 22.5 4.5
1994 2,403 226.7 121.9 104.8 1,129.0 104.8 18.1 5.0
1996 2,576 230.8 121.0 109.9 1,100.3 109.9 18.9 4.1
1998 2,584 246.5 86.1 160.4 1,296.9 160.4 17.8 7.1
2000 2,173 242.7 109.5 133.2 1,097.0 132.9 20.1 5.2
2002 2,188 167.1 68.2 98.9 974.5 98.3 16.0 4.5
2004 3,334 254.0 63.2 190.8 1,802.7 188.0 13.6 5.4
sub-average 2,405 230.9 104.0 126.9 1,192.5 126.4 17.8 5.2
2006 4,972 758.3 115.7 642.5 3,331.3 641.8 22.0 14.9
2008 4,023 423.8 70.2 353.6 3,530.0 353.5 11.8 5.7
average 2,870 310.9 101.5 209.4 1,689.9 208.9 17.4 7.5
Source: CBS StatLine5
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without recourse to the estate, as provided by law6 (CBS, 2008: 9). The overall recovery 
rate (CBS) in column 9 therefore underestimates total recovery (Boot and Ligterink, 2000: 
26 table 10).
Table 1.2 analyses the total debt of concluded bankruptcies as mentioned in column 6 of 
table 1.1 in detail. Three debt categories are discerned: estate handling related debt with 
highest preference according to s 182 Fw7; taxes and social security with high preference 
according to s 21 Iw; and other debt with low preference or without any preference. Estate 
handling costs are on average 7.1% of the total debt. These are the costs the administrator 
incurs. On average 76.4% of these costs are recovered and €30 million is written off 
annually. Apparently the estate is often too small to cover even all estate-related costs. 
Taxes and social security premiums form 22.9% of the total debt. Despite the high pref-
erential nature of this debt, on average a mere 9.5% of the tax and social security debt is 
recovered, which implies that on average over €350 million had to be written off annually 
between 1992 and 2008. Other debt, on average over €1.2 billion/year, shows a recovery 
rate of 6.8% (an increase on the 2004 average of over 3% points). This means that, every 
year, ordinary creditors write off well over €1.1 billion on average. The amounts increase 
fast, however. In a favourable year such as 2006, the recovery rate for the other debt 
category amounted to 16.7%. Still, almost €2 billion had to be written off, and in 2008 
even €2.4 billion. Thus the category ‘other debt’, mainly trade creditors, seems to bear 
most of the bankruptcy losses. In effect, and depending on the actual tax regulation, part 
of this burden is shifted to the State.
Table 1.2: composition of the total debt of concluded bankruptcies of legal persons in the Netherlands 
1992-2008 (in percentages)
debt categories (in percentage of total debt) overall recovery rates by debt category
year
total debt in 
mln euros
estate 
handling
taxes and 
social 
security other debt
estate 
handling
taxes + 
social 
security other debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1992   947.3 6.5 23.1 70.4 83.3 10.5  2.5
1994 1,129.0 5.8 24.2 70.0 79.1 11.9  2.6
1996 1,100.3 7.7 30.3 62.0 80.2  8.3  2.1
1998 1,296.9 7.3 19.4 73.3 79.4 11.6  5.9
2000 1,097.0 9.2 20.3 70.6 80.6 16.2  2.0
2002   974.5 7.9 25.4 66.7 75.1 10.8  2.1
2004 1,802.7 7.5 23.2 69.3 71.7  7.7  4.7
sub-average 1,192.5 7.4 23.5 69.0 77.8 10.5  3.4
2006 3,331.3 7.5 22.8 69.7 73.0  9.6 16.7
2008 3,530.0 6.1 21.5 72.4 76.0  6.8  5.4
average 1,689.9 7.1 22.9 70.0 76.4  9.5  6.8
Source: CBS StatLine
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The macro-economic impact of bankruptcy losses is evident by relating those figures 
to the GDP (Gross Domestic Product), as shown in table 1.3. Because the actual loss was 
incurred some years before the conclusion of the bankruptcy, the losses are (arbitrarily) 
related to the GDP two years before. The impact on the economy is clear: on average at 
least 0.39% of GDP is annually lost due to bankruptcies. To put this in perspective: the 
debt to be written off amounting to €1.5 billion/year is 3.3 times the annual costs of the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam8. This figure probably underestimates9 the true macro-
economic losses. Not all creditors give notice to the administrator of the debts payable 
(CBS, 2008: 9), while the administrator might not be able to trace all of the debts due to an 
incomplete administration. Banks, moreover, do not always give notice of the remaining 
debt after liquidation of the secured goods and receivables, knowing that there is little 
or nothing left to be distributed. Unemployment benefits are only bankruptcy-related 
debt up to the notice term10, and not all employees will have found a new job by then. 
Termination of the activities of one company could cause lay-offs in other companies. 
On the other hand, efficiency gains due to better allocation of production factors cannot 
be excluded. These are hard to calculate.
Table 1.3: the impact on the Dutch economy of concluded bankruptcies of legal persons in the 
Netherlands, 1992-2008, (mln euros)
year GDP total debt
total dividend paid
remaining 
debt (3)-(4)
remaining 
debt as % of
GDP (t=-2)
(5)/(2)
in mln 
euros
% to 
estate
% to taxes 
+social 
security
% to
other debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 243,561
1992 266,472   947.3  90.6 56.3 25.3 18.4   856.7 0.35
1994 287,517 1,129.0 104.8 49.4 31.1 19.5 1,024.2 0.38
1996 319,755 1,100.3 109.9 62.0 25.1 12.9   990.4 0.34
1998 362,464 1,296.9 160.4 46.6 18.3 35.2 1,136.5 0.36
2000 417,960 1,097.0 132.9 61.0 27.2 11.8   964.1 0.27
2002 465,214   974.5  98.3 58.9 27.1 14.0   876.2 0.21
2004 491,184 1,802.7 188.0 51.9 17.1 31.0 1,614.7 0.35
sub-average 337,563° 1,192.5 126.4 54.5 23.4 22.1 1,066.1 0.32
2006 534,324 3,331.3 641.8 28.3 11.4 60.3 2,689.5 0.55
2008 595,900 3,530.0 353.5 46.1 14.5 39.3 3,176.5 0.59
average 376,495° 1,689.9 208.9 44.0 17.6 38.4 1,481.0 0.39
Source: CBS StatLine
° in calculating the average the last year has been omitted due to the time lag assumed in column 6 (see 
text).
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To conclude, the average overall recovery rate in Dutch bankruptcies of legal persons 
is as low as 7.5% (with an outlier in 2006 of 14.9%). The resulting macro-economic loss 
due to bankruptcies in the Netherlands averages at least 0.39% of the GDP annually and 
showed a tendency towards 0.55-0.59% between 2006 and 2008. The next section is 
about international research on bankruptcy costs and recovery rates.
1.2.2 Data on bankruptcy costs and recovery rates in other countries
Studies on the efficiency of bankruptcy systems in other countries focus on recovery 
rates and bankruptcy cost. The recovery rates are, as Boot and Ligterink (2000: 28) and 
Couwenberg (2001: 268) mention, difficult to compare11. Table 1.4 presents the results of 
some studies in other countries on recovery rates after default. Note that default, which 
means non-compliance with financial obligations, is a broader concept than bankruptcy. 
Altman, Resti and Sironi (2001), Branch (2002) and Couwenberg and de Jong (2008) refer 
to numerous other studies and results. Leaving aside the Bris et al. (2006: 1288, 1263) 
results, which rely on assumptions regarding direct asset seizures in Chapter 7 of Title 
11 of the US Code (Bankruptcy Code) that may be too low, the bottom average recovery 
Table 1.4: summary of some international studies on recovery rates after default
author subject recovery rate
Franks and Torous (1994) 37 US Chapter 11 reorganizations average 50.9% of face value; secured 80%, 
bank debt 86%, senior debt 47%, junior 
debt 29%
Carty, Lieberman and Fons 
(1995)
750 defaulted US bonds issues (1970-
1994), over $ 60 billion in face value
average 37.61% of par value; senior 
secured 53%, senior unsecured 45%, senior 
subordinated 36%, subordinated 29%.
Altman and Kishore (1996) 696 defaulted US bonds issues (1978-
1995)
average 41.7% of par value; senior secured 
58%, senior unsecured 48%; senior 
subordinated 34%, subordinated 31%
Carty (1998) 200 bank loans in the bankruptcy 
of 119 large public borrowers, US 
Chapter 11 (1986-1997)
secured 87%, unsecured 79% (of which 
prepack Chapter 11: secured 93%; 
unsecured 100%)
Gupton (2000) 121 Loss Given Defaults (LGD) for 181 
bank loans US (1989-2000)
senior secured 69%; senior unsecured 52% 
(single loan 63%, multiple loan 37%)
Thorburn (2000) 263 small-firm bankruptcies in 
Sweden
average 35%; secured 69%, priority 27%, 
unsecured 2%
Franks and Sussman (2005) 542 small or medium size UK 
companies in default or deemed in 
distress by banker’s assessment
74%-77% of the main bank loan
Bris, Welch and Zu (2006) 61 US Chapter 7 and 225 Chapter 11 
cases
27.4% (median 6%) for Chapter 7,
69.4% (median 79%) for Chapter 11
Davydenko and Franks (2008) 2,280 defaulted firms according to 
Basel II criteria, in France, BRD and UK
informal formal bankruptcy
UK 78% 69% (bank)
France 83% 47% (bank)
BRD 76% 59% (bank)
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rate reported is 37.61% for the United States of America (USA) in the Carty et al. (1995) 
study and 35% for Europe in the Swedish study of Thorburn (2000). With 53% - 58% the 
defaulted US bonds show a lower recovery rate for secured creditors than other debt 
categories, which increase from 69%. Bank debt recovery also amounts to 69% or more, 
with the exception of France and Germany (BRD) in the case of formal reorganizations, 
which will be discussed in chapter 2. The reported results are reasonably in line with 
those of Couwenberg and de Jong (2008: 115) for the Netherlands, who report an average 
recovery rate of 37.2% (median 32.6%) and a bank recovery rate of 80.0% (median 99.5%).
It should be noted that these results rely on samples and may suffer from a sample bias12. 
The Dutch overall recovery rates as reported in table 1.1 are based on all concluded 
bankruptcies of legal persons in a given year. Boot and Ligterink (2000: 29, 31) concluded 
from the difference between the reported CBS figure of 7.5% and the international recov-
ery rates that the Dutch bankruptcy system is inefficient. However, the Djankov, Hart, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2006) study shows that the Netherlands has a remarkably efficient 
bankruptcy system: it is ranked first of all liquidation-based bankruptcy systems they 
studied. Another explanation of the difference in recovery rates might be that smaller 
companies recover less (Bris et al. 2006) and that, while most of the empirical studies 
focus on bonds or bank loans, there is a bias in all samples towards relatively larger 
companies. Logically, the recovery rates will decline if all bankrupt entities are taken into 
consideration, as in table 1.1.
As for the costs of bankruptcy, Branch (2002: 42), distinguishes:
• real bankruptcy costs borne by the firm ex ante and ex post as there are:
 o  professional fees (lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, appraisers, auction-
eers, actuaries),
 o  internal staff resources.
• real bankruptcy costs borne directly by the firm’s interest holders:
 o  professional fees (for assessment of legal position, to follow court proceedings, to 
negotiate disputes),
 o  internal staff resources (the owner of an interest must take and therefore prepare 
for certain decisions, e.g. should a reorganization plan be voted for or against? 
Should the interest holder take a position in court?),
 o  reduced marketability (the now-distressed assets are less suitable for the original 
investor than they were when they were non-distressed instruments. Thus higher 
transaction costs are involved to sell it off including a discount on the original 
asset).
• losses for the distressed firm that may be offset by gains of other entities:
 o  market share loss (business goes from the distressed firm to another),
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 o  short run focus (applying very high discount rates in order to generate cash quick-
ly, causes many potentially profitable possibilities to fail. Deferred maintenance 
costs will become greater. Assets might sometimes be sold at bottom prices).
• real costs borne by other parties (which are beyond the scope of Branch’s review).
Branch’s (2002: 53-54) results show that total bankruptcy costs incurred by the firm 
are between 9.45-16.35% of the firm’s predistressed value13 (PDV) and claims holders’ 
costs between 3.25-4.15%. This means that on average the cost of dealing with distress 
consumes about 16% of PDV. From his literature survey he concludes that the average 
gross recovery rate for claims holders is about 60% . Thus, Branch (2002: 54) concludes:
1. the loss, which caused the bankruptcy, consumes about 28%;
2. the costs of dealing with distress consumes about 16%;
3. the net value available to distribute to the claims holder amounts to about 56%14.
It is clear that a decrease of the costs of bankruptcy would result in an equal increase in 
the recovery rate. Franks and Sussman (2005: 92) report an attempt of the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) to diminish the costs of bankruptcy by requiring receivers to tender for 
bankruptcy appointments. This resulted in a 14.5% costs share in 31 RBS cases, compared 
to 18.5% and 26.8% (both median) as reported by Franks and Sussman for two other 
banks. Bris et al. (2006) compared the costs of bankruptcy between the US Chapter 7 
(61 cases) and Chapter 11 (225 cases) proceedings15. They report (p. 1280) an average 
of 8.1% (Chapter 7; median 2.5%) to 16.9% (Chapter 11; median 1.9%) of pre-bankruptcy 
asset-value for direct, court-declared expenses, e.g. trustee, accountant, debtor attorney, 
and they conclude that these costs vary widely, anywhere between 2% and 20%. This is 
possibly in line with Couwenberg and de Jong (2008: 115) who report 16.0% (median: 
11.2%) direct costs, as a percentage of realized proceeds, for the Netherlands; but much 
lower than the average 44.0% reported in table 1.3 for all Dutch concluded bankruptcies 
of legal persons. This difference might be explained by the sample bias in other research 
for relatively large companies.
What can be learned from the international research on bankruptcy costs and recovery 
rates? An important conclusion is that the figures are hardly comparable, as they are:
• collected in different situations (default versus bankruptcy), and
• in different bankruptcy systems (see chapter 2),
• by way of different definitions (average - median; secured - unsecured; omitting or 
estimating recovery by mortgage and pledge holders), and
• relate to different bases (pre-bankruptcy assets, total liabilities, realized proceeds), 
and
• originate from different sampling methods (medium-sized, large, or even all con-
cluded bankruptcies).
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The previous section also looked into the macro-economic effects of bankruptcy in the 
Netherlands. There is no international literature available that relates the annual loss of 
bankruptcies to e.g. the GDP as has been done in the previous section for the Netherlands. 
Research on the reversed causality, i.e. the causal relationship between the development 
of certain macroeconomic factors, e.g. variations in aggregate income; price level; interest 
rate, and the incidence of corporate bankruptcy has been done by Levy and Bar-Niv 
(1987) and Liu (2004). However, this is not the subject of this thesis.
The previous analysis shows that bankruptcy has a large impact on the financial system 
and on the society as a whole. This makes bankruptcy a relevant topic for research. By 
decreasing the number of bankruptcies and the amounts concerned, direct losses for 
creditors will diminish while risk-premiums will decrease in due course, an advantage for 
every citizen. Can the number of bankruptcies be influenced? To answer this question, 
the causes of bankruptcy must be studied. This is the topic of the next section.
1.2.3 Causes of bankruptcy
In order to see if the costs of bankruptcy can be avoided, an analysis of the causes of 
bankruptcy would be helpful. Altman (1993: 17) described a survey of 1,300 turnaround 
managers, wherein 88% of the respondents considered the quality of management the 
primary difference between success and failure. Van Amsterdam (2004) came to a similar 
conclusion. Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) conclude as well that the management is at 
the origin of most problems. Table 1.5 presents a breakdown of the causes of concluded 
bankruptcies of Dutch legal persons. Table 1.5 reports in the right column that on average 
29% of bankruptcies relate to the economy, 10% to problems in the holding company and 
22% to other or unknown causes. Thus 61% of all bankruptcies, or less depending on the 
correct classification of the other or unknown category, have an external cause16. Of the 
remaining 39% due to internal causes, 32% had to do with mismanagement and 4% with 
Table 1.5: causes of concluded bankruptcies of legal persons in the Netherlands
cause of bankruptcy 2006 2008 average 2000-2008 
in %number percentage number percentage
economy-related 1,639  33 1,365  34  29
bankruptcy holding company   423   8   304   8  10
mismanagement 1,422  29 1,344  34  32
problems within the board   182   4    81   2   4
fraud   191   4   106   3   3
other causes   806  16   590  15  17
unknown   309   6   167   4   5
total 4,972 100 3,957 100 100
Source: CBS (2008, 2010)
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problems within the board. A small minority was fraud-related (3%)17. Thus, at least 36% 
of bankruptcies are directly management-related18. Would the nature and organization 
of a legal person matter as regards the chance of bankruptcy? The next section searches 
for an answer.
1.2.4 Bankruptcy incidence per legal person
Table 1.6 gives a breakdown of bankruptcies that occurred in 2006 per legal person in 
relation to the number of (active) legal persons as registered in the Handelsregister19.
Column 4 shows the number of bankruptcies per 1000 registrations for each type of legal 
person and column 6 shows the number of bankruptcies per 1000 active registrations. A 
registered company has been active according to the Chamber of Commerce if it displays 
economic activities24. From the results of both columns it is clear that the bankruptcy 
incidence for foreign limited forms is highest. This confirms the prejudice that foreign 
limited forms are often used (by Dutch nationals as well as others) to commit fraud and 
leave creditors with empty estates25. On the other hand, the incidence of bankruptcy for 
associations is persistently the lowest. Another clear observation can be made for non-
limited company forms: the one-man business (3.24) and other non-limited company 
forms (2.50) have a much lower incidence of bankruptcy than the limited form (5.72). 
Column 6 is even clearer on that than column 4. One could conclude that the certainty 
of personal liability of the entrepreneur for the one-man business and the non-limited 
company forms is a stronger disciplinary mechanism than the possibility of personal 
Table 1.6: breakdown of declared bankruptcies in 2006 in relation to the number of registrations in the 
Handelsregister, per type of legal person
legal person
number of 
declared 
bankruptcies in 
2006
total number 
registered in 
Handelsregister20
bankruptcies 
per 1000 
registered
(2)/(3)
total number 
active 
registered in 
Handelsregister
bankruptcies 
per 1000 active 
registered
(2)/(5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
institutions   124
 foundations21   103 164,278  0.63  17,660  5.83
 associations     3  96,955  0.03   5,720  0.52
 co-operatives    18   4,502  4.00   1,850  9.73
companies 4,104
 limited form (Dutch)22 3,645 636,900  5.72 262,742 13.87
 non-limited form23   392 157,047  2.50 140,567  2.79
 maatschap, Ltd, Inc    67   6,290 10.65   3,919 17.10
one-man business 1,713 527,982  3.24 427,138 4.01
natural persons 3,238
total bankruptcies 9,179
Source: CBS, Handelsregister, Santen and de Bos (2006), www.rechtspraak.nl
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liability for the limited forms. Other interesting findings are (1) the one-man business 
has a higher bankruptcy incidence than non-limited company forms of a partnership 
nature, suggesting that partners might correct each other and thus avoid failures; (2) 
co-operatives show a much lower bankruptcy incidence than limited companies, sug-
gesting that the double relationship in a co-operative is a factor in avoiding failures, and 
(3) foundations do have much lower bankruptcy incidence than companies, but much 
higher than associations. Chapter 8 will empirically analyse the differences between legal 
persons.
1.2.5 Concluding remarks on the macro-economic analysis
Whilst the calculated average Dutch recovery rate in bankruptcies of legal persons of 
17.4% might be an underestimation, international studies show recovery rates of around 
35% (Sweden), 40% (US bond-loans) and up to 70% and more for secured bank loans. 
The resulting macro-economic loss on non-paid debt only amounts to an annual 0.39% 
of Dutch GDP for 1992-2008, and even 0.57% for 2006-2008. To this should be added 
unemployment expenses, lay-offs in supplying companies and wealth effects on the 
negative and allocation gains on the positive side. Human factors, i.e. mismanagement 
(32%), problems with the board (4%) and fraud (3%) cause at least 39% of bankruptcies. It 
seems worthwhile to attempt to reduce this percentage.
1.3 MICRO-ECOnOMIC AnALYSIS OF BAnKRUPTCY
This section analyses bankruptcy on a case study basis. It uses factors derived from 
literature to evaluate the causes of bankruptcy of two relatively small cases. These cases 
have been chosen to show the impact of bankruptcy on individual creditors. Bankruptcies 
of large, exchange-listed firms like Fokker (1996) or KPNQwest (2003) are well known, 
but it is the author’s conviction that smaller ones do relatively more harm. Smaller com-
panies often have a strong regional basis. They co-operate with other small firms from 
the region, which work often on a relatively small scale. Bankruptcies do more damage 
to these small companies than to larger companies with relatively well-spread activities 
(across regions, customers, or industries).
1.3.1 Case studies in the literature
Argenti (1976) analysed a large number of bankruptcies and concluded that either man-
agement defects (e.g. autocratic leadership), system defects (e.g. ineffective administration) 
or change defects (e.g. poor response to change) lie at the origin of bankruptcy. Chapter 
5 builds on his theory. Couwenberg (1997) was the first to study financial distress in 
the Netherlands on a case study basis. Afterwards Van Amsterdam (2004) studied the 
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success factors of 80 informal reorganizations in the Netherlands. He concluded (p. 273) 
that of all factors the perceived quality of management is, in fact, the only significant 
factor for success. In a case study analysis of 20 successfully and 15 non-successfully 
informally reorganized companies, Adriaanse (2005: 49 and 59) identified as the most 
frequent causes of financial difficulties:
• inadequate management information systems (MIS): either the MIS is inadequate, or 
insufficient avction is taken;
• poor management: an unsatisfactory reaction to developments inside and outside the 
company; and
• excessive costs and investments.
One recognizes Argenti’s issues. Jensen (1993: 854) argues that the strategic redirec-
tion of exchange-listed firms suffers from insufficient or unsatisfactory reactions. In his 
view, internal control systems have two faults: they react too late, and they take too long 
to effect major change. More recently, Roland Berger (2006) detected (1) management’s 
commitment, (2) a comprehensive strategy and (3) quick implementation as the three 
crucial factors for successful restructuring. Their report shows that (at least for Germany 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: conceptual failure model of possible causes of bankruptcy 
 
Source: Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004), Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) and the author. 
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in 2006) companies respond rather slow to crises: it took in general 20 months to react 
after identifying a crisis, and the restructuring might take another year and a half. The 
time cushion (The Turnaround Finance Group, 2006: 16) is thus considerable.
Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) developed a conceptual model of causes of bankruptcy, 
which is reported in figure 1.1. The model essentially shows that each specific company 
is influenced by external and internal factors. A wrong mix of factors might result in 
failure. The external factors consist of the general and the immediate environments. The 
general environment is the political, economic and social structure of a country and its 
global position. A change in the general environment is the excuse most often used by 
management in the case of bankruptcy (Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008: 237). The immedi-
ate environment stands for the direct outside parties a company encounters: customers, 
suppliers, competitors, investors and banks. The loss of large customers may result in 
bankruptcy, as may the loss of a supplier, the arrival of new competitors or the lack of 
investors or credit. The processing of contaminated raw material or the importing of toys 
containing lead paint could be equally disastrous.
However, the general and the immediate environments of a distressed company normally 
play a subordinate role in the failure process. If apathetic management does not anticipate 
or respond to these changes, or if it cannot because it lacks the financial means to adjust, 
bankruptcy may be the result. Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004: 380) consider the internal 
factors, the quality of management and the corporate policy, of much more importance. 
Under quality of management they comprise such factors as:
• inadequate competences or experience; quite often the founding management is 
experienced in one specific area and lacks experience in overall management,
• personal characteristics such as being autocratic, often even charismatic, risk prone 
and blinded by success, labelled by Skeel (2005) as Icarean behaviour,
• an absence of systematic planning; decision-making is often intuitive, and
• an inability to recognize and react promptly. It takes time before management is 
prepared to recognize changing figures as a trend and not as an incident. Thereafter, 
a reaction should be formulated and implemented.
The other internal factor, corporate policy, has to do with all the processes within the 
firm, either relating to strategy or commercial policy, or operational, personnel, financial 
and administrative issues including fraud, and relating to the corporate governance of 
the company. The variety of potential distress causes under this heading runs from ill-
advised takeovers and insufficient integration efforts, via defective products or product 
placement and inefficient production, to unhealthy financial ratios, creative accounting, 
outright swindle and inadequate supervision of management.
In the following section this model is applied to two anonymous case studies from the 
author’s own administrator’s practice to illustrate its usefulness.
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1.3.2 Hector
Hector, a one-man business, provided national and international transport services. It 
employed some 30 drivers and rented 25 trucks. The owner started the firm in 1994 
which grew fast until it went bankrupt by the end of 1997. Most of the employees and 
suppliers knew the owner from earlier jobs and believed in his skills as an entrepreneur. 
As there were no assets, the bank refused to finance the firm. It could only continue its 
services by collecting its receivables properly and on time. By the end of 1996 the firm 
was hit by two bankruptcies of major customers. These customers had paid their first 
orders well, the number of orders grew exponentially, payment gradually slowed down 
and bankruptcy was filed for these customers shortly afterwards. Over €250,000 had to 
be written down, and shortage of money and work hampered the continuance of the firm. 
Hector ‘solved’ the matter by borrowing criminal money, by illegally selling some rented 
trailers and by finding one new big client, who had lots of work, at rock bottom prices, but 
paid in cash. Fire was set in the office (April 1997), presumably by the criminal lenders, 
and the bookkeeping and administration were gone. Setting up a new administration had 
no priority due to the shortage of money. It was all cash, debt and promises that kept 
the firm in the air until the end of 1997. More fraud was committed right up to the end. 
Freight was stolen and strong suspicions of insurance-fraud were uttered. Other rented 
trailers were sold illegally. Just days before the bankruptcy date orders were placed and 
delivered for office equipment, an alarm installation and new tyres, seriously damaging 
some small suppliers. The only two trucks of Hector were sold around the bankruptcy 
date and the proceeds were not accounted for.
The administrator had to close down the shop. He provided information relating to fraud. 
After six years this resulted in two prison sentences for the owner of Hector, as well as 
some of his clients and relations. The court however released a seized Luxemburg-based 
bank account in the big client’s name which, in the administrator’s opinion, should have 
belonged to the estate of Hector. There was nothing left for the two preferred creditors 
(for over €300,000) and 90 unsecured creditors (for over €350,000). The recovery rate 
of pre-bankruptcy debt was zero. Even the estate-related bankruptcy costs could not 
be paid in full (recovery rate of 72%). The owner of Hector did not own any assets, other 
than his house which was sold by the bank. Towards the end of 1997 he was being used 
and instructed by others. Even during bankruptcy he tried a dubious restart twice. His 
bankruptcy lasted eight years, three of which he spent in prison.
Evaluation
Three out of four of the causes of the model have been prevalent in this bankruptcy:
1. general environment: the general environment did not play a role in this case.
2. immediate factors: after losing two customers, the owner of Hector had an urgent 
problem to solve. He could have downsized the company, but instead he started 
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looking for new customers. He obviously had not learned much from this writing-off 
experience, as for the second time he chose a rotten apple as a new client.
3. corporate policy: from the beginning, Hector’s flaw was its financial policy, as it had 
no long-term investors or borrowers. This made it extremely fragile. Once it decided 
not to downsize but instead to seek criminal money and later on to commit fraud, 
all efforts at proper administrative behaviour were gone. Due to the absence of any 
corporate governance or monitoring efforts from outside the company, these actions 
were not stopped. Not the truck rental firm, which was caught in a prisoner’s dilemma 
to accept a considerable loss or to proceed for better or worse, nor the tax authorities 
nor the partially unpaid drivers took timely action. It was the defrauded trailer rental 
company that finally filed for bankruptcy.
4. management quality: the owner of Hector was an experienced planner in a trucking 
department and he brought a portfolio of customers. He did not have any manage-
ment experience. There was no business plan. He could not cope with bad news or the 
possibility of downsizing. He wanted to keep his powerful position and was prepared 
to go beyond boundaries. His charisma led creditors and employees to give him the 
benefit of the doubt for a long time. It was personal pride, not a struggle for private 
wealth, which led him to his fraudulent behaviour.
1.3.3 Pass BV
Pass BV produced entrance, loyalty and chip cards with originally some 60 employees in 
four divisions: retail, transport, telecom and banking. Retail loyalty cards and free travel 
permits for public transport were the core business. Due to the booming telecom business 
in the years up to 2000, Pass BV thought to have found new profitable activities. Against 
high turnover in this sector stood high costs (in personnel and kind) and low margins. 
When turnover in this sector fell in 2001 with around 70% Pass, convinced of better 
times to come, did not lay off its employees and downsize its costs. The earlier profits of 
the telecom business were invested in new production machinery for bankcards, which 
activity never generated any money. New investors were sought, in vain. Declaration of 
bankruptcy was inevitable. Interested parties subsequently withdrew. Five weeks after 
the declaration of bankruptcy a venture capitalist was found. The administrator was able 
to sell the retail and transport division, while closing down the telecom activities.
It turned out that the annual accounts had not been published in the Handelsregister26. 
Moreover, some months before bankruptcy the director had bought the debt of a former 
partner, thus equalizing his own private debt position to the company27. The director 
was held liable for non-disclosure and the equalizing transaction. This estate claim was 
settled by the administrator. There were two secured creditors (for over €500,000) and 
120 unsecured creditors for over €2,500,000. The bank apparently overestimated its 
secured position (due to overstated receivables) and was one of the unsecured creditors 
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for €470,000. The recovery rate of pre-bankruptcy preferred debt was 5% (unsecured 
debt: 0%). The estate-related bankruptcy costs were paid in full.
Evaluation
While trade and character of both cases differ, the prevalent aspects have a striking 
similarity:
1. general environment: the management did not recognize that the downfall in mobile 
telephone activities after 2000 had a permanent character and therefore did not adapt 
its corporate policy in a timely manner.
2. immediate environment: when the mobile phone business started to collapse, the 
management immediately went in search of new customers and new products but 
it did not have the expertise in place to develop the new banking cards division, nor 
could the company cope with the competition of other companies in the same area, 
looking for new opportunities.
3. corporate policy: the company had formulated certain policies but it could not realize 
them. The focus on the banking business was misguided, as it was a too specific 
product. The operational work of the other divisions was not very efficiently planned. 
It involved a lot of human effort, often on short notice and thus expensive. Although 
the financial position of the company was very weak, the bank did not monitor very 
actively. Corporate governance was hardly present, the executive director (ED)28 was 
the only shareholder. The management team was weak, the auditor did not play a 
true monitoring role nor did the tax authorities, who knew the ED from a previous 
bankruptcy.
4. management quality: the ED was a charismatic man and could therefore bind his 
employees, his suppliers and his customers to the company, also in difficult times. 
This made it hard to challenge him. Even the bank could not get through. The ED 
was overly optimistic and could not cope with bad news. Even though no accounts 
were published, an AMX-listed company was convinced into doing business with Pass 
BV – and was never paid – for approximately €1 million on the basis of unpublished, 
manipulated figures. The anger of creditors after filing for bankruptcy can be seen as 
proof of the confidence in the management: they did not expect it at all.
1.3.4 Concluding remarks on the micro-economic analysis
The Ooghe and Waeyaert model as well as the previous analysis of two randomly chosen 
bankruptcy cases make clear that management plays a key role in situations of near 
financial distress. First, it should at least acknowledge that circumstances are changing, 
second it should actively decide whether it should or should not take any action and 
third, if it has been decided that action should be taken, it should decide on the nature 
of the action. Or in other words, management can make three categories of mistakes: it 
could overlook relevant changes in the environment, it could decide not to act where it 
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should, and it could make the wrong decisions on the action to be taken. If the quality of 
the management concerned is considered as a given, the question is: what circumstances 
would have to be created to diminish the incidence of management mistakes and thus 
the number of financially distressed companies? The law provides for some answers as 
1.4 shows.
1.4 LEGAL IMPACT OF BAnKRUPTCY
The law usually provides for two sets of rules related to financial distress: those rules 
that after the filing for bankruptcy arrange either for the division of assets after liq-
uidation or for a formal reorganization; and those that restrict or encourage specific 
behaviour of directors before bankruptcy. Chapter 2 discusses the after filing rules in 
functional terms. It describes the existing types of bankruptcy systems and compares the 
outcome between a formal reorganization or a liquidation process and an informal reor-
ganization. These are the main solutions when financial distress is imminent. However, 
the before bankruptcy rules encourage directors to stay away from bankruptcy through 
behaviour-influencing measures. Especially when financial distress or bankruptcy is im-
minent, incorrect director’s behaviour may result in personal liability, annihilation of 
contracts, directors’ disqualification or a criminal offence. Chapter 5, which focuses on 
the situation of imminent financial distress, describes these measures. These measures 
are predominantly of a ‘discouraging’ nature. Shortcomings of this approach are: (1) 
instead of offering directors a mechanism to improve management quality, all they do 
is discourage undesirable management behaviour; (2) a large grey area between a good 
and a reproachable management decision remains; and (3) the threat of liability may not 
act as a meaningful deterrent for owner-managers, who often have few personal assets 
beyond their stake in the firm (Armour et al. 2009: 135).
Could there be a mechanism that goes beyond the shortcomings mentioned? Would it 
be possible to achieve better decision quality? Just as the number of traffic casualties 
dropped after the 1970’s through a number of different legal measures, the number of 
bankruptcies may decrease by a mix of measures as well. Reflection on these issues leads 
to the research question of this thesis.
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIOn: WHAT?
The analyses of the previous sections deliver four important conclusions. One: the macro 
economic analysis shows that the impact of bankruptcy on society is big. Unpaid debt 
after bankruptcy of legal persons in the Netherlands is as high as 0.39% of the GDP 
each year and growing. Two: human factors, i.e. mismanagement, problems within the 
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board and fraud account for at least 39% of all bankruptcies. Three: the micro analysis 
indicated that management, by acknowledging changes, by deciding to react and if so, 
how, has a pivotal role. Four: thus far the law relies on ‘discouraging’ provisions to avoid 
bankruptcies.
The research question of this thesis derives from these conclusions. Given the impact of 
bankruptcies on society, and management’s pivotal role on the one hand as the cause and 
on the other hand in taking action, one wonders how a management’s performance can 
be improved in order to avoid financial distress. The legal answer formulated in the past 
decades is to hold directors personally liable to the company in general and to creditors 
specifically in situations of near financial distress where serious blame can be attributed 
to the directors (chapter 5 of this thesis). With Armour et al. (2009:135) one may presume 
that the legal approach normally works as a deterrent. It urges directors to stay away 
from the ‘serious-reproach-area’. However, the legal approach does not necessarily act 
as an ‘encouraging’ stimulus to improve the decision quality above the minimum level 
required by the law. Despite the existing legal measures, 32% of corporate bankruptcies 
are still due to mismanagement. Should this percentage be accepted or could science 
possibly provide instruments to decrease it?
This is where the economic concept of monitoring comes into play (Alchian and Demsetz, 
1972). Consultations on short notice with people connected to the company, if available, 
could prove of valuable assistance – sometimes management is in a dead lane, misses 
know-how or a network, overlooks alternatives which other people involved could offer, 
or simply needs an occasion to reflect. In short: management may need a monitor29, 
meaning someone who observes or comments on a process or activity30 and who gives 
advice or warning as to conduct31. Would monitoring, which is the activity monitors do, 
indeed improve management’s performance in terms of financial distress? This is the 
subject of this thesis. The research question therefore reads:
What is the role of monitoring near financial distress from an economic and legal 
perspective?
More specifically, the following questions are the subject of this thesis:
 •  What does financial distress mean and what are the options of a financially dis-
tressed company?
 •  What is the role of monitoring from an economic perspective?
 •  How does the law organize monitoring?
 •  Are there any specific requirements for monitoring near financial distress?
 •  Is there any empirical evidence on the relationship between monitoring and the 
incidence of financial distress?
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This study focuses on monitoring in five categories of legal persons: public and private 
limited companies, co-operatives, associations and foundations, since all of these play 
a vital role in the private sector in society32. Religious societies, public legal entities and 
legal persons of a somewhat hybrid nature such as universities, which in the Netherlands 
are legal persons sui generis by law, are thus excluded. The legal study surveys the Dutch, 
German and UK corporate system. The empirical research is executed using Dutch data.
1.6 METHODOLOGY: HOW?
In order to find an answer to the above questions, three research methods are applied: 
literature search, comparison of law systems and empirical studies.
Literature search
For all the subjects discussed in this thesis, an international literature search has been 
conducted into the state-of-the-art on the matter. The search is generally limited to 
databases and journals available through the library of the Erasmus University Rotterdam 
(EUR). Two precautions should be made. The first is that the search machines predomi-
nantly focus on studies written in English. While some studies in Dutch and German have 
been consulted, the searches in these languages have been restricted. The second is that 
literature on corporate governance and related issues is quite extensive and grows by the 
month. If ever an inquiry could be exhaustive, it would certainly not be in this field. The 
focus has been on the developments in science, rather than on a complete overview of all 
the literature concerned.
Comparison of law
Where this thesis analyses monitoring near financial distress, it aims to do so on a 
systemic level and therefore uses a comparison between the UK, Germany and the Neth-
erlands. Why these countries? The UK is chosen for its long-time shareholder orientation. 
Originally it was heavily oriented towards the US corporate system. Germany: as it takes 
rather the opposite position where it puts the stakeholder and specifically the employee 
in the centre. The Netherlands: because in quite a few aspects it is in between the Ger-
man and the UK corporate system. Chapter 4 elaborates on the differences between the 
corporate systems. The analysis is on a stratigic level, as it is considered less interesting 
how exactly each corporate law system works, than to compare the political choices made 
with a focus on monitoring strategies.
Empirical studies
The second part of this thesis consists of three empirical studies on monitoring. Based 
on two major economic theories, the agency theory and the resource dependence theory, 
hypotheses are formulated and tested. Chapters 6 and 7 test these theories on Dutch 
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listed companies. The database has been built from electronically available and manually 
collected data from annual reports. Chapter 8 tests the theories on small Dutch compa-
nies, using data downloaded from the Handelsregister system.
1.7 ARRAnGEMEnT OF CHAPTERS
Figure 1.2 shows the design of this thesis. Part one is of an analytical nature. This analysis 
mainly has an inductive character. Chapter 2 describes financial distress in terms of 
the concept and the legal and economic approach to a solution. Since CBS data for the 
Netherlands shows that 32% of bankruptcies originate from mismanagement which may 
occur, as Argenti (1986A) argued, at a rather early stage, chapter 3 studies whether the 
economic concept of monitoring could be a tool to improve management decisions in 
general. Chapter 4 studies the organisation of monitoring in the law over three different 
legal systems. The findings of the literature search and the comparative analysis from 
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chapters 2, 3 and 4 are integrated in chapter 5 which is on monitoring in situations of 
near financial distress. This results in a model on the role of monitoring when financial 
distress nears.
Part two of this thesis is of an empirical nature. It tests the hypotheses derived from the 
economic and legal analysis of part one against two databases, one consisting of data on 
Dutch listed companies and another on small Dutch private companies and other legal 
persons.
Chapter 6 studies the relevance of the agency theory to near financial distress. Chapter 
7 examines the relationship between individual board member characteristics, board 
diversity and financial distress, based on the resource dependence theory. Chapter 8 uses 
a database of 378 small Dutch legal persons to test hypotheses related to director’s 
characteristics and board structure, and financial distress.
Part three (chapter 9) formulates recommendations and concludes.
1.8 SIGnIFICAnCE OF THIS THESIS
Much research has been done on the relationship between corporate governance and 
the financial performance of companies e.g. Daily (1995), Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and 
Johnson (1998), Klein (1998), Vafeas (1999), Postma, Ees and Sterken (2000), Bhagat and 
Black (2002), O’Connell and Cramer (2010). Whether a firm performs well or not, however, 
is essentially a shareholders’ concern. Their profits depend on the development of the 
share price, presumably linked to performance, and share dividend. Other stakeholders 
might feel side effects when a company is performing less, for example lay-offs and re-
structuring for employees, less tax income for the government, fewer goodwill activities 
for employees and society or fewer investment opportunities due to the lack of growth. 
But essentially the company will keep on meeting its contractual obligations.
This changes dramatically when a company enters bankruptcy. At that moment, the com-
pany stops meeting its contractual obligations. Employees, creditors and taxes are not 
paid, deliveries are not made or services not rendered. This is a much more severe event 
than a company not performing as expected, or as its peer group. The latter is a relative 
problem, the first is, certainly in creditor-oriented33 bankruptcy systems, of a much more 
absolute nature. The company often dissolves; the shares become worthless. Few studies, 
e.g. Daily and Dalton (1994A), Elloumi and Gueyie (2001), Lee and Yeh (2004) and Donker, 
Santen and Zahir (2009), have been conducted on the relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics, e.g. board composition and ownership and financial distress. 
This thesis contributes to current literature in describing, analysing and testing the role 
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of monitoring near financial distress. Since mismanagement causes 32% of bankrupt-
cies, board problems 4% and fraud 3%, this thesis wonders if these percentages could 
decrease by applying monitoring mechanisms to the company. Monitoring is certainly 
not a panacea, nor will it be able to avoid all internal, mainly management-related errors. 
Monitoring might however be a factor in reducing the 39% internal causes of bankruptcy. 
Even a reduction of management errors resulting in 0.01% point less debt loss due to 
bankruptcy in GDP terms, e.g. from an average of 0.39% to 0.38%, would result in an 
efficiency gain of approximately €60 million annually (table 1.3 columns 6 and 2). The 
resulting insights and recommendations of this thesis may prove useful to directors, 
banks and other creditors, insolvency advisors, administrators and judges.
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EnDnOTES
1 This thesis applies ‘administrator’ as the generic term for administrators, liquidators, admin-
istrative receivers in the UK, Insolvenzverwalters in Germany, and curatoren and bewindvo-
erders in the Netherlands, unless otherwise noted.
2 see also 4.2.3. As chapter 4 shows, the UK Companies Act 2006 covers a broad range of or-
ganizations with legal personality; as does Titel 1 Boek 2 of the Dutch Burgerlijk Wetboek. 
Dutch law distinguishes between ‘the legal person’ and ‘the enterprise’ (s 2:140/250(2) BW in 
fine; Van Schilfgaarde/Winter, 2009: 20). Since UK law does not recognize such a distinction, 
this thesis regards ‘the legal person’ and ‘the company with legal personality’ as one and the 
same.
3 The median is the numeric value separating the higher half of a sample from the lower half 
(in common language: the middle observation). If the number of observations is even, the 
median is usually calculated as the average of both ‘middle’ observations.
4 CBS discerns data on bankruptcies of people, sole proprietorships and ‘institutions, corporations 
and similar’ (‘vennootschappen e.d.’). Annex 1 shows the data for all concluded bankruptcies. 
Since this thesis focuses on legal persons, the figures in the text relate to bankruptcies of 
legal persons only. Although the category ‘institutions, corporations and similar’ (‘vennoot-
schappen e.d.’) contains non-legal-person-partnerships as well (‘vennootschap onder firma’ 
or ‘CV’), this concerns less than 10% of the cases (table 8.1). Therefore, this thesis considers 
those data as relating to legal persons only. See: CBS, 2010:8, Faillissementen: oorzaken en 
schulden in 2008, (Den Haag/Heerlen).
5 All figures in these and following tables are available online from CBS StatLine. The author is 
responsible for the presentation of the figures.
6 s 57 and 58 Faillissementswet (Fw). Column 4 therefore only states part of the total recovery by 
secured creditors (Boot and Ligterink, 2000: 27).
7 The ‘s’ in s 182 Fw stands for ‘section’ or ‘artikel’ (Dutch) or ‘§’(German). See also 4.3.7. Ab-
breviations of laws e.g. Fw for ‘Faillissementswet’ (Dutch) and their translations are found in 
the List of Abbreviations early in this thesis.
8 See Financieel Jaarverslag 2009 – Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam: 63, 70 available on www.
eur.nl.
9 Van Amsterdam (2004: 42) mentions that overestimation due to majoration by creditors and 
tax authorities happens as well. It is the opinion of the author of this thesis that a proper 
administrator should sort this out as much as possible.
10 s 64 b Werkloosheidswet (WW; Unemployment Insurance Act)
11 Couwenberg (2001: 267) argues that the recovery rates of liquidation-based systems (where 
all bankrupt companies are treated equally: they are either sold or liquidated) seem to be 
somewhat lower than those attained in reorganization-based systems (like in the US Chapter 
11, wherein the company is reorganized). See also chapter 2 of this thesis.
12 A sample bias means that in a sample of a group all factors or participants are not equally 
balanced or objectively represented (Mosby’s Medical Dictionary, 8th edition, 2009, Elsevier, 
from http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com).
13 Predistressed value (PDV) means the market value of the firm before the financial distress was 
made public.
14 It should be noted that those conclusions are reached in opposite order. The 56% is the result 
of the calculation: 60% (average recovery rate) - 4% (average claims holders’ costs). Those 56% 
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added to the average 16% total cost of dealing with distress, comes to 72% and leaves 28% 
unexplained, being the loss.
15 Chapter 2 hereafter describes the difference between both procedures.
16 See for all figures over 2000-2008 Staat 3 p.5 and for the definitions of the causes CBS, 
2010:15.
17 Note the difference between the causes of bankruptcy (Staat 3, CBS, 2010) with a minor share 
of fraud of 3% and the incidence of fraud which is the case in 22% of bankruptcies of BVs in 
2008 (calculated from Staat 10, CBS, 2010).
18 Van Amsterdam (2004: 80) concludes, that even 70% of the bankruptcies are caused by 
mismanagement. A good entrepreneur, he argues, recognizes macro-economic and other 
problems and adapts company policy in time. See also section 1.3.1. of this thesis.
19 The Handelsregister (translated: Commercial Register) is held by the Chamber of Commerce 
(s 3(1) Handelsregisterwet (Hrgw). All legal persons and all firms should be registered (s 5-7 
Hrgw).
20 On 22 March 2007. Main office only.
21 The breakdown of the number of bankruptcies for foundations, associations and cooperatives 
comes from chapter 8, table 8.2. The number of associations includes the category ‘undis-
closed’.
22 Naamloze vennootschap (NV) and Besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid 
(BV).
23 Vennootschap onder firma (VOF) and commanditaire vennootschap (CV).
24 As opposed to companies that display only financial activities (like pension BVs, financial 
holding companies, Stichtingen ‘Administratiekantoor’).
25 Calculations based on Staat 10 (CBS, 2010) show a fraud incidence for 2004-2008 of 8% for 
a partnership, of 10% for a one-man business, of 22% for BVs and of 22% for ‘other’. This 
‘other’ category includes institutions with presumably a relatively low fraud rate, and foreign 
legal persons, with presumably a high fraud rate. See for fraud with foreign legal persons: 
Bunt, H.G. van de, T.J. Van Koningsveld, and M.J. Kroeze et al., 2008, Overheidstoezicht op 
buitenlandse rechtspersonen.
26 Disclosure is mandatory under s 2:394 BW. As a consequence of non-disclosure the director 
might become personally liable (s 2:248 BW).
27 As forbidden by law under s 53 and 54 Fw.
28 See 3.2.1. for a definition.
29 The Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 782 definition of ‘monitor’ and ‘monitoring’ is much broader 
and does not apply here. See also: section 3.5.
30 Oxford English Dictionary, monitor (noun) under 11.a.
31 Oxford English Dictionary, monitor (noun) under 9.
32 See also section 4.2.3 of this thesis.
33 Chapter 2 elaborates on bankruptcy systems.
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The options for the company near financial distress
Bankruptcy is essentially a state-
supervised system for breaking (or 
more politely rewriting) contracts 
that are mutually inconsistent and 
therefore, unenforceable. (Jensen, 
1993: 849).
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2.1 InTRODUCTIOn
This chapter aims at describing and evaluating the options for the company near fi-
nancial distress. Financial distress is the starting point of this thesis. How should it be 
defined? Is this definition operational? Can it be measured? This is the subject of section 
2.2. The next question is how financial distress should be handled. What options does 
the company have once it realizes that it is in financial distress? It becomes apparent in 
section 2.3 that there are quite a few. The most radical solution is bankruptcy. Section 2.4 
defines the aims of a bankruptcy system and discusses different approaches in various 
bankruptcy systems. One of the less radical solutions to financial distress is an informal 
reorganization (‘work-out’), which is the subject of section 2.5. This is a privately negoti-
ated form of re-contracting which has been developed over the years especially in the UK. 
Research indicates that the work-out solution is widely applied. Section 2.6 compares 
the formal and informal reorganization routes. A clear picture of the advantages and 
disadvantages of the various possibilities facilitates the choice for the right route under 
the circumstances. Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 FInAnCIAL DISTRESS
The meaning of ‘financial distress’ is the topic of this section. After the evaluation of 
the early definition of Gordon derived from finance theory, some definitions used in 
empirical work will be reviewed. Finally, this thesis’ definition will be chosen.
2.2.1 Gordon’s definition of financial distress
Gordon (1971: 348) was the first to establish a theory on financial distress. His starting 
point is the theory of finance. In his view a firm is financially distressed when a fall in its 
earning power creates a non-trivial probability that it will not be able to pay the interest 
and principal on its debt. In that situation, Gordon proceeds, its bonds will sell at yields 
materially above the interest rates at which financial institutions are willing to extend 
credit to otherwise similar corporations. In a lively open bond-market as in the USA 
this may be a relevant definition. However, in Europe this market is relatively small as 
long-term loans are mainly provided by banks and other financial institutions. The ‘fall 
in earning power’ part of the definition is deemed irrelevant: any cause is good enough. 
The same goes for ‘interest and principal’: any non-payment causes trouble. However, 
the ‘non-trivial probability’ part of the definition is important, as it shows that financial 
distress covers a great number of situations and cannot be grasped in one event. The 
definition Wruck (1990: 421) gave of financial distress as a situation where cash flow is 
insufficient to cover current obligations, is therefore felt to be too restricted. If the firm 
knows it cannot meet its next-year’s obligations, it might feel financially distressed as 
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well. It is this variety of situations that inhibits a once and for all definition of financial 
distress.
2.2.2 Definitions of financial distress in applied research on listed companies
Applied research in this field should start with an operational definition of financial 
distress. One finds two approaches: a multistage approach with three or more stages of 
financial distress, and a dichotomous approach. An example of the multistage approach is 
found in Lau (1987: 127) who developed a five-states financial distress prediction model:
State 0 financial stability
State 1 omitting or reducing dividend payments
State 2 technical default and default on loan payments
State 3 protection under Chapter X or XI of the Bankruptcy Act
State 4 bankruptcy and liquidation.
While acknowledging that a financially stable firm might reduce or omit dividends for 
sound reasons, her decision to define state 1 is based on empirical studies, which have 
shown that a firm that is reducing dividends is typically encountering some financial 
distress. In their study, Johnsen and Melicher (1994: 273) choose a three-state model, 
wherein an explicit category of “financially weak” firms is used. Hill, Perry and Andes 
(1996) work with three categories - stable, financially distressed and bankrupt - as well. 
They define financially distressed firms as firms having cumulative negative earnings 
over a three-year period. This three-year requirement secures that the firms are indeed 
distressed and not just experiencing some fluke in earnings (p. 69).
The dichotomous approach discerns between non-distressed (control) and distressed or 
bankrupt companies. In Altman’s original study the bankrupt group consists of manu-
facturers that filed a bankruptcy petition under Chapter X of the US Chandler Act of 
1938 (Altman 1993: 30, 184). Likewise Aziz and Lawson (1989: 56), in their article on 
financial distress models, only refer to firms that entered bankruptcy. Gilson (1989: 243) 
defines financial distress as an inability to meet the fixed payment obligations on debt. 
More specifically he considers a firm financially distressed if it is either in default on 
its debt, bankrupt, or attempting to restructure its debt to avoid bankruptcy (p. 246). 
In their study on dividend policy and financial distress, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990: 
1416) focused on firms that experienced protracted financial trouble, as evidenced by at 
least three annual losses during 1980-1985. Opler and Titman (1994: 1019) reason along 
similar lines, when they define financially distressed firms as: highly leveraged firms. 
In more recent work however, the trend seems to be a retreat on bankruptcy. Charitou, 
Lambertides and Trigeorgis (2005: 9) investigate the monitoring role of institutional 
investors in highly distressed US firms. For them, financial distress is defined by having 
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filed a US Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Nunez, Casado, Pacheco and Gomez (2005: 
8) studied the problem of variable selection for financial distress. They equal financially 
distressed firms with failed firms, i.e. firms under temporary receivership or declared 
bankrupt.
Thus, research on financial distress in listed companies has covered various phases of 
financial distress.
2.2.3 Definitions of financial distress in applied research on non-listed companies
Listed companies have to disclose their financial difficulties, non-listed companies do 
not. In their research on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), Franks and Suss-
man (2005: 74) define a non-listed company to be in distress once the local bank branch 
and the regional credit officer decide to transfer the account to the bank’s Business Sup-
port Unit (BSU). While the test is objective, the decision itself is probably not, and the data 
is only available if the customer files of the bank are made available for research, as in 
Van Amsterdam (2004), Adriaanse (2005) or Davydenko and Franks (2008). This will not 
often be the case.
Another approach to studying financial distress in SMEs is to focus on bankrupt com-
panies only. This is undoubtedly an objective and formal criterion. Whilst it is true 
that not all financially distressed companies will end bankrupt, it is also true that all 
bankrupt companies will have been financially distressed for some time. A study on 
publicly available financial and governance data of non-listed bankrupt companies over 
the period before bankruptcy, if available, might reveal information on the background 
of the financial distress. The use of another possible distress test, i.e. the one of three-
years-consecutive-losses, would depend very much on the availability, reliability and 
to a certain extent subjectivity of financial data. For SME distress research therefore, 
bankruptcy is considered the best financial distress definition.
2.2.4 Concluding remarks on the concept of financial distress
Financial distress is a much broader concept than bankruptcy only. Therefore every study 
needs a clear definition of the subject. Moreover, an empirical study has to avoid subjec-
tive elements in the definition. Financial distress in part one of this thesis means the 
existence of a non-trivial probability that the legal person will not be able to pay its debt 
within the terms of payment. It is the Gordon definition without reference to the cause of 
the situation, which is deemed irrelevant, and with the extension to all debt. The empiri-
cal part two of the thesis defines the concept of financial distress in measurable terms.
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2.3 THE UnROLLInG OF FInAnCIAL DISTRESS
Now, imagine a virtual company C, which is in financial distress according to the defini-
tion of 2.2.4. What are the possible outcomes for C? This section starts with an academic 
catalogue of possible outcomes. It presents a strategic model on the probable unrolling of 
financial distress, given the circumstances. The role of monitoring near financial distress 
is the subject of chapter 5.
2.3.1 Possible outcomes of financial distress
How threatening is it to become financially distressed? It would be wrong to consider fi-
nancial distress as the first step of an unavoidable process, leading to formal bankruptcy. 
Instead, it should be seen as a challenge to turn the company around. One can think of 
five scenarios for unrolling financial distress (Berkovitch and Israel, 1998)1:
1. The company continues and hopes for a favourable change of circumstances,
2. The company merges with another, or is sold,
3. The company is voluntarily reorganized,
4. The company is voluntarily liquidated,
5. The company (or a creditor) files for bankruptcy and is liquidated or involuntarily 
reorganized.
In the first scenario financial distress extinguishes by ‘a change in the firm’s fortunes’ 
(Gordon, 1971: 355). An upswing of the economy, favourable fiscal government mea-
sures, lifting import barriers for Chinese textiles or the permit system for cheaper East-
European labour: these kind of events may signify the difference between life and death 
for some companies. There is a famous story of a Dutchman, who had invested all his 
money in dead stock of chemicals. When driving to the Court to declare bankruptcy, he 
heard the announcement of the 1973 oil embargo against the Netherlands. He realized 
that this embargo would make the dead stock valuable, returned home, and became a 
wealthy trader of chemicals2.
The second scenario is where an investor becomes interested in merging with the 
company or in buying it. This investor might be a competitor who knows of adverse 
circumstances before the financial market does and makes a bid. Or it may be a private 
equity investor, who waits long enough to be able to buy the company for next to nothing. 
It may be that interested parties knock on the door, or that directors or investment banks 
have to invite third parties. But in the end, the original investors have less money left than 
the company’s worth before the financial distress occurred, while the new investors think 
they have invested in a great opportunity.
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An approach to the third scenario, voluntary reorganization, also known as informal 
reorganization or private work-out, will be discussed in 2.5. It is about reorganization in 
the broad sense: on an operational, managerial, as well as financial level.
The fourth scenario is voluntary liquidation. In the good old days the shop, the factory, 
or the office earned enough for its proprietors, but slowly, or all of a sudden, this is over. 
People shop on the internet, where they buy directly from e.g. Germany instead of from 
the shop around the corner. A new shopping centre, a new production technique, these 
can all be causes of running out of business sooner or later. A responsible entrepreneur 
or manager will decide to liquidate in good time. With a timely decision one buys time for 
an orderly process. And an orderly process guarantees the best proceeds.
Bankruptcy is the fifth scenario and points to liquidation or reorganization within an 
insolvency law framework. Liquidation means that the administrator sells the assets, 
either piecemeal or going concern. In the end the company is dissolved. Reorganization in 
this scenario is called formal reorganization, as it takes place within insolvency law. The 
company will be restructured in strategic, operational, financial and often property terms 
with the intention to survive as a going concern. The going concern option is indicated 
when the going concern value is higher than that of the individual assets (Brouwer, 2006: 
10). Especially if investments are sunk, e.g. railroads or cable companies, or if human 
capital is a very valuable asset, a going concern sale or formal reorganization is the better 
solution. This fifth scenario will be discussed at some length in 2.4.
In scenario one the company turns around by itself, and in the scenarios two and four the 
firm ceases to exist as an independent legal person. The focus in this chapter is on efforts 
to save the legal person or its business activities independently, through the scenarios 
three, voluntary or informal reorganization, or five, liquidation or involuntary, formal 
reorganization.
2.3.2 Towards a model to strategically handle financial distress
Imagine that our virtual company C acknowledges it is in financial distress. It might 
already have lost valuable time in finding out, but now it knows. What should it strategi-
cally do? The model presented below indicates at what level a company should focus 
its reaction to financial distress. The approach developed below relies heavily on the 
conceptual failure model of possible causes of bankruptcy of Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) 
and Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008). As already explained in 1.3.1 above, they distinguish 
four main causal factors, i.e. management and corporate policy as internal factors, and 
the immediate environment and the general environment of the company as external fac-
tors. The fifth relevant, though not causal, factor is the company itself: its size, industry, 
age and flexibility determine its reaction and its possibilities.
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In this section the argument will be developed that in order to survive, the cause of fi-
nancial distress should be cured. The company just has to react properly, either by chal-
lenging the cause itself directly or, if that is not possible or not desired, by adapting other 
circumstances it can influence. The model in figure 2.1 therefore presents the very same 
four factors of the causal model of Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004), now as the determining 
factors for the outcome of financial distress. What matters in financial distress is to de-
termine the real cause as fast as possible, in order to react properly. Much time is lost in 
identifying that cause. The survival model developed in figure 2.1 implies that a solution 
should be found in the same box that holds the cause, or in a ‘lower’ box, meaning a box 
with a lower level of abstraction. The general environment is ‘higher’ or more abstract 
than the immediate environment, which is ‘higher’, more abstract than corporate policy, 
and this is ‘higher’ than management. The general environment is abstract, far away, and 
difficult to influence or to change. For the immediate environment this is easier: suppli-
ers or customers receive the message that due to a changed general environment factor, 
the price or the term of payment will change. Corporate policy comes close to everything 
the manager believes in and has created to the best of his3 knowledge and effort. It is 
often difficult for a manager to acknowledge that, so nearby, almost personal decisions 
have to change. And this goes even further if the management has to question itself: am I 
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Table 2.1:  strategies for surviving financial distress 
                             company 
 
 
cause of distress 
 
no separation of ownership and control (SME) 
 
full separation of ownership and control (listed 
company) 
general environment • favourable change 
• reorganization (production, distribution) 
• options in boxes below 
• lobbying (depending on size and industry) 
• reorganization (production, distribution) 
• formal reorganization through bankruptcy 
• options in boxes below 
immediate environment • primary focus on new customers, new 
suppliers 
• related new products 
• financial restructuring 
• (M&A or liquidation as a last resort) 
• options in boxes below 
• new markets 
• new production process 
• new products 
• M&A with competitor, customer or supplier 
• financial restructuring 
• options in boxes below 
corporate policy • rigorous change in policy 
• reorganization: back to the core business  
• options in box below 
• rigorous change in policy 
• reorganization: back to the core business  
• options in box below 
management/entrepreneur • self-invention of management 
• appointment of an heir 
 
• appointment of new non-executive directors 
• replacement of executive directors 
external factors 
internal factors 
 
IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT 
• customers 
• suppliers 
• competitors 
• debt holders 
• stockholders 
• mishap/bad luck 
GENERAL ENVIRONMENT 
• economics 
• technology 
• government and politics 
• social factors 
• foreign countries 
MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR 
• motivation 
• qualities 
• skills 
• personal characteristics 
CORPORATE POLICY 
• strategy and investments 
• commercial 
• operational 
• employees 
• finance and administration 
• corporate governance 
THE COMPANY 
• maturity 
• size 
• industry 
• flexibility 
level of abstraction of the m
easures to be taken 
FAILURE 
Figure 2.1: determining factors for the outcome of financial distress
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the right person for the company in the current circumstances, or do I need advice from 
others, should I step down even?
It is the author’s conviction that the mistake that is often made is that the cause is 
defined and therefore measures are taken in the wrong box, at a level that is too high and 
therefore wrong. Whether the measures taken will work also depends on the company’s 
characteristics: is it large enough to survive a serious blow, is it flexible enough, is it in 
the right industry, and is it able to rejuvenate itself, if necessary. Usually, the first thing 
a company looks at when in financial distress is not the company itself, but its environ-
ment. We do the right thing, it is only the adverse circumstances that cause us trouble, is 
the excuse generally heard in financial papers as well as from management. The general 
environment, the highest level of abstraction involved, lies outside the company. It is 
normally a given, although it is possible for pressure groups or branch associations to 
push politics to a favourable change, e.g. a relaxation of fiscal tariffs, of trade barriers, 
or of a labour permit policy. The immediate environment will generally be the focus of 
management in situations of near financial distress. It is still outside the company, but on 
this level the company may influence events. A search commences for new or better pay-
ing customers through a new advertising campaign; for more, cheaper or more reliable 
suppliers or more efficient production techniques; for ways to do better than competi-
tors; for new capital. It is a process of repositioning the company (Adriaanse, 2005: 23). If 
the immediate environment is indeed the cause of financial distress, then this approach 
might work, provided management is able to find the appropriate mix of measures. The 
danger however, is that the management focuses on symptoms and not on the real cause 
of distress (Ooghe and Waeyaert, 2004). If the cause of distress lies internally, at the 
relatively abstract level of corporate policy, or at the more fundamental level of manage-
ment itself, then change should start there. Whether this will be possible depends on the 
level of separation between ownership and management of the company. Where there 
is not much separation, as in SMEs, it will be very difficult for management to concede 
that it has not been capable of doing its job under the present circumstances, or that 
its often self-defined corporate policy proved to be wrong. To replace itself under such 
circumstances, or to reformulate corporate policy, requires self-criticism that people in 
such situations often lack (Skeel, 2005). However, if there is a high level of separation 
between ownership and management, as usually is the case in listed companies, and 
provided shareholders are informed in time, shareholders might call for a change of 
management and/or corporate policy. The uprising of shareholders and the following 
dismissal of Jean-Paul Votron, CEO of Fortis NV, after an unexpected emission of shares 
on 26 June 2008 forms an example. But even then, one has to look out for symbol policy 
and to seek real change in order to survive the distressed situation.
The previous section described five scenarios for unrolling financial distress. This section 
is about four different levels of causes and solutions for financial distress. Table 2.1 
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combines both and summarizes the possible scenarios for each box of causes for SME 
and listed companies. The table is based on Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) and the author’s 
own experience. The second column of table 2.1 shows that SME companies have fewer 
strategies than listed companies when confronted with financial distress. When distress 
is due to general causes, lobbying will not be effective because of the relatively small 
size of the SME. Reorganization of production or distribution is an option often executed 
rather late, since the personal relationships in a SME as well as the often essential skills 
of the workers stand in the way of quick dismissals. If the causes lie in the immediate 
environment sphere, an SME will have fewer possibilities to invest, for example in new 
products. Usually its scope will be on doing better with the existing products through new 
advertisements, by lowering prices or even by lowering quality. Financial restructuring 
will often not be considered, because the owner/manager should in that case be prepared 
to share his power and his property. An M&A transaction will be a difficult option for 
the same reason. If the SME has the wrong corporate strategy or incapable management, 
then it should have to reinvent almost itself, as the owner/manager should be prepared 
to give up or change all that he has believed in over the past years. These managers will 
often rely on their hope of a favourable change and wait, convinced as they are that they 
have made the right choices. They will stimulate their employees to work harder. It will 
be bankers or auditors who suggest ‘last resort’ solutions such as an M&A, a voluntary 
reorganization or voluntary liquidation. This analysis implies that if the real cause of 
financial distress lies in management or corporate policy-related issues, the chances of 
Table 2.1: strategies for surviving financial distress
 company
cause of distress
no separation of ownership and control 
(SME)
full separation of ownership and control 
(listed company)
general environment •  favourable change
•  reorganization (production, 
distribution)
•  options in boxes below
•  lobbying (depending on size and 
industry)
•  reorganization (production, 
distribution)
•  formal reorganization through 
bankruptcy
•  options in boxes below
immediate environment •  primary focus on new customers, 
new suppliers
•  related new products
•  financial restructuring
•  (M&A or liquidation as a last resort)
•  options in boxes below
•  new markets
•  new production process
•  new products
•  M&A with competitor, customer or 
supplier
•  financial restructuring
•  options in boxes below
corporate policy •  rigorous change in policy
•  reorganization: back to the core 
business
•  options in box below
•  rigorous change in policy
•  reorganization: back to the core 
business
•  options in box below
management/
entrepreneur
•  self-invention of management
•  appointment of an heir
•  appointment of new non-executive 
directors
•  replacement of executive directors
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survival of SME companies are small. Management will seldom be able to criticize and 
replace itself and/or its policies and will search for solutions in the general or immediate 
environment sphere. If the issue is not there, the company has a big chance of going 
bankrupt. If however, the real distress cause lies in the general or immediate environment 
and one takes appropriate measures, the company has a good chance of surviving.
For companies with full separation of management and control there are more survival 
options, but as there are often many shareholders involved, the transparency required 
by law, at least for listed companies, might feel like a constraint. The favourable change 
option can seldom be considered because once the financial distress is disclosed, share-
holders, trade unions and banks require immediate action. There is no time for a thorough 
analysis of the problem. If the economy is in a recession, or the whole industry suffers, 
stakeholders accept that the reorganization will be led by the incumbent management. If 
the problem lies in the general or immediate environment sphere, management might very 
well come up with the right reorganization plan. A merger or sale of the company or part 
of it is highly probable, especially when the imminent distress is discovered at an early 
stage and has not been disclosed to the market. Management might save its job during 
the process, the shareholders will get a relatively good price and there is no reputational 
damage. For these reasons, liquidation is highly unlikely. A search for new products, new 
markets and new techniques might be viable but takes a long time; a reorganization of 
the existing production process might be faster, if the company thinks the problem is in 
the immediate environment sphere. There will often be considerable pressure, especially 
if the company’s results lag behind those of the peer group, to sacrifice the management 
and afterwards, during the big bath, also the corporate policies formulated by them. This 
might be the right reaction if it is indeed the real cause of the distress, but it means a loss 
of time and effort if it is not.
The conclusions drawn from the survival model developed above are:
• If one knows the real cause of financial distress, one can often find the solution in the 
same direction.
• If an SME becomes financially distressed due to inadequate management or errors 
in corporate policy, chances of survival are small, as it will be very difficult for the 
management to reinvent itself.
• If a listed company becomes financially distressed, stakeholders often call for changes 
in management or in corporate policies, whereas this will only help if the real cause 
lies there; otherwise one loses precious time.
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2.4 BAnKRUPTCY: LIQUIDATIOn AnD FORMAL REORGAnIZATIOn
The worst outcome of financial distress for a company and its stakeholders is bank-
ruptcy. Management, shareholders and creditors all have their own interests in delaying 
bankruptcy as long as possible: to keep its job, to preserve value and to avoid costs. The 
step from financial distress to bankruptcy partly depends on the maturity structure of 
the debt and the amount of non-operating liquid assets (Gordon, 1971: 355).
The word bankruptcy is said to originate from bancus ruptus, the literally broken table 
of the banker who was not able to meet his obligations. Bankruptcy is a somewhat 
old-fashioned concept. Nowadays legal systems present several options for responding 
to a bankruptcy filing. Besides bankruptcy there are other declarations with differ-
ent legal consequences, i.a. administration (England), redressement judiciaire (France), 
Insolvenzverfahren (Germany), reorganization bankruptcy under Chapter 11 (USA), or 
schuldsanering (debt rescheduling; the Netherlands). Modern theory and law therefore 
use the concepts of insolvency and insolvency system to indicate that there are more 
solutions for a distress problem than bankruptcy only. From an economic viewpoint, 
Altman (1993: 4) discerns technical insolvency, when a firm cannot meet its current ob-
ligations, and insolvency in a bankruptcy sense, a chronic condition, when total liabilities 
exceed a fair valuation of its total assets. The first requires a cash-flow or a liquidity test 
and the second a balance sheet test. As 5.4.2.3 shows legal systems may apply either one, 
or even both criteria. Thus, the legal meaning of ‘insolvency’ depends on the legal system. 
Sometimes one uses ‘formal insolvency’ meaning that a legal person is declared insolvent 
formally i.e. by means of legal proceedings. Normally this procedure involves court inter-
ference, but as the English Insolvency Act (IA) 1986 shows, where e.g. the directors of a 
company may appoint an administrator4, this is not necessary. Since bankruptcy remains 
a current concept in the literature, both the bankruptcy and the insolvency concept will 
be used in this thesis.
A bankruptcy system can be studied from various viewpoints. What is its aim? How often 
is it used? Is it predominantly debtor or creditor-friendly? What role does the legal origin 
of the bankruptcy system have? Is it liquidation or reorganization-based, or in Hart’s 
words: is it asset sale or structured bargaining-oriented (Hart, 2000)? An economist 
could inquire whether there is a financial criterion available for bankruptcy or whether it 
can be predicted. All these questions will be touched upon in the next subsections. The 
section concludes with a search for the optimal bankruptcy system.
2.4.1 Aims of a modern bankruptcy system
What should be the aims of a modern bankruptcy system? According to German insol-
vency law, it serves to satisfy creditors collectively5. Dutch and UK law do not formulate 
60 Chapter 2
such an explicit aim. However, economists have their ideas. According to Boot and Lig-
terink (2000: 11), a bankruptcy system should comply with the requirements of speed, 
timeliness, unilateral goals and efficiency. More specifically, Hart (2000: 3) formulates 
three characteristics of a good bankruptcy procedure:
1.  Ceteris paribus, it should deliver an ex post efficient outcome.
2.  It should preserve the bonding role of debt by penalizing managers and sharehold-
ers adequately in bankruptcy states (ex ante efficiency).
3.  It should preserve the absolute priority of claims, except that some portion of value 
should possibly be reserved for shareholders, to avoid the incentive ‘to go for broke’.
The first, ‘efficient outcome’ characteristic means that the procedure should guarantee 
the maximum net value of the estate. This implies that the law should consider the 
optimal method of transferring assets into cash, as well as the costs of the bankruptcy 
procedure incurred by the estate and by third parties. The second, ‘bonding role of debt’ 
characteristic stresses that the ex ante commitment of the company to repay borrowed 
money is valuable only if shareholders and management are penalized in the event of 
non-commitment. This penalty could be the loss of their stake, their job, their repu-
tation, or even personal liability. The third, ‘absolute priority rule’ (APR) characteristic 
‘means only that contractual obligations of priority in distribution are to be honoured’ 
(Easterbrook, 1990: 412). Brouwer (2006: 9) formulated this characteristic as ‘an orderly 
assessment of claims.’
A similar, though slightly different approach is taken by Franks and Torous (2002), who 
judge a bankruptcy code efficient if:
1. it encourages adherence to the terms of the debt contract,
2. it minimizes the probability of both premature as well as deferred liquidations, and
3. it minimizes the direct costs of insolvency.
Their first criterion is based on the notion that violations of the original contract between 
lender and borrower may affect the pricing of debt and in the end even the availability of 
credit. This is in fact the APR criterion mentioned above. The second means to avoid the 
liquidation of an insolvent but economically viable company, as well as the deferral of a 
necessary liquidation. This is felt to be only one factor of Hart’s (2000) broader optimal 
asset sale criterion. The third, efficiency criterion focuses on the direct cost, not only for 
the estate, but also for the stakeholders.
To resume the discussion, a bankruptcy code should play a bonding role ex ante, as well 
as a value maximizing role ex post. As regards the distribution of the proceeds, the terms 
of contract should be honoured as much as possible.
61The options for the company near financial distress
2.4.2 Liquidation and formal reorganization: the facts
Once a bankruptcy case has commenced, the law usually provides two options: liquida-
tion or formal reorganization. Since Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Act 1978 is often 
considered as the successful formal reorganization procedure, table 2.2 presents the 
related figures.
Chapter 7 incorporates the liquidation option, applied in 61% (2007) of all filings and 
in 66.2% (2007) of all business filings. A large minority of 30-40% reorganizes formally 
through Chapters 11, 12 and 136. Chapter 11 is the formal reorganization provision for 
companies. Table 2.2 shows that it concerns only a tiny percentage of all filings. From 
the viewpoint of total business filings, the Chapter 11 proceedings, with 20.3% in 2007, 
are still important. It should be noted though, that according to Brouwer (2006: 10) the 
confirmation rate7 is only 20%, which leads her to the conclusion that formal reorganiza-
tion emerges in about 5% of all US corporate bankruptcy cases.
Formal reorganization, meaning the rescue of the company as a going concern, has first 
priority in present French and English insolvency law. In German law and in a proposal 
for a new Dutch law it is mentioned as an option for satisfying creditors, but liquidation 
is mentioned first. In the USA, the filer initially makes a choice for one of the options, 
which the court might or might not endorse. Research shows that formal reorganization 
is used less in Europe than in the USA. Brouwer (2006: 19) describes the difficulties 
encountered in reorganization under US and European bankruptcy law. She concludes 
from an analysis of Dutch, German, French and English insolvency laws that the reforms 
in the ‘80s and ‘90s in a more reorganization friendly direction have not raised the share 
of formal reorganizations in Europe substantially. She reports that the percentage of 
reorganizations under bankruptcy law as a percentage of total corporate bankruptcies 
is on average well below five. Wood (2007: 31 and 49) mentions a percentage between 
0.5 and 10. Especially for France, where keeping the firm in operation has first priority 
by law, the 2.5% figure of corporate bankruptcies ending in a formal reorganization is 
surprising. Brouwer’s explanation is that the management is not interested in reorgani-
zation under insolvency law, since it will lose its job, whilst the protection of the rights 
Table 2.2: bankruptcy cases commenced by a chapter of the US-Bankruptcy code, USA 1990 and 2007
filings total Chapter 7 Chapter 11 Chapter 12 Chapter 13
total 1990 782,960 543,334 69.4% 20,783  2.6% 1,346 0.2% 217,468 27.8%
total 2007 850,912 519,364 61.0%  6,353  0.7%   376 0% 324,771 38.2%
business 1990  64,853  36,394 56.1% 18,282 28.2% 1,346 2.1%   8,802 13.6%
business 2007  28,322  18,751 66.2%  5,736 20.3%   376 1.3%   3,412 12.1%
Source: www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/statistics.
The totals of the data do not always fully add up.
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of secured creditors, tax authorities and employees in France and other countries inhibits 
the flexibility needed for such reorganization. Couwenberg (2001: 52) found that over a 
period of 25 years (1970-1995) the number of requests for the Dutch form of formal re-
organization, i.e. suspension of payments, has been between 200-800 a year on average8. 
Of this number, over 60% ended in bankruptcy. Luttikhuis (2007: 36) reports that out of 
all 4,167 concluded corporate bankruptcies in the Netherlands during 20049, 23 (0.6%) 
reorganized formally, while in 261 cases (6.3%) the company was, entirely or partially, 
sold going concern. Franks and Sussman (2005: 93) report, tentatively, higher figures for 
going concern sales in the UK after bankruptcy.
The figures show a remarkable difference in the use of formal reorganization procedures 
between the USA and Europe. The following subsections elaborate on the background of 
this difference, by explaining the differences in bankruptcy systems.
2.4.3 Debtor or creditor-oriented system
If a company cannot meet its debt obligations and restructuring attempts have proved 
unsuccessful, it is virtually bankrupt. As long as creditors go along and do not under-
take any legal action, the company can proceed. Creditors (and often the trade creditors 
amongst them) quite often finance a company in distress. However, if one of the creditors 
wants to withdraw its money, there is a problem to be solved, because the pie is too small 
to give every creditor its share. The law has to make a choice: either to protect the pie, and 
arrange a solution for the creditors, or to protect the creditors, and optimize the value 
of the pie. This dilemma is known as the choice of a debtor or a creditor-oriented bank-
ruptcy system, or more tendentiously, as the choice of a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ system (Boot 
and Ligterink, 2000; Franken, 2004: 650) . The US Chapter 11 proceedings exemplify the 
debtor-oriented system. After filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, the management 
retains control of the business, albeit under detailed court supervision; interest payments 
to unsecured creditors are suspended; and creditors are restrained from taking actions 
to collect their debts or enforce their security since the law provides for an automatic 
stay. The debtor generally remains in possession. The management has an exclusive right 
to propose a reorganization plan during the first 120 days, which may be extended. The 
plan should be approved by the various classes of creditors and can be ‘crammed down’ 
by the court by forcing the non-assenting class to accept proceeds, in accordance with 
absolute priority, from a hypothetical liquidation (Franks and Torous, 2002). The aim is 
to increase the likelihood of survival of the firm through a formal reorganization.
The English ‘administrative receivership’ procedure, frequently used until the Enter-
prise Act 2002 came into force, exemplifies the creditor-oriented bankruptcy system 
on the other side of the spectrum. Here, a creditor with a floating charge may appoint a 
representative who has a wide range of statutory powers and may, if necessary to satisfy 
the claim of the charge holder, sell it as a going concern or liquidate it (Franks and 
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Torous, 2002: 457). It is all about changing assets into money. The management is wiped 
out; there is no automatic stay and no court involvement. The principal responsibility 
of the receiver is to repay the creditor that appointed him. Normally though, there is 
court involvement in a creditor-oriented system. The upholding of the APR is the main 
characteristic. A limited stay provision of assets for the estate is its consequence.
European law is generally classified as creditor-oriented, since none of the systems know 
the US Chapter 11 provisions for reorganization under insolvency, that is the debtor-
in-possession, unrestricted automatic stay and a loss-sharing distributive rule between 
creditors and shareholders, meaning that creditors and shareholders could agree on 
an APR-deviating distribution (Franken, 2004: 650; Brouwer, 2006:11). Even the French 
system, which has evaluated in the direction of a debtor-oriented system, does not know 
this distributive role (Davydenko and Franks, 2008). The aim of a creditor-oriented sys-
tem remains primarily to repay the creditors according to their priority, although more 
and more attention is given to rescuing the company.
2.4.4 Origin of the bankruptcy procedure
A valuable distinction in origin seemed to be that between common-law and civil-law 
systems. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) discern four origins of 
law: the common-law system (e.g. UK, USA), the French civil-law system (e.g. France, the 
Netherlands), the German civil-law system and the Scandinavian-origin system. They 
found ‘that common-law countries generally have the strongest and French civil-law 
countries the weakest legal protection of investors, with German and Scandinavian civil-
law countries located in the middle.’ However, their study does not distinguish between 
the enormous differences in investor protection within the systems. The Netherlands 
for example scores far above the French system average value on all eight characteris-
tics under research and only below that of Germany, the UK and the USA on two. That 
the Djankov et al. (2006: 24) study shows results to the contrary regarding the investor 
protection in the Netherlands may therefore not come as a surprise. They conducted 
research on the hypothetical outcome of an artificial case: an insolvent hotel firm with 
a given number of employees, capital and ownership structure, a value as going concern 
and a value if sold piecemeal. Practitioners in 88 countries answered a questionnaire on 
the outcome of the case in their country. The Djankov efficiency measure, defined as 
the present value of the terminal value of their hypothetical firm after bankruptcy costs, 
was as high as 94.2 on a scale of 100 for the Netherlands, 90.7 for the UK, 85.8 for the 
USA, 55.7 for Germany and a low 54.1 for France. In general, their results indicate that 
the efficiency of debt enforcement in the 43 French civil-law countries in their research 
is low, while rich countries are vastly more efficient than the poorer ones. Here again the 
Netherlands does not fit into this conclusion.
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In sum, empirical research has shown that common-law countries are more efficient 
than French civil-law countries in the enforcement of debt and investor’s rights. However, 
this conclusion does not necessarily apply to an individual country.
2.4.5 Asset sale or structured bargaining system
Hart (2000: 6) distinguished bankruptcy procedures according to the predominance of 
asset sale (or cash auction) or structured bargaining. In an asset sale system, the estate 
is liquidated by selling the assets piecemeal or going concern, either through private 
negotiations or through a public auction, whichever generates the highest value. As soon 
as the firm is transformed into a pile of cash, the proceeds are distributed according to 
the absolute priority. However, the problem is to determine the actual value of the assets, 
and to realize it. The market, despite the growing advantages and possibilities of the 
internet, is not transparent. Potential bidders wait along the side lines till the price comes 
down. Hart concludes that all discussions and changes have not been in the direction 
of cash auctions, but on structured bargaining. The idea is that the company’s claim-
ants are encouraged to bargain about the future of the company in terms of liquidation, 
reorganization and value distribution, according to predetermined rules (Hart, 2000: 7). 
He signals a problem here, as bargaining tries to make two decisions at once: what to do 
with the company and who should get what in the event of restructuring of claims. As 
long as the proceeds are not clear, the prospect of a speedy liquidation with a recovery 
rate of 60% might be preferred over the possible but still uncertain sale to a private equity 
party, with a recovery rate of over 80%, thus possibly jeopardizing a profitable future 
for the company. Hart therefore proposes the cancelling of all debt, and attributing it to 
the former creditors’ shares instead. Through this debt-for-equity swap, a conflict of 
interests between various creditors and shareholders is avoided, as by then they all have 
the same rights. Thereafter it will be easier to decide about the future of the company.
Hart works according to the property rights tradition, which takes the view that the owner 
of a nonhuman asset possesses residual control rights over that asset, and that there is 
an optimal allocation of such residual control rights10. Hart’s approach is more directed 
to the allocation process of control rights than to the outcome (survival or debt recovery). 
That rethinking the efficiency of the process is worthwhile follows from the relatively low 
recovery rates shown in chapter 1.
2.4.6 A financial bankruptcy criterion
In the UK the court may issue an administration order if the company is or is likely to be-
come unable to pay its debts11. One of the criteria for a winding-up order is the company’s 
inability to pay its debts12. According to the Insolvency Act (IA) this inability happens i.a. 
if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the company is unable to pay its debts 
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as they fall due13; and also if the value of the company’s assets is less than the amount of 
its liabilities, taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities14. German law 
has two similar criteria for instituting insolvency proceedings for a legal person: actual 
or imminent illiquidity (Zahlungsunfähigkeit)15 and over-indebtedness (Überschuldung)16. 
If the debtor has ceased making payments, German law presumes illiquidity17. This is 
similar to present Dutch bankruptcy law which requires that the debtor must have ceased 
making payments for some time18. The commissie Kortmann, in a proposal for a new 
Dutch insolvency law19, maintains this Dutch ‘situation of ceased payments’ criterion and 
adds to it the German ‘imminent illiquidity’ criterion.
Would it be possible to translate these verbal criteria into financial criteria to be derived 
from the balance sheet? Van Eeghen (2006B), interpreting the Dutch criterion as actual 
illiquidity, formulated two criteria a company should comply with. The first is that the 
company should be able to meet its current obligations in order to avoid technical insol-
vency. In symbols this formula is:
(1) CCE ≥ CLS
where: CCE =  cash and cash equivalents, including tradable securities, open credit lines, accounts 
receivables to be received shortly
 CLS = current liabilities to be paid shortly.
This formula can best be calculated from a cash planning survey, instead of from a bal-
ance sheet. By using a cash forecast, future considerations may be taken into account.
The second criterion is that the company should also be able to meet its obligations in the 
long term to avoid economic insolvency. From:
(2) OA +CCE = TA
(3) E + L + PR + CLS = TA
(4) E = s * TA = s * (OA + CCE)
(5) CCE = CLS (minimum condition)
where: E = equity
 L = loans
 OA = other assets
 PR = provisions
 s = required solvency ratio (E / TA)
 TA = total assets.
follows:
(6) L = (1-s) * OA – s * CCE - PR
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This formula offers the minimum condition. When the amount of the loans comes close 
to the number calculated with this formula, the company is on the brink of insolvency. 
When the loans equal the formula, the debtor should file for bankruptcy. The criticism 
levelled at this approach is fourfold (see also van Eeghen, 2006B: 202):
• Future developments are inadequately taken into account (for example: as a conse-
quence of new products, new human capital);
• The formula is vulnerable to creative accounting (for example by increasing OA or 
decreasing PR);
• The semi-exactitude of the formula is false in as far as taxations of values20 are like 
profit: they are not a fact, but an opinion;
• The quality of management has not been taken into account.
Others have tried to derive criteria from the balance sheet in order to predict bankruptcy. 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980), Zmijewski (1984), Aziz and Lawson (1989) 
and Daily and Dalton (1994) made considerable contributions to this field. Chapter 6 of 
this thesis will elaborate on that. This subsection only intends to explain how an eco-
nomic approach to bankruptcy works, and what its limitations are.
Altman’s original work of 196821 is based on a sample of 66 companies of which 33 
were bankrupt. Based on ratios and multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), he calculated a 
Z-score which is often presented as follows:
 Z = 1.2 X1 + 1.4 X2 + 3.3 X3 + 0.6 X4 + 0.99 X5
where: X1 = working capital/total assets (liquidity ratio)
 X2 = retained earnings/total assets (earned surplus measure)
 X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets (productivity measure)
 X4 = market value of equity/book value total liabilities (buffer)
 X5 = sales/total assets (capital-turnover ratio), and
 Z > 2.67 means no errors in non-bankruptcy classification
 Z < 1.81 means no errors in bankruptcy classification,
 Z between those values signals a grey area for the company.
Altman developed revised Z-score models for private sector companies (p. 202):
 Z’ = 0.717 X1 + 0.847 X2 + 3.107 X3 + 0.420 X4 + 0.998 X5
where: X4 = book value of equity/book value total liabilities (buffer)
 Z > 2.90 means no errors in non-bankruptcy classification
 Z < 1.23 means no errors in bankruptcy classification.
The potential industry effect of the sales/total assets ratio is avoided by leaving it out:
 Z’’ = 6.56 X1 + 3.26 X2 + 6.72 X3 + 1.05 X4
where: X4 = book value of equity/book value total liabilities (buffer)
 Z > 2.60 means no errors in non-bankruptcy classification
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 Z < 1.10 means no errors in bankruptcy classification.
Later on, Altman refined his initial findings in a ZETA model, published in 1977. The 
parameters are not disclosed, as it has become a commercial product. The correct pre-
diction of non-bankrupt firms, most important to avoid losses of bankruptcy, of both 
models is impressive. For the Z-models it is 97.0% at t = -1 and 93.9% at t = -2, while 
for the ZETA models it is 89.7% at t = -1, 93.1% at t = - 2 and is still 82.1% in t = -5. The 
Z-score and ZETA models remain popular tools for bankruptcy prediction, but should be 
treated cautiously:
(a) bankruptcy caused by bad luck can never be predicted,
(b)  due to permanently changing industry sectors, the relevance of the model may 
become less,
(c) due to a change in modes of production, the ratios might change over time, and
(d)  due to a continuous adjustment in the desired values of ratios, the grey area may 
contract or expand.
Van Eeghen’s threshold and the other prediction models apply only financial factors in 
the analysis. Issues as the quality of management (Altman, 1993: 17; Van Amsterdam, 
2004: 265) or the incidence and quality of monitoring are left aside. The empirical part 
of this thesis works on that.
2.4.7 Concluding remarks: in search of an optimal bankruptcy system
In the previous sections bankruptcy has been discussed from various viewpoints. What 
bankruptcy system is optimal? Table 2.3 analyses the advantages and disadvantages of a 
Table 2.3: a survey of advantages and disadvantages of different bankruptcy systems
bankruptcy 
system
advantages disadvantages
debtor-oriented •  incentive for early reorganization for 
management and shareholders (thus 
avoiding ex ante over-investment)
•  incentive to go along for secured creditors
•  survival of profitable companies (thus 
avoiding ex post under-investment)
•  survival of trading opportunities for other 
companies
•  higher creditors risk, thus higher cost of 
capital (risk of ex ante under-investment)
•  unjustified protraction of the renegotiation 
process by shareholders and unsecured 
creditors
•  survival of unprofitable companies (risk of 
ex post over-investment)
•  higher risk of new bankruptcies
creditor-oriented •  creditors know exactly what to rely upon
•  creditors give more credit (no incentive 
for ex ante under-investment)
•  quicker solution of bankruptcy (no ex post 
over-investment)
•  cheaper solution of bankruptcy
•  no incentive for management or 
shareholders for early filing (thus providing 
an incentive for ex ante over-investment)
•  no incentive for shareholders for new 
investments
•  creditors risk mainly borne by unsecured 
creditors
•  untimely liquidation of (potentially) 
profitable companies (ex post under-
investment)
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debtor and a creditor-oriented system, based on Hart (2000), Franks and Torous (2002), 
and Franken (2004). From table 2.2 it seems clear that an absolute superior bankruptcy 
system does not exist. In fact, ex ante inefficient investment behaviour is traded off 
against ex post efficiency and vice versa (Franken, 2004: 653). An investor under a debtor-
oriented system will ex ante be prepared to invest relatively less, which might cause 
under-investment22, since he runs the risk that his rights will be curtailed in bankruptcy. 
But ex post, the debtor-oriented system avoids inefficient ex post under-investment, as it 
may lead to survival of the company. And while a creditor-oriented system foregoes the 
risk of ex ante under-investment, it might cause ex post under-investment insofar as it 
steers towards liquidation and inhibits survival of the company.
Gilson et al. (1990: 323) pointed to the importance of the information asymmetry 
between shareholder and creditor. The extensive Chapter 11 disclosure requirements 
diminish this asymmetry. Frouté (2007) signalled this as the reason for the evolution of 
creditor-friendly bankruptcy laws to more debtor-friendly systems. In his view, inef-
ficient investment is due to information asymmetry between debtor and creditor. If these 
two cannot agree on the necessary measures for a reorganization, ‘courts become the key 
actor of the credit relationship, whose aim is to provide information’ (p. 207). By deciding 
to liquidate or to reorganize a company, the judge reveals a debtor’s type of risk and 
allows the separating of good companies from the bad (p. 212). However, this theory is 
only relevant ex post and not ex ante.
Franken (2004) qualified corporate bankruptcy as a governance system. On the one 
hand there is the typical SME, characterized by concentrated equity ownership, a long-
term lending relationship with one main bank that holds strong security positions, and 
dispersed trade creditors. In a creditor-oriented system the bank has a very powerful 
position; it is the only monitor of importance and it has strong legal instruments. Under 
bankruptcy, the bank’s position does not weaken as its position is secured, provided there 
is only a limited automatic stay. Management’s position on the contrary does weaken, as 
it will lose control. This induces financially distressed companies to restructure outside 
of bankruptcy. This is efficient ex ante, Franken notes, because the costs of these out-
of-court restructurings are relatively low as negotiation only takes places between the 
debtor and the relational bank lender (p. 659). The downside of ex post lower proceeds 
in a creditor-oriented system should be balanced against the higher efficiency ex ante. 
The latter exceeds the costs, at least for SME companies, as is shown by Franks and 
Sussman (2005). Brunner and Krahnen (2008) analysed the problem of multiple banking 
in borrower’s distress empirically. They found that the existence of small bank pools, by 
means of which banks in Germany coordinate their actions opposite distressed borrow-
ers, significantly increases the probability of work-out success, while large pools do not.
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On the other side of the governance spectrum is the large publicly held firm with a dis-
persed ownership structure. Here again, if there is a strong consortium of banks working 
together, there will be a strong monitoring function of the lenders. A creditor-oriented 
system will do, as it will force the management to reorganize whenever deemed necessary 
by the lenders. However, if there is no such banking consortium, nor one other large 
creditor, security holders only monitor specific assets and there is no central warning 
system for financially distressed companies. As Gilson et al. (1990: 316) showed, private 
negotiation is less likely to succeed when there are more distinct classes of debt. When 
a large company is in financial distress, a debtor-oriented system simplifies negotiat-
ing with creditors as the requirement of an affirmative vote by a majority constraints 
holding-out policies of creditors, and courts can impose a settlement on creditors. 
Nevertheless, in practice senior creditors often offer junior creditors or stockholders a 
small distribution, to avoid the costly and time-consuming cram down procedure (Gilson 
et al.,1990: 318; Baird, Bris and Zhu, 2007: 7).
The previous analysis concludes that the creditor-oriented system urges the management 
to reorganize in time as it runs the risk of (a) being ousted and (b) personal liability (see 
chapter 5 of this thesis) in bankruptcy as a penalty. Since the APR is honoured, there 
are no additional risk-related costs of credit. In debtor-oriented systems the APR can be 
violated and the management can retain its position. Due to the exculpatory provision 
authorized by s 102(b.7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law, which enables char-
ters to provide for the elimination of the personal liability of a director to the corporation 
or its stockholders for breach of the duty of care, personal liability in the USA is less 
of an issue (Black, Cheffins and Klausner, 2006). This implies: there is less pressure to 
reorganize in time and the costs of credit will be higher. Especially if there is one large 
creditor (or one strong consortium of creditors) who monitors effectively, the creditor-
oriented system is the superior reorganization system. A filing for bankruptcy in a 
creditor-oriented system therefore usually implies that the company really is not viable. 
In a debtor-oriented system one cannot be sure of that, because the filing might also be 
a move of the management to change the rules. However, if the creditors are dispersed, 
mostly in larger companies, the monitoring function of the creditor will be absent (Franks 
and Torous, 1994: 366), and bankruptcy in that case does not ipso facto indicate that the 
company is lost. The court should do research on that. In such a case, a debtor-oriented 
system will be superior, as more solutions for financial distress will remain.
Neither the debtor nor the creditor-oriented regime of corporate bankruptcy law is clearly 
the more efficient. However, a bankruptcy regime may have a comparative advantage if it 
is more responsive than other regimes to the governance mechanisms at work in specific 
firms, for example listed or SME-firms (Franken, 2004: 647).
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2.5 REORGAnIZATIOn OUTSIDE BAnKRUPTCY
2.5.1 An economic approach to informal reorganization
Reorganization should be preferred to liquidation or acquisition if more value is pre-
served in that way (Brouwer, 2006: 6). Reorganization of financially distressed companies 
can be done through a formal procedure laid down in insolvency law, or through private 
negotiations outside insolvency law. The choice depends on two factors: which alterna-
tive is cheapest, and: can claimholders agree on the division of the saving (Gilson et al. 
1990: 318).
Table 2.4: summary of some studies on informal reorganization (‘work-outs’) of distressed companies
author subject successful informal reorganization formal reorganization results
in % of sample recovery rate in % of sample recovery rate
Gilson, John and 
Lang (1990)
169 financially 
distressed 
US firms 
(insufficient cash 
flows to meet 
debt payments)
47.3% 52.7% of which:
24.9% (survived)
5.9% (merger)
2.4% (liquidated)
19.5% (unknown 
or in progress)
Franks and Torous 
(1994)
161 financially 
distressed US 
firms (debt issue 
downgraded to 
CCC or worse)
47.2% median 80.1%
(bank debt 86.6%)
52.8% of which:
10.5% survived
12.4% in progress
25.5% unknown
4.3% no procedure
median 50.9%
(bank debt 86.4%)
Van Amsterdam 
(2004)
989 financially 
distressed Dutch 
SME companies 
(account 
transferred to 
Business Support 
Unit, BSU)
54.5% median bank 70-
100% (depending 
on the bank)
unknown
Franks and 
Sussman (2005)
542 financially 
distressed SME 
companies in 
the UK (account 
transferred to 
BSU)
33.5% (going 
concern)
16.4% 
(rebanking)
18.6% (ongoing 
in BSU)
no write down 31.5% bankrupt 75% for banks 
(median 87.9 to 
100%); unsecured 
zero
Davydenko and 
Franks (2008)
2,280 heavily 
distressed firms 
in the UK, France 
and BRD (Basel II 
default)
UK 24.6% 
France 22%
BRD 13.1%
median for banks:
UK 100% 
France 100%
BRD 79%
UK 75.4%
France 78.0%
BRD 86.9% 
piecemeal liq.
UK 42.9%
France 62.0%
BRD 56.9%
median for banks:
UK 82%
France 39%
BRD 61%
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In an informal reorganization, also called a ‘(private) work-out’, the firm and its creditors 
renegotiate their contracts privately, resolving distress without resorting to the bank-
ruptcy courts (Wruck, 1990: 425). Literature shows that an informal reorganization is 
very popular in practice among financially distressed companies, ‘at a guess 75% or 
more of the cases’ (Wood, 2007: 49). Table 2.4 shows that on average around 50% of the 
informal reorganizations succeed. The Davydenko and Franks (2008) results are lower, 
because their definition of distress is biased towards the rather severe cases. The high 
recovery rates in informal reorganization might explain their success: in all cases they are 
substantively higher than in a formal reorganization. Unsecured creditors often receive 
even 100%. The costs of informal reorganization are lower as well (Gilson et al. 1990: 319, 
337); they might well be over 4.5% of firm value (Franks and Torous, 1994: 369).
2.5.2 A legal approach to informal reorganization (‘work-out’)
Formal reorganization is a detailed arrangement provided by insolvency law. Informal 
reorganization is of a contractarian nature (Baird, 2007: 9). Essentially parties can agree 
on any financial restructuring within the boundaries of the law. With regard to the orderly 
management of work-outs, the Bank of England outlined the “London Approach” in 1990 
(Wood, 2007: 626). Its key features are:
(a) a responsible and supportive attitude by bank lenders towards companies in dis-
tress, (b) the role of the Bank of England as a neutral chairman and intermediary, (c) 
a lending standstill, (d) the gathering of the fullest possible information to support 
the analysis and subsequent judgement, and (e) the duty of the lead bank to inform 
all other banks involved.
Although these rules are not binding, they are still considered good banking practice 
(Wood, 2007: 627). The INSOL principles issued in 2000 also focus on buying time with-
out losing legal, preferred or secured, positions. They essentially23 are:
(1) all relevant creditors should be prepared to co-operate with each other to give suf-
ficient time (a “Standstill Period”) to the debtor for information and for proposals for 
resolving the debtor’s financial difficulties to be formulated and assessed; (2) during 
the Standstill Period, all relevant creditors should agree to refrain from taking any 
steps to enforce their claims against the debtor and are entitled to expect that their 
position relative to other creditors and each other will not be prejudiced; (3) during 
the Standstill Period, the debtor should not take any action which might adversely 
affect the prospective return to relevant creditors as compared with the position at 
the Standstill Commencement Date; (4) the interests of relevant creditors are best 
served by coordinating through co-ordination committees and by the appointment of 
professional advisers; (5) during the Standstill Period, the debtor should provide, and 
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allow relevant creditors reasonable and timely access to all relevant information, in 
order to enable proper evaluation to be made of its financial position and any propos-
als to be made to relevant creditors; (6) proposals for resolving the financial difficul-
ties should reflect applicable law and the relative positions of relevant creditors at the 
Standstill Commencement Date; (7) information obtained should be made available to 
all relevant creditors and should be treated as confidential; (8) if additional funding 
is provided during the Standstill Period the repayment of such additional funding 
should be accorded priority status.
Wood (2007: 627) mentions that a number of countries have adopted similar rules, mostly 
by means of self-regulation. The Netherlands has not, and neither the Netherlands 
Bankers’ Association (NVB) nor the DNB apparently feels itself compelled to take the 
lead. From an economist’s point of view this attitude is inefficient, since it necessitates 
avoidable transaction costs. With some creativity these INSOL principles could also be 
introduced in the Dutch legal system (Santen and Verhoeff, 2006: 154). Introduction of 
this or a similar set of rules would be helpful to reduce transaction costs and to avoid the 
risk of litigation. At present, holding companies that try to rescue their subsidiaries risk 
being sued by Dutch administrators for improper behaviour since the boundaries of such 
an operation are not yet clear24. And a bank that closes a new credit arrangement with 
additional securities in a rescue-operation just a month before its bankruptcy faces the 
voidance of this arrangement if it cannot prove that at the moment of closing ‘neither the 
debtor nor the bank could reasonably foresee bankruptcy and a deficit’ (HR 22 December 
2009, NJ 2010, 273, ABN AMRO BANK/ Van Dooren q.q. III)25.
2.6 FORMAL AnD InFORMAL REORGAnIZATIOn COMPARED
One may compare the formal and informal reorganization procedures from an economic 
as well as from a legal viewpoint. The economic comparison is about costs and economic 
impact, the legal comparison mainly about proceedings.
2.6.1 An economic comparison of reorganization routes
Wood (2007) and Santen and de Bos (2008) described a number of economic advantages 
of an informal reorganization:
• Capital preservation: as soon as it is publicly disclosed that the company is in finan-
cial distress, the value of its assets and by consequence of its shares will decrease. 
Moreover, the company and its management will suffer from reputational damage. If, 
by using the informal route, disclosure can be avoided, capital will be preserved, at 
least better than through a formal reorganization (Franks and Torous, 1994: 350). Bris 
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et al. (2006: 1264) show that the decline of the pre-bankruptcy values of Chapter 7 
(liquidation) is worse than the Chapter 11 decline.
• Costs: according to Gilson et al. (1990: 319) it is widely believed that direct as well as 
indirect costs are significantly higher for bankruptcy than for private renegotiation. 
Franks and Torous (1994: 350) estimate ‘incremental costs of formal over informal 
reorganizations of at least 4.5% of firm value’. Bris et al. (2006) conclude that the costs 
of Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 proceedings range between 2% and 20%. Although the 
company will incur high costs for hiring professionals during informal reorganiza-
tion, formal proceedings tend to be more costly as they take much longer and require 
more creditor involvement (Wood, 2007: 39).
• Recovery-rate: as a consequence of a higher preservation of capital and lower costs, 
the recovery rate in an informal route is higher than in a formal route, especially 
for non-secured debt. Bank debt has a recovery rate of around 80-100% in informal 
reorganization and less (39%-86.4%) in formal reorganization. However, for non-
secured debt the differences are even clearer: whilst they often would not receive a 
cent in formal reorganization, they might even receive 100% of their claim through the 
informal route. Ordinary creditors’ losses will thus be lower in an informal route.
• Employment: does the loss of employment differ between both routes? Luttikhuis 
(2007) studied the employment effects of liquidation and formal reorganization in the 
Netherlands. She found that 15% of the jobs concerned in bankruptcy are preserved 
by a formal reorganization. Since generally speaking informal reorganization is less 
rigorous than a formal reorganization, one may hypothesize that informal reorgani-
zation costs less in terms of loss of employment. There are no data available to test 
this hypothesis.
• Cascade effects: what are the economic effects of reorganization on third parties? 
These effects come in two ways. Firstly, as a result of write-downs on debt by 
creditors after reorganization, the amount of tax to be paid by these creditors will 
decrease. The higher the write-downs, the less tax income to the government. The 
fiscal loss compensation for the debtor might, depending on national law and the 
mode of reorganization, have a similar or an opposite effect on tax income.
 Secondly, for creditor companies the write-downs mean a lower solvency as well as 
less turnover if the debtor has downsized its activities. Reorganization may thus seri-
ously hamper the prospects for other companies. Whilst the downsizing-effect may 
remain in an informal route, the high recovery rates in that case diminish the effects 
of write-downs. Informal reorganization is therefore the preferred solution.
• Pareto-optimality: in an informal reorganization route it is the market, represented 
by the parties directly related to the company, such as banks and shareholders, which 
determines the price the reorganization is worth. As a consequence of a formal route 
the problems of the company have to be disclosed. Price signals are distorted be-
cause of reputational damage, court interference, hold-out behaviour by creditors, 
the wipe-out of equity holders (Baird et al. 2007: 5) and irrational behaviour. For 
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example, governments may come under heavy pressure of their voters to save virtu-
ally bankrupt companies (RSV, Fortis, Alitalia). The market will only save a company 
if that is deemed worthwhile after a financial judgement (due diligence research).
Informal reorganization holds one clear risk: that of information asymmetry, meaning 
that directors hold all the information which they do not necessarily share with other 
parties in the process (see 3.3.1.2.). Parties involved in the negotiation process should be 
aware of that. However, taking all economic arguments into account, informal reorgani-
zation is by far to be preferred over a formal reorganization procedure.
2.6.2 A legal comparison of reorganization routes
If there is a choice, what legal arguments are there to prefer informal reorganization and 
which arguments can be found against? (Wood, 2007: 35). Informal reorganization has 
the following advantages from a legal point of view:
• Evasion of personal liability: in many creditor-oriented systems directors face the risk 
of personal liability in bankruptcy either for the total deficit or for specific damage 
(see chapter 5 of this thesis). After a successful informal reorganization this risk no 
longer exists.
• Less creditor involvement: where informal reorganization normally involves the com-
pany and its large creditors, for example the bank, bondholders, the tax authorities 
and social security funds, formal reorganization requires the full-fledged involve-
ment of all the creditors. The mass of creditors and the noise they may produce could 
influence the probability, the content and the speed of a final composition.
• No court involvement: every court involvement as required under insolvency law takes 
time, costs money and is to some extent unpredictable in its outcome. It furthermore 
requires public disclosure of business figures, normally kept secret from competitors.
However, formal reorganization has its advantages too:
• Clean assets: the assets bought from an auction during bankruptcy are clean in the 
sense that it is certain that there will not be any third-party rights to the asset, nor 
may they have to be returned due to ‘voidable preference’ or ‘fraudulent transfer’ 
(Gilson et al. 1990: 321). Such claims may jeopardize informal reorganization.
• Abandonment of onerous obligations, guaranties, contracts or litigations: loss generat-
ing guaranties, environmental obligations, contracts or litigations may be a reason 
to seek formal reorganization. If there is no chance of survival once the claim is 
final, formal reorganization through a newly established legal person might facilitate 
survival of the activities of the company.
• Court decision power: courts have mandatory rights to require information or decide 
on the case, whilst informal reorganization is based on mutual agreement. Thus, 
courts (1) will require information of directors and administrators, thus reducing the 
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information asymmetry; (2) preserve the rights of all parties involved, especially those 
that do not have secured rights, for example trade creditors (Chapter 11)26, and other 
stakeholders, for example employees (France); and (3) may ‘cram down’ a plan or may 
preside at a creditors’ meeting where ‘holding out creditors’ in a formal reorganiza-
tion may be overruled27.
• Automatic stay: formal reorganization might be the only way to inhibit foreclosure of 
essential assets by a dissentient creditor28. Although formal reorganization differs in 
details on this respect over the various legal systems, secured creditors are essentially 
free to foreclose their assets in formal reorganization, with the exemption of France 
(Davydenko and Franks, 2008: 604) and, under strict regulation, of Chapter 11 (Bris et 
al. 2006:1263).
• Debtor in possession: this characteristic of Chapter 11, that the management generally 
stays in position and can keep on doing business with the present assets, is found to 
a much lesser extent in France during the réglement amiable or the early phase of the 
redressement judiciaire (Davydenko and Franks, 2008: 603). Although management 
may certainly consider this a shelter, and a hope to keep their jobs in this way, usually 
they do not (Gilson, 1989; Baird, 2007).
What choice should the distressed company make? There may not always be a choice. 
Some jurisdictions, for example Germany, require that management files for bankruptcy 
if fair value equity falls below zero. Bankruptcy need not always be the less efficient solu-
tion. A Chapter 11 filing with a composition proposal, the so-called prepackaged filings 
or prepacks, can significantly reduce the time and the costs involved (Gilson et al. 1990: 
325). Bris et al. (2006: 1257) even mention prepacks that took only two weeks to solve. 
In the Netherlands, a well-prepared going concern sale in a formal reorganization could 
take less than two weeks, and a vote on a composition after suspension of payments 
can be organized in 4-6 weeks, provided everything goes smoothly. The disadvantage 
is that during this short period, the owner/manager loses control and has to indulge an 
administrator. To avoid this and the accompanying uncertainty, the company should, if it 
is not in a position that it absolutely needs the legal advantages of formal reorganization 
summed up above, avoid the legal route, as the economic analysis is in strong support of 
informal reorganization. The court-route is needed only as a fall-back (Wood, 2007: 49).
2.7 SUMMARY AnD COnCLUDInG REMARKS
This chapter concludes by defining financial distress as the existence of a non-trivial 
probability that the legal person will not be able to pay its debt within the terms of pay-
ment. Financial distress can unroll in five scenarios from (1) a favourable change in the 
circumstances, or (2) a merger, to (3) a voluntary reorganization, (4) a voluntary liquida-
tion or (5) an involuntary liquidation or reorganization. The chapter continues with a 
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focus on saving the economic activities of the company independently through scenarios 
3 and 5. It argues that a thorough analysis needs to be made of the true causes of distress, 
before starting the reorganization, and offers a model to that effect. After a discussion 
into the nature and the effects of involuntary, i.e. formal reorganization on the one hand 
and informal reorganization, i.e. a ‘work-out’ on the other, the chapter compares the two 
reorganization forms. It concludes that informal reorganization is the efficient solution 
to financial distress, provided that the market deems reorganization Pareto-optimal and 
that the quality of management is sufficient. This is an important restriction, since the 
lack of quality of management is often considered the main cause of bankruptcy (Altman, 
1993: 17; Ooghe and De Prijcker, 2008: 234). One mechanism to improve the quality of 
management decisions could be the introduction of monitors in the company. This is the 
subject of chapter 3.
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EnDnOTES
1 These authors do not consider the merger scenario.
2 This company became Caldic BV.
3 Manager, director, agent and other functions will be referred to throughout the text by ‘he’, 
‘him’ or ‘his’ as the case may be. The choice is made since the majority of managers, directors 
and agents are still male.
4 IA 1986 Schedule B1 s 22(2).
5 s 1 InsO.
6 Chapter 7 of the US-Bankruptcy Code provides for liquidation, i.e. the sale of a debtor’s non-
exempt property and the distribution of the proceeds to creditors. Chapter 11 provides for 
reorganization, usually involving a corporation or partnership. A Chapter 11 debtor usually 
proposes a plan of reorganization to keep its business alive and pay creditors over time. 
People in business or individuals can also seek relief in Chapter 11. Chapter 12 is designed 
for “family farmers” or “family fishermen” with regular annual income. It enables financially 
distressed family farmers and fishermen to propose and carry out a plan to repay all or part 
of their debts. Chapter 13 provides for adjustment of debts of an individual with regular in-
come. A Chapter 13 bankruptcy is also called a wage earner’s plan. It allows a debtor to keep 
property and pay debts over time, usually three to five years. (www.uscourts.gov/uscourts).
7 Baird, 2007, p. 13 speaks of a dismissal of two-thirds; Bris et al. (2006: 1256) of ‘about half’.
8 CBS StatLine reports that the number of concluded bankruptcies after the requisition of sus-
pension of payments was on average 230 (varying between 166-320) for the 1992-2008 
period.
9 Of the reported 5,939 concluded bankruptcies in 2004 (table 1.1), 4,167 are corporate bank-
ruptcies which include bankruptcies of sole proprietorships (CBS, 2010: 5).
10 This sentence comes from Oliver Hart and John Moore, Incomplete contracts and ownership: some 
new thoughts, p. 1, not dated, found on www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg.../0105_1015_1702.
pdf.
11 s 11 Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act.
12 s 122(1.f) IA.
13 s 123(1.e) IA.
14 s 123(2) IA.
15 s 17 and 18 InsO.
79The options for the company near financial distress
16 s 19 InsO. It should be noted that s 5 Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz (FMStG) from 17-10-
2008 added to s 19(2) InsO the possibility to relieve the requirement to file for insolvency in 
the event of Überschuldung ‘if the company’s going concern is predominantly likely under the 
circumstances’. s 6 (3) FMStG intends to change s 19(2) InsO by 1-1-2014 so that the present 
addition is replaced by reference to a going concern valuation of the assets if the company’s 
going concern is predominantly likely. See: s 7 FMStG on www.buzer.de/gesetz/8396/index.
htm. Also: Hirte, H., B. Knof, and S. Mock, 2008, Überschuldung und Finanzmarktstabilisier-
ungsgesetz, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Insolvenzrecht (ZInsO) 2008, 1217.
17 s 17(2) InsO.
18 s 1 Fw; especially the word situation (toestand).
19 s 2.2.1 of the proposal (to be found at: www.justitie.nl/onderwerpen/wetgeving).
20 See for an introduction to the German approach on valuation of near financial distress: 
Hirte, H., B. Knof, and S. Mock, 2008, Überschuldung und Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz, 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Insolvenzrecht (ZInsO) 2008, 1217.
21 This part is based on Altman, E.I., 1993, Corporate financial distress and bankruptcy (John 
Wiley and Sons, inc.).
22 Under-investment occurs if the company fails to invest in projects with a positive NPV. In case 
of over–investment the company has invested in projects with a negative NPV (Berkovitch 
and Israel, 1998; Franken, 2004).
23 The full text of the INSOL principles is on the INSOL website, www.insol.org.
24 HR 18 September 2009, LJN BI5912 (Coutts). Although the Hoge Raad rejects the appeal based 
on 81 RO, the conclusion of AG Timmerman deserves attention (a) for its survey of relevant 
case law (3.4-3.11) on holding company liability in situations of financial distress and (b) for 
the analysis of the differences between the much cited HR 21 December 2001, NJ 2005, 96 
(Sobi/Hurks II) case and the underlying case (4.11, 4.18). In Sobi/Hurks II the holding com-
pany was held liable whilst in the Coutts case the Court of Appeal accepted its behaviour.
25 Criticism of this judgment: A. van Hees in ‘het Financieele Dagblad’ 19 January 2010.
26 Unsecured creditors often receive more because of their negotiating position, than they would 
according to the law (Baird, 2007)
27 E.g. s 173b Fw.
28 E.g. s 33 Fw.
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We currently have little which could 
be glorified by the title of a “Theory of 
monitoring” and yet this is a crucial 
building block of the analysis. (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976: 354)
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3.1 InTRODUCTIOn
Chapter 1 showed that at least 32% of all bankruptcies are due to management errors. 
This is the very same management that, according to chapter 2, should attempt to solve 
financial difficulties when they occur. If these difficulties cannot be dealt with by the 
company on its own, management may have to negotiate for an informal reorganization. 
This negotiation process will only succeed if creditors have confidence in management’s 
capabilities. Management’s role is apparently crucial in running a company near financial 
distress. Good monitors and well-designed monitoring structures may add to its quality1.
This chapter aims to explore the role of monitoring in the broader context of the gov-
ernance of the company from an economic viewpoint. Section 3.2 sets out to survey the 
various parties a company may come across. The topic of 3.3 is the economic theory 
behind corporate governance. Section 3.4 describes the mechanisms by which corporate 
governance actually works. Monitoring of the company is the focus of 3.5. Section 3.6 
concludes.
3.2 PARTIES RELATED TO THE COMPAnY
Any company functions in the broader context of society. Its relationships with share-
holders, lenders, employees, customers, suppliers, trade unions, the government, jour-
nalists and so on determine its success. How are these relationships organized and how 
powerfully do they influence the company’s policies and its success? That is the subject 
of this section.
The analysis starts with the relationship with the company. A corporate relationship 
means that the party belongs to the structure of the company. In a commercial relation-
ship, a party contracts with the company from outside the company structure. And in a 
public relationship, the public function concerns itself with the company. An analysis of 
each follows in sections 3.2.1 – 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Corporate relationships
Corporate relationships relate to the structure of the company. Most of the relation-
ships shown in figure 3.1 are established in corporate law, but they may originate in e.g. 
labour law as well. Founders are at the origin of the company. The participants, members, 
convene at least once a year in the annual general meeting (AGM), which discusses the 
policy and the state of the affairs of the company. This AGM is also the moment to take 
decisions, assigned to the members by law or by the articles. Directors are appointed 
in the memorandum or later on by a decision of the members or others in accordance 
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with the law and the company’s articles. Economists describe the relationship between 
directors and members as an agency relationship (see 3.3.1.1). The member, called the 
principal, orders the director, called the agent, to direct the company and pursue his 
interests. Larger companies usually have executive (EDs) as well as non-executive direc-
tors (NEDs). EDs normally have a full-time employment contract with the company. 
Their prime responsibility is the running of the company’s business2. NEDs do not hold 
managerial roles in the company3. They are outsiders and make their services available 
to the company part-time. As the UK Code on Corporate Governance (UKC) puts it, ‘they 
should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy’4. Management or 
manager is not a legal term. Management usually means the ensemble of EDs and senior-
managers. A manager is a person who runs part of a company. However, management 
happens to indicate senior management only as opposed to EDs as well. The wording 
differs also between US and British literature. Careful reading is necessary. In a one-tier 
system as in the UK the board is a company organ consisting of EDs and NEDs together. 
According to the UKC ‘its role is to provide entrepreneurial leadership of the company 
within a framework of prudent and effective controls which enables risk to be assessed 
and managed. The board should set the company’s strategic aims, ensure that the neces-
sary financial and human resources are in place for the company to meet its objectives 
and review management performance’5. In a two-tier system such as in Germany and the 
Netherlands, EDs and NEDs are organized in two separate boards, the executive board 
6(EB) and the supervisory board (SB). The Dutch corporate governance code (DC) describes 
the role of the supervisory board as ‘to supervise the policies of the management board 
and the general affairs of the company and its affiliated enterprise, as well as to assist the 
management board by providing advice’7. The supervision includes i.a. the functioning of 
the management board8, corporate strategy and risks9. Thus, in both systems NEDs have 
a control, service and strategy role10 (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 303; Brennan, 2006: 58011). 
Or as Chancellor Allen of the Delaware Court of Chancery once said12:
outside directors should function as continuous active monitors of corporate manage-
ment; have an active role in the formulation of long-term strategic, financial and or-
ganizational goals and should approve plans to achieve those goals; engage in periodic 
performance review and be prepared to press for correction when in their judgment 
there is need.
This makes their position hybrid: they have to monitor and supervise the EDs and to 
co-operate with them through their service and strategy formulating role for the better 
of the company (Jungmann, 2006). Members appoint NEDs if the law so requires or as 
soon as they feel that closer supervision of management than they themselves can offer 
is needed or appropriate. Again, an agency relationship comes into existence between 
members and NEDs. If NEDs appoint EDs, which is the case in some corporate systems, 
there even exists an agency relationship between the EDs and the NEDs.
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The establishment of a works council depends on the circumstances, e.g. legal system, 
number of employees and an employee request. This council, although established by 
labour law, is considered a part of the structure of the company here, because through 
its rights to advise or to approve it directly influences management decisions. Moreover, 
a works council in the Netherlands may de facto nominate candidates for the SB. The UK 
system prescribes a company secretary, which is essentially a compliance officer. Figure 
3.1 gives a schematic overview of the one-tier corporate structure, found in the UK and 
therefore called the ‘Anglo-Saxon Model’ and the two-tier structure with its employee 
involvement, also called ‘the Rhineland Model’. The arrows in figure 3.1 indicate a moni-
toring relationship.
It is important to note that where legal scholars would make a difference between a per-
son, e.g. a member, and a corporate organ, e.g. the AGM of the company13, an economist, 
studying relationships rather than legal structures, would not. A member with a large 
stock, a so-called blockholder, might exert influence by talking to the (executive) board 
about proposals he has, in ‘one-on-ones’ outside the company structure. He may even 
have the right to convene an extraordinary general meeting (EGM) if he has a certain 
percentage e.g. 10% of the shares (see i.a. chapter 4.4). But the final decision is up to the 
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EGM, and he may lose a contest if more than 20% of the shareholders are present and he 
is the only supporter of his proposal.
Employees may have direct influence on the membership of the works council or the SB 
and indirect influence by voting with their feet or by blowing the whistle. After its incor-
poration in US law (Sarbanes-Oxley) and European governance codes the whistle-blowing 
mechanism may become a powerful instrument. NEDs and EDs are marked individually as 
well as collectively by ‘board’ in the figure, since the law addresses them in some cases as 
an individual and in others as part of the board.
Corporate law organizes most of the corporate relationships. It aims at proper checks 
and balances between the various constituents in the company, often based on the find-
ings of economists on the subject of corporate governance. Other relationships are vital 
to the company as well, as the next section shows.
3.2.2 Commercial relationships
Every company does business with outside parties. After the establishment of the com-
pany, a search commences for a director, for housing, for utility connections, for other 
employees. Thereafter follow suppliers of all kinds of goods and services and customers. 
Often, investors will finance the company and keep a close watch. The auditor checks 
the truthfulness of the annual report. If a company becomes listed, it contracts with the 
stock exchange. Investor-analysts and credit-rating agencies come into play. This is the 
full-blown concept of the company as a nexus for contracting relationships (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).
Companies do not always understand the importance of these relationships. For investor 
relations they usually do; all the websites of listed companies have a button ‘investor 
relations’ but not all of the information is easily accessible, and after some time the 
information is often removed from the web. But it is not only investments that a company 
needs; just as important are suppliers, customers, applicants for jobs. In order to remain 
an attractive business partner, a company should, by means of its directors, listen to 
signals from the market and react to them. If companies neglect signals this might lead to 
additional legal obligations, e.g. mandatory product guarantee regulations for customers; 
whistle-blowing provisions and a labour-union right to request a court for an inquiry; 
and on the reverse side obligations for the company, e.g. the obligations for insurance 
and investment companies to disclose their margins.
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3.2.3 Public relationships
The company has various relationships with the outside world that are not of a commer-
cial nature. The government and its constituencies are most important: the tax authori-
ties, the competition authorities, inspection services for production quality or for labour 
conditions, authorities for certain permits or grants, the Handelsregister, and so on. For 
listed companies there is usually a market regulator, and for listed financial companies 
there is the supervision of the central bank as well. Courts play an important role in 
criminal, commercial, labour or corporate conflicts a company might encounter. Other 
relationships of a public nature are pressure groups, e.g. Greenpeace which inhibited the 
sinking of Shell’s oil platform Brent Spar. Trade unions, journalists or an ombudsman 
who brings dubious practices of a company to daylight also fall into this category. All 
these relationships might produce signals to the market in as far as those relationships 
and its results are disclosed to the public.
3.2.4 Relationships: concluding remarks
A company develops various relationships in the course of its business. Each relationship 
might bring warnings, insights or opportunities. If the company does not recognize these 
signals, it might miss necessary options for renewal or correction, which may usher in the 
end of the company. How to organize the company to avoid this loss of potential? This is 
the subject of the next section.
3.3 CORPORATE GOVERnAnCE
This section elaborates on the economic insights on governance of the company, better 
known as corporate governance. Section 3.3.1 is about the concept and its underlying 
economic theories. Definitions of corporate governance found in the literature are dis-
cussed in section 3.3.2. Section 3.3.3 touches on the question whether such a definition 
should be positive or normative. Section 3.3.4 concludes.
3.3.1 Evolution of the concept
The concept of ‘corporate governance’ is relatively new. The Principles of corporate gov-
ernance and structure: restatement and recommendations of the American Law Institute 
(ALI) of the early 1980s14 can be considered a starting point15. Ever since, the flow of 
literature on corporate governance has grown. This subsection explores some of its basic 
theoretical foundations.
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3.3.1.1 Agency theory
The idea of an existing conflict of interests between investors and directors is very old. 
Seeds can already be found in Plato’s The Republic, when he describes that guardians 
should not acquire property of their own beyond what is necessary, in order to be able to 
do a proper job as a guardian16. Theoretical development started with Smith (1776) who 
wrote:
The directors of such (joint-stock) companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own (Book Five, Chapter 1, part 3, article 1).
Berle and Means (1932) convincingly showed the crucial insight of the separation of 
ownership and control in large corporations. They observed:
If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is the prime force motivating 
control, we must conclude that the interests of control are different from and often 
radically opposed to those of ownership; that the owners most emphatically will not be 
served by a profit-seeking controlling group (Berle and Means, 1932: 114).
Later on, Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 781) concluded that in team production, due to 
metering problems of the individual effort, shirking arises, which can only be reduced 
by monitoring the input performance of team members. The crucial question remained: 
who will monitor the monitor (p. 782)? Their answer is: the specialist who receives the 
residual rewards, the residual claimant. The seminal article of Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
on the theory of the firm elaborated on those insights. Their starting point is the agency 
relationship, defined as a contract under which one or more persons – the principal(s) 
– engage another person – the agent – to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (p. 308). The relation-
ship between a shareholder, the principal, and the manager, the agent, is the standard 
example of an agency relationship in company law17. There are others, like the relation-
ship between majority (agent) and minority (principal) shareholders; and that ‘between 
the controllers of the company, whether directors or shareholders (agents) and those 
other groups whose contribution is vital to the success of the company, such as investors, 
lenders, employees, suppliers and customers (Davies, 2010: 29; Kraakman et al. 2009: 2, 
35). If both parties to a contract are utility maximizers, there is good reason to believe 
that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal (p. 308). Such 
agency conflicts may arise in any form of jointly owned enterprise (Kraakman et al. 2009: 
2). Exemplary for an agency conflict is the manager’s tendency to appropriate perquisites 
out of the firm’s resources for his own consumption (Jensen and Meckling, 1976: 313). To 
88 Chapter 3
minimize agency problems, costs have to be incurred. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 308) 
define these agency costs as the sum of:
1. the monitoring expenditures by the principal (e.g. costs of management supervision 
and external auditing costs),
2. the bonding expenditures by the agent (e.g. obligations to disclose properly; to abstain 
from corporate opportunities or related party transactions; to accept an option-
scheme, a lock-up for earned shares, variable rewards or personal liability), and
3. the residual loss (this is the result of the divergence between the agent’s decisions and 
those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal).
Later on Jensen (1994) pointed out that not only rational behaviour causes agency costs, 
but also nonrational behaviour of the agent, i.e. non-functional behaviour that system-
atically harms the individual as well as those around them.
In Jensen and Meckling (1976) as well as in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) monitoring is 
predominantly present. Not surprisingly, it is predominant in corporate governance as 
well. What does monitoring mean exactly? This will be the subject of section 3.5. To be 
able to monitor well, disclosure of information is indispensable, as will be shown now.
3.3.1.2 Bounded rationality, opportunism and information asymmetry
(Neo-)classical economic theory assumes rational behaviour of economic individuals. As 
Simon (1957: 196) puts it:
There are two principal species of economic man: the consumer and the entrepre-
neur. Classical economics assumes the goals of both to be given: the former wishes to 
maximize his utility, which is a known function of the goods and services he consumes; 
the latter wishes to maximize his profit. The theory then assumes both of them to be 
rational. Confronted with a pair of alternatives, they will select that one which yields 
the larger utility or profit, respectively.
Simon (1957) stated that for an analysis of the specific problems with which organiza-
tional theory is concerned, this idealization is inappropriate. Instead, he introduced the 
concept of bounded rationality (p. 198):
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very 
small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively 
rational behaviour in the real world – or even for a reasonable approximation to such 
objective rationality.
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Of the numerous often complex alternatives, the individual is able to choose and work 
out only a few, the presumably realistic ones. The span of control of an individual is lim-
ited. Moreover, Williamson argued that the classical assumption of trustworthiness and 
reliability of the agent should be dropped. He introduced the concept of opportunism.
Opportunism effectively extends the usual assumption of self-interest seeking to make 
allowance for self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1981: 1545).
Acknowledging that the alternatives the manager has scrutinized are limited and that 
he might behave opportunistically, the problem of information disclosure arises. Obvi-
ously, as the manager has bounded rationality, supervisors suffer the same. How can a 
monitor be sure that the agent provides him with all the relevant information and that 
this information is true? This is known as the problem of information-asymmetry. It 
comes in three ways. Akerlof (1970) describes the adverse selection problem. This is the 
ex ante information asymmetry problem, referred to by Douma and Schreuder (1998) as 
essentially a problem of unobservability. Before contracting, one does not know whether 
all the relevant information has truly been given. The buyer of a car keeps in mind that 
the offered second-hand car might be a lemon (a Monday-morning car) and bids ac-
cordingly. The owner of a good car will refrain from using the open market, which in the 
end gives rise to the speculation that all second-hand cars in the open market will tend 
to be lemons or worse. Likewise, the offeror of an insurance policy takes the possibility 
of a new client being a bad risk into account (although he himself does not know). The 
insurance policy is therefore offered at a relatively high premium, making it only ac-
ceptable for bad risks. Finally the policy will disappear from the market. In terms of a 
company, this implies that new directors should be interviewed thoroughly about their 
backgrounds, experiences and expectations. The directors should do proper research 
themselves as well on the terms of their contract and on their new employer. Jensen 
(1993: 863) calls this directional due diligence18. Moral hazard is the second information 
asymmetry problem. It has been described by Knight (1921, as reprinted in 1933: 249) 
and can be considered as the ex post information asymmetry problem (Williamson, 1981: 
1545). It refers to actions which parties in a transaction may take after they have agreed 
to execute the transaction, e.g. sloppy behaviour, creative accounting or even fraud. The 
problem is often unobservable too. The challenge is to make this behaviour controllable 
in some way (e.g. through standards, contractual arrangements, disciplinary law). Thirdly, 
as Boot and Macey (2004: 373) argued, it is the timing of the information that is essential. 
Late intervention as a consequence of information received too late is costly in terms of 
financial and reputational losses.
The conclusion is that every agency relationship will suffer in some degree from the 
aforementioned phenomena: bounded rationality, opportunism and information asym-
metry.
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3.3.1.3 Shareholder and stakeholder model, stewardship theory and good agents
Apart from agency conflicts and noise in the agency relationship, whose interests should 
the agent ideally serve? Blair (1995) discusses two approaches. The first states that since 
managers are appointed by shareholders, they should serve, only19 or mainly, the share-
holders’ interests. An enlightened version of this approach adds that this can be done 
through serving the interests of the company. Anyhow, either direct or through the inter-
ests of the company as a means, the shareholders’ interests should be served. This is the 
shareholder value approach or shareholder approach. The other approach acknowledges 
the nomination of the managers by the shareholders, but adds that the shareholders do 
not nominate as such, but act as a legal organ of the company. So, the nomination is not 
made by the shareholders but by the company (according to its articles) and hence the 
managers should serve the interests of the company. Since it is in the interests of the 
company not only to have good accessibility to the capital markets, but also to other 
markets e.g. the labour and consumer market, and players, such as competitors and the 
government, in the latter approach the scope of interests an agent should look after is 
by far broader. This approach is called the stakeholder approach. ‘Stakeholder’ refers to 
those groups without whose support the organization would cease to exist (Freeman and 
Reed, 1983). In the narrow sense it means the corporate and commercial relationships 
described in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. In the wide sense20, it includes the public relationships of 
3.2.3. as well.
It is easy to see that the shareholder approach originates directly from the early develop-
ment of corporations21. Individuals collected capital for a venture. Those individuals were 
called members (Davies, 2002: 28). The members appointed a manager to let the venture 
happen. Ideally that manager should look after the interests of the members. Later on, 
these ventures received legal status upon request, and the corporate form with limited 
liability came into being (Davies, 2002: 1). By introducing this third legal person, a new 
field of force arose. As long as only the shareholders have a say in the company, this 
view is somewhat theoretical22. But even then, judges started to distinguish between the 
interests of the shareholders and those of the company23. This is the origin of the more 
enlightened version of this shareholder approach, in which the ultimate goal of a company 
became to generate maximum value for shareholders, later on redefined in: corporate 
wealth, during the life cycle of the company24. With this approach, the company itself got 
a position: decisions made in the immediate interests of the shareholder might very well 
not be in the interests of the company in the long run. The latter should prevail25.
In fact one could consider the stakeholder approach as a further development of the 
enlightened approach described before. During the reconstruction period in Europe after 
World War II it became clear that tying in as many interests as possible in the company 
was the best approach to fast growth. Avoid strikes and motivate labour, was the motto. 
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That is why labour has a rather important position in German and Dutch company law, 
and in EU law (at least relative to that of the USA) in general. As Blair (1995: 179) shows, 
a development towards considering other interests (through the ‘best interests of the 
corporation’ criterion) – at least for the take-over context - can be seen in the USA as 
well. While it is still mainstream in the USA to acknowledge the predominant position of 
capital26 in companies, the importance of the interests of labour, creditors, consumers, 
other interested parties and the government is at least in Europe gradually accepted27. 
In the USA as well as in Europe the member approach has been left behind; the company 
is seen nowadays as a separate legal person with interests of its own. These interests 
should be prevalent in company decisions, by law28.
A further development in the goals to be served by the agent shows the stewardship 
theory. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997: 24) write:
In stewardship theory, the model of man is based on a steward whose behaviour is 
ordered such that pro-organizational, collectivistic behaviours have higher utility than 
individualistic, self-serving behaviours.
Stewards work in the best interests of the group. They are ‘motivated to maximize or-
ganizational performance, thereby satisfying the competing interests of shareholders’. 
The essential assumption underlying the prescriptions of stewardship theory is that the 
behaviour of the executive directors is aligned with the interests of the corporation and 
its principals (p. 25). This implies that interested parties should trust the agent almost 
unconditionally. A related concept is that of a ‘good agent’ (Cooter and Eisenberg, 2001: 
1732). Agents should internalize firm-specific fairness norms, making them less inclined 
to opportunism and more able to cooperate. ‘Agents who internalize firm-specific fair-
ness norms acquire good agent character and act authentically from internalized values, 
whereas agents with bad character act instrumentally and opportunistically.’
All this, it is felt, is too far from reality. Reality shows that human beings are by definition 
fallible. The principle of opportunism suits practice therefore better, since it covers all 
types of agents, than the concept of the steward or that of the ‘good agent’. This does not 
imply that agents are supposed to work only for their own direct personal benefit. There 
is nothing inconsistent between self-interested and altruistic behaviour (Jensen, 1994)29. 
In the Resourceful, Evaluative, Maximizing Model (REMM; Jensen and Meckling, 1994), 
which can be seen as an elaboration of Simon’s work, there is room for maximization 
of other values than money. The individual cares about intangible values, such as the 
environment, friends, culture, and he is resourceful. Still each individual is a maximizer: 
he acts so as to enjoy the highest level of value possible. Altruistic values may be one 
of them and in pursuing them, self-interest is served as well. Since the agency theory 
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proves flexible enough to cover the full range of human behaviour, it is the paradigm of 
this thesis.
3.3.2 Towards a definition of corporate governance
With the agency theory in mind, the question of the precise definition of corporate gov-
ernance will now be turned to. Governance comes form gubernare in Latin (to steer; also 
to be used in connection with rem publicam) and κυβερνάω in Greek (with a similar 
meaning). Corporate steering would not be a bad start for a definition, and indeed one 
of the first definitions found in literature defines corporate governance as the purposes 
and method of how we structure and control our companies large and small (Barker, 
1980: vii in: Midgley, 1982). Bookshelves full have ever since been published on corporate 
governance30 and more often than not the author or report decides on a new definition31. 
It is instructive to scrutinize a few authoritative definitions. Some are compact, as the one 
of the Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (better 
known as the Cadbury Report, 1992, after the Chairman of the committee):
Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled 
(Cadbury, 1992, par. 2.5).
Clarke (2004: 1) calls this a functional definition. Hart’s (1995: 678) approach is of a 
property rights nature, thus focussing on the optimal allocation of residual control rights 
(see 2.4.5). He explains that corporate governance issues arise in an organization when-
ever two conditions are present: (1) the existence of an agency problem or a conflict of 
interest between members of the organization; and (2) transaction costs are such that 
this agency problem cannot be dealt with through a contract. In a world, Hart continues, 
of incomplete contracts that faces agency problems, a governance structure can be seen 
as a mechanism for making decisions that have not been specified in the initial contract. 
More precisely the
governance structure allocates residual rights of control over the firm’s nonhuman 
assets; that is the right to decide how these assets should be used, given that a usage 
has not been specified in an initial contract (p. 680).
In this line of thinking, Transaction Costs Economics (TCE), which is predominantly  con-
cerned with economizing on transaction costs, considers debt and equity principally as 
governance structures rather than as financial instruments (Williamson, 1988: 579; 2007: 
3)32. Shleifer and Vishny (1997: 737) approach the issue from this investment viewpoint 
as well. Their widely-cited article opens with the sentence:
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Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corpora-
tions assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.
While Cadbury focuses on the company, which can be considered a European approach 
(e.g. Mallin (2009), figure 4.1.: 64), the American approach represented by Hart (1995), 
Williamson (1988) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) focuses on the investor33. The more 
elaborated OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD, 2004: 11) combine both 
worlds:
Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s manage-
ment, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate Governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.
The present Dutch Corporate Governance code (DC) describes (good) corporate gover-
nance as follows:
Good entrepreneurship, which includes integrity and transparency of the management 
board’s actions, as well as effective supervision of their actions and accountability for 
such supervision, are essential conditions for stakeholder confidence in management 
and supervision. These are the two pillars on which good corporate governance is 
founded and which are the basis of this Code.
A famous American textbook however, Monks’ Corporate Governance (Monks and Minow, 
2004: 2) adds a new element, by placing sustainability in the centre:
Corporate Governance is the structure that is intended to make sure that the right 
questions get asked and that checks and balances are in place to make sure that the 
answers reflect what is best for the creation of long-term, sustainable value.
Although this explicit long-term perspective sounds more sympathetic to Europeans 
than Shleifer and Vishny’s 1997 definition which might strike one as ‘short-termish’, 
the value (thus: the shareholder) also remains in the centre in this case. Mallin (2009) 
refrains from providing a new definition, but instead presents some important features 
of corporate governance:
• It helps to ensure that an adequate and appropriate system of controls operates within 
a company and hence assets may be safeguarded;
• It also prevents any single individual having too powerful an influence;
• It is concerned with the relationship between a company’s management, the board of 
directors, shareholders and other stakeholders;
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• It aims to ensure that the company is managed in the best interests of the shareholders 
and the other stakeholders;
• It tries to encourage both transparency and accountability which investors are increas-
ingly looking for in both corporate management and corporate performance.
The conclusion is that the European approach (represented by Cadbury, Mallin and in-
cluding the first sentence of the OECD description) is based on the company. The rules 
by which the company has to be governed are given in its interests. The American ap-
proach, however, primarily sees the company as an investors’ vehicle. This is clear from 
the property rights approach of Hart (1995) as well as from the description of Shleifer 
and Vishny (1997). The second sentence in the OECD description, speaking of setting the 
objectives of the company and the means of attaining those, indicates a similar direc-
tion. This study chooses the European approach as research is done on European data 
in a European setting. As Cadbury’s definition is short, clear and workable, this study 
will use the definition of corporate governance as the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled as is indicated in figure 3.2. The figure shows that in a corporate 
governance system ‘direction’, i.e. the actual running of the company, is surrounded by 
various control mechanisms.
3.3.3 A positive or a normative approach to corporate governance
As may be concluded from the last subsection, corporate governance in itself is a posi-
tive concept. It should describe the actual organization of the interrelationship between 
company, agent, shareholders and stakeholders, without being normative. The normative 
or prescriptive use of the corporate governance concept is to be avoided. A personal 
preference for a desired set of rules of the game should go by the term good corporate 
governance, which indicates clearly enough that the author takes a position. Monks (2004: 
2) and Mallin (2009: 8) describe corporate governance normatively when using word-
ing such as: intended, the right questions, aims, encouragement. The Dutch corporate 
governance code has a similar normative approach, but concludes by naming this good 
corporate governance, as it should be. The OECD code (2004: 11) makes the distinction 
properly:
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Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and man-
agement to pursue objectives that are in the interest of the company and its sharehold-
ers and should facilitate effective monitoring.
While acknowledging that there is no single model of good corporate governance, the 
OECD claims to have identified some common elements that underlie good corporate 
governance. They are:
I. Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient 
markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of re-
sponsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities.
II. The Rights of Shareholders and Key Ownership Functions
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders’ rights.
III. The Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.
IV. The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability 
of financially sound enterprises.
V. Disclosure and Transparency
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclo-
sure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.
VI. The Responsibilities of the Board
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s ac-
countability to the company and the shareholders.
It should be noted that the OECD (2004) brings in new elements, being as Jensen (1993: 
850) puts it, the legal/political/regulatory system (number I) and the role of stakeholders 
(number IV). A similar approach can be read in Mallin’s (2009) work. This implies that in 
this approach good corporate governance surpasses the boundaries of the firm.
3.3.4 Concluding remarks on corporate governance
This section explained the choice for the agency theory as the basis for further theoreti-
cal analysis. It seems a flexible and widely applicable approach. Agents, who direct the 
company, should be kept on the right track by control through monitors. This is the 
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essence of corporate governance. This thesis therefore defines corporate governance as 
the system by which companies are directed and controlled. This system is not restricted 
to the company; outside monitors have their role as well, as 3.5 shows.
3.4 DIRECTIOn AnD COnTROL
If, using Cadbury’s definition, corporate governance is about direction and control of the 
company, the division between direction and control remains to be determined. This has 
never been done as transparently as by Fama and Jensen (1983: 303) in their description 
of the four stages of the decision process:
1.  initiation – generation of proposals for resource utilization and structuring of 
contracts;
2.  ratification – choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented;
3.  implementation – execution of ratified decisions; and
4.  monitoring - measurement of the performance of decision agents and implemen-
tation of rewards.
Obviously, the first and the third stage, which they call decision management, are in the 
hands of the management. This is the direction part of corporate governance. The second 
and the fourth stages, decision control, are executed by the board. Here the control part 
of the corporate governance definition comes into play. This clear distinction of the deci-
sion process in decision management and decision control should be at the heart of every 
analysis of corporate governance. It is in fact a principle of proper administration policy. 
However, the required distribution of tasks is not always possible in small companies 
with few employees.
Tricker (1984: 6), in a similar analysis, states that the management role is running the 
business operations efficiently and effectively, while, by contrast, the governance role is 
concerned with giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling 
the executive actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations for ac-
countability and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries. The following 
subsections present an analysis of both the direction and the control part of corporate 
governance.
3.4.1 Direction
Direction of a company, the abstract initiation and implementation phase of Fama and 
Jensen (1983), concerns more specifically the way management operates. It is
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(..) about the product design, procurement, personnel, management, production, mar-
keting and finance functions, and so on, within the boundaries of the company under 
which it trades. (..) The focus is on managing the business (Tricker, 1984: 6).
This is essentially what executive directors and the management teams working for them 
do. As long as things work out all right, no one bothers. There is a risk of free-rider 
behaviour of all stakeholders. But the agency theory shows that agents and principals 
have different objectives. Inevitably this difference of objectives will surface. It is at that 
moment that the principals should be able to control their interests, the latter half of 
Cadbury’s definition.
3.4.2 Control
Why is control necessary? The necessity derives from the insight based on the agency 
theory that the interests of the agent and the principal (management and shareholder; 
majority and minority shareholder; shareholder and creditor or employee) diverge and 
should be aligned in order to avoid expropriation of the principal by the agent. Although 
the analysis below focuses on the management/shareholder agency conflict, it applies 
mutatis mutandis to the other two sources of agency conflicts as well. Generally control 
is divided in internal and external control. Internal control is defined as organizationally 
based mechanisms of corporate control designed to bring the interests of managers and 
shareholders into congruence (Walsh and Seward, 1990: 421, 423) and external control as 
market and government based control mechanisms. As Jensen (1993: 850) puts it:
There are only four control forces operating on the corporation to resolve the problems 
caused by a divergence between managers’ decisions and those that are optimal from 
society’s standpoint. They are the
• Capital markets,
• Legal/political/regulatory system,
• Product and factor markets, and
• Internal control systems headed by the board of directors.
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The elementary corporate governance system of figure 3.2 now evolves to figure 3.3. The 
figure shows that the internal control system is part of the company, just like manage-
ment, whilst the external control systems stand outside the company structure.
3.4.2.1 Internal control
Internal control means different things to different people (COSO, 2006)34. Maijoor (2000: 
106) described three perspectives on internal control to be distinguished within the ac-
counting literature: (1) the external auditing, (2) the management control and organiza-
tion theory, and (3) the economic perspective, the last dominated by the agency theory. 
The agency theory research focuses on top-level control problems like those between 
outside capital suppliers and (inside and outside) directors (Maijoor, 2000: 105)35. Jensen 
(1993: 862-867) listed some of these control problems from the US perspective:
• Board culture: the emphasis on politeness and courtesy at the expense of truth and 
frankness, which Davies (2002) described as ‘mutual back-scratching’.
• Information and expertise problems: the CEO almost always determines the agenda 
and the information given to the board and (financial) expertise might be lacking on 
the board.
• Legal liability: legal incentives are more often consistent with minimizing downside 
risk or reputational damage rather than maximizing value.
• Lack of management and board equity holdings: encouraging new board members to 
hold substantial equity interests would force them to recognize that their decisions 
affect their own wealth as well as that of remote shareholders.
• Oversized boards: keeping boards small can help improve their performance.
• Attempts to remodel the process after political democracy in which various constituen-
cies are represented are likely to make the process even weaker.
• Separation of CEO and chairman positions is required for an effective board. The 
challenge for such a board is to rise early to the challenge of correcting a failing 
management system.
• Resurrecting active investors (promoting shareholder activism): active investors are 
important to a well-functioning governance system because they have the financial 
interests and independence to view firm management and policies in an unbiased 
way.
To these internal control problems should be added:
• Adequate composition of the board, (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) to be analyzed in 
terms of:
 o  insider/outsider: is the director employed by the company?
 o  dependent/independent: does the director have business ties with the company?
 o  education and expertise, and
 o  personal characteristics.
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• Distribution of power between the internal organs: management, board and share-
holders determine the corporate governance structure of a firm (Boot and Macey, 
2004: 373). The law and the articles of association provide the framework, but the 
behaviour and weight of the participants influences the actual position as well.
It is these kind of top-level problems, as referred to by Maijoor (2000), which are per-
fectly covered by the aforementioned definition of Walsh and Seward (1993), to which 
this thesis will refer: Internal control is the system of organizationally based mechanisms 
of corporate control designed to bring the interests of managers and shareholders into 
congruence.
For Jensen (1993: 862) the very purpose of the internal control mechanism36 is to provide 
an early warning system to put the organization back on track before difficulties reach 
a crisis stage. This is a crucial insight for answering the question why internal control is 
that important. Only when internal control is ineffective will external control be neces-
sary to replace and discipline managers (Fama, 1980: 295; Walsh and Seward, 1990: 434; 
Berkovitch and Israel, 1996: 20). Figure 3.4 fits these internal control mechanisms into 
the upper-middle block. Section 3.2 already described the corporate relationships of the 
monitors of the internal control mechanism in the middle block of figure 3.4. Employees 
are an internal control ‘mechanism’ as well insofar as they vote for representatives in 
company organs, blow the whistle, or ‘vote with their feet’. The other blocks of figure 3.4 
show the external control mechanisms of corporate governance, to be discussed in the 
next section.
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3.4.2.2 External control
External control is the system of market and government-based control mechanisms. 
An important force is the capital market, also called the market for corporate control 
(Manne, 1965). Walsh and Seward (1990: 435) describe this force as follows:
(..) as top managers engage in self-interested behaviour, their company’s performance 
is likely to increasingly diverge from its maximum potential. This underperformance is 
reflected in the value of the company’s stock. Under such circumstances, other man-
agement teams are likely to offer themselves to the shareholders as alternatives to the 
incumbent management. The “market for corporate control” then, is the competition 
among these management teams for the rights to manage corporate resources.
In the literature external control and the market for corporate control are sometimes 
erroneously identified (Berkovitch and Israel, 1996: 210; Weir, 1997: 156).
Although Jensen (1993: 850) regards the legal/political/regulatory system as far too 
blunt an instrument to handle the problems of wasteful managerial behaviour effectively, 
it should be acknowledged that e.g. the mandatory audit for large firms, anti-cartel mea-
sures, the US Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) and subsequent various EU regulations in the 
field of securities regulations, effectively do have major influence on the behaviour of 
directors. For fine-tuning at an individual company level however, this system seldom 
appears to be effective. Only courts and to a certain extent auditors are able to provide 
custom-built signals. Courts since they ultimately decide whether specific behaviour is 
acceptable; and auditors since their statement contains a judgment on the reliability 
of the annual accounts37 which should be made available to the shareholders38. At the 
individual company level, the product and factor markets directly identify the need for 
corrections to the management team. Firms that do not supply the product consumers 
desire at a competitive price cannot survive (Jensen, 1993: 850). A similar mechanism 
can be observed for the demand for management on the market for managerial labour 
(Fama, 1980: 292). If the proposition is not attractive, the firm will not be able to acquire 
new management.
The aforementioned factors originate from outside the company. The capital market fac-
tor, however, is only effective when shareholders are not satisfied with the performance 
of the incumbent management and are prepared to sell their shares to a bidder. Usually 
this will only be the case when the internal control does not work sufficiently. How can 
the actual functioning of the internal control system be ascertained? Stakeholders have a 
role here as will be discussed in the next section.
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3.5 MOnITORInG
Whether the internal control mechanisms actually work can only be established by stake-
holders who watch over the firm39. These are called monitors. Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 
782) attach primarily a disciplinary connotation to the term monitor, as do Jensen and 
Meckling (1976: 308):
(..) the term monitoring includes more than just measuring or observing the behavior of 
the agent. It includes efforts on the part of the principal to ‘control’ the behavior of the 
agent through budget restrictions, compensation policies, operating rules etc.
So, a monitor indeed observes, comments, advises and warns as indicated in 1.5 but in 
order to be more effective its functioning should have a ‘controlling’ and disciplining 
connotation. Boot and Macey (2004: 357) have identified a variety of monitors: directors, 
auditors, credit-rating agencies, stock market analysts, take-over firms, arbitrageurs, 
large shareholders, outside lenders, and even customers and suppliers40. Some studies 
have introduced more specific monitoring roles. The next sections elaborate on these 
roles and the specific interests a monitor may have. Section 3.5.6 poses the question 
whether one monitoring system would fit all companies. Section 3.5.7 concludes.
3.5.1 Internal monitoring
Internal monitoring means monitoring through control mechanisms from inside the 
company structure. EDs are monitored by their managers, the company secretary and 
by NEDs; managers are monitored by the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983), their col-
leagues (Fama, 1980: 293), the company secretary and employees; and the board should 
be monitored by itself (the collegial board principle to be discussed in chapter 4), by 
the shareholders and the works council. Unfortunately, as Hart (1995: 681) explained, 
monitoring happens to be a public good and each shareholder will free-ride in the hope 
that other shareholders will do the monitoring, which they do not. So internal monitoring 
is essentially an activity of control between executive directors, managers, NEDs and 
employees, with the shareholders in the backseat. While acknowledging that monitors 
are crucial to effective corporate governance, Boot and Macey (2004: 357) argue that a 
trade-off exists between objectivity in monitoring and proximity in monitoring
(..) because monitors that obtain close proximity necessarily forego objectivity and 
objective monitors must maintain sufficient distance from management, which results 
in loss of the advantages of proximity.
Proximate monitors are susceptible to bias, as the board of directors may become too re-
liant on, and captured by, the judgement of the management (p. 372). The upper-middle 
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block of figure 3.5 describes the internal control mechanisms that may be present. Below 
each mechanism the figure indicates the relevant monitor: management controls the 
running of the company through EDs and senior management; the supervisory board 
controls EDs and senior management through NEDs; in a one-tier system the board 
controls senior and executive management through directors; the GM as a collective and 
shareholders through one-on-ones control management and the supervisory board; and 
so on, each monitor restricted by its function and legal competences. The next section 
describes the external monitoring control mechanisms of figure 3.5.
3.5.2 External monitoring
According to Ang, Cole and Lin (2000: 104) external monitoring is monitoring by external 
parties, like banks or bondholders. To this can be added: auditors, credit-rating agen-
cies, stock market analysts, take-over firms, arbitrageurs, customers and suppliers, as 
mentioned by Boot and Macey (2004), and in some sense even pressure groups, journal-
ists, whistle-blowers and judges. These are all external parties, so external monitoring is 
defined as monitoring by control mechanisms from outside the company structure. In the 
wide sense, these mechanisms except the legislator can all be considered as stakeholders 
of the company (see 3.3.1.3). In figure 3.5 each block represents a separate monitoring 
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mechanism, e.g. the capital market and its monitors, e.g. shareholders, lenders. Monitors 
are each in their own respect responsible for the efficient and effective functioning of 
the specific control mechanism. Most external monitors in figure 3.5 are market-related. 
Their role is either on the input markets for capital, labour and supplies or on the prod-
uct market. Market-related external monitors differ to a large extent per company and 
industry. However, the external monitors originating from the legal/political/regulatory 
system exist in principle for all companies. The formation authority brings the legal 
person into being; the external auditor reports annually to the members on the reliability 
of the annual accounts; the tax authorities correct company policy if they detect ad-
ministrative errors; the disclosure authority collects and checks financial and other data 
from the company and opens some of it to the public; the financial market authorities 
concern themselves with the prudential and behavioural side of financial companies, 
e.g. banks, insurance companies, financial intermediaries; the judicial authority either 
checks behaviour of the company (public prosecution) or settles conflicts (courts); the 
trade union may have a right to call on a judge, e.g. for an inquiry into company mis-
management in the Netherlands; publicity and interest groups make the public aware of 
dangers or abuse; whistle-blowers tell their employer, a regulator, customers, the police 
or the media about a dangerous or illegal activity that they are aware of through their 
work41; government agencies check whether the production process and products are in 
conformity with legislation; and finally the legislator decides whether the time has come 
to translate signals from society into new legislation. In fact, each citizen may at times 
play an external monitoring role, e.g. when filling out customer questionnaires on the 
internet. Since shareholders usually do not know more than any external monitor and 
do not often actively participate in the company, one might wonder whether they are 
internal or external monitors. This is the topic of the next section.
3.5.3 Shareholder monitoring
The question rises whether shareholders qualify as internal or external monitors. Huson, 
Parrino and Starks (2001: 2267-2271) loosely describe boards and institutional investors 
as internal monitoring mechanisms. Are they right? One has to admit that shareholders 
can monitor through different channels: through the AGM/EGM; through one-on-ones 
between large shareholders and the board; through preparatory research on a take-over 
bid; through their reaction to a take-over bid by someone else; by offering the shares or 
not; by buying or selling. Or, as Boot and Macey (2004: 367) put it:
Shareholders can exercise control through their impact on the board of directors and 
through interventions in the market for corporate control.
It is not immediately clear which shareholder activity should be classified as internal 
or external monitoring. This difference matters, as external monitoring is a free, un-
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formatted activity, while internal monitoring is made possible by special contractual or 
legal provisions and restrictions. In this study shareholder monitoring will be considered 
internal monitoring, if the shareholder while monitoring uses information or legal or 
contractual rights conferred to him as shareholder. If the shareholder uses other means 
of control, e.g. through the market for corporate control, this is external monitoring.
3.5.4 Institutional monitoring
Chung, Firth and Kim (2002: 31) studied the effectiveness of institutional monitoring, 
which they described as external monitoring by institutional investors. Charitou, Lam-
bertides and Trigeorgis (2005) used the concept outsider monitoring to indicate monitor-
ing by institutional investors. Should monitoring by institutional shareholders be labelled 
as internal or external monitoring? Tricker (1984: 15) wrote:
The institutional shareholders may be able to influence matters directly, without the 
involvement of the whole body of members, not necessarily acting in the interests of 
the whole. Meetings of members are felt by many to be inadequate and inappropriate 
vehicles for exercising governance (..).
From this angle, institutional monitoring seems predominantly to have an external moni-
toring nature. However, the importance of internal monitoring behaviour is apparent in 
e.g. the UKC (Schedule C) and the DC (IV.4.1-3) jo. s 5:86 Wft which prescribe justification 
of voting behaviour in the AGM/EGM by institutional investors i.a. on their websites. 
Whether institutional shareholders will use the internal or the external procedure may 
also depend on their goals. Coffee (1991: 1329) argues that modern public shareholders, 
which are often institutions, in fact purchase liquidity at the cost of control42. He con-
cludes43 that the optimal institutional monitor has an ability to hold large equity stakes, 
an inclination to hold them for the longer term over which improved monitoring can pay 
off and has no substantial conflict of interest (p. 1367).
Each institutional monitor will use his blockholder power and his actual power on the 
market in its own way, depending on its goals, its bias and its time horizon. This provides 
them with a special mix of powers that can exert influence far beyond the actual vot-
ing power, as e.g. was the case for TCI in the ABNAMRO case. For each separate action 
though, one can easily discern whether it involves internal or external monitoring, on the 
basis of the definitions provided above.
3.5.5 The interests of monitors
A monitor is an economic man. For him, monitoring is an economic activity which he 
will only undertake if it makes him better off in terms of his personal utility. That is 
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why small shareholders show free-rider behaviour: their effort never pays off and so 
they leave monitoring to others. It also explains why institutional shareholders in listed 
companies often choose to leave their assessment of board performance to intermediate 
institutions such as RiskMetrics. Or why a large blockholder such as TCI decided to write 
a letter and disclose it, since it felt it was not being taken seriously. This insight implies 
that truly effective monitoring only takes place if it adds to the utility of the monitor in 
terms of money, reputation, information, network or otherwise.
Moreover, every monitor unavoidably takes his own specific view. An ED-monitor may 
see career opportunities in a risky take-over plan or may oppose it, afraid of losing his 
reputation and being held personally liable. The secretary-monitor has to do and keep 
his job, to build up his reputation, to avoid mistakes in the legal requirements he has to 
meet and negative publicity as well. So he will have a legal, risk-avoiding attitude. For 
an employee-member of the works council job security and career development play a 
constant role in the background of his performance. A banker-NED is certainly interested 
in the well-being and growth opportunities of the company, but his focus of interest will 
be finance and the risks for the bank. A supplier-NED will be interested in the market of 
his supplies and in growth of the user-company. In a situation of near financial distress 
his focus may be on minimizing his risk. And even the truly independent NED will judge 
from his own experiences and cannot objectively oversee all the relevant aspects of a 
business case.
Thus, a director pondering the weight of a monitors’ opinion will always have to answer 
these two questions: (a) did the monitor really invest in the monitoring activity; and (b) 
from what interests or background did the monitor come to his advice or conclusion?
3.5.6 Monitoring: one size fits all?
Figure 3.5 shows the dual control system of internal and external control, its mechanisms 
and its monitors. Does this system apply to all companies, no matter the size, the specific 
legal form, or its objectives? Whilst the answer would certainly be in the affirmative on 
a systemic level, one has to admit that in practice a one-man business cannot afford e.g. 
managers, NEDs or a company secretary. This does not imply that a one-man business 
may not hire a manager to straighten out production problems; an external advisor to 
develop new markets; or someone to organize bookkeeping, disclosure and taxes, which 
is often the accountant. However, a one-man business may do with ‘lighter’, i.e. infor-
mally and/or ad hoc organized forms of monitoring than a larger firm or a listed firm. 
An expanding firm may need more NEDs than a consolidating one. A firm near financial 
distress may need other monitoring mechanisms or other monitors since, as chapter 5 
shows, financial distress marks a shift of interests from shareholders to creditors and 
employees. Eventually, every company should implement the monitoring system that 
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best fits its present and foreseeable future needs within the framework of the law. The 
latter is the subject of chapter 4.
3.5.7 Concluding remarks on monitoring
The monitoring concept derives from the agency theory. Monitoring should lessen shirk-
ing (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or opportunistic behaviour in general (Williamson, 1981) 
and may reduce the probability of mistakes (Jungmann, 2006). One discerns internal 
monitoring, which is monitoring by stakeholders from inside the company structure, 
and external monitoring, by stakeholders from outside the company structure. Which 
is the shareholders’ position? Some see institutional shareholders as internal, others as 
external monitors. If a shareholder, while monitoring, uses information or legal or con-
tractual rights conferred to him as a shareholder, it is internal shareholder monitoring. 
It is external if the shareholder uses other means of communication, as one-on-ones, 
road shows, analysts meetings, interviews in the media or court procedures. Likewise, 
banks (Bolton et al. 2005) and bondholders can profit from internal monitoring through a 
representative on the board. But normally they44 will only receive extra financial informa-
tion because this is agreed upon in a debt covenant. This again is external monitoring. In 
appreciating a monitors’ opinion it is important to know if the monitor did really invest in 
the monitoring activity as well as its background. Every company should implement the 
monitoring system that bests fits its needs within the framework of the law.
3.6 SUMMARY AnD COnCLUDInG REMARKS
This chapter explored the role of monitoring in the broader context of the governance of a 
company. In each company, various parties are involved in the daily routine but only one 
party, management, is committed full-time to its direction and control. Agency theory 
stresses that the principal, i.e. the member, and the agent, i.e. the manager, by definition 
have a different utility function (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This is the paradigm of 
this thesis. Moreover, proper performance by agents in the interests of the principal may 
severely be hampered by other factors. These are bounded rationality (Simon, 1957), i.e. 
every agent can cope with only a few alternative solutions, and information asymmetry, 
i.e. the agent does not share all the relevant information with the principal (Knight, 1921; 
Akerlof, 1970) which may even result in ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 
1981). Managers may become blinded by their power and unable to recognize adverse 
developments or new opportunities. They may even completely lose touch with reality 
(Skeel, 2005). Proper control of the agent is therefore essential. This is what corporate 
governance is about, defined based on the Cadbury Report of 1992 as the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled.
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Control, according to Jensen (1993), is a warning system. The control structure envelops 
the ‘direction’ activities by management through internal monitoring mechanisms, e.g. 
shareholders and supervisors, and external monitoring mechanisms such as markets, the 
auditor and a court. The control process is executed through monitors, i.e. all stakehold-
ers from inside and outside the company. It is a form of corporate democracy (Freeman 
and Reed, 1983). Well-executed monitoring is primarily in the interest of the members of 
the company, because their financial or ideological interests are at stake. But, at least in 
the long run, well-executed monitoring turns out to be in the interest of all stakehold-
ers of the company, including management. Every means to avoid blindness or Icarean 
behaviour; to improve results, to preserve one’s job or to avoid reputational damage 
should be welcomed by management if honest and in good faith. Management should 
only be prepared to listen sincerely. In order to remain efficient, it should not lose to 
monitors much of its discretionary power to direct the company. However, by listening to 
the various signals, arguments and opinions, the probability of mistakes will be reduced 
and management’s decisions will be improved. Monitoring comes at a cost. As long as it 
reduces the whole of agency costs i.e. reduces the residual loss for a larger amount than 
the monitoring investment, the company is better of.
Based on this analysis, a more elaborate definition of corporate governance could be:
Corporate governance is the entire system of internal and external monitors, execut-
ing the mechanisms of internal or external control, in order to have agents direct the 
company in an efficient and effective way.
Thus, management acts sensibly in organizing effective internal and external control, 
adapted to the needs of the company and to be performed by effective monitors.
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example on job security) (p. 1329-1334); (5) the opportunistic monitor (strives for his own 
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good; has conflicts of interest) and (6) the unaccountable monitor (of which public pension 
funds are an example).
43 Coffee concludes that pension funds and closed-end mutual funds are therefore better insti-
tutional monitors than banks and other creditor-shareholders.
44 See on this and related bonding costs issues: Jensen and Meckling (1976: 338).
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approach
By nature, organizations abhor 
control systems, and ineffective 
governance is a major part of 
the problem with internal control 
mechanisms. (Jensen, 1993: 852)
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4.1 InTRODUCTIOn
The previous chapter portrayed the role of monitoring from an economic perspective. 
The agent or executive director (ED) directs the company. His utility function differs by 
definition from that of the principals or members. To avoid a too wide diversion of inter-
ests, EDs are monitored primarily by non-executive directors (NEDs), if present (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003: 384), and members, as well as by others. These internal and external 
monitoring mechanisms are important to keep companies on track and to avoid expro-
priating or otherwise opportunistic behaviour of directors. The prime research question 
of this chapter therefore is whether and how corporate law1 applies the aforementioned 
agency theory-based insights to the desirability of internal and external monitoring. If 
the adoption is incomplete or inadequate, this may implicate that, at least from the point 
of view of economic theory, the legal person in question is inadequately looked after. This 
may cause undesirable social costs, varying from an inefficient operation of the company 
up to its bankruptcy.
The analysis has three limitations. First, the external monitoring structure of figure 3.5 
shows five categories of external monitoring mechanisms. For reasons of feasibility, the 
market-type external monitoring mechanisms at the left and the right hand side of the 
figure are set aside. The study focuses exclusively on the internal monitoring structure 
and on the external monitoring structure of a legal/political/regulatory nature. Second, 
the analysis focuses on mandatory mechanisms. The legislator apparently determined 
these to be the minimal monitoring mechanisms required. Although individual companies 
may voluntarily adopt more monitoring mechanisms through their articles or through 
contracts, these mandatory provisions determine the minimal level of stakeholder pro-
tection. Three, the company is not in financial distress. Therefore this chapter does not 
go into the rules framing directors’ behaviour in a situation of near distress especially 
as regards to creditors. This is the subject of chapter 5. In the meantime these rules for 
distress situations do however play a role in the background of any of the directors’ 
major decisions.
Figure 4.1 presents an overview of the flow of this chapter. Section 4.2 describes the 
method and objects of study. It accounts for the choice to review and compare the 
mandatory monitoring structure of five corporate forms in the Netherlands, Germany 
and the UK. Section 4.3 develops an analytical approach based on the models of Davies 
(2010), Kraakman et al. (2009) and Timmerman (2009). Based on the approach developed 
in section 4.3, sections 4.4 to 4.8 examine the mandatory monitoring structure for the 
five selected legal forms. Each section contains a comparison between the various legal 
systems. Section 4.9 offers an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the different 
systems based on Davies’ legal strategies approach. Section 4.10 evaluates the systems 
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along the fundamentals of Timmerman. Section 4.11 ponders which legal system moni-
tors best.
4.2 METHOD AnD OBJECTS
This section explains the aim and method of the study on the mandatory monitoring 
structure. It justifies the choices made regarding the objects of the study.
4.2.1 Comparison: aim and method
Why would one take up the challenge of a legal comparison? To understand one’s native 
legal system is hard enough. However, it is curiosity about how other nations go about 
similar problems that drives the literature to set itself this task. As Zweigert and Kötz 
(1998) put it:
The primary aim of comparative law, as of all sciences, is knowledge. (..) comparative 
law can provide a much richer range of model solutions than a legal science devoted to 
a single nation, simply because the different systems of the world can offer a greater 
variety of solutions than could be thought up in a lifetime by even the most imaginative 
jurist who was corralled in his own system. (p. 15)
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Comparative law has various objectives (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998; Glenn, 2006). The aim 
of comparison in this thesis is to provide the reader with:
• a survey of the mandatory control mechanisms of five legal persons;
• an analysis of the differences between those legal persons in three legal systems;
• recommendations of improvements to the present system.
Instead of a functional approach (Kraakman et al. 2009: 3; Örücü, 2006: 443, 448) this 
study chooses a strategic approach through a prescribed format, which is developed in 
4.3. Such a strategic approach enables a comparison of the 15 legal persons involved as 
will be shown later in this chapter.
A proper comparison of legal systems requires a thorough understanding of their en-
vironment (Örücü, 2006). This suggests that the comparatist must be something of a 
polymath, highly learned in a variety of disciplines and extremely conversant with the 
socio-cultural backdrop to the subject matter of comparison (Cruz, 1999). Upholding this 
requirement would probably make any comparison impossible, and certainly so within 
the framework of this thesis. In the meantime, the results of the presented comparison 
should be interpreted with caution, as the comparison concerns only elements of a larger 
framework, society, and should be understood in that specific context. Solutions that 
work in the Netherlands do not necessarily work in the UK or Germany and vice versa. 
Attempts to pick the best elements in various systems may eventually lead to lengthy 
processes with, in the end, impractical solutions, if any at all, as e.g. the European SE-
process has shown.
4.2.2 Three legal systems
The analysis contains three legal systems in order to study how similar problems are 
solved in different systems or to detect blind spots. Company law systems can be looked 
at from various angles, as there are:
• The origins of the law system: the UK has a common law system. The Netherlands and 
Germany have a civil-law system, where the Dutch law system is based on French 
roots and the German system is of a younger date. La Porta et al. (1998: 1116) find 
that common-law countries give shareholders and creditors relatively the strongest, 
and French civil-law countries the weakest protection, with Germany somewhere in 
between.
• The corporate governance system: as already discussed in 3.3.1.3 common-law 
countries generally favour shareholder value as the goal of the company, either in an 
enlightened or in a raw form, whilst Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and the Nordic 
states have chosen for a broader, stakeholder-oriented approach. In most of those 
stakeholder-oriented countries, the law prescribes a form of co-determination by the 
labour-factor.
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• The monitoring system: UK shareholdings are said to be more dispersed than in con-
tinental Europe, with the Netherlands somewhere in between (Kraakman, 2004: 46). 
This is due to large family and bank shareholdings predominant in France, Germany 
and Italy. This difference, it is maintained, means that ownership, control and moni-
toring issues require different solutions for different countries.
• The efficiency of the capital market: as a consequence of the previous remark, capital 
markets in continental Europe are said to be less developed, because of these large, 
illiquid shareholdings (Kraakman, 2009: 302).
• Competitiveness: the present wave of proposals and laws throughout Europe for a 
more flexible organization of private company forms, combined with an ongoing 
strive for lower tax rates, has been described as ‘a race to the bottom’ (Rammeloo, 
2007). Some countries, such as Ireland and Luxembourg, made considerable success 
in attracting economic activity through more flexible and less costly solutions, as a 
result of which others (e.g. Germany and the Netherlands) had to react and follow. In 
the UK there is competition between new forms and the Ltd. In the Netherlands and 
especially in Germany, one sees a competitive influence emerging from the EU free-
dom of establishment. Around 25% of the newly established German private limited 
companies have a foreign form (Verbrugh, 2008).
Based on the differences summarized in table 4.1, this thesis compares between the UK, 
Germany and the Netherlands. The UK is chosen because it is exemplary for the share-
holder approach. Germany is included as it takes rather the opposite position, where it 
assigns a stakeholder, i.e. the employee, the right to be represented on the supervisory 
board. The Netherlands has been selected because it bridges in quite a few aspects the 
difference between the German and the UK corporate system2. A summary of these clas-
sifications is shown in table 4.1.
4.2.3 Five legal persons
In creating a legal form, the legislator could focus on variables such as ownership, li-
ability, object, origin of capital, ease of exit, size and impact. Hansmann (1996) argued 
Table 4.1: a categorization of the legal systems of the UK, Germany and the Netherlands
 legal system
criterion
UK Germany the Netherlands
legal origin common law civil law (modern) civil law (French roots)
corporate governance
system
enlightened shareholder 
value
stakeholder value; direct 
labour influence
stakeholder value; 
indirect labour influence
monitoring system dispersed/institutions blockholders dispersed/institutions
efficiency capital market high medium high medium high
competition legal forms only British alternatives high impact medium high
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that there are essentially two sorts of legal persons depending on the property rights to 
the residue. He calls these profit and nonprofit organizations.
The defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization is that the persons who con-
trol the organization – including its members, directors and officers – are forbidden 
from receiving the organization’s net earnings. This does not mean that a nonprofit 
organization is barred from earning profits; rather, it is the distribution of the profits 
to controlling persons that is forbidden. Thus by definition, a nonprofit organization 
cannot have owners (p. 17).
Apparently, in his view the legal possibility to distribute profits discerns legal forms. 
Therefore Hansmann (1996: 17) sees no fundamental reason to have specialized business 
corporation statutes. The business corporation is nothing more than a formalized form 
of a lenders’ co-operative, wherein members of a capital co-operative supply, i.e. lend, 
to the firm a given sum of money with residual rights, just as the members of a dairy 
producers co-operative would supply their milk (p. 13). A separate business corporation 
statute may only have a transaction costs advantage.
Some questions arise. The first is whether this difference between profit and nonprofit 
companies can be traced in the mandatory monitoring structure of the various legal 
persons. The second is whether the various profit forms are indeed alike in organizational 
form, as Hansmann suggests. And the third is whether the differences in organizational 
form are functional or just an outcome of ‘accidental’ legislation. To answer these ques-
tions, one needs to study the public and private limited form, the co-operative and the 
nonprofit forms of association between people. As Davies (2008: 82) points out public 
and private companies fulfil different economic purposes. These are: to raise capital from 
the public to run the corporate enterprise for the public company3; and to confer a sepa-
rate legal personality on the business of a single trader or a partnership for the private 
company. The specific characteristic of a co-operative is the dual role of its members. 
Since they are members of the co-operative as well as its consumer or supplier there is 
no reason to impose a nondistribution constraint (Hansmann, 2010: 69). In nonprofits 
however, the nondistribution constraint protects consumers from exploitation and thus 
provides trust in its products and services especially in situations of severely asymmetric 
information (Hansmann, 2010: 62). Nonprofits form the social infrastructure of civil so-
ciety (Anheier, 2010: 8). On average about 6% of the total employment in OECD countries 
is in the nonprofit sector and nearly 10% if volunteer work is taken into account (Anheier, 
2010: 3). Moreover, through the ‘new public management’ (NPM) approach (Anheier, 2010: 
5-8) as well as the rise of markets and quasi-markets in areas that have long been part 
of the state, nonprofits are developing into real corporations. In the associative nonprofit 
form people work together towards a common object of which they are often the primary 
beneficiaries. The other nonprofit form is the foundation. Instead on membership (uni-
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versitas personarum) it is based on some core asset, the ancient Roman universitas rerum 
(Anheier, 2005: 50). Hopt and Hippel (2010: xliv) point out that the term ‘foundation’ may 
be unfamiliar to certain legal systems, e.g. that of the UK, or have a rather different use 
and organization. In the Netherlands, foundations are important suppliers of e.g. hous-
ing, health, education and welfare services. To a lesser extent this applies to Germany as 
well. In the UK such activities are organized through private limited companies, industrial 
and provident societies, trusts or charities.
A strategic comparison of the legal mandatory monitoring structure of these legal per-
sons along the framework developed in the next sections is the topic of this chapter.
4.3 A STRATEGY-ORIEnTED FRAMEWORK
This section develops a framework for the analysis of the mandatory monitoring structure 
of legal persons. It starts with a discussion of the models of Davies and Kraakman et al. 
in 4.3.1 and of Timmerman in 4.3.2. Section 4.3.3 develops a model for the analysis of the 
internal mandatory monitoring structure. The special position of directors is the subject 
of 4.3.4. Section 4.3.5 discusses why and how the analysis takes the external mandatory 
monitoring structure into account. The benchmark of comparison is the subject of 4.3.6. 
Section 4.3.7 concludes.
4.3.1 The models of Davies and Kraakman: legal strategies
The existing set of corporate rules for each legal person can be explored by means of 
the concepts developed by Davies (2010) and Kraakman et al. (2009). Both are agency 
theory inspired and consider reducing the occasions for opportunistic behaviour as a 
demanding task for company law (Davies, 2010: 28; Kraakman, 2009: 2). In their ap-
proach, the law has five pairs of legal strategies4 to address these agency problems. They 
are summarized in table 4.2.
Table 4.2: legal strategies for the regulation of principal/agent relationships
Kraakman (2009) regulatory strategies governance strategies
legal strategies agent constraints affiliation terms appointment rights decision rights agent incentives
ex ante rules entry selection initiation trusteeship
ex post standards exit removal veto reward
Davies (2010) enhancing the principal’s control
structuring the agent’s decisions
Source: Kraakman et al. (2009): 39 combined with Davies (2010): 1135.
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Each pair consists of an ex ante and an ex post strategy. The agent constraints strategy 
attempts to restrict the agent’s freedom by prescribing do’s and don’ts in the form of 
specific (rules) or more abstract (standards) norms of conduct for directors. Rules form 
an ex ante specific code of conduct, while the proper application of a standard can only 
be judged ex post, given the facts. The affiliation terms strategy is about the terms on 
which a principal may enter, or leave, the legal person. Ex ante, when entering the legal 
person, the law may prescribe transparency through disclosure by means of a prospectus 
and annual reports in order to avoid adverse selection. Ex post, this strategy focuses on 
the possibilities of selling the shares: by prescribing or forbidding certain restrictions, 
by giving a duty or a right to sell to a majority shareholder; by organizing the existence 
of a free float, and most essentially by not inhibiting the market for corporate control. 
The appointment rights strategy concerns the ex ante regulation of the appointment of 
directors: by shareholders or by the board, by recommendation by special groups of 
shareholders or even by third parties, such as the employees. The ex post appointment 
strategy concerns the reverse side: who is competent to suspend and dismiss directors. In 
the decision rights strategy the law attributes specific decision rights to the shareholder 
instead of to the specialized management. In order to avoid the loss of the advantages 
of specialized management, only a few categories of decisions are apt for this strategy: 
(1) infrequent ones, such as alterations to the company’s constitution; (2) decisions 
where the agent lacks specialized know-how, such as the issue of new shares; (3) highly 
important decisions, such as a merger or a large acquisition; and (4) decisions with a 
high risk of possible conflict between the interests of the principals and the agent, such 
as related party transactions, or the reaction to a take-over bid (Davies, 2008: 376). The 
ex ante strategy offers principals the possibility of making a proposal. More often only 
an ex post, or veto strategy is established. The agent incentives strategy concerns itself 
with avoiding a conflict of interest (ex ante) or aligning the interests (ex post) of principal 
and agent. A means to avoid the conflict of interests is to attribute the decision right 
to certain issues to a ‘trustee’, e.g. the supervisory board in a two-tier system or to 
ensure that ‘independent NEDs6 are to be a significant part of the board as a whole and 
dominant on the committees where the conflicts of interest might be expected to be most 
prominent’ (Davies, 2010: 200). An auditor or a court might perform this ‘trustee’ role as 
well (Davies, 2002: 207). This is a negative incentive strategy, in the sense that it reduces 
or removes the self-interest of the agent (Davies, 2010: 192). The ex-post strategy is a 
positive strategy since it aligns the interests of principals and agents in a reward strategy, 
for example by a proper long-term incentive plan (LTIP).
Although the strategies of Davies and Kraakman are identical, the analysis differs. The 
upper-half of table 4.2 depicts the approach of Kraakman et al. The first row of the table 
shows two subsets of strategies. Regulatory strategies are prescriptive. They describe 
either the content (agent constraints) or the formation and the dissolution (affiliation) of 
the principal-agent relationship. Governance strategies attempt to protect the principals 
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indirectly, either by enhancing their power or by moulding the incentives of the agents (p. 
23). The lower half of table 4.1 shows Davies’ (2010) division of the same five strategies 
in a subset focused on enhancing the control of the principal over the agent and another 
on directly structuring the exercising by the agent of his discretion (p. 119). The checks 
and balances nature of corporate governance is better expressed, it is felt, in Davies’ ap-
proach. Many rights can be formulated as: “The principal shall decide (..)”, thus enhancing 
the principal’s control, or as “The agent shall disclose (..)” , thus constraining the agent’s 
discretion. The choice will be influenced by the importance attached to the often very 
advantageous specialized management feature of a company. By requiring direct control 
the principal loses the advantages of fast action executed by specialized agents.
Section 4.3.3 develops a framework based on these strategies for the analysis of the 
internal mandatory monitoring structure of a legal person. However, first follows an 
introduction to an alternative analytical tool of corporate law, that will function as a 
means to control the results of the strategy-oriented approach.
4.3.2 The model of Timmerman: fundamentals
Timmerman (2009) recently presented a pragmatic approach to the fundamentals of 
company law. In his view the main goal of company law is to invent legal structures that 
function successfully in (international) economic life. They must be effective and efficient 
and therefore have an economic component as well. The importance of the development 
of the fundamentals of company law is that they may function as a substance over form. 
Under circumstances these fundamentals may even outweigh an actual legal or regulatory 
provision. Timmerman derives those fundamentals from actual company law. He upholds 
that they are neither absolute nor eternally true. They evolve over time7. His approach 
is useful for the present study since it is another means of comparing the three legal 
systems under review. The results found through the strategy approach will therefore be 
evaluated from this perspective at the end of this chapter. The questions to be answered 
would be (1) whether all three legal systems adhere to the same fundamentals and, if not, 
(2) which of the fundamentals are omitted, (3) which fundamentals are to be detected 
elsewhere, and (4) whether this difference in fundamentals is mirrored by a difference in 
legal strategies respectively mandatory monitoring mechanisms.
Timmerman lists eight actual and two nascent fundamentals. Five of them are of a struc-
tural nature – they picture the décor of the company, and are therefore called décor 
fundamentals – and the other five are of a behavioural nature. The structural funda-
mentals8 are those of: (1) transparency of the company regarding its structure and its 
financial situation; (2) the freedom of restructuring in or outside the present legal form, 
either through amendment of the articles or through a change in legal form; (3) partition 
of assets between the legal person and the members, and limited liability of the members; 
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(4) a principal division between the inside and the outside of the legal person: third parties 
doing business with the legal person should not suffer from an (internal) deficiency in 
the power of representation; and a nascent fundamental: (5) company law should only be 
mandatory law for specific reasons. 
The behavioural fundamentals9 are those of: (6) pluralism of interests to be taken into ac-
count, either through a structural measure, e.g. co-determination in Germany, or through 
the application of standards concerning the behaviour of participants; (7) free and un-
disturbed ownership; (8) no conflict of interests; (9) a collegial board system, meaning that 
the board functions as a whole. Whilst a certain distribution of tasks may be efficient, this 
does not dismiss directors from their responsibility for the general and financial policy 
of the legal person as well as a duty to monitor colleagues and intervene if necessary; and 
a nascent fundamental: (10) the court should avoid judging with hindsight and examine 
with restraint.
An examination of those fundamentals vis-à-vis the strategies approach follows in 4.10.
4.3.3 The internal mandatory monitoring structure
The internal monitoring structure of a legal person as shown in figure 3.5 contains all 
the functions and organs within the legal person provided for in the law and the articles 
that monitor the ‘direction’ of the company 10. A function11 may be a director, a company 
secretary, a shareholder or a general meeting. In economic terms these are monitors. An 
organ12 may be the executive board (EB) and the supervisory board (SB) in the two-tier 
system, the board in the one-tier system, the general meeting (GM) or the works council. 
In economic terms these are monitoring mechanisms. Not all systems incorporate a func-
tion in an organ. For example, there is no board in the German GmbH and the general 
meeting in the UK is not an organ as it is in the Netherlands13. These functions or organs 
of the company, and the people in it, are responsible for the proper internal monitoring 
of the company. Functions and organs are created by the law or by the articles. This 
analysis only sees to mandatory functions and organs inherently created by the law. Legal 
scholars doubt whether a works council is an organ of a legal person14. From an economic 
point of view it is, since it certainly influences company policy. Van Schilfgaarde/Winter 
(2009) remark that de facto it will often function as an organ. In this research it will be 
considered as such.
The analysis of the internal mandatory monitoring structure of a legal person will be 
centred on a figure like figure 4.2 (see 4.4.1). The upper part of the figure shows the 
internal mandatory monitoring structure of a Dutch NV. It opens with a flowchart with 
arrows, denoting the monitoring influence of an organ on, mostly, executive directors. In 
order to perform its monitoring tasks, every organ has been assigned several mandatory 
rights. The boxes in the middle of the figure list these rights along the various legal 
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strategies described in 4.3.1. The agents constraints strategy is not mentioned in the 
figure, since it directly assigns duties to directors. It is analyzed separately in the text (see 
also 4.3.4). Instrumental rights are a new feature, added to the figure by the author. These 
cover ‘preliminary’ rights, such as the right to information, to convene an AGM or to vote, 
necessary to execute the legal strategies. Davies (2010: 115-120 and 127-130) describes 
these rights elsewhere in the text and not under a separate heading since in his view they 
are functionally a way of implementing the identified strategies. Whilst this may be true, 
a comparison of these rights is also deemed important for the underlying study.
The figures may be compared horizontally, i.e. between identical forms in various 
legal systems, and vertically, i.e. between forms of one legal system. The idea is that 
this comparison will reveal whether and how the law implements economic insights on 
monitoring.
4.3.4 The position of directors
Broadly speaking, the law leaves the ‘running of the company’s business’ (UKC A.2) to the 
executives and senior management in the one-tier system, and to the executive board (EB) 
in the two-tier system. The law directly restricts the freedom to manage-at-will through 
the agent constraints strategy. Directors owe their duties to the company as formulated in 
rules and standards. Moreover the law often prescribes that the board acts as one organ 
and that directors are in principle jointly and severally liable to the company15 for acts 
of the board or of the board members. This implies a duty for directors to monitor each 
other. One may consider this strategy as part of the ‘bonding’ mechanism developed in 
economic theory.
The position of the non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board and that of the super-
visory board (SB) is hybrid. On the one hand they have a control function and as such 
they are important internal monitors of the company. This function requires that the 
executive function must be kept at a certain distance. On the other hand NEDs have a 
service and strategy function. In performing these, they co-operate more (one-tier) or 
less (two-tier) closely with the executives for the benefit of the company. In both roles, 
NEDs have considerable freedom. The law applies the same strategy as those for execu-
tives to restrict this freedom as well.
The best way to make full use of the directors’ capabilities is to offer full freedom and 
to restrict the use of this freedom through a system of legal duties in order to prevent 
abuse. Thus, in the analysis of the position of the board in this chapter the focus will be 
threefold: (1) on its structure, (2) on its task and (3) on the directors’ duties.
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4.3.5 The external mandatory monitoring structure
For the comparison and evaluation of the internal monitoring structure of a legal person 
one needs to know the external monitoring structure. A severe internal monitoring struc-
ture may require less external monitoring and vice versa16. This trade-off complicates the 
analysis considerably. Two choices have been made. The first is to exclude the market-
type external monitoring mechanisms from the analysis. Since these markets work more 
or less similarly between the countries under review, this is probably not a great loss for 
the analysis. The second is to restrict the analysis of the external mandatory monitoring 
mechanisms to a strategic analysis: what is the monitoring strategy they perform?
The lower part of figure 4.2 shows the external mechanisms under review. The common 
denominator of the agencies presented is that they are all non-market and company-
independent monitors of the company. Some the legislator has created intentionally: the 
formation authority, the monitoring task of the auditor, the disclosure authority, the 
financial authority, the judicial authority and whistle-blowing arrangements. Others have 
the monitoring function of legal persons as a by-effect: the tax-authorities, the trade 
union (as petitioner of an inquiry), publicity, interest groups, government agencies or 
the legislator. All these institutions function as monitors in the feedback they give to the 
legal person.
4.3.6 The monitoring capacity as a benchmark
The study in this chapter evaluates each legal person on the mandatory capacity to moni-
tor its board. The evaluation is restricted to the power of internal monitoring of appoint-
ments and dismissal, accountability and disclosure, veto on company decisions, company 
structure, directors’ duties; and to the power of external monitoring mechanisms. Each 
section concludes in a table like table 4.3 (see 4.4.1.6) to indicate the strengths and weak-
nesses of these six issues seen from the viewpoint of the mandatory capacity to monitor 
the board. In section 4.9 these evaluations end in a broad horizontal and vertical analysis 
of the legal persons being studied.
4.3.7 Concluding remarks
Whilst the agent constraints strategy and the agent incentive strategy focus directly on 
the behaviour of the agent, the affiliation, appointment and decision strategies aim to 
empower the members. These five strategies form the framework of the internal moni-
toring analysis of the legal person. An additional evaluation of the external monitoring 
mechanisms puts the internal monitoring arrangements in perspective. This external 
analysis will be done on a functional level. The analysis of each legal person ends with 
an evaluation based on the criteria (1) appointment/dismissal, (2) accountability, (3) 
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veto, (4) company structure, (5) directors’ duties and (6) external monitoring. Finally, the 
results based on the strategy approach are compared with those obtained by means of 
the fundamentals of Timmerman (2009).
The analysis does not strive to achieve full coverage of all the legal details. The aim is to 
keep a helicopter view. To that end, some shortcuts are necessary. The notation of legal 
provisions has for efficiency reasons been shortened to an s for section, followed by the 
section number and, if necessary and space is available, which is sometimes a problem 
in the tables, the relevant subsection between brackets. The Dutch art for artikel and 
the German § for paragraph to indicate a section, are thus omitted. Another shortcut 
concerns reference to the literature. Each of the following sections 4.4 – 4.8 will start with 
a short description of the general materials used. Referrals to this or other literature in 
the text is omitted, unless for specific issues of interest or importance.
4.4 THE MAnDATORY MOnITORInG STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLIC 
LIMITED COMPAnY
A public limited company is a capital association characterized by a separate legal entity 
and limited liability for its members, designed to run the corporate enterprise with capital 
raised from the public (though it may not in fact have done so)17. This section evaluates 
sequentially the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch NV (4.4.1), the German AG 
(4.4.2) and the UK Plc (4.4.3). Section 4.4.4 concludes.
4.4.1 The Dutch naamloze vennootschap (nV)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Kroeze, Timmerman and Wezeman (2007), Van Schil-
fgaarde/Winter (2009), Kluwer Rechtspersonen (groene losbladige serie), Klaassen (2007), 
Vink and Van het Kaar (2009) for the works council and Van der Heijden/Van der Grinten 
(1992) for historic reference.
4.4.1.1 Formation and institutional structure
Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code (BW) contains all the laws regarding the formation and 
organization of companies. All company law is mandatory unless mentioned otherwise. 
Titel 1 of Boek 2 BW(s 2:1-25) applies to all legal persons. S 2:64-174a BW18 contain 
public limited company law in the Netherlands. One person suffices to form a Dutch pub-
lic company (naamloze vennootschap;NV). The company’s name should contain the full 
title or the abbreviation19. A notarial deed, to be executed after government clearance20, 
constitutes the formation moment. It is a legal person with transferable shares21; the 
minimum capital to pay up is €45,000. The NV may emerge in two forms: as an ordinary 
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or a ‘structure NV’. Both forms can be listed. The ordinary NV has a mandatory EB and 
GM. A separate SB - Dutch law still maintains a two-tier system22- is only mandatory 
for the ‘structure NV’. Non-company law may require a supervisory board in specific 
cases or for specific economic activities. An NV becomes a ‘structure NV’ if (1) the sum 
of its issued share capital and its positive reserves is at least €16 million23; (2) there is a 
mandatory established works council; (3) its workforce in The Netherlands counts at least 
100 people; and (4) if this situation lasts during three consecutive years24. The structure 
regime is mandatory but exemption or mitigation25 is provided for in specific cases26 
which are notably multinational holding companies (Van het Kaar, 2009)27. Voluntary 
adoption of the regime is allowed28. A ‘structure NV’ is not necessarily listed or vice versa. 
The law obliges every institution that employs at least 50 people on a regular basis to 
establish a works council29. Institutions that employ at least 10 people (and less than 50) 
have to organize a meeting between the employer and the employees twice a year30.
Dutch listed NVs have to comply with the listing rules, comprised in the Rule Books 
I and II of NYSE Euronext and with the Dutch corporate governance code, hereinafter 
referred to as the Dutch Code (DC). The DC is connected to company law through a 
‘comply or explain rule’ and other disclosure requirements mentioned in a decree based 
on the annual report section of the BW31. Finally, the Sociaal-Economische Raad (social 
and economic council of the Netherlands, SER) has adopted the SER-Fusiegedragsregels 
2000 (Merger Code 2000), to be applied on a voluntary basis by merging companies, of 
which one has at least 50 employees. It contains rules for the protection of employees’ 
interests in the merger.
4.4.1.2 Internal mandatory monitoring structure
Figure 4.2 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of an NV. The upper and lower 
side of the figure show that in the full-blown picture the NV has five internal and pos-
sibly nine external monitoring mechanisms. The one-man NV still encounters at least 
four external monitoring mechanisms. The text below analyses the internal mandatory 
monitoring structure in the figure from left to right. It discusses the mandatory rights 
of each function or organ as mentioned in the boxes in the middle of the figure. The 
executive board is dealt with in 4.4.1.3.
Shareholders
Shareholders have, as figure 4.2 shows, several instrumental rights. They are entitled to 
an inspection copy of the annual accounts and the annual report. They may request that 
a GM be held or an item be placed on the agenda32, but collective action problems may 
inhibit execution of these rights (Davies, 2010: 127). Their voting right may be restricted 
in the articles through a voting-cap33. For non-depositary receipt holders, the trustee 
may restrict the voting right e.g. in case of a hostile take-over bid34. However, their rights 
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provide shareholders with negotiation power in one-on-ones with the management35. Any 
litigation, either on the validity of decisions or resolutions36, on the content of the annual 
accounts37 or aimed to provoke an inquiry (enquête) into ‘the policy and the course of 
business’ (Assink, 2007) carries risks, costs and reputational damage which any sensible 
director would preferably avoid. Concerning affiliation rights, Dutch law requires the NV 
to disclose its annual accounts and annual report through the Handelsregister, more or 
less in detail, depending on its size, which may be small, medium or large38. If the NV is 
‘small’ and does not aim to make profit, it may under certain conditions even be exempt 
from public disclosure39. Full disclosure is required for listed NVs40. For a small fee, much 
of the data is electronically available to the public. Listed companies should disclose 
through their website and to the AFM41. And ex post, the exit arrangements are in place. 
A block of shareholders holding 30% of the votes is obliged to make a public bid42. If a 
bidder has acquired 95% of the shares of the listed target, both parties can litigate to sell 
respectively to obtain the lacking shares. In any case, an owner of 95% of the shares may 
legally pursue a buy-out. An expel and resign arrangement only exists for a closed NV43.
General meeting (GM)
Once shareholders convene, the GM should receive all the information requested, unless 
it were against the company’s weighty interests44. The GM decides by majority and is not 
subject to quorum requirements unless otherwise required by the law or the articles45. 
If not structured, the GM appoints the EDs and NEDs. The articles may provide for the 
appointment of up to one-third of the NEDs by other parties46. Other restrictions in the 
articles may contain specific requirements a director has to meet47, or a regime of obliga-
tory recommendation of nominees by other parties48. However, mandatory law enables 
the overruling of these restrictions by a majority of two-thirds of the votes, representing 
over half of the issued capital. If structured, the GM may be sidelined almost completely. 
In that case, the SB appoints the EDs. The default rule is that the GM appoints the NEDs 
on the recommendation of the SB49. The GM and the works council50 may nominate can-
didates to the SB. The SB may ignore these nominations, unless they stem from the de 
facto recommendation right the works council has for one-third of the NEDs51 (Santen 
and Plusquin, 2009). If the GM vetoes52 the SB recommendation, the SB is entitled to a new 
recommendation. Although this procedure is much cited as mandatory law53 and is much 
copied in the articles, it is a default rule. The law enables other appointment arrange-
ments to be made by the articles provided the SB and works council agree beforehand54. 
However, the GM’s rights in the ‘structure NV’ to request55 the OK to dismiss a NED for 
e.g. negligence, or to dismiss the full SB are mandatory.
For all NVs, the Dutch GM decides on the adoption of the annual accounts. The release 
from liability (décharge) of directors should be a separate agenda item. Changes in 
corporate identity, including mergers, split-ups and liquidation56, in capital or in the 
articles57 are primarily assigned to the GM, albeit usually in the form of a right to veto 
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EB proposals. However, the GM right is probably better qualified as a co-decision right 
if the articles contain the permitted clause that those changes be made on the proposal 
of a third party or an organ, or with its (prior) consent58. Actually, it seems quite logical 
in legal forms of an associative nature like the NV that ‘the rules of the game’ including 
corporate identity, articles and (new) membership, i.e. new shares, as well as a change of 
identity or character of the company, are the GM’s domain (Klaassen, 2007: 79). In 2004 
the GM acquired an additional decision right, in the form of a right to veto an important 
proposed change in the identity or character of the NV that would essentially leave the 
shareholder with an altered company (Klaassen, 2008). From HR 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 
178 (Bank of America/ VEB and ABNAMRO)59 it became clear that this right should be 
interpreted restrictively. Another GM decision right applies if the company wants to buy 
property from the incorporator within two years of its existence. A typical example of the 
negative agent incentives strategy is the provision that the GM is the primary party for 
appointing the auditor. An auditor is mandatory if the NV is either listed or categorized 
as larger than ‘small’60. The other example is the GM’s indirect right to establish an SB 
through an amendment to the articles. On the positive agent incentives side, the GM 
determines the remuneration policy of EDs and their actual remuneration only as far as 
it is in shares or options. The articles often attribute the actual remuneration to the SB.
Although the law, within the limits defined by the law and the articles61, assigns all 
competences to the GM, unless assigned to the EB or others, the GM is not allowed to 
instruct the EB62. This principle of board autonomy (Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 185, 187) 
is vested in HR 21 January 1955, NJ 1959, 43 (Forum-bank). Or to paraphrase Klaassen 
(2009): the EB is responsible for the management (bestuur), the GM for the structure 
(structuur).
Supervisory board (SB)
The Dutch SB is a collegial board (Galle, 2007). NEDs may be held jointly and severally 
liable in the event of serious reproach or apparent mismanagement63, which is a monitor-
ing mechanism in itself64. The SB has a hybrid task: it monitors (‘supervision’) the EB on 
the one hand, and it co-operates (‘assist with advice’) with the EB on the other hand. The 
guideline of the members of the supervisory board in the performance of their duties is 
the interests of the company and the enterprise connected with it65. The directors’ duties 
of NEDs are similar to those of EDs. The description is in the next section on the executive 
board. However, NEDs are not responsible for the mismanagement of an ED, but if they 
detect it when supervising, they should take immediate action for redress, HR 28 June 
1996, NJ 1997, 58 (Bodam Jachtservice).
The SB is entitled to adequate information66. The determination of the strategy is in 
principle an EB task, to be supervised by the SB, ruled HR 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 178 
(Bank of America/ VEB and ABN AMRO, r.o. 4.3)67. For the ‘ordinary NV’ the law leaves 
it at that. In a ‘structure NV’ the SB appoints, suspends and dismisses the EDs. The SB 
134 Chapter 4
may suspend a NED or request68 the OK to dismiss a NED for e.g. negligence. The SB has 
a decision right in the form of a right to veto important EB decisions listed in the law 
such as the issue of new shares or large investments69. The articles may extend this list. 
For all NVs the negative agent incentives strategy applies in the SB right to supervise the 
management’s policy and the general course of affairs of the company and to advise the 
EB. Applying those rights, e.g. in a take-over contest, may eliminate conflicting interests. 
Usually, the SB convenes together with the EB about six to eight times a year and only 
once or twice a year as a separate board. The law clearly assigns the management of the 
company to the EB70.
Works council
The works council has a right to be informed and to convene with directors. It has a decision 
right in the form of a required approval of intended EB decisions on social matters such 
as regulations on working hours, holidays, rewards and job assessment systems, staff 
training programmes, promotion policy, and complaint procedures. The negative agent 
incentives strategy is important since it facilitates smooth transitions and avoids strikes. 
The right to advise on company matters concerns a planned merger, take-over, disposal, 
liquidation, important reorganization, new investment including new technologies and 
environmental measures, important financial arrangement, sick-pay risk bearing, and 
the commissioning of an expert to advise on such matters71. Moreover, the works council 
has the right to advise on the appointment and dismissal of an ED72 and to formulate an 
opinion to be forwarded to – and if so desired by the works council to be clarified in – the 
AGM/EGM on the occasion of (1) an important change of identity or character of the NV73; 
(2) the appointment, suspension or removal of an ED or a NED74; (3) the adoption of the 
remuneration policy of EDs75. Moreover, in the ‘structure NV’ it has the right to nominate 
NEDs to the SB – and one-third of them even de facto to the GM – unless it consented to 
another regime in the articles76; to forward – and to clarify – its opinion to the GM on the 
recommendation of a NED77; or to request78 the OK to dismiss a NED for e.g. negligence. 
Dutch law does not assign company law-related rights directly to employees. With one 
exception: in the absence of a works council in the case of a cross-border merger, the 
employee himself is entitled to information79.
4.4.1.3 Executive board (EB) and duties of directors
Just like the SB, the EB is an internal monitor in itself since it is a collegial board and 
members may be held jointly and severally liable in the event of serious reproach or appar-
ent mismanagement80. However, a director who proves to be not responsible for the failure 
and, depending on the situation, not negligent in taking measures for redress, is not liable81.
The law assigns to the EB the internal (‘charged with the management of the company’) 
and external representation of the legal person82. In order to exploit the specialized 
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management advantage of a legal person, the EB should have free rein. However, to avoid 
expropriation and other opportunistic behaviour, this free rein should be constrained 
through rules and standards. Rules can be found throughout the law and relate to two 
main areas of corporate life, the production of the annual accounts and the regular ad-
ministration of the company (Davies, 2008: 377). Standards guide directors, EDs as well 
as NEDs, in performing their tasks, without limiting their options beforehand, as rules 
do. Dutch company law recognizes four of these standards. The first is that the interest of 
the company is the guideline. One recognizes a similarity to the duty of loyalty in UK law, 
which ‘requires the director, when exercising discretion, to act bona fide in what he thinks 
is the best interests of the company’ (Davies, 2002: 159; also 4.4.3.3). However, the UK 
standard is originally of a subjective nature, while the Dutch standard is formulated more 
objectively. Dutch law determines this standard for NEDs83 and case law does for EDs84. 
The standard implies that the interests of all concerned should be part of the decision 
process. The second standard is that the legal person and parties concerned with its or-
ganization should behave according to the requirements of reasonableness and fairness85. 
This broad standard applies e.g. in minority shareholder cases. The Hoge Raad ruled 
in HR 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 178 that the Dutch Code co-defines these requirements 
depending on the circumstances86. The third standard is that directors should perform 
their functions with due care, which resembles the duty of care in UK law. In the UK 
this has evolved into ‘a reasonable person test’ (Davies, 2002: 154). For the Netherlands, 
the Hoge Raad ruled in HR 10 January 1997, NJ 1997, 360 (Staleman/Van de Ven) that 
liability under this duty requires a ‘serious reproach’ to be determined depending on the 
circumstances as well as on ‘the insight and care that can be expected of a suitable and 
conscientious director’. The fourth standard is on conflict of interests and is rather diffuse 
for various reasons. The law provides by default that NEDs should represent the company 
in the event of conflicting interests between executive directors and the company87. In HR 
9 July 2004, NJ 2004, 519 (Duplicado), the Hoge Raad explained that this duty is aimed 
at preventing an executive director from being guided by (mainly) his personal interests 
instead of (exclusively) the interests of the company that he should serve. In HR 29 June 
2007, NJ 2007, 420 (Bruil) the Hoge Raad required substantiation of the specific circum-
stances that could have influenced the directors’ decision process. However, this default 
rule is often ‘disabled’ in the articles such that the executive director may represent the 
company at any rate. Of a mandatory nature is the provision that enables the GM to 
appoint at any time representatives for the company when interests conflict88. The Hoge 
Raad ruled in HR 3 May 2002, NJ 2002, 393 (Joral) that the EB is obliged to be transparent 
and to inform the GM in a timely manner about a conflict of interests in order to enable 
the GM to exercise this right. If the EB does not inform the GM in a timely manner, the 
decision taken may be nullified. The conflicting interest provision will be replaced shortly 
for the NV and the BV. The ‘representation angle’ will be replaced by a ‘decision angle’ 
wherein the director is forbidden to participate in the decision process if he has a ‘direct 
or indirect personal interest that conflicts with the interests of the company’89. The DC 
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even requires the approval of the supervisory board in material transactions in which 
there are conflicts of interest90.
A director owes the aforementioned duties primarily to the company. A director may 
breach his duties to a shareholder, and consequently a shareholder may sue a director 
personally, only in the event of a serious reproach related to specific, individually assigned 
rights to this individual shareholder (HR 20 June 2008, NJ 2009, 21, Willemsen/NOM). 
Chapter 5 of this thesis discusses whether and how these duties are owed to creditors.
4.4.1.4 Pending changes in NV law
There are changes pending in NV law on (1) the facilitation of a one-tier structure in 
Dutch law (NV and BV); (2) the prevention of abuse of legal persons (all legal persons); (3) 
an increase from 1% to 3% of the threshold to place an item on the agenda of an AGM/
EGM (NV only); and (4) a ‘claw-back’ of retrospectively unjustified bonuses (NVs and 
other financial legal persons). Annex 2 shows their status and content in some detail.
What would be their consequences in terms of legal strategies? The analysis follows figure 
4.2. The shareholder instrumental rights in the NV will be fewer since the threshold will 
increase to 3%. The GM loses its negative agent incentives right to appoint representatives 
if interests conflict. Instead, the one-tier proposal introduces a director’s duty to abstain 
from the decision process if interests conflict. The rights of the SB only change – if the NV 
decides to opt for a one-tier board – insofar as it is not an independent organ anymore 
and thus follows the rules directed at ‘the board’. This implies that the SB negative agent 
incentives strategy changes into a collegial monitoring mechanism. In fact, the one-tier 
structure upholds as much as possible the internal mandatory structure as outlined in 
figure 4.2 since it assigns the competences presently assigned to the SB to the NED faction 
of the board. The SB positive agent incentives strategy will be strengthened through the 
possibility to ‘claw-back’ unjustified bonuses. The works council rights do not change. 
The external monitoring changes since the ex ante control of the formation authority is 
replaced by continuous monitoring. Thus, external monitoring will increase.
4.4.1.5 External mandatory monitoring structure
The lower part of figure 4.2 contains the external monitoring mechanisms of a legal/
political/regulatory nature. The formation authority is the notary who has a formal role. 
Government clearance is essentially directed at the antecedents of the people involved in 
its incorporation and in its board. The external auditor is mandatory if the NV is either 
listed or larger than ‘small’. He should be appointed, in priority, by the GM, SB or EB. 
The Wet toezicht accountantsorganisaties (Wta) in 2006 strengthened the requirements 
for auditors of listed NVs and other important NVs (organisatie van openbaar belang; 
OOB). The tax authorities require an annual declaration and have the right to verify. In 
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doing so, they can redress failures or even fraud. It does so generally in silence, although 
sensational dawn raids, seizures or prosecution cases sometimes become public91. The 
disclosure authority receives the data that a company is legally required to disclose. Negli-
gence is a criminal offence92 and may trigger the company’s dissolution93. Of the financial 
market authorities, DNB is responsible for the macro and micro prudential supervision of 
financial companies94, whilst AFM supervises the behaviour of financial market parties. 
Any party that has offered shares or bonds to the public falls under the AFM supervision, 
unless (1) the offer is directed at less than 100 people, or (2) the par value is at least 
€50,000, or (3) the total sum to be collected is less than €100,000 over 12 months95. 
Moreover, the AFM may check the compliance of the annual accounts and reports of 
securities-emitting institutions96 (Santen and de Bos, 2006). The judicial authority may be 
the district court (Rb) (e.g. for the validity of corporate decisions; dismissal of directors; 
suppression or dissolution of the legal person97), the Enterprise Division of the Amster-
dam Court of Appeal (Ondernemingskamer, OK; e.g. dismissal of NEDs in the ‘structure 
NV’; the inquiry procedure ‘in a prima facie case of mismanagement’98), the Rotterdam 
District Court (e.g. if the DNB refuses to clear candidates for a director’s position in a 
financial institution99) or even the public prosecution service (Openbaar Ministerie, OM; 
e.g. if it requests the OK for an inquiry in the public interest100; or the EB of a stichting for 
information101). The trade union is not only a labour market factor but also an external 
monitor of a general nature, since it could request an inquiry if it has members amongst 
the company employees. The indistinct publicity, interest groups and whistle-blowing 
mechanisms are never mandatory in the actual sense of the word, but they are always in 
place as optional external monitors. Publicity and interests groups actually do influence 
company policy quite often. Whistle-blowing culture is not much developed. The DC 
forces listed companies to have a whistleblower procedure but there is no disclosure of 
its effect. Dutch judicial authorities are not very protective of whistleblowers. Govern-
ment agencies may monitor NVs from their own specific point of view e.g. as regards 
construction, safety or health. Finally the legislator may see to an efficient but balanced 
approach of the governance system and change the law where it sees a flaw or a failure102.
4.4.1.6 Concluding remarks on the NV
Table 4.3 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the Dutch NV. Note (again) that the analysis only implies mandatory rights. 
The table evaluates six points of view: (1) appointment and dismissal (who appoints, 
suspends, dismisses, rewards), (2) accountability (all issues related to the accountability 
of directors for their activities), (3) veto (who has a veto right and on what issues; a 
decision right is classified as a veto right, since it may block any action), (4) company 
structure (mandatory organs), (5) directors’ duties (including corporate model and co-
determination) and (6) external monitoring. The evaluation scores mean:
+ predominantly strong on the issue from a monitoring point of view
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+- strong as well as weak points on the issue from a monitoring point of view
- predominantly weak on the issue from a monitoring point of view.
The results stem directly from the above analysis and need no further comment.
4.4.2 The German Aktiengesellschaft (AG)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Schaub (1988), Schmidt (2002), Klaassen (2007), 
Maitland-Walker (2008), Schmidt and Lutter (2008) and Andenas and Wooldridge (2009).
4.4.2.1 Formation and institutional structure
Book 1 of the Aktiengesetz (AktG) essentially103 defines the German public limited com-
pany (Aktiengesellschaft; AG). It contains mandatory law unless otherwise noted104. The 
AG is a legal person105, which can already be formed by one person106. The word Aktieng-
esellschaft or a generally understandable abbreviation should be part of the company’s 
name107. An AG is established once it is registered in the Handelsregister108. The court to 
which the request for registration is referred to performs a material check and may deny 
registration109. The articles, to be established in a notarial form110, should contain the 
objects and branch111. The AG should have a minimum capital of €50,000112 of which at 
least 25% is to be paid up before registration113. It may, but need not, be listed114.
By law, an AG has a two-tier governance structure, with an EB115 (Vorstand), a GM (Haupt-
versammlung) and always an SB (Aufsichtsrat) that consists of at least 3 people116. The 
composition of the EB and SB is partly determined by various co-determination laws117. 
Table 4.3: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch NV.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+
−
not ‘structure NV’: GM appoints EDs and (two-thirds of) NEDs. A binding recommendation 
can be overruled by a qualified majority. GM determines the remuneration policy (all NV)
‘structure NV’: SB appoints EDs. Default: GM appoints NEDs from an ‘overrulable’ binding 
recommendation by SB. Works council recommends 1/3 NEDs. Articles may sideline GM.
accountability
+
−
−
GM adopts annual accounts, appoints auditor and releases directors from liability. Public 
disclosure through Handelsregister
no mandatory audit for ‘small’ NVs unless listed
DC requirements (listed) may dissolve in mandatory disclosure rules only
veto
+ −
+
+
GM decides on identity, capital, articles subject to approval or proposal provisions in the 
articles; and on major change of identity or character
SB veto on important company decisions as listed in the law and in the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure + − SB only mandatory for a ‘structure NV’; mandatory works council if ≥ 50 employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / interests of the company (het belang van de onderneming)
clear standards often need court clarification on issues e.g. conflict of interests, minorities
external 
monitoring
+
−
at least four. Easy access to OK in order to request an inquiry (enquête).
no whistle-blowing culture
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If the AG counts over 500 employees118 the Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz (DrittelbG) requires 
one-third of the NEDs to be directly elected employee-representatives of which at least 
two should be employed by the AG119, whilst reflecting the gender ratio in the com-
pany120. If there are over 2,000 employees the Mittbestimmungsgesetz (MitbestG) applies. 
It prescribes the mandatory appointment of a personnel director121 (Arbeitsdirektor) 
in the EB and the appointment of half of the NEDs122 by the employees, either directly 
or indirectly123. One of the NEDs must be a manager124. A mandatory division of the 
labour-appointed NEDs between employees and representatives of trade unions is pro-
vided for125. The Chair of the SB, who has a casting vote126, is to be chosen by either a 
two-thirds majority or, if this does not work out, by the GM-appointed NEDs127. The Be-
triebsverfassungsgesetz (BetrVG) makes a works council (Betriebsrat) mandatory for every 
institution128 with five employees, of which three are eligible129. It consists of one (for 
up to 20 employees) to 35 members (for 9,000 employees)130 and should reflect gender 
proportions131. The law provides for working in smaller committees132. Some members 
may be exempt from their duties133.
Germany has its own corporate governance code for listed companies134, the Deutscher 
Corporate Governance Kodex, hereinafter referred to as the German Code (GC). It is en-
forced through a ‘comply or explain rule’ in the AktG135.
4.4.2.2 Internal mandatory monitoring structure
Figure 4.3 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of an AG. It is clearly a rather 
stakeholder-oriented model of corporate governance (Glozbach, 2008). In the full-blown 
picture, the AG has four internal and possibly nine external monitoring mechanisms. The 
one-man AG still encounters at least one internal monitor and four external monitoring 
mechanisms.
Shareholders
Shareholders have the instrumental right of information at the GM about items relevant 
to the agenda136. The EB may deny information e.g. if this would cause a non-insignificant 
disadvantage137. The shareholder may appeal to the court in the case of a refusal138. With 
5% of the issued shares one may request a GM; and with 5% or €500,000 one may request 
that items be placed on the agenda139. The court may authorize a shareholder to convene 
a meeting140. Every shareholder has a voting right. Polls are decided by a simple majority, 
unless otherwise noted141. The articles may contain a voting cap142. Shareholder litigation 
often relates to the protection of minorities, e.g. regarding information, nullity of deci-
sions. 1% of the shareholders (or holders of €100,000 issued capital) can already request 
permission from the court for a ‘derivative action’143. A shareholder representing 10% of 
the issued capital may request the court to dismiss a GM-appointed NED144. Affiliation 
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rights are provided for regarding the mandatory disclosure of the annual accounts145 as 
well as exit arrangements for minority shareholders.
General meeting (GM)
The list of GM competences in s 119 AktG is by no means complete146. The GM has the 
instrumental right that the annual accounts and report as well as attachments defined in 
the law be made available to the GM before the meeting. The EB and the chairman of the 
SB should clarify their contributions to the reports147. The GM appoints and dismisses148 
the NEDs, insofar as they are not appointed by employees149 or other parties150. It decides 
on the adoption of the annual accounts only if the SB has vetoed, or if the EB and SB 
decide it should be left to the GM151. It in any case decides on the attribution of the 
distributable profits and on the release from liability of directors. The decisions on ‘alle 
mit dem wirtschaftlichen und rechtlichen Aufbau der Gesellschaft zusammenhangende 
Fragen’, i.e. the legal and economic structure of the company, belong to the GM (Kropff, 
1965: 165). Such GM decisions may not, unlike under Dutch law, be subject to the ap-
proval of other company organs (Klaassen, 2007: 148). The law lists those mandatory 
competences152. They are limited as well: the GM may decide only if the law or the articles 
so prescribe, or if the EB so requests153. However, this strict division between ‘structure’ 
and ‘management’ has been mitigated154. In BGH, 25.02.1982, BGHZ 83, 122 (Holzmüller), 
the Bundesgerichtshof ruled that in ‘fundamental decisions (..) intervening deeply into 
the member and equity rights of the shareholders, the EB could not reasonably hold that 
it could decide itself without involvement of the shareholders155.’ The legislator subse-
quently incorporated a provision, requiring a GM decision if a company wishes to transfer 
all of its assets156. In BGH 26.04.2004, BGHZ 159, 30 (Gelatine) the Bundesgerichtshof 
clarified the earlier decision and limited the decisions to be laid before the GM as ‘touch-
ing the core competence of the GM to determine the articles and coming close to an effect 
that could only be achieved by amendment of the articles’157. The negative incentives 
strategy is deployed in the GM right to appoint the auditor if the AG is categorized as 
larger than ‘small’158 or if it is listed159. One recognizes the positive incentives strategy in 
its right to determine the reward of NEDs. Recently, this strategy was extended for listed 
companies by a right to decide on the rewards system for EDs. However, this vote is not 
mandatory160.
Supervisory board (SB)
The task of the SB is primarily of a supervisory nature161 but the literature as well as the 
GC stresses the advisory role as well162. The list of competences in s 111 AktG is by no 
means complete163. The instrumental rights in figure 4.3 contain the right to convene 
an EGM ‘wenn das Wohl der Gesellschaft es fordert’ (‘if the interests of the company so 
require’); the right to inspect the administration and the liquid assets; the right to be 
informed by the EB at regular intervals prescribed by law on intended strategy, plan-
ning, results, important issues; and the right to require information from the EB at any 
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time on company related issues164. Jungmann (2006: 452) points out that this right to 
information on strategy implies an increased involvement of the SB in strategic deci-
sions. This is reflected in GC 3.2 which states that the EB ‘coordinates the strategic ap-
proach with the SB and discusses the current state of strategy implementation with the 
SB in regular intervals’. The appointment, dismissal and reward165 of EDs by the SB are 
arranged for in the Aktiengesetz but for proper application one also has to consult, if 
applicable, the Mitbestimmungsgesetz166. Dismissal of EDs is only possible in the case of 
gross negligence, incompetence and withdrawal of confidence by the GM167. Unlike in the 
Netherlands, a court may reverse a dismissal. The SB may request the court to dismiss 
a NED on important grounds concerning the person of the NED168. The decision rights of 
the SB may stem from the law, from the articles or from a decision by the SB itself, that 
specific kinds of decisions need their approval169. However, management tasks cannot be 
transferred170. The SB veto right is a means of taking supervision seriously and preparing 
a list of issues to be approved by the SB is considered an SB duty171. If a company is a 
shareholder in another mitbestimmte company, it can apply its shareholder rights – in 
short those concerning appointment and the rules of the game – only if the majority of 
the shareholder-NEDs agree172. Moreover, the SB has to approve loans to EDs and NEDs. 
EDs should ask permission of the SB to transact, either personally or through another 
company or partnership, in the company branch, or to be an ED in another company173. 
Activities of a NED for the company in addition to the non-executive duty should be 
approved by the SB. Payments to NEDs that are not approved should be reimbursed174. 
The SB has to examine the annual accounts, although it is not exactly clear what this 
implies175. The SB should report to the GM on the results of the examination176. Normally 
the SB approves the annual accounts, unless EB and SB decide to leave it to the GM177. 
The negative incentive strategy applies since the SB supervises and advises the EB. It 
represents the company vis-à-vis the EDs. This is stricter than Dutch regulation178. And 
although the GM appoints the auditor, the SB negotiates the contract with the auditor179. 
The law deploys a positive incentive strategy to fix the rewards of EDs or even to adapt 
them downwards if the situation of the company so requires180.
From 1998 the law requires the SB to convene at least two times each half year181. Jung-
mann (2006: 454) refers to studies showing this frequency was common practice up to 
1998, resulting in a shockingly low NED workload calculated at 14 hours and 13 minutes 
per year.
Works council
The works council is elected directly by and from the employees182. Trade unions do 
not play a role: their task is exclusively restricted to wage negotiations183 although a 
representative may be invited to works council meetings184. Concerning the instrumental 
rights, the works council meets once a month with the employer185. Disclosure of infor-
mation is prescribed in general186 and in respect of specific subjects, e.g. investments 
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in factories187, planning of personnel188, dismissal189, the annual accounts and company 
reorganizations190. The law accounts for a large number of decision rights. A veto right 
exists in case of company reorganizations albeit on limited grounds mentioned in the 
law191. Co-determination is arranged for in social matters192 (e.g. company regulations, 
working hours, holidays, labour conditions, security, salary systems) unless these issues 
have already been settled with the trade union; for company training measures193, per-
sonnel forms194, order of dismissal195, assessment principles196 and dismissal in special 
cases197. The law urges parties to strive seriously for a solution and to consider an in-
termediate solution198 and provides for a settlement arrangement (Einigungstelle) in case 
parties cannot reach agreement199. The negative agent incentives strategy is deployed 
through a large number of consultation rights. Hearing is provided for in respect of 
proposals to the employer200 or dismissal201. Consultation is obliged in the case of e.g. 
large investments202 or company reorganization203. The council has a right of initiative in 
respect of personnel planning and other labour conditions204 (e.g. job security, part-time 
employment, flexible working hours), and in respect of vocational training205. A corporate 
works council throughout the corporation may be established at the request of the indi-
vidual works councils206.
Employee democracy is substantiated by some other measures. Firstly by the prescription 
of a general meeting of all employees (Betriebsversammlung), to be held four times a year 
or on request207. Secondly, 5% of the employees are entitled to propose agenda items for 
the works council208. Thirdly employees have a right to elect, directly or indirectly, and 
dismiss their representatives in the SB if co-determination applies209.
4.4.2.3 Executive board (EB) and duties of directors
The EB is responsible for the management as well as the representation of the company210. 
It coordinates the firm’s strategic approach with the SB211. German law applies the col-
legial board principle. Directors act within the framework of the EB respectively SB212. If 
they have divided up their work, one director is only then liable for the other’s failure, 
if he neglected his monitoring duty. This is the case if there were signs of negligence, 
and the other director did not react213. The AktG contains an identical provision for the 
duty of care and the responsibility of EDs and NEDs214. They should apply the ‘care of a 
careful and conscientious businessman’ (die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen und gewissen-
haften Geschäftsleiters). Their information should be in conformity with ‘the principles 
of a rigorous and faithful account’215. For EDs and NEDs the law contains the Business 
Judgement Rule (BJR), which means that a decision is supposed to have been taken with 
care if the director could have reasonably thought, based on relevant information, that 
the decision was in the interests of the company216. The BJR had already been formu-
lated by the Bundesgerichtshof in BGH 21.04.1997, BGHZ 135, 244 (ARAG/Garmenbeck) 
where the BGH attributed to the EB ‘a wide free space to act’217. The judgement is rather 
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general in its formulation and Schmidt (2002: 425) is of the opinion that the BJR applies 
throughout German law. The law reminds both EDs and NEDs explicitly of their duty of 
confidentiality (Verschwiegenheitspflicht)218. In the case of asserted dereliction of duty, 
the burden of proof is on the directors219. If the company has paid for D&O insurance, 
only EDs have an excess of 10% with a maximum of 150% of their annual fixed pay220. 
One would look in vain for a general duty of loyalty in the AktG. However, a similar 
concept derives from the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB), the Treuepflicht221. In every legal 
relationship, and consequently in every association, there are duties of loyalty (Schmidt, 
2002). The Treuepflicht should be understood as ‘a general appraisal and restriction on 
the interests and competences of the members’222. It applies as opposed to the members 
as well as to the company223. The provisions on the use of corporate opportunities, busi-
ness judgement rule, secrecy, conflict of interests and non-competition originate from 
this Treuepflicht224. The law provides for joint and several liability of executive directors 
to the company225 and eventually, in the event of coarse negligence, to the creditors as 
well.226 The same rules apply, mutatis mutandis, to NEDs.
4.4.2.4 External mandatory monitoring mechanisms
The registration authority has already been discussed above. The verification made is 
not purely formal. The external auditor is to be appointed by the GM unless the AG is 
not listed and small227. Every company, from AG to Stiftung, has to file an annual tax 
return228. Corporations that, according to their articles and their actual activity, only and 
directly serve public benefit, charitable or religious purposes are exempt229. The disclo-
sure authority checks whether the disclosure is made in time and is complete. One risks 
a fine for negligence230. BaFin (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) supervises 
credit institutions, insurance undertakings, financial services institutions and invest-
ment companies. BaFin and Deutsche Bundesbank share banking supervision. Their co-
operation is governed by section 7 of the Banking Act, which stipulates that the Deutsche 
Bundesbank will i.a. analyse the reports and returns that institutions have to submit and 
assess whether their capital and risk management procedures are adequate. The trade 
unions’ role is not only labour market-related, since they also have representatives in the 
SB (not in the works council). Whistle-blowing protection is in practice restricted to scarce 
safety-related provisions. Schmidt (2005) explains that case law focuses on the dismissal 
risk. The duty of loyalty of an employee to the employer requires that any concern be 
raised internally first. External whistle-blowing however is not principally forbidden, but 
it should be clear to the court that the interests of society in clarification must outweigh 
the loyalty obligation231.
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4.4.2.5 Concluding remarks on the AG
Klaassen (2007: 58) concludes that the organization of the AG is characterized by equiva-
lence of the GM, EB and SB. Table 4.4 underlines this conclusion by showing the strengths 
(+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring structure of the German AG. The 
results stem directly from the above analysis and need no further comment.
4.4.3 The UK public limited company (Plc)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Davies (2008), Andenas and Wooldridge (2009), 
Maitland-Walker (2008), Davies (2010) and Pettet (2001) for historic references.
4.4.3.1 Formation and institutional structure
The UK Companies Act 2006 (CA) defines one generic broadly applicable company form232 
for the public limited company (Plc)233, the private limited company (Ltd, see 4.5.3)234 
and the community interest company (CIC, see 4.7.3)235. Since the company’s objects are 
unrestricted236 profit as well as not-for-profit companies can use it. CA sections and 
regulations237 based on the CA may contain specific provisions applicable to one specific 
form. The public limited company may emerge in two forms: as a company limited by 
shares or as a company limited by guarantee and having a share capital. Formation of the 
latter form is not allowed any more238. The name of a limited company that is a public 
company must end with ‘public limited company’ or ‘Plc’239. One person may already form 
a Plc240. The certificate of incorporation should state that it is a public company241. It is 
Table 4.4: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the German AG.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+
+ −
GM appoints, dismisses (at least half of) NEDs and determines their remuneration
SB appoints, dismisses EDs and determines their remuneration
accountability
+ −
+
−
−
SB or GM adopts the annual accounts. GM appoints auditor, releases directors from liability
Disclosure through Handelsregister
no mandatory audit for ‘small’ AGs unless listed
GC requirements (listed) may dissolve in mandatory disclosures only
veto
+ −
+
+ −
+
Limitative list of GM rights. No instruction right. GM decides on identity, capital, articles
GM veto on disposal of all assets; and on fundamental, deeply intervening decisions with 
a similar effect as an amendment to the articles (Holzmüller/Gelatine)
SB veto on EB decisions listed in the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure
+ mandatory SB + co-determination > 500 empl.; mandatory works council if ≥ 5 
employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / interests of the company (zum Wohle der Gesellschaft)
Sorgfalt, Treuepflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht; no conflict, no corporate opportunities; BJR
external monitoring + − at least four. Manifold court access. No whistle-blowing culture
146 Chapter 4
established by registration242. The registrar registers once the requirements of registra-
tion have been complied with243. It is a legal person with a minimum allotted share capital 
of £50,000244 of which one-quarter of its nominal value and the whole of any premium 
on it should be paid up245. A Plc may be quoted and unquoted246. The CA contains specific 
provisions for quoted companies247.
The CA provides mandatory law but it leaves many institutional choices to the articles248. 
The Model Articles for Public Companies contain default rules249. Mandatory for the Plc 
is a one-tier governance structure with at least two directors, one of which should be a 
natural person250; members, who may pass a resolution at a meeting251; and a company 
secretary252. Although the law refers mostly to the director, it refers to a board of direc-
tors (BOD) as well253. UK law does not consider the GM to be a company organ254. If a 
resolution is passed, it becomes a company resolution255. A works council is still a rare 
phenomenon in the UK due to the special position trade union representatives have in 
the company256. However, if a Plc is part of a ‘Community-scale group of undertakings’, 
being a group of at least two undertakings in different member states with at least 1,000 
employees and at least 150 employees in each of two member states, the Council Direc-
tive on the establishment of a European Works Council (EWC)257 applies. The Directive 
prescribes either the establishment of an EWC or of ‘an information and consultation 
procedure’ (ICP)258 to which section 4.4.3.2. in fine refers.
Listed Plcs have to abide by additional sets of rules259. The UK Code on Corporate Gover-
nance (UKC), issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), is ‘soft law’260 enforced by a 
hard obligation to ‘comply or explain’. The Listing Rules require UK registered companies 
with a primary listing in the UK to disclose the extent to which they have complied with 
the UKC and to give reasons for non-compliance261. Both the Listing Rules (LR), regulated 
by the FSA, and the Takeover Code (TC), regulated by the Panel on Takeovers and Merg-
ers262, contain mandatory rights for shareholders to be discussed below.
4.4.3.2 Internal mandatory monitoring structure
Figure 4.4 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a Plc. In the full-blown picture 
the Plc has five internal and possibly eight external mandatory monitoring mechanisms. 
The one-man-Plc still encounters internally a company secretary and externally six 
external monitoring mechanisms. The UK legislator has chosen to organize the company 
through a default system. Therefore there are relatively few mandatory rights. Regula-
tions issued by the Secretary of State contain different model articles for the Plc and the 
Ltd. However, a company may adopt or exclude all or any of the provisions of the model 
articles263.
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Shareholders
The predominant instrumental rights of shareholders are to be informed and sometimes 
to receive copies or to inspect. This ranges from the index of member names, via the 
director’s service contract264 or the information related to a public offer, to the annual 
accounts and reports. The latter are the directors’ report (DR) and, only for listed com-
panies, the directors’ remuneration report (DRR)265, including the auditor’s report. If the 
requirement to disclose directors’ benefits is not met, the auditor must include in his 
report a statement giving the required particulars266. Five percent of the voting rights 
are sufficient to require directors to call an EGM. The request may include a resolution 
and if so, the notice of the meeting must include notice of the resolution267. Five percent 
or one hundred members may require circulation of a statement or a resolution for the 
AGM268. The articles may circumvent the ‘one share, one vote’ principle269. Shareholders 
have several judicial procedures open to them. Three important ones are mentioned. The 
derivative suit is open to each shareholder in respect of a cause of action vested in the 
company, and seeking relief on behalf of the company. The cause of action should arise 
from an actual or proposed act or omission involving negligence, default, breach of duty 
or breach of trust by a director of the company270. A shareholder who brings a derivative 
claim must apply to the court for permission to continue271. A second procedure is the 
unfair prejudice procedure. It applies on the ground that the company’s affairs are being 
or have been conducted in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of mem-
bers in general or of some part of its members (including at least the petitioner), or that 
an actual or proposed act or omission of the company is or would be so prejudicial272. 
The third important action of a shareholder relates to the annual accounts. Members may 
apply to the court for an order directing directors to file accounts and reports if they 
did not comply with this duty273. Shareholders do not have a role in the case of defective 
accounts. Although these judicial procedures are of an ex post nature, one may consider 
their mere existence as a negative agent incentive strategy in the sense that directors have 
a reputational incentive to avoid them.
The first affiliation right of shareholders is the required public disclosure of the annual 
accounts through the registrar, Companies House. A ‘small company regime’ for the Plc 
does not exist274. The second category of affiliation rights contains the various exit rights. 
In the event of a takeover offer275 the offeror who has acquired 90% of the shares has 
the right to buy out (‘squeeze-out’276) the minority shareholders, whereas likewise the 
minority shareholder has a right to be bought out by the offeror (‘sell-out’277). The merger 
procedure through liquidation contains an appraisal right, meaning that a member may 
require the liquidator to purchase his interest at a price to be determined by agreement 
or by arbitration278. The ‘unfair prejudice’ procedure has a similar arrangement279.
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General meeting (GM)
An AGM is to be held at least once a year280. Recently a new provision was added concern-
ing the right to ask questions in the GM of a traded company281. The GM of a public 
company decides at meetings by ordinary or by special resolution282. If the law mentions 
a ‘resolution’ or an ‘ordinary resolution’ it requires a simple majority. The articles may 
provide for a higher majority. A legal provision for a ‘special resolution’ requires a 75% 
majority. Two members are the quorum subject to the articles283. On the appointment 
side, the GM only has a mandatory right to remove directors284. However, it has a fairly 
broad range of decision rights. The members decide on the structure of the company 
through their mandatory rights concerning the corporate identity, capital-issues and 
an amendment to the articles285. For amendment to the articles a special resolution is 
needed, but ‘provisions for entrenchment’ to the effect that conditions have to be met or 
procedures have to be complied with that are more restrictive than a special resolution 
are valid286. To which the law adds that any power of a court or other authority to amend 
a company’s articles remains unaffected287. A ‘fusions and mergers’ chapter does not 
exist288. The ‘schemes of arrangement’ fill this function and can be used in a number 
of other cases289. A wide range of BOD decisions are subject to GM approval as well. 
The CA forbids acquisitions from an incorporator (promoter) within two years after the 
trading certificate has been issued290. It forbids as well substantial property transactions, 
loan, guarantee or credit transactions and payment for loss of office with or to direc-
tors or connected persons, without shareholder approval. The Listing Rules provide for 
shareholder involvement in major decisions that are outside the ordinary course of the 
listed company’s business and may change a security holder’s economic interest291. For a 
large, so-called “Class 1” transaction292 the company must send an explanatory circular 
to its shareholders and obtain their prior approval at an EGM for the transaction293. The 
Takeover Code requires shareholder approval of defensive measures to be taken once 
a takeover offer is imminent294. Regarding the annual accounts and reports, the BOD 
approves them and the GM has no approving role295. In addition to the obligation to send 
accounts and reports to the members, directors of public companies must lay the ac-
counts and reports before the GM296. The GM must be afforded an opportunity to discuss 
them297. A (negative) setting agent incentives right is the GM right to appoint or remove 
the auditor. There is no exemption for ‘small’ Plcs298. A (positive) setting agent incentives 
right is that the GM should approve service contracts with directors if they last over two 
years. Another is the GM’s ‘advisory vote’ in quoted companies on the annual remunera-
tion report, which is advisory in the sense that no director’s entitlement is conditional on 
a positive vote299. The LR require shareholder approval of employee share schemes and 
long-term incentives plans (LTIPs).
The division of powers between board and shareholders is mainly a matter for the ar-
ticles300. If they follow the default rule of the Model Articles that ‘subject to the articles, 
the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business’301, then 
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modern doctrine expresses that ‘they, and they alone can exercise these powers’302. 
However, the Model Articles present an escape in a ‘shareholders’ reserve power’ as they 
may, by special resolution (as would be needed to change the articles), direct the directors 
to take, or refrain from taking, specified action303. On top of this, the GM may remove 
directors at any time by ordinary resolution. This all may induce directors to follow the 
shareholders’ vision304.
Company secretary
The law does not define the company secretary’s role. Much will depend on the articles, 
the contractual terms of employment and the size of the company involved. Essentially, 
the tasks are of a compliance and organizational nature305.
European Works Council (EWC) or Information and Consultation Procedure (ICP)
In the circumstances described in 4.4.3.1 an EWC306 has to be established unless parties 
negotiate and settle for an ICP. Either way, at the very least an information and consulta-
tion duty of the board is to be arranged for307. As a consequence of the EU Information 
and Consultation Directive of 2002308 the ICER (2004) has extended this duty ‘on receipt 
of a valid employee request’309 to all undertakings310 employing at least 50 employees 
in the UK. Consultation means the exchange of views and establishment of a dialogue 
between employees’ representatives and management311. Parties are under a duty to work 
in a spirit of co-operation and with due regard for their reciprocal rights and obligations, 
taking into account the interests of both the undertaking and the employees312. Since in 
the European context parties are free to settle for an ICP and determine its content and 
in the UK context a negotiation is foreseen as well, a mandatory minimum on the content 
of the information and consultation cannot be filled out in figure 4.4. However, if the 
standard provisions of ICER 2004 come to apply, consultation is only foreseen on ‘the 
situation, structure and probable development of employment’ and ‘decisions likely to 
substantial changes in work organisation or in contractual relations’313.
4.4.3.3 Board (BOD) and duties of directors
UK company law says little or nothing about the structure and composition of the BOD 
which makes its position in company law deeply ambiguous (Davies, 2008: 361). However, 
the UKC provides for a clear framework as it states: ‘Every company should be headed 
by an effective board, which is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the 
company’314. This is the collegial board principle315. Its role is threefold: (1) to provide 
entrepreneurial leadership of the company within a framework of prudent and effec-
tive controls which enables risk to be assessed and managed; (2) to set the company’s 
strategic aims, ensure that the necessary financial and human resources are in place for 
the company to meet its objectives and review management performance; (3) to set the 
company’s values and standards and ensure that its obligations to its shareholders and 
others are understood and met316. Although the CA 2006 does not recognize NEDs, the 
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UKC does: ‘The board should include an appropriate combination of executive and non-
executive directors (and, in particular, independent non-executive directors) such that 
no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the board’s decision taking’317. 
Executive directors are responsible for the running of the company’s business318, whilst 
non-executive directors have a role in service, control and strategy. Or in the wording of 
the UKC319: ‘As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors 
should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. Non-executive 
directors should scrutinise the performance of management in meeting agreed goals and 
objectives and monitor the reporting of performance. They should satisfy themselves 
on the integrity of financial information and that financial controls and systems of risk 
management are robust and defensible. They are responsible for determining appropri-
ate levels of remuneration of executive directors and have a prime role in appointing, 
and where necessary removing, executive directors, and in succession planning.’ The 
Institute of Directors considers the main principles of the Code a useful starting point 
for reviewing governance structures and processes320. The CA provides only that the 
BOD is externally unrestricted to bind the company321, but internally it is only by default 
rule322, as discussed above, that ‘the directors are responsible for the management of the 
company’s business’ which means ‘they, and they alone’.
UK company law is beyond doubt the most detailed in describing directors’ duties. Whilst 
these duties used to be derived from common law (and they still are for non-CA compa-
nies, see 4.6.3.3), for companies they have been provided for in the CA since 2006. Table 
4.5 summarizes them in wording close to the text of the law. One easily detects the main 
duties of the common-law system. The duty of care provision in s 174 CA323 clarifies that 
the objective ‘reasonable person’ test delivers the bottom line quality, which may be en-
hanced by the (subjective) specific director’s skills. The pure form of the duty of loyalty in 
s 172 CA is rephrased as the duty ‘to promote the success of the company for the benefit 
of its members as a whole’. In doing so, it should have regard to e.g. the consequences 
in the long term; and the interests of the employees, suppliers, customers, community 
and environment. This reflects an enlightened shareholder approach. Whilst this duty of 
loyalty is essentially of a subjective nature, common law derived four objective duties 
from this standard and the law even five. The first is to act within powers, which is a 
conjunction of obeying the constitution. Note that ‘the constitution’ means the articles 
as well as resolutions and agreements324. The no fettering rule, rephrased as the duty to 
exercise independent judgement325, implies that directors owe independent judgement 
to the shareholders, which is based on their fiduciary duties to the shareholders. This 
is even so for directors who are appointed to represent specific interests. For them too, 
the interests of the company as a whole precede (Davies, 2010: 183). Sections 175, 176 
and 177 CA all deal with different manifestations of the no-conflict principle (Davies, 
2008: 559). The first focuses on exploitation by a director of property, information or 
(other) corporate opportunities. In common law this is ‘the rule against secret profits’, 
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Table 4.5: overview of directors’ duties according to the Companies Act 2006
CA header shortened description of directors’ duty
171 Duty to act 
within powers
(a) to act in accordance with the company’s constitution, and
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred.
172 Duty to 
promote the 
success of the 
company
to act in the way the director considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing so have 
regard (amongst other matters) to
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business 
conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(3) This duty has effect subject to any rule of law requiring directors, in certain 
circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.
173 Duty to exercise 
independent 
judgment
to exercise independent judgment. This duty is not infringed by his acting
(a) in accordance with an agreement duly entered into by the company
that restricts the future exercise of discretion by its directors, or
(b) in a way authorised by the company’s constitution.
174 Duty to exercise 
reasonable 
care, skill and 
diligence
to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence. This means the care, skill and diligence that 
would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person 
carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the company, and (b) the 
general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.
175 Duty to avoid 
conflicts of 
interest
to avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or 
possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company.
(2) it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the situation.
(3) this duty does not apply to a conflict of interest arising in relation to a transaction or 
arrangement with the company.
(4) it is not infringed (a) if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise 
to a conflict of interest; or (b) if the matter has been authorised by the directors.
(5) authorisation may be given by the directors (see s 175 and the constitution).
(6) The authorisation is effective only if (a) any requirement as to the quorum at the meeting 
at which the matter is considered is met without counting the director in question or any 
other interested director, and (b) the matter was agreed to without their voting or would 
have been agreed to if their votes had not been counted.
176 Duty not to 
accept benefits 
from third 
parties
not to accept a benefit from a third party conferred by reason of (a) his being a director, or 
(b) his doing (or not doing) anything as director.
(4) This duty is not infringed if the acceptance of the benefit cannot reasonably be regarded 
as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest.
177 Duty to declare 
interest in 
proposed 
transaction or 
arrangement.
to declare to the other directors the nature and extent of any interest, directly or indirectly, 
in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company.
(4) Any declaration required must be made before the company enters into the transaction.
(5) A declaration of an interest in a transaction of which the director is not, or ought not 
reasonably be, aware of is not required.
(6) A director need not declare an interest (a) if it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to 
give rise to a conflict of interest; (b) if, or to the extent that, the other directors are already 
aware of it (and for this purpose the other directors are treated as aware of anything of which 
they ought reasonably to be aware); or (c) if, or to the extent that, it concerns terms of his 
service contract that have been or are to be considered (i) by a meeting of the directors, or (ii) 
by a committee of the directors appointed for the purpose under the company’s constitution.
Note: In the table various paragraphs are omitted. Numbers and letters between brackets are the original 
numbers and letters from the text of the CA.
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also known as the ‘no-profit’ rule326. The duty is not infringed if the matter has been 
authorized by the directors327. Bribery is forbidden in s 176 CA (Davies, 2010: 182). The 
common law rule against self-dealing is specified in s 177 CA and focuses on the direc-
tor, interested in a proposed transaction or arrangement with the company. Directors 
must declare their interests to the other directors beforehand.
More than one of the general duties may apply in any given case328. With the text and 
Davies (2008, Chapter 16) in mind, there is a lot to comment on as regards these sections 
and it is tempting to do so, e.g. on the curious cohabitation of statutory law in the CA and 
the interpretation of these principles in the same way as common law rules or equitable 
principles329. This however would go far beyond the scope of this comparative chapter of 
this thesis. Finally it should be noted that directors owe their duties to the company, and 
not directly to the shareholders, unless there is ‘a special factual relationship’ between 
the directors and the shareholders in a particular case330.
4.4.3.4 External mandatory monitoring structure
Of the external monitoring mechanisms, the registrar (Companies House) is the formation 
authority. It is a formal type of monitoring as the registrar may accept the statement of 
compliance to be issued by the incorporators as sufficient evidence of compliance331. The 
auditor’s profession is heavily regulated, influenced by the early new millennium events 
as well as European plans and Directives332. The FRC oversees the whole auditors-related 
spectrum, from qualifications and standards to discipline, through a number of operat-
ing bodies333. The tax authority, HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC), requires every company 
to file its Company Tax Return annually. Exemption is only possible for a charity (see 
4.8.4). Under special conditions the commissioners of HMRC may disclose information to 
third parties334. The registrar of companies is responsible for filing all the documents de-
livered by the company. If the company is in default, the registrar may give notice to the 
company requiring that it comply within 14 days335. The rate of compliance with the filing 
deadlines is around 95%336. An unlimited company is not required to deliver accounts 
and reports337. The FSA is responsible for the prevention of (financial) market abuse. It 
issues the Listing Rules (LR) and the Code of Market Conduct338. Every quoted company 
has to comply with the rules and competences of the FSA339. The Panel on Takeovers and 
Mergers (the “Panel”) is an independent body whose main functions are to issue and ad-
minister the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and to supervise and regulate takeovers 
and related matters. Its central objective is to ensure fair treatment for all shareholders 
in takeover bids340. In the case of defective accounts, the Financial Reporting Review Panel 
(FRRP), an operating body of the FRC, is authorized by the Secretary of State to apply for a 
court order to prepare revised documents341. As for the Judicial authorities, the CA opens 
the possibility to apply to a court on a number of occasions342 and defines to which court 
jurisdiction is conferred343. The trade union does not have a role as external monitor of 
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a legal/political/regulatory nature, since its role is purely designed as a labour-market 
role. Whistle-blowing is regulated by the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA). Ever 
since, employees have been protected against retaliation by their employers (public or 
private) if they properly disclose information of a criminal offence; non-compliance; a 
miscarriage of justice; dangers to the health or safety of any individual; damage to the 
environment; or information concerning deliberate concealment of these matters. The 
law describes exactly what ‘proper disclosure’ is344. In the Department for Business Inno-
vation & Skills (BIS), and the former Departments of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR) and Trade and Industry (DTI) the UK has active government agencies on 
modernizing and keeping company law up-to-date.
4.4.3.5 Concluding remarks on the Plc.
Davies (2008: 366) reminds us that the division of powers in the CA is a matter for 
private ordering by the members of the company rather than something to be specified 
as mandatory in the company’s legislation. Table 4.6 underlines this by showing the 
strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the relatively ‘light’ mandatory monitoring structure 
of the UK Plc. The results stem from the previous analysis and need no further comment.
4.4.4 Concluding remarks on the public limited company
The NV, AG and Plc have a lot in common. This is essentially due to the European attempts 
to harmonize company law. Andenas and Wooldridge (2009) present a comprehensive 
survey of these harmonization activities. The more striking are the important differences 
in mandatory law from a monitoring point of view as table 4.7 reveals. This is in line 
with the analysis of Goergen, Manjon and Renneboog (2008) that the German system still 
Table 4.6: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the UK Plc.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
− GM may remove a director; has no mandatory appointment right for directors
accountability
+
−
−
GM appoints auditor; no exception for ‘small’ Plcs neither as regards auditing nor 
reporting; public disclosure through Companies House
no approval of annual reports by the shareholders; no release from liability of directors
UKC requirements for listed companies may dissolve in mandatory disclosure rules only
veto
+
+
+
+
GM decides on identity, capital, articles
GM decides on payments for loss of office; on long-term service contracts
GM veto on a wide range of EB decisions with a possible conflict of interests
GM veto on ‘Class 1’ transactions and defensive measures (listed companies)
company structure − no mandatory presence of NEDs; no ‘organic’ employee representation (works council)
directors’ duties
+ −
+
shareholder approach / the benefit of its members as a whole (+ have regard to)
an integrated system of duties
external monitoring + at least six; Takeover Panel, FSA, FRC; whistle-blowing system through PIDA
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differs significantly from a market-based system, i.e. that of the UK, despite a degree 
of convergence. As regards appointment/dismissal the CA assigns the GM the right to 
remove at any time, whilst the BW and the AktG arrange for mandatory appointment 
procedures as well. In the AktG rewards are determined by the GM for NEDs and by the 
SB for EDs (the Netherlands: GM for NEDs and ED reward policy and option schemes for 
EDs). In the UK, the Listing Rules recognize an advisory vote on the DRR. Accountability 
and public disclosure is largely EU harmonized. However, the approval (or adoption) of 
the annual accounts is as a rule assigned to the board (UK) or the SB (Germany), whereas 
in the Netherlands it is assigned to the GM. Striking differences are the lack of legal 
safeguards for auditors’ remuneration in the Netherlands and for release from liability in 
the UK as well as the mandatory audit for small, non-listed Plcs in the UK. The right to 
veto is more widely attributed to the GM in the Plc than in the NV or the AG; in all forms, 
GM instruction of the board is generally forbidden. The GM decides on the rules of the 
game; in the Netherlands and the UK the articles may contain a ‘provision for entrench-
ment’. Moreover, the SB and the works council have veto rights in the NV and AG. The 
company structure largely differs between the Plc, which does not require the presence 
of NEDs345 or a works council, and the AG, which requires both, or the NV, where NEDs 
are only required in a ‘structure NV’. Remarkably, the CA does not even mention NEDs. 
It must be admitted that the two-tier system with its broader scope on the well-being of 
the company does not always work well (Hopt and Leyens, 2004: 145, 165; Andenas and 
Wooldridge, 2009: 298, 307, 311; Jungmann, 2006).
Table 4.7: a comparative evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the NV, AG and Plc.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
NV+
AG+
Plc−
In ‘ordinary NV’ GM appoints, suspends, dismisses EDs and (the majority of) NEDs; in a 
‘structure NV’ as well as in an AG > 500 employees the GM appoints and dismisses de 
facto two-thirds of the NEDs (AG > 2,000 employees: 50%) whilst the SB appoints the 
EDs. Plc: CA only recognizes a GM right to remove directors.
accountability
NV+−
AG+−
Plc+−
Plc: annual accounts and reports to be approved/adopted by the board; AG: by the SB or 
if refused or agreed upon, by the GM; NV: by the GM. Release from liability only for NV, 
AG. GM appoints auditor. If small+non-listed: Plc only. Auditor’s fee: GM in Plc, SB in AG.
veto
NV+−
AG+−
Plc++
GM decides on identity, capital, articles; has no instruction right (all). In Plc GM 
decides on payments for loss of office, long-term service contracts, a wide range of 
EB decisions with a possible conflict of interests (e.g. property, (quasi-)loans). GM veto 
on: (Plc:) ‘Class 1’ transactions (>25%) and defensive measures (listed companies); 
(AG:) disposal of all assets or deeply intervening; (NV:) major change of identity or 
character (e.g.100% sale). SB veto on items listed in the law (NV) or the articles (AG, 
NV); works council veto on social matters
company structure
NV+−
AG+
Plc−
no mandatory presence of NEDs (Plc); only if ‘structure NV’ (NV)
mandatory works council if ≥ 5 (Germany) or 50 (the Netherlands) employees
Plc: no co-determination or works council (unless EWC)
directors’ duties
NV+−
AG+−
Plc+−
stakeholder approach in Germany and the Netherlands
(enlightened) shareholder approach in the UK
an integrated system of duties (Plc). Clear standards often need court clarification (NV, AG)
external monitoring
NV+
PLC+
Takeover Panel; whistle-blowing system through PIDA (Plc); easy access to specialized 
OK (NV).
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The system of directors’ duties is much more developed in the UK than it is elsewhere. 
Hopt and Leyens (2004: 142) conclude for German law ‘that the issues at the heart of 
directors’ duties are not adequately covered.’ This difference may be a consequence of 
(a) fewer mandatory provisions346 and (b) the originally unequivocal shareholder focus 
of the system. As for external monitoring, the difference in whistle-blowing arrange-
ments between the UK (PIDA) and Germany and the Netherlands is striking, as well as the 
specialized and easily accessible court (OK) in the Netherlands.
In evaluating the NV/AG/Plc one should bear in mind that the ‘legal’ public limited com-
pany and the ‘listed’ public limited company become more and more distant relatives 
instead of identical twins (Van Schilfgaarde/Winter, 2009: 5). The various governance 
codes are not taken into account in the analysis since they are not mandatory law. How-
ever, these codes ‘codify’ principles which could in specific cases have their influence 
outside listed companies – and outside the public limited sphere as well for that matter. 
The evaluation scores for this evaluation are:
++ relatively very strong on the issue from a monitoring point of view
+ predominantly strong on the issue from a monitoring point of view
+− strong as well as weak points on the issue from a monitoring point of view
− predominantly weak on the issue from a monitoring point of view
−− relatively very weak on the issue from a monitoring point of view.
A final remark: nowhere does the law assign the ultimate responsibility, and thus the 
lead, of the audit process to the SB. The German approach347 comes nearest, but Schmidt 
and Lutter (2008: 1210) tone down the expectations. At present, auditors co-operate 
intensively with the CFO and other EB members during the audit process. This threatens 
the auditor’s independence. Auditors assess the work and the performance of EDs. EDs, 
or their subordinates, are the chief suppliers of information to the auditor. They are the 
principal interested parties in a successful audit. Therefore, and in line with their ultimate 
monitoring responsibility, NEDs, if available, should be in the lead of the audit process.
4.5 THE MAnDATORY MOnITORInG STRUCTURE OF THE PRIVATE 
LIMITED COMPAnY
A private company confers a separate legal personality on – usually – the business of a 
single trader or a partnership348. It is not necessarily a capital association, since it is quite 
often a one-man shop. Nor is limited liability a necessary condition as the UK private 
unlimited company shows. It may not offer securities to the public. This section evalu-
ates sequentially the mandatory monitoring structure of three types of private limited 
companies: the Dutch BV (4.5.1), the German GmbH (4.5.2) and the UK Ltd (4.5.3). Section 
4.5.4 concludes.
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4.5.1 The Dutch besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (BV)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Kroeze, Timmerman and Wezeman (2007), Van Schil-
fgaarde/Winter (2009), Kluwer Rechtspersonen (groene losbladige serie), Klaassen (2007) 
and Van der Heijden/Van der Grinten (1992) for historic reference.
4.5.1.1 Formation and institutional structure
S 2:175-284a BW contain private limited company law in the Netherlands. One per-
son suffices to form a Dutch private company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte 
aansprakelijkheid;BV). The company’s name should contain the full title or the abbre-
viation349. A notarial deed to be executed after government clearance350 constitutes the 
formation moment. The BV is a legal person with shares that are not freely transferable351. 
The minimum capital to pay up is €18,000. The BV has only registered shares. Listing of 
a BV is thus not possible. The BV may emerge in two forms: as an ordinary or a ‘struc-
ture BV’. The ordinary BV has a mandatory EB and GM. A separate SB - Dutch law still 
maintains a two-tier system for the BV as well352 - is only mandatory for the ‘structure 
BV’. The criteria for a ‘structure BV’ are the same as for the NV, as are the arrangements 
for exemption or mitigation353. The establishment of a works council depends on the 
conditions described in 4.4.1.1.
4.5.1.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.5 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a BV. In the full-blown picture, 
the BV has five internal and possibly nine external monitoring mechanisms. The one-
man BV still encounters at least four external monitoring mechanisms. The text below 
analyses the internal and external mandatory monitoring structure of the BV. Since these 
structures are almost identical to that of the NV and only slightly adapted to the closed 
structure of the BV, the text focuses on their differences.
The internal mandatory monitoring structure of the BV differs for shareholders on the 
instrumental side with the absence of a voting right for holders of depositary receipts. For 
the BV – and the closed NV – the law has created an exit through a dispute arrangement 
for conflicts between shareholders 354. The GM lacks a mandatory decision right in respect 
of the issue or buy-back of shares since the articles may attribute this competence to 
another organ355. Nor is the GM explicitly entitled to approve EB decisions on the change 
of the identity or character of the company. However, Klaassen (2009) argues based on 
the literature and case law to the contrary. In her view, the GM always has a right of ap-
proval if the rules of the game (‘structure’) of the legal person are at stake356. Concerning 
positive setting incentives the GM lacks mandatory involvement in the remuneration of the 
EDs357. The mandatory rights of the SB are identical to the NV. The differences between 
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NV and BV may be explained as a consequence of the supposed shareholders’ proximity 
to the EB. If they are not so close however, e.g. in second or third generation shareholders, 
shareholders may lack important rights.
The works council rights of the WOR apply to the BV as they do to the NV (4.4.1.2). How-
ever, the recently added rights to attend and be heard in the GM apply only to the NV. The 
role of the board and the duties of directors (4.4.1.3 for the NV) are identical in the BV.
The external monitoring mechanisms are essentially the same as for the NV, without 
the specific arrangements for listed companies. The AFM will encounter BVs mostly as 
financial intermediaries on the market.
4.5.1.3 Pending changes in BV law: the Flex-BV
The proposal intends to make the BV a ‘less regulated entity with more autonomy for 
its shareholders’ (Timmerman, 2007: 326). It contains four main issues: (1) deletion of 
minimum capital requirement and mandatory blocking clause; (2) enhanced freedom in 
structure and decision; (3) new creditor protection rules; and (4) adaptation of conflict 
rules. Annex 2 describes the details. In terms of the legal strategies the proposal en-
hances in figure 4.5 the shareholder instrumental rights by decreasing the threshold for 
convening an AGM/EGM to 1% of the shares; and decreases them by allowing shares 
without voting rights358. The GM appointment rights may be restricted in the articles to 
at least one ED/NED for a certain class of shares359. Under strict conditions the GM loses 
its decision rights in respect of the adoption of the accounts and release of liability of 
directors if all the shareholders are directors, and its right to scrutinize acquisitions 
from an incorporator360. When interests conflict, the GM no longer has a special role361. 
Whilst one may, grosso modo, conclude that in effect no strategy redistribution occurres, 
it seems that the aims to regulate less, be more flexible and enhance the autonomy for 
the shareholder will to a certain degree be achieved.
4.5.1.4 Concluding remarks on the BV
Table 4.8 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the Dutch BV. The results stem directly from the above analysis and need no 
further comment.
4.5.2 The German Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Schmidt (2002), Klaassen (2007), Lutter and Hom-
melhoff (2009) and Andenas and Wooldridge (2009).
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4.5.2.1 Formation and institutional structure
German private limited company law dates from 1892 (Gesetz betreffend die Gesell-
schaften mit beschränkter Haftung; GmbHG). It is largely of an enabling nature, unless 
otherwise indicated362. One person suffices to form a GmbH363. The articles (Gesellschafts-
vertrag) should be drawn up in a notarial from364. Its name should contain Gesellschaft 
mit beschränkter Haftung in full or an abbreviation365. It comes into existence366 once it is 
registered in the Handelsregister367 and is thereafter a legal person368. The court to which 
the request for registration is referred to performs a material check and may decline 
registration e.g. if the payment in kind is overvalued369. Its capital is divided in shares370 
that are in principle freely transferable through a notarial form371. Names of sharehold-
ers are kept in the Handelsregister372. The minimum capital is €25,000 of which at least 
half is to be paid up before registration373. The articles may provide for a GM right to 
determine that additional payments should be made by the shareholders (Nachschussp-
flicht)374. In an attempt to counter the competition from the UK Ltd form, the German 
legislator recently created an Unternehmergesellschaft (haftungsbeschränkt) or in short 
UG haftungsbeschränkt375. This UG follows the GmbHG with a few exceptions. It is to be 
formed by at most three people, with standard articles (Musterprotokoll) and without a 
minimum capital376. However, it has to retain 25% of its profits until the €25,000 amount 
is reached377. Then it may opt for the full GmbH status378.
The GmbH appears in two forms. By its legal nature it has a two-tier governance struc-
ture, with one379 or more directors (Geschäftsführer)380 who should be natural persons381 
Table 4.8: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch BV.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+
−
not ‘structure BV’: GM appoints EDs and (two-thirds of) NEDs. A binding recommendation 
can be overruled by a qualified majority
‘structure BV’: SB appoints EDs. Default: GM appoints NEDs from an ‘overrulable’ binding 
recommendation but GM may be sidelined through the articles
accountability
+
−
GM adopts annual accounts, appoints auditor and releases directors from liability. Public 
disclosure through Handelsregister
no mandatory audit for ‘small’ BVs
veto
+ −
−
+
+
GM decides on identity, capital (by default), articles subject to approval or proposal 
provisions in the articles. No GM veto on major change of identity or character decisions.
no voting right for depositary receipt holders
SB veto on important company decisions as listed in the law and in the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure + − SB only mandatory for a ‘structure BV’; mandatory works council if ≥ 50 employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / interests of the company (het belang van de onderneming)
clear standards often need court clarification on issues e.g. conflict of interests, minorities
external monitoring
+
−
−
at least four. Easy access to OK in order to request an inquiry (enquête).
dispute arrangements including expel and resign rights do not work satisfactorily
no whistle-blowing culture
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and a GM (Gesellschafterversammlung)382. The law does not mention a board. An SB is 
optional383. This changes once the GmbH employs over 500 people and the co-determi-
nation laws come into play. Then the law requires the establishment of an SB and with it 
a number of other provisions come into force. A works council (Betriebsrat) is mandatory 
if the conditions are met as described in 4.4.2.1.
4.5.2.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.6 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a GmbH. In the full-blown pic-
ture, the GmbH has four internal and possibly nine external monitoring mechanisms. The 
one-man GmbH may have only four external monitoring mechanisms.
Shareholders and general meeting (GM)
The first of the instrumental rights is the information right. Every shareholder is entitled to 
immediate information and to inspection of the books. A director may refuse information 
or inspection for ‘non-company-related purposes’ for fear of abuse384. The shareholder 
may appeal to the court385. The convening of a meeting may be requested by 10% of the 
issued capital386. This percentage may also request that certain subjects be placed on the 
agenda387. Every shareholder has a voting right for each euro of issued share capital388. To 
pass a resolution, a simple majority suffices389. A written resolution instead of a meeting is 
permitted if all the shareholders agree either with the written poll or with the proposal390. 
Shareholders should abstain from voting in certain cases where they have an interest in 
the outcome391. The affiliation right of disclosure of the annual accounts is provided for 
in one general clause for equity companies in the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB)392. An exit 
right is not provided for in the GmbHG, and if it is not provided for in the articles393, the 
court may assist to oust a shareholder in the last resort394. As regards the decision rights 
of the GM, the law provides a list with shareholder competences, e.g. the adoption of the 
annual accounts, appointment and removal of directors as well as directors’ release from 
liability, audit and supervision arrangements. However, this is default law395. The GmbHG 
provides for only a few mandatory arrangements: Satzungsautonomie prevails. One of 
the mandatory rights is that the appointer may always withdraw the appointment of an 
ED, notwithstanding contractual claims396. The others relate, as figure 4.6 shows, to the 
‘rules of the game’. The GmbHG does place the shareholder at the heart of the company. 
It is generally thought that the GM is the supreme organ of the company which has com-
petence in all company matters, except where the law or the articles provide otherwise. 
It has the power of giving instruction to the management (Andenas and Wooldridge, 
2009: 305)397 and strategy should be discussed with it (Schmidt, 2002: 1079). In the same 
line, the Holzmüller/Gelatine doctrine will not easily apply since fundamental decisions 
belong to the GM in any case398. Thus, whilst the GM has a very large role in the operation 
of the company, there are few mandatory rules. This changes if the co-determination laws 
apply. Then, generally speaking, the rules from the Aktiengesetz relating to the appoint-
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ment of NEDs by the GM apply, as figure 4.6 shows. The DrittelbG399 or the MitbestG400 
prescribe exactly which of the AktG provisions apply. The default GM right to appoint 
EDs remains unaffected by the DrittelbG.
Supervisory board
A SB may be established either voluntarily or mandatorily. For a voluntarily established SB 
the law refers to the provisions in the Aktiengesetz, unless otherwise provided for in the 
articles401. The supervisory tasks, however, cannot be bypassed402. The articles sometimes 
opt for a Beirat, an advisory forum without SB competences403. If a SB is mandatory404, 
then the Mitbestimmungsgesetz405 and the Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz406 determine the SB’s 
tasks mandatorily, largely according to the description in 4.4.2.2.
Works council
The mandatory requirements for establishment of a works council and its tasks were 
described in 4.4.2.
Directors and directors’ duties
Directors manage the company subject to the law, their service contracts, the internal 
rules, the articles and instructions of the GM. Managers are collectively entrusted with 
the management and the representation of the company, unless the articles provide 
otherwise407. In company affairs, directors must employ the ‘degree of care and skill of 
a conscientious businessman’408. This duty of care is an objective test. The BJR applies409 
but since the GM is the ‘höheste Willensorgan’ a good director will mostly refer important 
company decisions to the GM. The Treuepflicht410 and the other duties referred to in 
4.4.2.3 in principle exist here as well411. As a consequence, the BGB forbids a director to 
act for both parties but the articles can determine otherwise412. Loans to directors out 
of the Stammkapital (issued capital413) as well as payments to the shareholders out of 
the same are forbidden414. Directors are jointly and severally liable to the company for 
neglecting their duties415. A director is not allowed to vote on a resolution relating to the 
release from liability416.
External mandatory monitoring mechanisms
The external mandatory monitoring mechanisms are equal to those of the AG, without 
the specific arrangements for listed companies.
4.5.2.3 Concluding remarks on the GmbH
Table 4.9 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring struc-
ture of the German GmbH. The results stem directly from the above analysis and need 
no further comment.
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4.5.3 The British private limited company (Ltd)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Davies (2008), Maitland-Walker (2008) and Andenas 
and Wooldridge (2009).
4.5.3.1 Formation and institutional structure
A ‘private company’ is any company that is not a public company417. A private company 
may either be a ‘limited company’, which may be ‘limited by shares’ or ‘limited by guar-
antee418’, or an ‘unlimited company’419. The name of a limited company that is a private 
company must end with ‘limited’ or ‘Ltd’420, unless it is exempt, e.g. for being a charity421. 
The Companies Act 2006 (CA) regulates both the Ltd and the Plc. And although basically 
similar, there are some important differences between the two422. This may stem from 
provisions in the law specifically for quoted423, public424 or private425 companies; and of 
course from the non-applicability of the Listing Rules, Combined Code and Takeover 
Code. The remarks in 4.4.3.1 on establishment and on registration broadly apply to the 
Ltd. The deregulation of the Ltd was one of the wishes behind the corporate reform of 
2006. Therefore the Ltd is a legal person without a minimum capital426, without a manda-
tory company secretary427 and without the obligation to hold an AGM annually428. It has 
a one-tier governance structure. It should have at least one director, who should be a 
natural person429. It has one or more members, who may pass a resolution in or outside 
a meeting430. The law leaves many institutional choices to the articles. The Model Articles 
for Private Companies give only default rules431. If the Ltd is an international company 
with holdings in the EU, it might have a European Works Council (EWC) or an ICP.
Table 4.9: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the German GmbH.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+ GM appoints, dismisses NEDs (if an SB; and subject to co-determination law)
accountability
+
−
GM adopts the annual accounts and appoints the auditor. Disclosure through Handelsregister
no mandatory audit for ‘small’ GmbHs
veto
+
+
+ −
+
GM has an instruction right in respect of all company matters
GM decides on identity, capital, articles. The Holzmüller/Gelatine doctrine applies restrictedly
if mandatory SB: SB veto on EB decisions listed in the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure
+ −
+
no mandatory SB (unless > 500 employees); mandatory works council if ≥ 5 employees
Satzungsautonomie
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach if co-determination applies (> 500 employees)
Sorgfalt, Treuepflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht; no conflict, no corporate opportunities; 
BJR (restricted)
external monitoring + − at least four. Manifold court-access. No whistle-blowing culture
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4.5.3.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.7 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a Ltd. In the full-blown picture 
the Ltd has four internal and possibly eight external mandatory monitoring mechanisms. 
The one-man Ltd may encounter no internal and four external monitoring mechanisms.
Internally, the shareholders’ instrumental rights in the Ltd go into less detail than in the 
quoted Plc, due to the non-applicability of the LR, TC and UKC. To facilitate432 decision-
making shareholders may vote by a special resolution form outside a meeting, the ‘writ-
ten resolution’433. Directors and members may propose a written resolution434. It can be 
an ‘ordinary’ or a ‘special’ resolution, the first requiring 50% of the voting rights for 
approval, and the second 75%435. However, this procedure is not available, and an AGM/
EGM is required for two decisions: on the removal of directors or that of the auditor436. 
The threshold for calling a GM by members is 5% of the voting rights437. An auditor only 
has to be appointed if the Ltd is categorized as larger than ‘small’438. However, sharehold-
ers may always require an audit439.
Although not a corporate organ, the information and consultation of employees provided 
for in the ICER 2004 (see 4.4.3.2) provides, as and when requested, negotiated and estab-
lished, for an internal monitoring mechanism of the Ltd. Its content is determined either 
by the result of the negotiation between employer and the employee representatives or, if 
the parties do not reach a negotiated agreement, by the standard provisions of the law440.
The board of directors and directors’ duties are arranged identically to those of the Plc.
Externally, the lifted requirement for an audit of a ‘small’ company implies one manda-
tory monitoring mechanism less. There is no monitoring from the Takeover Panel. The 
FRC is in place only in the case of defective accounts of larger Ltds. The FSA only has a 
role in the case of financial sector companies.
4.5.3.3 Concluding remarks on the Ltd
Table 4.10 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the UK Ltd. The results stem from the previous analysis and need no further 
comment.
4.5.4 Concluding remarks on the private limited company
As table 4.11 shows, the BV, GmbH and Ltd differ more than their larger brothers, due 
to less EU involvement. The ‘associative’ origin is clearly felt in the GM position in the 
Ltd and the GmbH as the ‘highest organ’ in the legal person. In the ‘structure BV’, the 
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‘MitbestG GmbH’ and to a lesser degree in the ‘DrittelbG GmbH’ the SB takes over this 
position. It should not be forgotten that numerous private limited companies have less 
than the required number of employees and therefore do not have a mandatory SB. In 
the continental system, however, there are usually works councils, which means at least a 
form of monitoring, which the Ltd lacks, unless there is an EWC. Internally, the appoint-
ment/dismissal rights are the same as in the NV/AG/Plc. Although the accountability is 
Table 4.10: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the UK Ltd.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
− GM may remove a director; has no mandatory appointment right for directors
accountability
+ −
−
GM appoints auditor; exception for ‘small’ Ltds; public disclosure through Companies House
no approval of annual reports by the shareholders; no release from liability of directors
veto
+
+
+
+
GM decides on identity, capital, articles
GM decides on payments for loss of office; on long-term service contracts
GM veto on a wide range of EB decisions with a possible conflict of interests
decision-making (‘written resolution’) possible outside GM with two exemptions
company structure − no mandatory presence of NEDs; no ‘organic’ employee representation (works council)
directors’ duties
+ −
+
shareholder approach / the benefit of its members as a whole (+ have regard to)
an integrated system of duties
external monitoring + at least four; whistle-blowing system through PIDA
Table 4.11: a comparative evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the BV, GmbH and Ltd.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
BV+
GmbH+
Ltd−
In ‘ordinary BV’ GM appoints, suspends, dismisses EDs and (the majority of) NEDs; in 
a ‘structure BV’ as well as in a GmbH > 500 employees GM appoints and dismisses de 
facto two thirds of the NEDs (GmbH > 2,000 employees: 50%) whilst the SB appoints the 
EDs (for the GmbH >500 and < 2,000 employees: GM appoints EDs)
Ltd: CA only recognizes a GM right to remove directors
accountability
BV+ −
GmbH+−
Ltd−−
Annual accounts and reports to be approved/adopted by the board (Ltd); for BV, GmbH: 
by the GM. Release from liability only for BV by GM
Appointment of auditor: all by GM. No auditor mandatory if small
veto
BV + −
GmbH+
Ltd++
GM decides on identity, capital, articles (all) with (small) exception on capital in BV. On 
major change of identity or character: BV unclear, GmbH: Holzmüller/Gelatine.
Ltd: GM decides on payments for loss of office, long-term service contracts, a wide 
range of EB decisions with a possible conflict of interests (e.g. property, (quasi-)loans)
GmbH: GM has instruction right in respect of all matters. SB veto on items listed in the 
law (‘structure BV’) or in the articles (GmbH, BV); works council veto on social matters
company structure
BV+ −
GmbH+−
Ltd−−
no mandatory presence of NEDs (Ltd); only if > 500 empl. (GmbH) or if ‘structure BV’ (BV)
mandatory works council if ≥ 5 (Germany) or 50 (the Netherlands) employees
Ltd: no co-determination or works council (unless EWC)
directors’ duties
BV+ −
GmbH+−
Ltd+ −
stakeholder approach in Germany and the Netherlands
(enlightened) shareholder approach in the UK
an integrated system of duties (Ltd)
external monitoring
BV+
Ltd+
easy access to specialized OK (BV)
whistle-blowing system through PIDA (Ltd)
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largely identical as well, here the GM of the GmbH approves the annual accounts. The GM 
decides mandatorily in the BV and by default in the GmbH on the release from liability 
of directors. The veto rights for the GM are again present in the Ltd more than in the 
GmbH/BV. Only in the GmbH the GM has an instruction right and a right to decide on 
a major change of identity or character within the Holzmüller/Gelatine doctrine. In the 
GmbH and the BV the SB if present and the works council have veto rights as well. The 
company structure in the GmbH/BV often recognizes a works council and an SB subject 
to the number of employees.
Directors’ duties are identical to those in the NV/AG/Plc. External monitoring is mainly 
provided for by the auditor. If the company is small an auditor is not required. In all 
systems the private limited company must publicly disclose through the Handelsregister. 
The tax authorities monitor as well. In Germany the commercial and tax reporting con-
cepts are identical. In the Netherlands this has recently been provided for as an option441.
4.6 THE MAnDATORY MOnITORInG STRUCTURE OF THE CO-
OPERATIVE
A co-operative is an association characterized by a double relationship with its members: 
as equity suppliers and as business partners. This section evaluates sequentially the 
mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch coöperatie (4.6.1), the German Genossen-
schaft (4.6.2) and the UK Industrial and Provident Society (4.6.3). Section 4.6.4 concludes.
4.6.1 The Dutch coöperatie
The forthcoming analysis rests on Dijk/Van der Ploeg (2007), Galle (2007) and Asser-Van 
der Grinten II (de Rechtspersoon) (1986) for historic references.
4.6.1.1 Formation and institutional structure
S 2:53-63j BW specifies co-operative law in the Netherlands. Since the Dutch co-operative 
(coöperatie) is essentially an association442, its formation requires at least two people. The 
coöperatie is defined as an association established as a coöperatie by a notarial deed. It is 
a legal person. A minimum capital is not required. Its objects must be to provide for the 
specific material needs of its members under contracts, other than insurance contracts, 
concluded with them in the business it conducts443 for the benefit of its members. Contrary 
to an ordinary association, profit-distribution to members is allowed444. In its articles, a 
coöperatie may opt for full (WA; wettelijke aansprakelijkheid), restricted (BA; beperkte 
aansprakelijkheid) or exempt (UA; uitgesloten aansprakelijkheid) member liability in the 
case of a deficit. The latter is usually the case. The name of the coöperatie should contain 
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the word coöperatief445, as well as the indication WA, BA or UA446. Depending on its size, 
the coöperatie is an ordinary or a ‘structure coöperatie’. The ordinary coöperatie has a 
mandatory EB and GM. The GM usually consists of all of the members, but the articles 
may determine that the GM consists of representatives of the members only. In the latter 
case, the articles may list GM decisions that are subject to a poll of all the members447. 
A separate SB - Dutch law also maintains a two-tier system for a coöperatie448 - is only 
mandatory for the ‘structure coöperatie’. A coöperatie becomes a ‘structure coöperatie’ 
if (1) its equity is at least €16 million, (2) there is a mandatory established works council, 
(3) its workforce in the Netherlands counts at least 100 people, and (4) if this situation 
lasts during three consecutive years449. The structure regime which differs from that in 
the NV or BV450 is mandatory but exemption is provided for in specific holding company 
structures or can be requested from the Minister of Justice451. Voluntary adoption of 
the regime is allowed452. Initiatives for better governance of coöperaties have resulted 
in the NCR Code voor coöperatief ondernemerschap453. This code is meant as a tool for 
modernization and evaluation of the governance structure of a coöperatie and contains 
no mandatory rules. The establishment of a works council depends on the conditions 
described in 4.4.1.1.
4.6.1.2 Internal mandatory monitoring structure
Figure 4.8 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a coöperatie. In the full-
blown picture, the coöperatie has five internal and possibly nine external monitoring 
mechanisms. The one-man coöperatie, a legally admitted454 contradictio in terminis, still 
encounters at least four external monitoring mechanisms. The text below analyses the 
internal and external mandatory monitoring structure of the coöperatie. It starts with the 
internal mandatory monitoring structure. Again, it focuses on the differences with the 
NV.
Members
Members have the usual instrumental rights: in respect of information, to convene, to 
vote, to litigate and to petition an inquiry. There is no mandatory right to place items on 
the agenda. This is one of the indications that coöperatie law needs modernization455. The 
law gives due attention to the exit side, which is important because members have a dual 
relationship with the coöperatie: member and supplier or customer. Expel and resign 
arrangements are in place.
General Meeting (GM)
Although the literature456 assumes that the instrumental right to be informed exists, there 
is no such provision in the law. As regards appointment the essential characteristic is 
that the GM appoints the majority of the executive as well as the non-executive directors. 
The articles may provide for the appointment of a minority by others than members457. 
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Suspension and dismissal follow the same rules. The nomination of NEDs is mandatorily 
regulated in a ‘structure coöperatie’. The GM, works council and EB may nominate a 
NED. The SB delivers a binding recommendation to the GM. The GM’s choice of a NED 
may be restricted to one person recommended by the SB. If the GM objects, the OK may 
ultimately decide on the recommended nominee’s suitability458. There are no decision 
rights in respect of transactions proposed by the EB459. Concerning the rules of the game, 
the decision on membership is delegated to the EB with a right of appeal to the GM. There 
is a lively debate about whether the GM’s right to amend the articles can be restricted. 
Whilst Dijk/Van der Ploeg (2007)460 argue that the right to propose an amendment to 
the articles cannot be restricted, Asser/Van der Grinten (1986)461 and for the NV/BV 
Van Schilfgaarde/Winter (2006)462 and Klaassen (2007)463 take a different stand. Restric-
tions in the articles, e.g. the approval of an amendment by an organ or a third party, are 
permitted464. The (negative) setting incentives strategy has an interesting feature in the 
investigation committee (usually called: kascommissie). Its nomination is required if there 
is neither an SB nor a judgement of an external auditor. The committee, which consists 
of ordinary members, has an audit function and should receive all the information it 
requests465. Again, as in the BV, the (positive) setting incentives strategy has not been 
applied. The law has no provisions on ED remuneration and leaves remuneration of NEDs 
by default to the GM466.
Analytically the monitoring structure of a coöperatie is essentially identical to the NV and 
the BV. And although the principle of board autonomy holds, and the EB is in that sense 
the ‘highest authority’, Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007, argue467 that due to the appointment 
rights of the GM468 the latter is the ‘ultimate authority’ of the coöperatie. It may even 
instruct the EB on the strategy, if the articles so determine469.
Supervisory board (SB)
The instrumental and decision rights are largely identical to those of an SB in a NV or a BV. 
The SB, however, cannot appoint EDs, unless provided for in the articles and even then 
only a minority. The right to nominate NEDs to the GM categorizes as a negative agent 
incentives right. It may facilitate smooth co-operation between EB and SB.
Works council
The works council rights of the WOR apply to the coöperatie as they do to the NV (4.4.1.2). 
Since the rights of the works council in the ‘structure coöperatie’ are mandatory, figure 
4.8 presents a right to nominate NEDs and to object to a NED recommendation by the SB. 
The de facto right in the ‘structure NV/BV’ to nominate one-third of the NEDs does not 
exist here; nor does the right of the NV works council to attend and be heard in the GM.
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4.6.1.3 Executive board (EB) and duties of directors
Much of what is said in 4.4.1.3 applies. Both EB and SB have a collegial structure and 
their tasks are identical to those in the NV470. In a number of coöperaties the EB consists 
of laymen (representatives of members) and has hired a team of managers, often called 
‘directors’. These have the same executive role as the senior managers who are not execu-
tive directors in the NV or BV. The directors’ duties are largely identical to those in an 
NV. The provisions in the event of conflicting interests are much the same471. The Hoge 
Raad ruled that the director owes his duties to the coöperatie, just as in the NV, and not 
to the members, unless the director neglected his duty to one member specifically (HR 13 
October 2000, NJ 2000, 699, Heino Krause). The pending proposal472 to enable a one-tier 
board system for the NV/BV does not apply to the coöperatie. After its enactment, the 
board systems for the cooperative and the NV/BV will diverge even more.
4.6.1.4 External mandatory monitoring structure
The external monitoring mechanisms are essentially the same as for the NV. However, 
members have a double relationship with the coöperatie: they are a member as well as a 
supplier or customer. Their ‘double monitorship’ bridges somewhat the gap between the 
external suppliers or customers market (see figure 3.5) and the company and brings these 
monitors closer to the company. The law creates an additional external monitor of the 
coöperatie where it provides for an interested party or the OM to request its liquidation 
if it lacks members473.
4.6.1.5 Concluding remarks on the coöperatie
Table 4.12 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the Dutch coöperatie. The results stem from the previous analysis and need 
no further comment.
4.6.2 The German eingetragene Genossenschaft (eG)
The forthcoming analysis rests largely on Lang/Weidmüller (2006).
4.6.2.1 Formation and institutional structure
The Genossenschaftsgesetz (GenG)474 defines German co-operative law. It is of a manda-
tory nature475. The German co-operative (Genossenschaft) is essentially an association 
with specific objects, namely to promote the business or the private interests of its mem-
bers, or their social or cultural interests, through a collective business organization476. 
The co-operative is established by signing the founding agreement and the articles477. 
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The German co-operative may appear in a registered478 and in a non-registered form. A 
non-registered co-operative has no legal personality (nicht rechtsfähig). After registering 
(Eintragung) in the Genossenschaftsregister479, a process that involves extensive court 
examination480, a co-operative becomes a registered co-operative (eingetragene Genos-
senschaft, eG481), which is a legal person482. The name of the co-operative should contain 
the addition eG or eingetragene Genossenschaft 483. One needs at least three people484 
to establish a co-operative. The court is to dissolve it once the number of members 
falls below485. The articles (Satzung486), to be drawn up in written form, should choose 
whether the member liability to the co-operative for a deficit (Nachschusspflicht) will be 
full, restricted or exempt487. Profit-distribution to members is allowed488.
The eG has a mandatory EB, SB and GM. The EB (Vorstand) consists of at least two natural 
persons who should be members489. An election of a candidate on the condition that he 
becomes a member (Vorratswahl490) is permitted. The GM appoints the EB by default491. 
The mandatory SB (Aufsichtsrat), to be appointed by the GM, should consist of at least 
three natural persons who should be members 492. As long as the number of members 
does not exceed 20, the articles may lift the SB requirement as well as the two EB member 
requirement493. In that case the GM in principle494 also observes the rights and duties as-
signed to the SB. If the eG has over 1,500 members and the articles so determine, the GM 
(Generalversammlung)495 may be replaced by a meeting of representatives (Vertreters-
versammlung)496. The articles may provide that certain decisions remain in the domain of 
the GM. The co-determination provisions of the DrittelbG (for over 500 employees) and 
the MitbestG (for over 2,000 employees) apply here as well497. A works council (Betrieb-
srat) is mandatory if the conditions are met as described in 4.4.2.1.
Table 4.12: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch coöperatie.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment /
dismissal
+
−
GM appoints (the majority of) EDs and NEDs (and all NEDs if structured)
if structured, ‘non-overrulable’ binding recommendation by the SB for a NED nominee 
(court mediation is provided for)
accountability
+
−
GM adopts annual accounts, appoints auditor and releases directors from liability. Public 
disclosure through Handelsregister
no mandatory audit for ‘small’ coöperaties
veto
+ −
+
+
GM decides on identity, articles; on membership: in appeal; all, subject to approval or 
proposal provisions in the articles. No GM veto on change of identity or character decisions
SB veto on important company decisions as listed in the law and in the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure + − SB only mandatory for a ‘structure coöperatie’; mandatory works council if ≥ 50 employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / interests of the company (het belang van de onderneming)
clear standards often need court clarification on issues e.g. conflict of interests, minorities
external monitoring
+
−
at least four. Easy access to OK in order to request an inquiry (enquête).
no whistle-blowing culture
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4.6.2.2 Internal mandatory monitoring structure
Figure 4.9 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of an eG. In the full-blown picture, 
the eG has five internal and possibly nine external monitoring mechanisms. In the small-
est possible option, it may still have three internal monitors and four external monitoring 
mechanisms.
Shareholders
The legal relationship between the eG and its members is characterized by a Gleich-
behandlungspflicht498, the genossenschaftliche Treuepflicht and the genossenschaftliche 
Duldingspflicht499. The Gleichbehandlungspflicht means that every member has to be 
treated equally. The Treuepflicht, based on general association law, implies the duty to 
observe and promote the interests of the company and to refrain from everything that 
could harm the company unless exceptional general or personal interests with higher 
priority require otherwise500. The Duldingspflicht means that members have to accept 
duties imposed by the articles or by a decision of the required majority501. The first of 
the instrumental rights is the right to be informed. This right stems from the associative 
relationship between member and eG502 (see also 4.7.2.2.). Every member has an informa-
tion right503. Normally the information has to be given in the AGM/EGM. The Treuepflicht 
applies, i.e. the member should not abuse his right504. If 10% of the members request an 
EGM, the EB is obliged to organize one. If the EB does not, the members may require court 
permission to organize one themselves. The same minority has the right to put items on 
the agenda. Every member has one vote, but the articles may attribute more votes to one 
member505. Every member may litigate the eG in case of formal or material faults in the 
decision process in the GM506.
General Meeting
Although the GM is still considered the oberste Willensorgan of the eG, Lang/Weidmüller 
recognizes that the strengthened power of management in the law stands in the way of 
full GM competence regarding management issues507. A general instruction right does not 
exist. The AGM is to be held at least once a year within six months of the end of the finan-
cial year508. The information right contains the right to examine the annual accounts and 
the annual report509. The information right of the GM mirrors the Berichtspflicht of the EB 
and SB. This means that in principle they should inform the GM about all issues necessary 
for responsible decision-making including those uncommon in size or in nature510. The 
GM appoints the EDs by default511 and the NEDs mandatorily, or a part of them if the 
co-determination rules apply. Appointment of EDs may be for an undetermined period, 
subject to the articles512. The appointment of a NED is for a period fixed by the articles 
or by the GM513. Both appointments can be dissolved at any time514. The remuneration of 
directors is the competence of the appointing organ515. The GM decides516 in principle by 
simple majority on the approval of the annual accounts and on the attribution of profits; 
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on the release from liability of directors; and on credit restrictions to members. As re-
gards the ‘rules of the game’, the GM approves identity changes and amendments to the 
articles,517 specific subjects with a 75% or 90% majority. For membership the law requires 
a unilateral declaration as well as admission by the eG518, the later usually provided for by 
the EB519. The Holzmüller and Gelatine doctrine applies here as well520. The negative agent 
incentives rights contain the right to establish an SB if not yet established; and, if no SB 
is established, to observe the SB rights in general and to attend to the SB rights regarding 
the auditor specifically through a delegate521.
Supervisory board (SB)
The SB acts as a collegial forum. Its instrumental rights are to require from the EB any in-
formation on all company matters; to inspect the books522; and to convene an AGM/EGM. 
The auditor has to announce the start of the audit to the Chairman, as well as to inform 
him of important, immediate measures requiring findings523. The SB appoints the EDs 
mandatorily if the Mitbestimmungsgesetz applies, otherwise it is a default right. There 
is no long mandatory list of decisions to be taken or approved by the SB, except some 
provisions on credits to, or guarantees from EDs, should the articles so determine524.
The negative agent incentive strategy charges the SB, if present, with the supervision 
(Űberwachung) of the management of the EB525. The law assigns to the Vorstand as Ex-
ekutive an unambiguous and severe management accountability, whilst the control is 
transferred to the Aufsichtsrat as independent Judikative526. The supervision extends527 
e.g. to the organization of the eG, including the internal control and risk system; the 
important business decisions, relating to strategy, finance and investment policy; and 
daily management. As regards company strategy, the articles often prescribe that the EB 
should acquire the approval of the SB528. An important part of its task is the examination 
of the annual accounts and reports. The SB has to attend the meeting where the auditor 
reports on the results of the audit529. EB and SB should meet immediately after to discuss 
the report530. The law requires that the SB send an annual examination report to the GM531. 
Moreover, the SB represents the eG in dealings with EDs and, should the situation arise, 
with the company, e.g. in law suits against former EDs or regarding nullities.
If co-determination applies, the SB should convene at least twice every half year532. NED 
rewards may not depend on the results of the eG533.
Works council
The rights of the works council are the same as described in 4.4.2.2.
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4.6.2.3 Executive board (EB) and duties of directors
The EB is internally and externally responsible for the management of the eG534 subject to 
the articles. These article provisions must refer to specific decisions and cannot contain 
a general right of approval by another organ535. It is a collegial board536 with an Arbeitsdi-
rektor if the Mitbestimmungsgesetz applies537. An eG may have hauptamtliche (full-time), 
nebenamtliche (part-time) and ehrenamtliche (honorary) EBs538. The presence of honorary 
EBs is an essential characteristic of the eG539. Each ED has a monitoring duty regarding his 
colleagues and a Berichtspflicht in respect of the decisions made by him, since the collec-
tive accountability of the board also remains when a division of tasks has taken place540. 
An EB has to observe the Sorgfaltpflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht and Treuepflicht. 
Sorgfalt541 means that directors have to apply ‘the care of a prudent and conscientious 
director of an eG’542. This is an objective test: a director should do everything objectively 
possible and subjectively reasonable (a surplus) to preserve the eG, its members and its 
creditors from harm543. The BJR applies, thus attributing considerable freedom to act 
to the EB544. The Verschwiegenheitspflicht means a duty of secrecy545. The Treuepflicht 
means that in all eG-related decisions an ED has to be guided by the interests of the eG 
and its members and not by his own546. A breach of duty makes EDs jointly liable and 
the burden of proof is theirs547. The law lists a number of specific decisions that cause 
a breach of duty. However, if a decision relies on a GM decision, EDs cannot be held 
liable548. All this applies between the ED and the eG. However, if the breach of duty relates 
to causes specifically mentioned in the law, i.e. payments of interest or profit to members 
without GM consent, then even creditors may sue directors directly549.
4.6.2.4 External mandatory monitoring structure
The external mandatory monitoring structure is essentially identical to that of an AG. 
However, for the audit (Prüfung) the law contains special arrangements550. Each eG 
should be member of an auditors’ association (Prüfungsverband)551. The State confers 
and withdraws the right to audit eGs552. Such a Prüfungsverband is in turn examined as a 
mandatory member by the Auditors Chamber553 and by the government554. The examina-
tion of an eG by the auditor includes an audit, but is broader than that. It extends to an 
analysis of the organization itself, the financial system and situation, the management, 
the internal risk and control system, employee policy and the like. It should take place 
annually, with exceptions for small eGs555.
4.6.2.5 Concluding remarks on the eG
Table 4.13 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the German eG. The results stem from the previous analysis and need no 
further comment.
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4.6.3 The UK Industrial and Provident Society (IPS)
The forthcoming analysis rests on the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 (IPSA 
1965), the Friendly and Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1968 (FIPSA 1968), on Mills 
and Snaith (1997), on information found on the websites of The Co-operative Group, 
Co-operatives UK and the FSA and on Southern and Rose (1961) for historic references.
4.6.3.1 Formation and institutional structure
A co-operative in the UK can operate on an unincorporated basis, as a private company 
limited by guarantee/ shares, as a community interest company (CIC) limited by guaran-
tee/ shares, or as an Industrial and Provident Society (IPS). The latter is the stronger form 
for a co-operative556 and is therefore chosen as the object of analysis. The IPSA 1965 
defines an industrial and provident society as an organization conducting an industry, 
business or trade, either as a ‘bona fide co-operative society’ (for the mutual benefit 
of its members who will participate in the business of the society) or ‘for the benefit 
of the community’ (for people other than its own members)557. For the latter the law 
requires ‘special reasons’ as they should normally register as companies558. For registra-
tion a society needs three members and a secretary or, if the members are registered 
societies, at least two of them559. The Mutual Societies Registration section of the FSA is 
the registration authority560. Unlike the registration procedure of a company, here the FSA 
scrutinizes the articles, which are called ‘rules’561. The FSA has developed a strict set of 
requirements a society should adhere to before it can be registered as an IPS562. For a bona 
fide co-operative these are: (1) the existence of a community with a common economic, 
Table 4.13: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the German eG.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+
+ −
GM appoints, dismisses NEDs (if an SB; and subject to co-determination law)
GM competences regarding remuneration of NED, not ED (unless appointed by GM)
accountability
+
+
−
GM decides on adoption annual accounts, auditor’s report, release from liability EDs/NEDs.
Disclosure through Handelsregister
audit for eGs with total assets below €2 Million only mandatory once every two years
veto
+
+ −
+
GM decides on identity, articles; Holzmüller/Gelatine applies; credit restrictions
SB decides on issues listed in articles; credit to/surety by ED
works council veto on social matters
company structure
+
+
double monitorship of members through double relationship (member and  
supplier / customer)
no mandatory SB if ≤ 20 members; mandatory works council if ≥ 5 employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / co-determination
Sorgfalt, Treuepflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht, Gleichbehandlungspflicht, Förderpflicht, 
Duldpflicht; BJR
external monitoring
+ − at least five. Manifold court access. Specific auditor regulations for eG. Mandatory 
membership of Prüfungsverband. No whistle-blowing culture
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social or cultural need or interest, wherein (2) the business is run for the mutual benefit 
of all members, (3) the control of the society lies with all members, ‘one member, one 
vote’ should apply, and officers are elected by the members, (4) interest on share and loan 
capital should be limited to a rate necessary to obtain and retain enough capital to run 
the business563, (5) profits, if the rules allow distribution at all, should be distributed to 
the extent that the members have participated in the business, (6) membership should in 
principle be open to all, and (7) the applicants are able to convince the FSA that the rules 
demonstrate that the society will be a bona fide co-operative564. Upon registration the 
society becomes a body corporate with limited liability565. The maximum shareholding for 
natural persons is £20,000566. The last word of the registered society’s name should be 
‘limited’. However, if its objects are ‘wholly charitable or benevolent’ the FSA may accept 
a name without the addition of ‘limited’567.
As regards the institutional structure of the IPS the law speaks of members, a general 
meeting, which may be a delegate meeting if the society’s rules so allow568, a committee, 
and a secretary, receiver, manager or officer 569. The rules should contain further ar-
rangements. Schedule 1 IPSA 1965 lists the matters to be provided for in a society’s rules, 
which are e.g. the terms of admission of the members; the mode of holding meetings, 
the scale and right of voting and the mode of altering the rules; the appointment and 
removal of a committee, of managers or other officers and their respective powers and 
remuneration; and the mode of application of profits. There are no mandatory provisions 
on these issues. The IPS may also be subject to additional legislation and be entitled to 
different privileges, depending on the nature of their business570. If an IPS is a member 
of Co-operatives UK, it is required to adhere to the Corporate Governance Code of Best 
Practice for consumer co-operative societies 2005 and to disclose in its annual reports 
the extent to which it has followed the best practice recommendations and to give rea-
sons for non-compliance. A whistle-blowing procedure is part of the code.
4.6.3.2 Internal mandatory monitoring structure
Figure 4.10 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of an IPS. In the full-blown picture, 
the IPS has five internal and possibly nine different external monitoring mechanisms. 
The three-man IPS may encounter legally four and de facto no internal and five external 
monitoring mechanisms.
The internal monitoring mechanisms of a bona fide co-operative are the members, a 
general meeting, a secretary and a committee, often called the board. If the conditions 
are met an information and consultation mechanism of employee representatives may 
be in place.
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As figure 4.10 shows, few mandatory rules apply. Members’ instrumental rights are 
restricted to a request to the FSA to appoint an inspector or call a special meeting (see 
below) and to information through a copy of the rules and of the latest annual return; to 
a display of the latest balance sheet in a ‘conspicuous position at the registered office of 
the society’ and to inspection of his own account and (part of) the members’ register. The 
mandatory GM decision rights relate to the amalgamation, transfers of engagement and 
conversion and to the name of the company, as well as, not through the law but based 
on the ‘bona fide co-operative’ requirement, the rules and the receipt of financial state-
ments (Mills and Snaith, 1997). The appointment of the auditor is also GM territory571. The 
‘organic theory of power distribution’ developed in common law prevails, meaning that 
‘if powers of management are vested in the directors, they and they alone can exercise 
these powers’ (Mills and Snaith (1997). There are no specific provisions as to the role of 
the secretary.
4.6.3.3 Board (BOD) and duties of directors
Mills and Snaith (1997) explain that executives can be appointed either based on a 
requirement in the rules or as a matter of delegation from the board. How this may 
work out in practice is shown by the structure of the largest British co-operative, the 
Co-operative Group572. It has a Board consisting of 20 non-executives only, elected by 
the members. They are lay directors who depend on the expertise of the executives to 
run the business573. There are two executives, appointed by the Board. The responsibility 
of the Board is to direct the business of the Society, in particular (1) ensuring that its 
affairs are conducted and managed in accordance with its objects and in accordance with 
the best interests of the Society and its members, (2) determining the vision and strategy 
in consultation with the executives, and (3) overseeing the executives in the day-to-day 
management of the business574.
As indicated in 4.4.3.3 above, British law has a concise system of directors’ duties, devel-
oped in common law. Whilst this system is – in a way – codified in the CA 2006, for the IPS 
common law is still the guiding principle. As explained by Davies (2002), directors have 
two main duties in common law: a duty of care and a duty of loyalty also described as a 
duty to act bona fide. Every director should take care in the exercise of his duties, either 
as far as he himself is capable (the subjective test), or according to what one can expect 
of a ‘reasonable person’ (the objective test). This is what the duty of care implies. Whereas 
in common law the subjective test used to prevail, at present the Insolvency Act (IA) 1986 
formulates an objective test, at least as a minimum level (Davies, 2002: 154)575. The duty 
of loyalty requires that the director, when exercising discretion, acts bona fide in what 
he thinks are the best interests of the company (Davies, 2002: 159576). This is essentially 
a subjective, and thus not very valuable, criterion. However, common law has supple-
mented the duty of loyalty by equitable rules, which has resulted in objectively-based 
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rules as there are: the rule to obey the constitution, the no-fettering rule, the rule against 
self-dealing and the rule against secret profits. These are largely identical to the statutory 
regulations of the CA 2006. In addition, the IPSA enables the rules to require from officers 
‘having receipt or charge of money’ that they provide security ‘either by becoming bound 
(..) with or without a surety’ or ‘by giving the security of a guarantee society’577. Moreover, 
such an officer shall on demand render an account to the society and half-yearly deliver 
a return tot the FSA showing his receipts and his payments578. The IPSA also provides for 
the liability of directors in the case of fraud and misappropriation579.
4.6.3.4 External mandatory monitoring structure
The FSA is the leading external monitoring mechanism. It is not only a scrutinizing for-
mation authority, the disclosure authority for the annual returns580 and, as the case may 
be, the relevant authority under the FSMA581. The IPSA 1965 and the FIPSA 1968 attribute 
deeply intervening investigation rights to the FSA as well. The FSA may e.g. inspect the 
society’s register582, appoint an accountant to inspect the books and to report thereon583, 
require the production of the books, documents and other information584, appoint an 
inspector to examine the affairs of the society at the request of 10% of the members and 
call a special meeting of the society585, and require from an exempt society to appoint 
an auditor to audit its current or previous accounts586. The public may request access 
or copies of a society’s public file, which includes the annual returns and accounts587. 
A full professional audit by a qualified auditor is always required by societies which 
in the preceding year of account had a turnover in excess of £5,600,000 (£250,000 if 
charitable) or total assets in excess of £2,800,000588. Below these thresholds and with a 
turnover higher than £90,000 an accountant’s report 589will suffice, provided the rules 
allow this and the GM has passed a resolution to that end with less than 20% of the votes 
cast, and less than 10% of the members voting against590. Below £90,000 a society may 
produce unaudited accounts. For very small societies, the IPSA 1968 created the form 
of a lay audit591. IPSs are companies for tax purposes and are liable to corporation tax 
in respect of their profits with some exemptions592. The judicial authority is a court of 
appeal against FSA decisions or may decide disputes between the society and a member.
4.6.3.5 Pending changes in IPS law
The Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Act 2010 (CCBSA) 
received Royal Assent on 18 March 2010. It is not yet in force. It renames the various ‘In-
dustrial and Provident Societies Acts’ in ‘Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies 
and Credit Unions Acts’593. In future, societies will be registered as either a co-operative 
society or a community benefit society. Moreover, the act applies to registered societies 
the provisions relating to directors disqualification594.
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4.6.3.6 Concluding remarks on the IPS
An IPS is a not much regulated but externally heavily supervised body corporate suitable 
for a strong co-operative form. The FSA supervision will have the effect of sustaining 
confidence in the IPS in the markets. Table 4.14 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses 
(-) in the mandatory monitoring structure of the UK IPS. The results stem from the previ-
ous analysis and need no further comment.
4.6.4 Concluding remarks on the co-operative
The difference in possible objects is striking. The Dutch and UK co-operative emphasize 
material needs, whilst in Germany idealistic objects can be served within a co-operative 
as well. All systems recognize the GM as the ‘highest organ’. Table 4.15 shows that ap-
pointment/dismissal is basically a GM right, with an exception for the ED in a ‘MitbestG 
eG’. Directors are accountable for the annual reports to the GM (coöperatie, eG) or the FSA 
(IPS). The GM appoints the auditor (eG: mandatory membership of a Prüfungsverband595). 
There is no mandatory audit for small IPS or coöperatie. The GM can veto changes in the 
rules of the game; in the Netherlands the articles may attribute a right of denial to an 
organ or a third party. Moreover, the SB and the works council have veto rights in the 
coöperatie and eG. The company structure largely differs from the other forms since 
there is a double monitorship due to a double relationship between members and the 
co-operative. The coöperatie and eG, if large enough, require the presence of a SB and/
or a works council.
The system of directors’ duties relies on common law (IPS) and on legal standards and 
case law in the Netherlands and in Germany. As for external monitoring, the UK rec-
ognizes strong governmental monitoring through the FSA as well as a whistle-blowing 
arrangement (PIDA). Germany recognizes specialized and very detailed arrangements for 
Table 4.14: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the UK IPS.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+ democratic structure requirements of the FSA require members to appoint directors
accountability
+
−
+
GM appoints, removes auditor (if not exempt from audit)
no GM approval of annual accounts; no release from liability of directors
members may request FSA for inspection (10) or examination (100) into the society’s affairs
veto
+
+ −
GM decides on identity, rules
(common law may assign additional rights)
company structure
+
−
representation of members on the board
no ‘organic’ employee representation (works council)
directors’ duties + an integrated common law system of duties
external monitoring + at least five; strong monitoring/supervising role of FSA; whistle-blowing system through PIDA
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the audit of the eG. The specialized and easily accessible court (OK) is the Dutch external 
monitoring feature, although it should be acknowledged that coöperaties seldom use it.
4.7 THE MAnDATORY MOnITORInG STRUCTURE OF THE 
ASSOCIATIOn
An association is a group of persons, members, working together towards a common ob-
ject of which they are often the primary beneficiaries. This section evaluates sequentially 
the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch vereniging (4.7.1), the German Verein 
(4.7.2) and the UK community interest company (4.7.3). Section 4.7.4 concludes.
4.7.1 The Dutch vereniging
The forthcoming analysis rests on Galle (2002), Dijk/Van der Ploeg (2007), Van der Ploeg 
(2010) and Asser-Van der Grinten (1986) for historic references.
Table 4.15: a comparative evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the coöperatie, eG and 
IPS.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
coöperatie+ −
eG+
IPS+−
GM appoints (BV, IPS), dismisses (the majority of) directors (BV). In ‘structure 
coöperatie’ GM votes on ‘non-overrulable’ SB-nomination for NED. In eG 
> 500 employees GM appoints and dismisses two thirds of the NEDs (eG 
> 2,000 employees: 50%). If eG ≤ 2,000 employees: GM appoints EDs by 
default; if > 2,000 employees SB appoints EDs
accountability
coöperatie+
eG+
IPS−
GM appoints auditor if not exempt (coöperatie; IPS), adopts annual accounts 
(coöperatie; eG), releases directors from liability (coöperatie, eG). Public 
disclosure (all). Members may request FSA that examination of society’s 
affairs be inspected
veto
coöperatie+−
eG+
IPS−
GM decides on identity, articles; has no instruction right (all). No provision on 
major change of identity or character (unless for eG: Holzmüller/Gelatine).
SB veto on items listed in the law (coöperatie) or the articles (eG, coöperatie); 
works council veto on social matters (eG, coöperatie)
company structure
coöperatie+−
eG+
IPS−−
double monitorship of members through double relationship (member, 
supplier/customer)
no mandatory presence of NEDs (IPS); mandatory if > 20 members or > 500 
employees (eG); and if ‘structure coöperatie’ (coöperatie)
mandatory works council if ≥ 5 (Germany) or 50 (the Netherlands) employees
IPS: no co-determination or works council (unless EWC)
directors’ duties
coöperatie+−
eG+−
IPS+ −
stakeholder approach in Germany and the Netherlands
member approach in the UK (mutual benefit of its members)
an integrated system of duties based on common law (IPS)
external monitoring
coöperatie+
eG+
IPS+
easy access to specialized OK (coöperatie)
specialized auditors’ requirements and regulations (eG)
FSA supervision/monitoring; whistle-blowing system through PIDA (IPS)
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4.7.1.1 Formation and institutional structure
S 2:26-52 BW specifies association law in The Netherlands. The law requires at least 
two people for the formation of a Dutch association (vereniging). The formation takes 
place through a multilateral legal act. The law defines a vereniging as a legal person 
with members, directed towards a certain object which is not of a co-operative nature596. 
Profit-distribution to members is not allowed597. A vereniging may emerge in two forms: 
with and without full legal competence598. It obtains full legal competence once its articles 
are drawn up in a notarial deed599. The mention of the word ‘vereniging’ in the associa-
tion’s name is not mandatory600. The vereniging has a mandatory EB and GM. The GM 
usually consists of all the members, but the articles may determine that the GM consists 
of representatives of the members only. In the latter case, the articles may list GM deci-
sions that are subject to a poll of all the members (s 2:39 BW). Although the law explicitly 
mentions NEDs601, the establishment of an SB is optional. Non-company law may require 
the establishment of an SB, e.g. in health care, housing or education. The establishment 
of a works council depends on the conditions described in 4.4.1.1.
4.7.1.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.11 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a vereniging. In the full-
blown picture, the vereniging has three internal and possibly nine external monitoring 
mechanisms. The one-man vereniging602, a legally admitted contradictio in terminis, may 
encounter only one mandatory external monitor. The text below analyses the internal and 
external mandatory monitoring structure of the vereniging.
The internal mandatory monitoring structure analysis starts with the instrumental mem-
ber rights. Members are to be informed; 10% may convene an EGM; they have a voting 
right; and may even litigate or request an inquiry if the appropriate thresholds are met. 
As concerns the affiliation member rights, only a vereniging that maintains one or more 
enterprises with a total net turnover of over €4,4 million603 follows the disclosure and re-
lated litigation rules from Titel 9 Boek 2 BW (see 4.4.1.2). However, if these thresholds are 
not met litigation concerning the annual accounts and annual report through the special 
procedure established in the law or petitioning an inquiry is not possible604. Nor should 
a vereniging by then apply the accounting and disclosure rules of Titel 9 Boek 2 BW or 
is an auditor provided for, whatever the size of its membership. In that case its financial 
reporting may be rather basic605. Concerning the GM instrumental and appointment rights, 
they are similar to those of the coöperatie. Important is the GM decision right to adopt 
the financial reports, and the negative incentive rights to appoint an independent audit 
committee (kascommissie) to check the books606 and to appoint representatives in case of 
conflicting interests with the EB.
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The internal monitoring mechanisms of a vereniging are very basic and designed for the 
needs of a small vereniging 607. Thus, especially for a large vereniging, and there are quite 
a few, i.a. the ANWB, public broadcasting and Natuurmonumenten, a proper governance 
is almost entirely left to the articles. They will, as have been shown by Santen and Kloos-
terman (2007) for the NV, most likely choose the least governance-friendly alternative. 
The works council rights of the WOR apply to the vereniging as they do to the NV (4.4.1.2). 
However, it lacks the special rights assigned to the NV works council by the BW.
The executive board (EB) and duties of directors resemble the coöperatie (4.6.1.2) in its col-
legial board structure, its tasks and its duties of directors. In case the vereniging creates 
an SB, the articles should define its tasks in line with those of the NV/BV/coöperatie608. 
The same duties apply. However, for a vereniging which is not subject to Corporation Tax 
(VpB) there are exceptions609.
Given the weak internal monitoring structure, the importance of external monitors grows. 
However, the vereniging has few. The formation authority comes into the picture if the 
vereniging is fully legal competent, which is in the majority of cases (86.5%610). Financial 
disclosure is only mandatory if the vereniging maintains an enterprise with a standing 
turnover for two years of at least €4,4 million. For the mandatory appointment of an 
external auditor that enterprise should in addition be larger than ‘small’. However, the 
receipt of government subsidies normally implies a mandatory audit611. The tax authori-
ties may be evaded for some time if the association declares that it does not maintain 
an enterprise or compete in the market sector612. As regards the judicial authorities, an 
inquiry can only be requested of the OK if (a) the vereniging is fully competent and (b) 
maintains an enterprise with (c) 50 employees613 and in that case by (1) at least 300 mem-
bers; or (2) at least 10% of the members; or (3) at least as many members as represent 10% 
of the votes614; or (4) through a qualifying trade union; or (5) by the solicitor-general615 
in the public interest. The suppression and dissolution provisions mentioned in 4.4.1.5 
apply here as well. An additional external monitor forms the provision that an interested 
party or the OM may request its liquidation if there are no members left616.
4.7.1.3 Concluding remarks on the vereniging
Table 4.16 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the Dutch vereniging. The results stem from the previous analysis and need 
no further comment.
4.7.2 The German eingetragener Verein (eV)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Galle (1998), Schmidt (2002), Stöber (2004), Beuthien 
and Gummert (2009), Meckling (2010) and Von Hippel (2010).
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4.7.2.1 Formation and institutional structure
The sections 21-79 BGB specify the basics of German association law. It is mainly of a 
mandatory nature 617. The law does not define the association (Verein), but the literature 
maintains that it is a sustainable, institutionalized organization of people directed at 
a common object618. It may be established by two, but for registration it needs at least 
seven people619. The BGB discerns two sorts of private620 associations: the idealistic or 
nichtwirtschaflicher (non-economic) and the wirtschaflicher (economic) Verein621. Both 
may be legal persons or not622. The non-economic association obtains legal personality 
by registration in the register (Vereinsregister)623 and then becomes an eV (eingetragener 
Verein)624. One of the two should be added to the name625. The approval of the objects, 
which should not be directed at the economic exploitation of a company, is implicit in 
the registration procedure626. The economic association obtains legal personality once it 
has been approved by the State (Bundesstaat627). In order to avoid unequal competition628 
between companies with different legal forms, this concession is only granted in those 
few cases in which the petitioner succeeds in proving that the desired organization form 
cannot be created as an AG, GmbH, or eG (Subsidiaritätsprincip)629. Legal personality can 
be withdrawn by the court once the number of members falls below three630, or e.g.631 if 
a non-economic association pursues an economic goal632. The Verein has a mandatory 
EB (Vorstand) and GM (Mitgliederversammlung)633. The GM usually consists of all the 
members, but the articles may determine that the GM will consist of representatives of 
the members (Delegiertenversammlung634). An SB is permitted, though not required or 
regulated. Co-determination regulation does not apply. A works council (Betriebsrat) is 
mandatory if the conditions are met as described in 4.4.2.1.
Table 4.16: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch vereniging.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+
−
GM appoints and dismisses (majority of) EDs
no GM competences regarding remuneration
accountability
+
+
−
GM adopts annual accounts, appoints committee of investigation or, if need be, an auditor
if 2:360(3) (enterprise and turnover ≥ €4,4 Mio) applies: GM releases directors from liability; 
disclosure through the Handelsregister
no mandatory audit unless with enterprise; then, only mandatory if not ‘small’
veto
+ −
+
GM decides on identity, articles; on membership: in appeal; all, subject to approval or 
proposal provisions in the articles; no GM veto on change of identity or character decisions
works council veto on social matters
company structure + − no mandatory SB; mandatory works council if ≥ 50 employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / interests of the association (het belang van de vereniging)
clear standards often need court clarification on issues e.g. conflict of interests, minorities
external monitoring
+ −
−
at least one. Easy access to OK in order to request an inquiry (enquête).
easy initial avoidance of tax related obligations; no whistle-blowing culture
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4.7.2.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.12 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of an eV. In the full-blown pic-
ture, the eV has four internal and possibly seven external monitoring mechanisms. In the 
three-man eV there are still three internal and three external monitoring mechanisms. 
The principle of Satzungsautonomie635 results in a rather rudimentary legal regulation 
(Schmidt, 2002: 83; Galle, 1998). The internal mandatory monitoring structure is at fol-
lows.
Member
The first instrumental member right is to request the EB to convene a meeting or a court 
authorization to do so if the EB does not agree636. Each member has a voting right. Voting 
outside a meeting is allowed637. A member may have special rights638. Based on general 
legal principles (mitgliedschaftliches Grundrecht), Stöber (2004: 179) and Schmidt (2002: 
626) hold that members are entitled to information, annual accounts and inspection of 
the membership list. Members have a Förderpflicht639, a Treuepflicht640 and a Gleichbe-
handlungspflicht641. Accordingly, the articles may require the appointment of special 
representatives for specific transactions642; a member is not allowed to vote on an agenda 
item concerning litigation against him643; and it is generally thought that a member should 
not vote on items relating to release from liability or dismissal concerning himself644.
General meeting (GM)
The GM is fundamentally the highest organ of the Verein (Segna, 2002: 3) . The law 
provides for GM’s instrumental information right based on the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 
(BGB)645 although literature pleads for an analogous application of the AktG arrange-
ment646 of an information right for every member in the GM (Segna, 2002: 19). Schmidt 
(2002) constructs from the general BGB duty to inform647 an individual right to informa-
tion. The GM appoints EDs648 and it may repeal the appointment at any time, unless the 
articles restrict this right649. It has decision rights in respect of all items concerning the 
Verein, insofar as they are not attributed to the EB or another Vereinsorgan650. The articles 
may be amended by a 75% majority, and to change the objects 100% is necessary651. And 
although most Vereine are organized accordingly (Segna, 2002: 13), this is all default 
law652. Mandatory is the liquidation decision653. Normally, the GM decides by a simple 
majority654. Since the GM is the highest organ655 in the Verein, the EB should accept its 
instructions unless the law provides otherwise656.
The board (EB) and duties of directors
The EB functions as a collegial board657. It directs and represents the Verein658. Direc-
tors need not be members659. The articles may restrict its power of representation with 
external effect660. The Förderpflicht, Treuepflicht and Gleichbehandlungspflicht apply to 
directors as well661. Additionally, the BGB requires the care from each of the members 
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that one would exercise this for one’s own good662; avoid abuse and negligence, and - if 
a Kaufmann in the sense of the HGB - perform with ‘the care of a conscientious trades-
man’663.
The law leaves all the other issues to the articles664 e.g. relating to membership and con-
tribution; composition of the board; the organization of the GM. According to Schmidt 
(2002: 700) the Holzmüller/Gelatine doctrine applies here as well, which implies that 
the EB should request approval for decisions which in effect amend the articles. On the 
nullity of Verein decisions, Schmidt (2002: 697) is of the opinion that the sections in the 
Aktiengesetz should be applied per analogiam. Since directors’ liability refers to the BGB 
(Schmidt, 2002: 691) which may cause unreasonable consequences for the honorary (eh-
renamtliche) director, the law has been recently changed in order to in principle exempt 
directors earning less than €500/year665.
The first of the external monitoring mechanisms is the formation authority. For the eV 
this is the local court. This checks whether the Verein to be registered satisfies the legal 
requirements. This is more than a formal check, e.g. the objects are scrutinized666. An 
audit of a Verein is generally not required (Vogelbusch, 2008). If the eV is not exempt (see 
4.4.2.4) tax law may require annual reporting in general667 or for certain categories e.g. 
for hospitals668.
Public disclosure of financial data of an eV is not mandatory. For an eV that is not a 
Kaufmann according to the HGB there are no regulations for bookkeeping at all669. And 
even if the HGB applies, i.e. if the eV exploits an enterprise, the law prescribes book-
keeping procedures and no public disclosure. There is no government monitoring after 
registration.
4.7.2.3 Concluding remarks on the Verein (eV)
Table 4.17 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the German eV. The results stem from the previous analysis and need no 
further comment.
4.7.3 The UK Community Interest Company (CIC)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Davies (2008), Eijsbouts, Kristen, Jongh, Schild and 
Timmerman (2010) and materials downloaded from www.cicregulator.gov.uk.
4.7.3.1 Formation and institutional structure
Although it is possible to run an incorporated ‘association’ type of company as a Ltd670, 
the UK legislator created a special form in 2004 for not-for-profit, non-charitable com-
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panies whose aims are to promote the interests of the community or a section of it671. 
These community interest companies are either public (abbreviated as: community inter-
est Plc) or private (CIC672) limited companies. They may be formed either as limited by 
shares or as limited by guarantee673. Essentially, their institutional structure equals that 
of a Plc or a Ltd as the case may be. The Companies Act 2006674 has effect subject to Part 
2 of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (CA 2004), 
which established the CIC675. The memorandum of a CIC must state that the company 
is to be a CIC. A company satisfies the ‘community interest test’ if a reasonable person 
might consider that its activities are being carried out for the benefit of the community676. 
The range of activities is broad. The CIC register contains e.g. counsellors, foster care, 
theatre and lawn sports CICs677. A CIC, although established for charitable purposes, can-
not be a charity678. A ‘charity’ has a legal connotation to be explained in 4.8.3.1. Due to the 
special object of the CIC, the law forbids a CIC to distribute assets including dividends to 
its members, unless regulations provide otherwise679. Payments of interest on debentures 
may be limited as well680. These are called asset lock provisions, meant to satisfy third 
parties that the assets and profits are used solely for community benefit.
To the usual institutional structure of a Plc or Ltd, the CA 2004 has added external insti-
tutions of a supervisory nature. They are: a Regulator, an Appeal Officer and an Official 
Property Holder681. In short, the Regulator, an officer to be appointed by the Secretary of 
State, must facilitate, supervise and regulate the CIC sector. He clears a CIC for registra-
tion682. The subsequent registration by the registrar creates the body corporate683. The 
Appeal Officer has the function of determining appeals against decisions and orders of 
the Regulator684. The Official Property Holder685 holds functions relating to the property 
of a CIC, e.g. to secure this property in the interest of the CIC.
Table 4.17: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the German Verein (eV).
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
− legal requirements in State law
accountability − legal requirements in State law. EB has a Berichtspflicht. No disclosure requirements.
veto
+
+ −
+
GM may instruct EB
GM decides on identity; no veto on articles or membership; Holzmüller/Gelatine applies
works council veto on social matters
company structure − no mandatory SB; mandatory works council if ≥ 5 employees; Satzungsautonomie
directors’ duties + −
Sorgfalt; Treuepflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht, Gleichbehandlungspflicht, Berichtspflicht, 
Förderpflicht; BJR
external monitoring
+ −
+
for ‘nicht wirtschaftlicher Verein’ a ‘check at the gate’
for ‘wirtschaftlicher Verein’ a State executed / supervised concession and monitoring system
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4.7.3.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.13 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a private limited CIC. In 
the full-blown picture, the CIC has four internal and possibly nine external monitor-
ing mechanisms. Although theoretically not impossible, the presence of an EWC/ICP 
is deemed highly improbable. Only the possibility of an information and consultation 
procedure is mentioned in the figure. The one-man CIC may encounter no internal and 
five external monitoring mechanisms.
The internal mandatory monitoring structure and the provisions related to the board 
and directors’ duties are identical to those of the Ltd or the Plc, as the case may be. This 
section focuses on the private CIC.
Externally, the CIC is supervised by the Regulator686 from the cradle to the grave. The flex-
ible governance form of the CA 2006 is still present, but the Regulator may take measures 
against any abuse discovered. It is entitled e.g. to investigate the affairs of a CIC687; to 
require an audit and appoint an auditor688; to appoint, suspend and dismiss a director689; 
to appoint a manager690; to transfer shares or extinguish membership691; or petition to 
wind-up the CIC692. Moreover, the Regulator may ‘vest in the Official Property Holder 
any property held by or in trust for a CIC’ or may order a person who holds property on 
behalf of a CIC not to part with the property without the Regulator’s consent693. However, 
the law states694 that the Regulator should exercise his supervisory powers ‘only to the 
extent necessary to maintain confidence in community interest companies’. In order to 
keep the Regulator informed about the whereabouts of the CIC, the mandatory annual 
‘community interest company report’695 should be forwarded to the Regulator696 and to 
the registrar of companies697. This important role of the Regulator counterbalances the 
role of the members. Their decisions are often subject to the Regulator’s approval698.
4.7.3.3 Concluding remarks on the CIC
A CIC is a heavily regulated and supervised Plc or Ltd with a community interest object. 
The regulation and supervision will have the effect of sustaining confidence in the CIC 
on the markets. Table 4.18 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory 
monitoring structure of the UK Ltd. The results stem from the previous analysis and need 
no further comment.
4.7.5 Concluding remarks on the association
Table 4.19 evaluates the differences in the mandatory monitoring structure of the vereni-
ging, eV, CIC. All these forms endorse the idea of the GM as the ‘highest organ’. Regula-
tion of this type of association is rather ‘rudimentary’. In Germany one relies on a strict 
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‘entrance check’ and detailed regulation by State law, which has not been the subject 
of this study. The choice in the UK is for connection to the CA and State monitoring/
supervision through the FSA. In the Netherlands it is all rather ‘liberal’: no checks ‘at the 
gate’ and no State supervision. As a result the regulations between the three are rather 
different.
For appointment and dismissal only the vereniging recognizes strict provisions, and the 
CIC only for removal. With regard to accountability this is the same. Dutch law requires 
Table 4.18: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the UK CIC.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
− GM may remove a director; has no mandatory appointment right for directors
accountability − no approval of annual reports by the shareholders; no release from liability of directors
veto
+
+
+
GM decides on identity, capital, articles
GM decides on payments for loss of office; on long-term service contracts
GM veto on a wide range of EB decisions with a possible conflict of interests
company structure − no mandatory presence of NEDs; no ‘organic’ employee representation (works council)
directors’ duties + an integrated system of duties
external monitoring +
+
at least five; strong monitoring / supervising role of CIC-Regulator
whistle-blowing system through PIDA
Table 4.19: a comparative evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Vereniging, eV, CIC.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
vereniging+
eV+−
CIC−
GM appoints and dismisses (majority of) EDs (vereniging); State law (Germany); 
right to remove director and no mandatory appointment right (UK)
accountability
vereniging+
eV−
CIC−
GM adopts annual accounts, appoints committee of investigation or, if need 
be, an auditor. Public disclosure and release from liability, if ‘entrepreneur’ 
(vereniging). No approval of annual reports by GM; no release from liability of 
directors (CIC). State law (eV)
veto
vereniging+
eV−
CIC++
GM may instruct EB. GM decides on identity (only: eV), articles, membership 
(all three: CIC, vereniging) subject to approval or proposal provisions in the 
articles (vereniging). No GM veto on change of identity or character decisions 
(vereniging, CIC). CIC: CA applies. Thus: GM decides on payments for loss of 
office; on long-term service contracts; on a wide range of EB decisions with a 
possible conflict of interests. eV: State law.
works council veto on social matters.
company structure
vereniging+−
eV+ −
CIC−−
no mandatory presence of NEDs
mandatory works council if ≥ 5 (Germany) or 50 (the Netherlands) employees
directors’ duties vereniging+−
eV+ −
CIC+ −
stakeholder approach in Germany and the Netherlands
member approach in the UK (mutual benefit of its members)
an integrated system of duties (CIC)
external monitoring vereniging+−
eV+−
CIC+
easy access to specialized OK (vereniging). Strong monitoring and supervising 
role of CIC Regulator; whistle-blowing system through PIDA (CIC). Easy initial 
tax avoidance (vereniging). Thorough check ‘at the gate’(Verein)
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public disclosure for certain large verenigingen, which seems unique. A right to veto an 
amendment to the articles is recognized in the Netherlands and the UK. Moreover, the 
CIC recognizes the veto rights from the CA. The company structure shows the absence of 
mandatory NEDs, and the presence of a works council in the vereniging and eV. Direc-
tors’ duties essentially follow the private limited provisions with additional membership 
duties if the director is a member as well. The external monitoring by the CIC regulator 
(UK) and the State (Germany) whether ‘at the gate’ or as a monitor ex post is remarkable.
4.8 THE MAnDATORY MOnITORInG STRUCTURE OF THE 
FOUnDATIOn
A foundation is an entity working towards an object of which primarily third parties are 
the beneficiaries. This section evaluates sequentially the mandatory monitoring structure 
of the Dutch stichting (4.8.1), the German Stiftung (4.8.2) and the UK charity (4.8.3). Section 
4.8.4 reviews shortly the European Foundation Statute (EFS) project and 4.8.5 concludes.
4.8.1 The Dutch stichting
The forthcoming analysis rests on Dijk/Van der Ploeg (2007), Van der Ploeg (2010) and 
Asser-Van der Grinten II (de Rechtspersoon) (1986) for historic references.
4.8.1.1 Formation and institutional structure
S 2:285-304 BW specifies foundation law in the Netherlands. The law requires one person 
for the formation of a Dutch foundation (stichting). The formation takes place through a 
notarial deed699. The law defines a stichting as a legal person without members, aimed at 
realizing the objects stated in its articles by means of an amount of capital allocated to 
those objects. The objects may not include distribution to any incorporator or to those 
participating in its constituent organs or to other parties, unless, as regards the latter, the 
distributions have an idealistic or social purpose700. Note that the law does not require a 
minimum endowment for the foundation. The law does however provide for the dissolu-
tion of the foundation if it is very unlikely that adequate (sources of) funding to achieve 
the objects will be tapped701. The mention of the word ‘stichting’ in its name is manda-
tory702. The EB is the only mandatory organ of the stichting. There is no GM as there are 
no members. A supervisory board is optional. For specific branches, e.g. health care, 
housing or education, the applicable law may require an SB with specific competences. 
The establishment of a works council depends on the conditions described in 4.4.1.1.
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4.8.1.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.14 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a stichting. In the full-blown 
picture, there are two internal monitoring organs (unless the articles provide for an SB) 
and possibly nine external monitoring mechanisms. The one-man stichting may encoun-
ter only one mandatory external monitor.
Of the internal monitors, only the EB and the works council exist in the stichting. The 
works council rights of the WOR apply to the stichting as they do to the NV (4.4.1.2). 
However, it lacks the special rights assigned to the NV works council by the BW. The law 
allows for a ‘supervisory organ’ but gives no further provisions703. The articles may be 
changed if and as provided for in the articles704. Santen and de Bos (2006) conclude that 
the internal mandatory monitoring structure of the stichting is virtually non-existent.
The remarks for the previous legal persons (see 4.4.1.3, 4.6.1.3, 4.7.1.2) basically apply to 
the executive board (EB) and the duties of directors of a stichting as well, as a consequence 
of Titel 1 of Boek 2 BW. However, for a stichting which is not subject to Corporation Tax 
(VpB) there are exceptions705. Moreover, a general provision on conflict of interests lacks, 
although the default provisions to restrict directors’ competence can be interpreted in 
this line706. Dijk/Van der Ploeg (2007: 236) holds that without a provision in the articles 
to the contrary, directors cannot act in the case of conflicting interests. Foreign literature 
adds another duty to the usual duties of care and loyalty, that of obedience. According to 
Atkinson (2010: 570) it is the root of the fiduciary relationship in a foundation: ‘serve the 
one the principal designates, as the principal designates’. He works towards a Trinitarian 
theory of fiduciary duty, consisting of obedience, loyalty and care. This thesis adheres for 
reasons of comparability in analysis to the approach of 4.4.3.3 which designates the duty 
to obey the constitution as one of the rules deriving from the duty of loyalty.
The weak internal monitoring structure is remedied by a reinforcement of the external 
monitoring mechanisms. In addition to the remarks made on external mechanisms in 
4.7.1.2 concerning the vereniging, four aspects need to be stressed for the stichting. The 
first is the dual role of the tax authorities707. On the one hand, it is fairly easy to evade the 
annual tax filing obligation (4.7.1.2). On the other hand however, and this is a common 
characteristic for foundations, specifically sanctioned foundations (in the Netherlands: 
ANBI, Algemeen Nut Beogende Instelling) are exempt from inheritance taxes. An ANBI 
qualification is in a way a safeguard. The ANBI regulations require disclosure to the tax 
authorities at their request. The second aspect is the important governance role that is 
attributed to the judicial authorities. However, this is a passive role (Santen and de Bos, 
2006). The Public Prosecution Service (OM) may take action if it identifies serious neglect 
or definite illegal acts708 (Santen en de Bos, 2006; de Meijer, 2005). This may end in a court 
decision to dismiss and disqualify directors709, to amend the articles710, or even to dis-
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solve the stichting if its activities are contrary to the public order711. However, the OM is 
hardly equipped for this task712. The third aspect to be mentioned is the role of interested 
parties. In the case of serious neglect or definite illegal acts, such parties may petition 
the District court to dismiss a director. They may request annihilation of a decision to 
change the articles713 and even the dissolution of the stichting714. An incorporator may, 
if the objects are unattainable, petition for an amendment to the articles715. The fourth 
aspect relates to the inquiry to be requested from the OK. In case of a stichting this is only 
possible (1) if the stichting maintains an enterprise, (2) with 50 employees or more716, 
and (3) if the right is attributed by the articles or by special contract to a party: by that 
party717, or (4) by a qualifying trade union718, or (5) by the advocate general719.
4.8.1.3 Pending changes in stichting-law
Despite all these measures, Schmieman (2008) concludes that their effectiveness is poor, 
which he relates to a lack of information on the foundation’s whereabouts. To remedy 
these and similar (Van der Ploeg, 2010: 262) observations, several proposals to change 
corporate law are pending. Annex 2 under 3 describes a proposal pending in Parliament 
to enhance the quality of supervision in a large stichting. Annex 2 under 4 shows how the 
law will shortly aim to prevent abuse of all legal persons through a continuous check of 
the registers. Recently a consultation document was circulated containing a legal duty 
for all stichtingen to disclose their annual accounts, including data about donations and 
subsidies. The reactions were unequivocally adverse720.
4.8.1.4 Concluding remarks on the stichting
Table 4.20 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the Dutch stichting. They prove the remark in Asser/Van der Grinten (1986: 
333) that ‘Dutch law is very liberal in respect of foundations, more liberal than in any 
other legal system.’ The results stem from the previous analysis and need no further 
comment.
4.8.2 The German Stiftung
The forthcoming analysis rests on Versteegh (1998), Hof (2001), Schmidt (2002), Adloff, 
Schwertmann, Sprengel and Strachwitz (2007), Beuthien and Gummert (2009), Meckling 
(2010), Von Hippel (2010) and www.stiftungen.org721.
4.8.2.1 Formation and institutional structure
Sections 80-89 BGB specify the basic principles of German foundation law, but additional 
State law (Landesstiftungsgesetz) and fiscal law plays an important role. However, the 
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latter two are not the subject of this study. The law does not define the Stiftung, but 
Schmidt (2002: 173) holds that it is a non-associating organized legal person, established 
to pursue a specific object722. One person723 suffices to establish a foundation; in fact the 
bond between the founder and the foundation is characteristic of German foundation 
law (Versteegh, 1998). German law recognizes civil-law and public-law based founda-
tions, the former based on the BGB and State law, the latter established by separate 
administrative laws (e.g. universities). This thesis focuses on civil-law based foundations. 
Such a foundation becomes a legal person (rechtsfähige Stiftung724) after admission by the 
State authority. This admission is granted if the legal requirements725 in respect of the 
Stiftungsgeschäft (the memorandum of association) are met: a written declaration by the 
founder to dedicate a capital726; articles727 with name, place, objects, capital, EB; assurance 
of a sustainable realization of the objects; no endangering of the public interest by the 
objects. This is a material check (Konzessionsystem)728. The funding requirement is taken 
seriously: the proposed capital should stand in reasonable relationship to the proposed 
objects729. The literature is unclear about whether a non-legally competent foundation 
might already exist in the pre-admission stage730. To complicate matters even more, the 
literature discerns between dependent and independent and private and public founda-
tions. Only an independent foundation is a legal person731. It is private if it has a private 
object, e.g. family foundations, or public, if it is directed towards a public cause, which 
is generally the case732.
Table 4.20: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Dutch stichting.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
−
(none)
accountability
+
−
−
if an SB: NEDs entitled to inspection copy of the annual accounts/ report. It decides on the 
adoption of the annual accounts2 and, if 2:360(3) BW, on the appointment of the auditor
if no SB: EB decides on the adoption of the annual accounts; and in the case of 2:360(3) 
BW on the appointment of the auditor
an auditor is not mandatory for a stichting without an enterprise; and if it is ‘small’
veto
−
+
articles may provide that the EB is capable of changing the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure + − no mandatory SB; mandatory works council if ≥ 50 employees
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / interests of the stichting (het belang van de stichting)
clear standards often need court clarification on issues e.g. conflict of interests, minorities
external monitoring
+
+
−
−
court competence to change articles or veto a decision to change the articles; to appoint 
and, if need be, dismiss and disqualify directors; to dissolve if it acts contrary to the 
public order
interested parties and an incorporator may petition court (Rb) to act
reluctant OM attitude; easy initial avoidance of tax-related obligations
at least one; a request for an inquiry (enquête) to the OK is only possible if the articles so 
provide or through a contract (and for the competent trade union); no whistle-blowing 
culture
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Membership of a German foundation is not possible733. Distribution to the founders 
only is forbidden (Eigenstiftung). Distributions to family members of the founder are 
not prohibited as long as its object is not the providing of subsistence only734. Control 
of a company by a private foundation is in principle accepted735. The foundation has 
a mandatory EB (Vorstand)736. An SB, often in the form of a Kuratorium, is permitted, 
though not required or regulated. The State may examine whether attaining the object 
is still possible, or whether the object is still in the public interest, and in actual fact it 
does737. In the Stiftung as well, a works council (Betriebsrat) is mandatory if the conditions 
are met as described in 4.4.2.1.
4.8.2.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.15 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a Stiftung. In the full-blown 
picture, the Stiftung has two internal and possibly six external monitoring mechanisms. 
In the one-man Stiftung there may be only two external monitoring mechanisms left. 
Internally the characteristic of the Stiftung is that a structure is missing (fehlende Ver-
bandsstruktur; Schmidt, 2002: 174). The Stiftung is not able to merge738 but it is able to 
demerge (Ausgliederung)739. A change in legal form is not possible740. The federal arrange-
ments mentioned below, partly referring to association-law741, are rather rudimentary. 
However, contrary to association law they are mandatory742.
The EB functions as a collegial board743. It directs and represents the Stiftung 744. The 
articles may restrict its power of representation with external effect745. They may contain 
provisions on special representation of the Stiftung746. The Treuepflicht747 and the duty of 
obedience (Hütteman, 2010) apply. The law requires the director to inform the EB and to 
account for his acts748. The exemption in principle from liability for directors earning less 
than €500/year is valid here as well749.
The most powerful external monitoring mechanisms are the registration check on estab-
lishment and afterwards the governmental monitoring at State level. The latter varies for 
each State. Versteeg (1998) describes four categories of supervision to be found in the State 
laws: (1) inspection and information rights sometimes connected with advisory tasks, (2) 
right to approve certain transactions, (3) to undo decisions, and (4) to claim damages. Ver-
steeg (1998), Van der Ploeg (1999), Schmidt (2002) and Von Hippel (2010: 216-218) stress 
the importance and substance of this monitoring. Tax authorities monitor as well since a 
Stiftung often applies for tax exemption described in 4.4.2.4. Adloff et al. (2007) mention 
that approximately 98% of all foundations are tax exempt. The tax authorities decide 
whether a foundation conforms to the required notion for exemption, namely ‘furthering 
the public good’. Disclosure is barely arranged for. The State laws require an annual report, 
including a report on the realization of the foundation’s objects, and annual accounts to 
be sent to the State supervisory authority750. The HGB requirements of bookkeeping and 
202 Chapter 4
Fi
gu
re
 4
.1
5:
 G
er
m
an
 fo
un
da
tio
n 
(S
tif
tu
ng
): 
m
an
da
to
ry
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
str
uc
tu
re
 
 
 
di
re
ct
or
s  
  
 
 
  
 
 in
te
rn
al
  
m
an
da
to
ry
m
on
ito
rin
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
  
w
or
ks
 c
ou
nc
ila
 
in
st
ru
m
en
ta
l r
ig
ht
s 
 
Be
tr
VG
 
to
 b
e 
in
fo
rm
ed
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   b
   
 
to
 c
on
ve
ne
 w
ith
 d
ire
ct
or
s 
   
  7
4 
   
 
 de
ci
si
on
 ri
gh
ts
 
to
 v
et
o 
EB
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
n:
 
   
re
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
 
 
   
  9
9 
   
so
ci
al
 m
at
te
rs
  
   
   
   
   
 8
7,
90
,9
4,
95
, 
   
   
   
   
 9
8,
10
2,
10
3 
 se
tti
ng
 a
ge
nt
 in
ce
nt
iv
es
 (n
eg
at
iv
e)
 
to
 a
dv
is
e 
on
 im
po
rta
nt
   
   
   
   
80
,9
0,
92
,9
2a
 
co
m
pa
ny
 m
at
te
rs
  
   
   
   
 9
6,
98
,1
02
,1
11
 
      
 
no
te
s a
-b
 
a 
M
an
da
to
ry
 fo
r e
ve
ry
 c
om
pa
ny
 w
ith
 5
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
b  i
.a
. s
 5
3,
 8
0,
 9
0,
 9
2,
 1
02
, 1
11
 B
et
rV
G
 
 ex
te
rn
al
  
m
an
da
to
ry
 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
of
 
le
ga
l/p
ol
iti
ca
l/ 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 
na
tu
re
 
 
Fo
rm
at
io
n 
au
th
or
ity
 
 80
B
G
B
 
Ex
te
rn
al
 
au
di
to
r 
 
Ta
x 
au
th
or
iti
es
 
1,
 5
(1
.9
) 
K
St
G
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
au
th
or
ity
 
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
au
th
or
iti
es
  
 
Ju
di
ci
al
 
au
th
or
ity
 
 
Tr
ad
e 
un
io
n 
  
Pu
bl
ic
ity
 
In
te
re
st 
gr
ou
ps
 
W
hi
st
le
-
bl
ow
in
g 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ag
en
ci
es
 
 Le
gi
sla
to
r 
rig
ht
s 
--
--
--
   
on
ly
 m
an
da
to
ry
 if
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 a
re
 m
et
 (s
ee
 th
e 
te
xt
) 
St
at
e 
au
th
or
ity
 (z
us
tä
nd
ig
e 
Be
hö
rd
e 
de
s L
an
de
s)
: r
eg
is
tra
tio
n 
St
at
e 
au
th
or
ity
 in
sp
ec
ts
, m
on
ito
rs
 a
nd
/o
r s
up
er
vi
se
s S
tif
tu
ng
 (a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 S
ta
te
 la
w
)  
203
The mandatory monitoring structure of the company in the perspective of  
corporate governance – a legal approach
administration751 apply if the Stiftung is a Kaufmann, i.e. if it has, or is closely connected 
to, an enterprise. But even then, public disclosure is not mandatory.
4.8.2.3 Concluding remarks on the Stiftung
Table 4.21 shows the strengths (+) and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring 
structure of the German Stiftung. The results stem from the previous analysis and need 
no further comment.
4.8.3 The UK charity (CIO)
The forthcoming analysis rests on Davies (2008), Pearce and Stevens (2006), Leat (2007), 
Webb and Akkouh (2008), Picarda (2010), Dawes (2010) and materials available from the 
website of the Charity Commission.
4.8.3.1 Formation and institutional structure
The Charities Act 2006 defines a charity752 as ‘an institution established for charitable 
purposes only’753. Charitable purposes754 must be ‘for the public benefit’755 and fall within 
one of the following purposes: the prevention or relief of poverty; the advancement of 
education, religion, health or the saving of lives; of citizenship or community develop-
ment; of the arts, culture, heritage or science; of amateur sport; of human rights; of 
environmental protection or improvement; of animal welfare; the relief of those in need 
by reason of youth, age , ill health, disability, financial hardship or other disadvantage; 
the promotion of the efficiency of the armed forces, the police, fire and rescue services or 
ambulance services756; and any purposes that may be reasonably regarded as analogous 
to, or within the spirit of, one of these charitable purposes757. Although not identical, 
these objects come close to the usual objects of a stichting or a Stiftung. A charity is not 
necessarily a legal person758. It is often a ‘trust’, which is a separation of the legal and 
beneficial ownership of property (Pearce and Stevens, 2006: 157). A trust need not be 
a body corporate. It may be an ‘unincorporated association’ which is an organization 
Table 4.21: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the German Stiftung.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / dismissal − legal requirements in State law
accountability − no public disclosure, (rudimentary) disclosure to State authority
veto + works council veto on social matters
company structure − no mandatory SB; mandatory works council if ≥ 5 employees; Satzungsautonomie
directors’ duties + − Sorgfalt; Treuepfllicht,Verschwiegenheitspflicht,Berichtspflicht,Förderpflicht; BJR
external monitoring + extensive State monitoring on establishment; and afterwards
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of people who have decided to co-operate in furthering what the organization is set 
up to do and without legal personality759. A charity may also be formed as a ‘guarantee 
company’ under the CA which is widely used for schools, colleges and the “Friends” of 
museums760. Such a company has to abide by the CA as well as the Charities Act and 
suffers dual obligations e.g. regarding registration and disclosure761. For the purpose 
of comparison, this thesis focuses on the Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO762) 
which is a specialized body corporate763 established in the Charities Act 2006. According 
to Dawes (2010: 854) it is the nearest UK equivalent to the foundations of the civil-law 
countries. The Charities Act 2006 sets out the broad legal framework for CIOs but sec-
ondary legislation, expected for 2011, is required to provide the details on how CIOs will 
be established and operated764. Any one or more persons may apply to the Charity Com-
mission for a CIO to be constituted and to be registered as a charity765. A CIO only comes 
into existence and becomes a body corporate once it is registered with the Commission766.
The CIO may be either an ‘association’ type of charity, which has a membership as well 
as a trustee body, or the ‘foundation’ type, wherein the only members are the trustees767. 
Its directors are called charity trustees768. A trustee may, but need not, be a member. The 
members may be either not liable to contribute to the assets of the CIO if it is wound up, 
or up to a maximum amount each769. It is said that EC company-law directives will not 
apply to CIOs770.
4.8.3.2 Mandatory monitoring structure and duties of directors
Figure 4.16 shows the mandatory monitoring structure of a ‘foundation’ type CIO. In the 
full-blown picture, the ‘foundation’ type CIO has two internal and possibly six external 
monitoring mechanisms. The one-man CIO may encounter no internal and only three 
external monitoring mechanisms.
The internal monitoring structure of the CIO is at present only available in draft form. A 
final version is not yet available. In broad terms, the draft forms the structure of the CIO 
in accordance with the CA771. Picarda (2010) describes the duties for a charity trustee as 
those of loyalty, including observance of the declared objects and avoidance of conflict 
of interest situations, and the duty of care, adapted to the specific situations in nonprofit 
companies772.
The presence of the Charity Commission determines the external monitoring structure. 
Its legal objectives are fivefold: (1) to increase public trust and confidence in charities, (2) 
to promote awareness of the public benefit requirement, (3) to promote compliance by 
charity trustees with their legal obligations, (4) to promote the effective use of the chari-
table resources and (5) to enhance the accountability of charities to donors, beneficiaries 
and the general public773. It is a formation, disclosure, and financial authority in one. It 
determines whether institutions are or are not charities; it encourages and facilitates the 
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better administration of charities; and it identifies and investigates apparent misconduct 
or mismanagement and takes subsequent remedial or protective action774. An audit is 
required for the larger charitable companies; for smaller ones an accountant’s report will 
suffice775. Every charity should submit an annual return to the Charity Commission776 
unless its income is below £25,000. In the draft regulations all CIOs will have to submit 
accounts and annual returns to the Commission regardless of income. The Summary 
Information Return (SIR) forms part of the annual return that charities with an income 
of over £1 million have to complete and submit. The public can inspect a charity’s SIR 
from a link on its register entry. The Charity Commission is very powerful777 as it may 
institute inquiries778, call for documents and search records779, disclose information to 
other government agencies780 and, as either the auditor or the accountant, have a duty 
to report matters of importance to the Charity Commission781. The tax monitor is, due 
to the possibility of exemption, not always in place. A charity, once accepted as being 
a charity for tax purposes, is exempt from tax on income from land, interest, gifts, an-
nual payments or profit from trading, within certain boundaries782. Most charities do 
not automatically receive a tax return every year783. The Charities Act 2006 strengthened 
the judicial authority by creating a Charity Tribunal in order to create a low profile, less 
formal appeal procedure against Charity Commission decisions784. Moreover, the Char-
ity Commission is a ‘prescribed person’ under PIDA allowing it to accept disclosures 
(‘whistle-blowing’) from charity workers.
4.8.3.3 Concluding remarks on the CIO
A CIO is a legal person created by the Charities Act 2006. As a charity, it is heavily 
regulated and supervised by the Charity Commission. Table 4.22 shows the strengths (+) 
and weaknesses (-) in the mandatory monitoring structure of the ‘foundation’ type CIO. 
As much is yet to be determined, the table is only completed for the external monitoring 
mechanism.
Table 4.22: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the UK ‘foundation’ type CIO.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / dismissal
accountability + supposedly: as arranged in the Charities Act
veto
company structure − supposedly: no mandatory supervision function
directors’ duties + supposedly: based on the directors’ duties developed in common law
external monitoring + at least three; strong monitoring / supervising role of Charity Commission
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4.8.4 Concluding remarks on the foundation
All the foundation law studied above is rather basic. This apparently goes with the sub-
ject, although the fact that the German State law has not been studied, and that the UK 
CIO regulation is still underway, has helped to give this impression. As table 4.23 shows, 
internal mandatory monitoring is weakly provided for in all systems. There are no man-
datory NEDs, an occasional works council may be present, but the burden of mandatory 
monitoring comes from external authorities. Here is a clear distinction between Dutch 
law on the one hand, and German and UK law on the other. Dutch law is fairly liberal. 
There is no government control ‘at the gate’ and no systematic control ex post. The public 
prosecution service (OM) and the court have some correcting competences but they are 
seldom used, and even then, with little success. This is clearly different in Germany and 
the UK. Both have created monitoring and supervising institutions ex ante and ex post with 
strong competences. A common trait is the lack of public disclosure. One would expect 
transparency especially since the objects of all foundations are public-interest related. 
Instead, a mandatory general public-disclosure regulation lacks in all legal systems.
4.9 THE LEGAL STRATEGY APPROACH: An EVALUATIOn OF THREE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS
The previous sections provided a survey of 15 types of legal persons along six criteria: (1) 
appointment/dismissal, (2) accountability, (3) veto, (4) company structure, (5) directors’ 
Table 4.23: a comparative evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of the Stichting, Stiftung 
and CIO.
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
accountability
Stichting−
Stiftung−
CIO+
Stichting: public disclosure only if it has an enterprise of some size (2:360(3) BW)
Stiftung: no public disclosure; disclosure to State authority
CIO: full disclosure to the Charity Commission (very small CIOs probably exempt)
veto
Stichting+
Stiftung+
Stichting, Stiftung: A works council if present monitors through a veto right in 
respect of social matters.
company structure
Stichting−
Stiftung−
CIO− −
no mandatory NEDs. 
directors’ duties Stichting+−
Stiftung+−
CIO++
The UK common-law based duties system is more developed than the Dutch 
(based on general company law) and the German (based on Sorgfalt, Treuepflicht, 
Förderpflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht)
external monitoring
Stichting−
Stiftung+
CIO+
despite the supervision arrangements made in Dutch law, in practice it does 
not work. De facto stichting directors are practically free of any monitoring. In 
Germany and the UK this is different: strong supervision ‘at the gate’; annual 
return required and monitored as well as information-on-request by State or 
State-sponsored institution
208 Chapter 4
duties and (6) external monitoring. This section briefly discusses, in three subsections 
4.9.1 - 4.9.3, the mandatory monitoring systems of legal persons in the Netherlands, 
Germany and the UK, along the same criteria. A further evaluation follows by means 
of the questions posed earlier this chapter. Section 4.1 formulated the main research 
question of this chapter:
• are the agency theory based insights implemented in the internal and external moni-
toring mechanisms in corporate law, and is this implementation adequate?
Section 4.2.3 derived three other questions:
• does the mandatory monitoring structure of the various legal persons differ between 
profit and nonprofit companies?
• are the profit forms alike in organizational form?
• are the differences in monitoring structure functional?
The evaluation and the answers to the questions offer a vista of the monitoring structure 
of legal persons in different systems. Section 4.10 provides an analysis on a similar level 
of the legal persons along the Timmerman fundamentals. Section 4.11 concludes by 
answering the question which legal system monitors best.
4.9.1 The mandatory monitoring mechanisms of Dutch company law
4.9.1.1 An overview of Dutch company law
Table 4.24 presents an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of Dutch company law 
based on the previous analysis of Dutch legal persons. ‘Member’ in the table includes 
‘shareholder’. Table 4.24 clearly shows that shareholders and members have an impor-
tant role in the Dutch legal person. Although the articles may curtail their appointment/ 
dismissal rights, in the end they may break a binding recommendation by an enforced 
Table 4.24: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of Dutch company law
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
+
−
GM appoints (the majority of) EDs and NEDs (‘structure NV/BV’: NEDs only). A binding 
recommendation can be overruled by a qualified majority (unless structured)
GM may be sidelined in a ‘structure NV/BV’
accountability
+
−
GM adopts annual accounts, appoints the auditor and - except for non-360(3)-vereniging 
and stichting - the release from liability of directors. Disclosure of financial reporting 
through the Handelsregister, except for vereniging and stichting if no enterprise with > 
4,4 Mio turnover
no mandatory audit for ‘small’ NV/BV/coöperatie (unless listed NV); and not at all for 
vereniging and stichting without enterprise with > 4,4 Mio turnover
veto
+ −
+
+
GM veto on rules of the game may be subject to proposal or approval of another organ
GM veto on major change of identity or character decisions (NV; others unsure)
SB veto in ‘structure NV/BV/coöperatie’; works council veto on social matters
company structure + − mandatory SB for ‘structure NV/BV/coöperatie’; mandatory works council if ≥ 50 employees
external monitoring
+
−
easy access to OK in order to request an inquiry (enquête)
no whistle-blowing culture
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majority and appoint at least a majority of EDs (unless ‘structure NV/BV’) and NEDs of 
their choice (in the ‘structure’ regime other arrangements to voice disagreement are pro-
vided for). Accountability-wise shareholders and members are entitled to an inspection 
copy of the annual accounts. The GM has an information right as well, legally or according 
to literature, which may be blocked by important company interests, to be determined by 
the directors. The rights to adopt – or veto – the annual accounts and the annual report, 
to release directors from liability and to appoint the auditor, if mandatory, make the GM 
quite powerful in the financial field. Collective action problems may impede the actual and 
successful exercising of these rights. Other veto rights are sparsely attributed in order to 
maintain the advantage of agent specialization. In a ‘structure NV/BV/coöperatie’ the SB 
has a right to veto specific EB decisions listed in the law and the articles. And in the NV, 
a major change of identity or character of the company is subject to GM approval. The 
works council has a veto right in respect of social matters, as listed in the law. The Hoge 
Raad explicitly ruled that the GM does not have a right to instruct the EB. The determina-
tion of the strategy of the legal person is therefore primarily a matter for the EB. Klaassen 
(2009) puts this in another perspective. She argues that policy matters are attributed to 
directors, and structure matters to the GM. The important GM role as regards the rules of 
the game may however be – and often: is – mitigated by provisions in the articles. Thus, 
shareholders’ or members’ rights are not always what they seem. The reasonableness 
and fairness provision of s 2:8 BW may counterbalance this weakness in clear cut cases 
of abuse. Klaassen (2007)785 argues, correctly, that provisions in the articles that submit 
changes to the rules of the game to a proposal or the approval by a company organ, which 
is still allowed, should on analytical as well as corporate governance related grounds be 
forbidden. The obligatory presence of an SB – or of NEDs in the expected option of a 
one-tier system – for much smaller legal persons than is at present mandatory, and their 
right to lead the audit process, would seem worthwhile considering786.
The external monitoring structure in the Netherlands seems to be well-established. Weak-
nesses are the rather easy circumvention of prior government approval for the formation 
of NVs and BVs, the lack of prior clearance for other legal persons and the relatively poor 
compliance with public disclosure requirements for the BV and the coöperatie (chap-
ter 8). The poorly developed whistleblower culture may be considered a weakness too. 
Strengths are the presence of well-educated and guarded auditors, of modern financial 
authorities, of critical media, and above all, of a flexible judicial system. Especially the 
Enterprise Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (OK) is easily accessible by 10% 
of the shareholders or members in the case of suspected mismanagement. And it may 
work quickly: in the exceptional case of the sale of LaSalle by ABN AMRO Bank, the period 
between the purchase and sale agreement and the final sentence by the Hoge Raad (with 
the Enterprise Division ruling in between) was only 12 weeks!
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As the stichting has no members, much that has been said above does not apply. This 
lack of internal monitoring is counterbalanced by a host of virtual external monitoring 
mechanisms for the stichting. However, in reality these do not work out satisfactorily 
since they are not an OM priority. Would it be a solution to assign the OM attributed 
competences to a newly established ‘SPSS’ (Stichting Publieke Supervisie Stichtingen; a 
government sponsored Foundation for Public Supervision of Foundations) agency? Or to 
provide for a mandatory SB? For these questions, 5.5.3 may provide an efficient approach.
4.9.1.2 An answer to the research questions for the Netherlands
• are the agency theory based insights adequately implemented?
On the appointment and dismissal of directors, the approval of the annual reports and 
the rules of the game, shareholders have the final say. Monitoring by NEDs is only man-
datorily put in place for rather large companies, and not for the vereniging en stichting. 
External monitoring mechanisms are well-established for the profit sector, but they are 
inadequate for the non-profit sector since there is no regulatory institution in that field.
• does the mandatory monitoring structure differ between profit and non-profit compa-
nies?
It does. For non-profit, there is no mandatory SB structure. Generally, from the NV to the 
stichting the arrangements become less detailed.
• are the profit forms alike in organizational form?
Yes they are. They all have a mandatory SB depending on their size; they have to comply 
with the accounting, audit and disclosure rules of Titel 9 Boek 2 BW; and their members 
have access to the OK. Two differences: in the ‘structure coöperatie’ (1) EDs are appointed 
by the GM instead of by the SB as in the ‘structure NV/BV’ and (2) NEDs are chosen from 
a ‘non-overrulable’ binding recommendation by the SB (subject to OK-access).
• are the differences in monitoring structure functional?
The double monitoring position of members in the coöperatie may explain the direct 
choice of EDs by the GM (if structured). It is unclear why the NED election procedure in 
the ‘structure coöperatie’ has not been adapted in the Structuurwet 2004 to that in the 
‘structure NV/BV’.
4.9.2 The mandatory monitoring mechanisms of German company law
4.9.2.1 An overview of German company law
Table 4.25 presents an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of German company 
law based on the previous analysis of German legal persons. ‘Member’ in the table in-
cludes ‘shareholder’. German law designs the AG, GmbH and eG in separate laws. Whilst 
the eV and Stiftung partly refer to the same BGB provisions, State law provides for most 
of their essential arrangements. The restriction of the present analysis to the Federal 
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level is sufficient to analyse the political choices of the legislator vis-à-vis the other legal 
structures. Each design is adapted to the specific situation of the type of company. The 
AG strongly relies on the SB since on the one hand the companies are large and need good 
monitoring whilst on the other hand shareholders tend to show free-rider behaviour. 
The GM however has a final say in the structure issues of the company. In the GmbH this 
differs, since it is a close associative form, where shareholder monitoring is expected to 
be intensive. Therefore its organization form is more flexible. The GM may instruct the 
board and a SB is only mandatory if the employee interests become substantial. The eG 
is not so flexible due to the legislator’s emphasis on the interests of the members. The 
advantage of a double monitoring relationship, due to the double relationship mem-
bers have with the eG, may turn against them if the eG goes bankrupt: members lose 
(part of) their wealth as well as their source of income, trade platform or supplier. The 
GenG appears unbalanced since it leaves the tasks of the SB largely to the articles, but 
regulates the mandatory eG audit in detail. Apparently, the legislator’s idea of the Verein 
and Stiftung is that they predominantly have a regional function and should therefore 
be organized locally. The registration as well as the registers themselves are organized 
locally. In times of ‘globalization’ one would consider this inefficient. The same remark 
is valid where government monitoring is concerned. With 17,372 Stiftungen in Germany 
ultimo 2009, State monitoring may still be feasible but, since the number grew by 914 in 
2009, it will no longer be feasible somewhere in the near future.
Table 4.25: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of German company law
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / 
dismissal
++
+ −
GM appoints, dismisses NEDs (if an SB)
SB appoints, dismisses EDs; and determines their remuneration in AG
accountability
+
+
+
+
−
GM (normally SB in AG) adopts the annual accounts; no regulation for eV / Stiftung
GM appoints auditor (or approves auditor’s report, eG); no regulation for eV / Stiftung
disclosure through Handelsregister; no regulation for eV / Stiftung
GM releases EDs/NEDs from liability; no regulation for eV / Stiftung
no audit for ‘small’ AG (unless listed)/GmbH; bi-annual audit if eG has TA < €2 Million
veto
+
++
+ −
++
GM has no instruction right (AG; eG); full instruction right (GmbH, eV)
GM decides on identity, capital, articles (structure); Holzmüller/Gelatine applies
if mandatory SB: SB veto on EB decisions listed in the articles
works council veto on social matters
company structure
+ −
++
−
mandatory SB in AG (eG>20 members); co-determ. requires SB in GmbH, eG if > 500 empl.
mandatory works council if ≥ 5 employees
Satzungsautonomie for GmbH, eV and Stiftung.
directors’ duties
+
+ −
stakeholder approach / co-determination
Sorgfalt, Treuepflicht, Verschwiegenheitspflicht; no conflict, no corporate opportunities; 
BJR; in eG and eV: Gleichbehandlungspflicht, Förderpflicht, Duldpflicht (latter: if member)
external monitoring
+
−
more or less material check at registration; strong court access; special monitoring of eG 
through audit and of wirtschaftlicher Verein and Stiftung through State authority
no whistle-blowing culture
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4.9.2.2 An answer to the research questions for Germany
• are the agency theory based insights adequately implemented?
The AG, often the eG and if > 500 employees, the GmbH have an SB. However the articles 
should determine the tasks of the SB, except supervision which is mandatory. The GM ap-
points the NEDs (partly if co-determination applies). The appointment of EDs is either by 
the SB (AG) or arranged for by default. Generally the GM holds the structure-related rights 
and in the case of the GmbH and the eV it may instruct the EB on company matters as 
well. Generally, a works council is in place. External monitoring is strong ‘at the gate’ and 
for Stiftungen also afterwards. Inadequate implementation concerns the non-mandatory 
nature of the SB in the GmbH ≤ 500 employees; the lack of a mandatory list of issues to 
be decided by the SB; the formal and often inefficient working relationships in the SB due 
to the co-determination arrangements; the lack of GM adoption of the annual accounts in 
the AG; the lack of uniform mandatory provisions for the Verein and the Stiftung.
• does the mandatory monitoring structure differ between profit and non-profit compa-
nies?
Yes it does. Profit companies are regulated on a federal level with detailed and often 
mandatory regulations. The non-profit companies are rudimentarily provided for in 
federal law, and rely heavily on State law and State monitoring.
• are the profit-forms alike in organizational form?
Although due to the co-determination laws they may appear to be largely identical es-
pecially if > 2,000 employees, in fact they are not. The GM is important in the GmbH, but 
loses much of its importance in the mandatory regulated AG and eG. A board is impor-
tant in the AG, but not even mentioned in the GmbHG and often contains ehrenamtliche 
members in the eG.
• are the differences in monitoring structure functional?
The differences are functional since Germany decided to have separate laws, tailor-made 
for the specific needs of the AG (many shareholders), the GmbH (few shareholders) and 
eG (double relationship). For the Verein and the Stiftung the legislator delegated further 
legislation to the States in order to facilitate adaptation to local needs.
4.9.3 The mandatory monitoring mechanisms of UK company law
4.9.3.1 An overview of UK company law
Table 4.26 presents an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of UK company law 
based on the previous analysis of British legal persons. ‘Member’ in the table includes 
‘shareholder’. As Davies, 2008: 366 puts it, ‘unlike in many, perhaps most, other jurisdic-
tions, the division of powers as between the board and the shareholders is a matter for 
private ordering by the members of the company, rather than something to be speci-
fied mandatorily in the company’s legislation.’ This helps, he continues, ‘to underline 
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the shareholder-centred nature of British company law’. And indeed, table 4.26 shows 
remarkably few mandatory rights. However, two factors counterbalance this assumed 
freedom of directors. The first factor is the important common law (and presently CA) 
system of directors’ duties and the (often consequently) mandatory approval of company 
transactions with directors. The second factor is that despite the contractual tradition, 
there is heavy central ordering as well: the Model Articles (which could be by-passed), 
the UK Code, Listing Rules and Takeover Code for the Plc and the CIC-regulator for CICs, 
the Charity Commission for charities (of which the CIO is an example) and the FSA for 
the IPSs. Thus it seems that a balance of powers is achieved not by means of mandatory 
monitoring rights assigned to the shareholders, the GM or NEDs, but through duties, 
transaction vigilance and external monitoring mechanisms.
4.9.3.2 An answer to the research questions for the UK
• are the agency theory based insights adequately implemented?
UK law does not mandatorily attribute the appointment of directors, the approval of 
the annual reports or the release from liability of directors to shareholders or another 
monitoring body. On the rules of the game shareholders have the final say. Monitoring by 
NEDs or a works council (except the EWC) is not mandatory anywhere, although the IPS 
de facto comes close to a system with NEDs. As a result relatively strict directors’ duties 
and external monitoring mechanisms are put in place, the latter with a wide range of 
controlling competences.
• does the mandatory monitoring structure differ between profit and non-profit compa-
nies?
No, not really. The directors’ duties from the CA and the common law basically form 
the institutional structure of the legal person. The greatest difference is formed by the 
external monitoring mechanisms organized for each form except the Ltd.
• are the profit forms alike in organizational form?
Table 4.26: an evaluation of the mandatory monitoring structure of UK company law
internal monitoring +/− description
appointment / dismissal −
no mandatory appointment of directors by GM; mandatory removal right in 
Plc,Ltd,CIC
accountability
+
−
appointment and dismissal of auditor by GM
no GM right of approval of the annual accounts and reports
veto
+
+
GM veto on change of identity or character decisions (Plc)
GM veto on important transactions with directors
company structure
+
−
GM decision on the rules of the game
no mandatory NEDs; no ‘organic’ employee representation (works council)
directors’ duties + an integrated system of duties through common law or CA
external monitoring +
strong external monitors (FSA, FRC, CIC-regulator, Charity Commission); whistle-
blowing system through PIDA
214 Chapter 4
The Plc and Ltd are, since they are based on the CA. The IPS differs essentially since it has 
a strong external monitor, the FSA.
• are the differences in monitoring structure functional?
Yes they are, since the outside monitor should assist in ensuring that the IPS is a reliable 
debtor.
4.10 THE FUnDAMEnTALS APPROACH: An EVALUATIOn OF THREE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS
The previous section analysed UK, German and Dutch corporate law along the legal 
strategies developed by Davies (2010) and Kraakman et al. (2009). As shown in 4.3.2, 
Timmerman provides a different framework of analysis. He suggests assessing corporate 
law along five behavioural and five structural (‘décor’) fundamentals. Table 4.27 shows 
the results. Of the structural fundamentals, the first is transparency. For the public and 
private limited company forms EU law harmonized the requirements in this respect. Dif-
ferences are especially evident where disclosure for association and foundation forms is 
concerned, with a more stringent disclosure obligation through the Charities Act in the 
UK than is common in the Netherlands and Germany. The second structural fundamental 
is the freedom to restructure. All legal systems recognize this possibility, whilst ensuring 
through some form of supervision that creditors’ and minority shareholders’ interests are 
not neglected and that funds collected for the public benefit cannot be passed through to 
the individual members (‘asset-lock’). The third structural fundamental concerns parti-
tion of assets and the consequential limited liability of shareholders and directors. Partition 
of assets between the legal person and its members/shareholders is common for all the 
legal persons under review (by definition). However, mitigation of the strict rule is found 
(a) since a shareholder has to contribute to the extent of any sums unpaid on shares held 
by him787 or to the extent of his guarantee788, (b) a German GmbH may recognize in its 
articles the duty to pay up some extra money in the event of distress, and (3) the articles 
of German and Dutch co-operatives may recognize a certain amount of money to be paid 
by its members in bankruptcy (WA; BA). Moreover, directors may be liable to the company 
or in incidental cases even to third parties, e.g. in the event of intentional harm or gross 
negligence. The fourth structural fundamental refers to the inside/outside division, which 
means that the legal full power of representation of directors may very well internally be 
constrained by the articles or by resolutions, without any consequences to third parties 
unless acting in bad faith. Bad faith requires more than knowing that the act is beyond 
directors’ power789. Only the German eV and Stiftung rules still protect the legal person 
if the director exceeds his authority. The number five structural fundamental, a nascent 
one, proposes non-mandatory law unless justified. Especially British and to a lesser ex-
tent Dutch company law offer numerous options. Timmerman considers s 2:25 BW, which 
recognizes Dutch corporate law to be mandatory, as a technical provision and indeed it 
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leaves many choices open to the shareholders. However, many monitoring mechanisms 
in all the legal systems are mandatory to prevent abuse and failure: the UK Secretary, CIC 
regulator, FSA and Charity Commission; the German Mitbestimmung and Betriebsrat, and 
the Dutch Structuurwet and Ondernemingsraad.
Moreover, Timmerman discerns five behavioural fundamentals. The first is the observa-
tion that a legal person contains a pluralism of interests to be handled either through the 
development of structures, i.e. the nomination of NEDs, the establishment of a works 
council, different committees of directors; or through standards, i.e. the duty of care and 
of loyalty and their derived norms. All the systems recognize this pluralism of interests. 
However, Germany and the Netherlands predominantly choose a stakeholder-value 
orientation which not only organizes the behavioural norms, but also the structure ac-
cordingly. In the UK an enlightened shareholder-value approach reigns, in which the 
benefit of the members as a whole comes first and the interests of e.g. employees are a 
matter of ‘regard’ in the process of promoting the success of the company790. The second 
behavioural fundamental concerns that of free and undisturbed ownership. This means 
that a shareholder cannot be burdened by other obligations than to pay up the amount 
due at the time the share is offered. This fundamental applies to all public limited forms 
and to the Dutch BV. However, in Germany the GmbH articles may enable its GM to create 
a Nachschusspflicht, i.e. a duty to pay up additional funds791. For the Dutch and German 
co-operatives similar provisions exist. If a British private limited is limited by guarantee, 
the members are liable to contribute a specific amount792 if the assets are insufficient to 
cover the liabilities. If the private company is unlimited, the members’ duty to contribute 
is unlimited793. The third behavioural norm is that a director should avoid a conflict of 
interests. This norm is very explicit in Dutch and UK law, but is much more detailed in the 
UK (s 175-177 CA). The lack of detailed arrangements in the Netherlands (s 2:146/256 
BW) has recently caused a wave of new HR sentences cumulating in the requirement of 
the absence of a direct or indirect personal interest. Germany recognizes some spe-
cific provisions on conflicts of interests but its law largely rests on the principle of the 
Treuepflicht and related case law. The fourth behavioural norm concerns the collegial 
board principle. This monitoring norm is common to all systems, although the German 
AktG and the Dutch BW elaborate much more on the role of the executive board as such 
than does the GmbHG, or British law on the function of the board of directors in general. 
The fifth and nascent behavioural fundamental concerns restrained court examination. It 
underlines ‘the desirability of avoiding the luxury of substituting the courts’ hindsight for 
the directors’ foresight’ (Davies, 2008: 494). German law applies the BJR, thus providing 
directors a freies Ermessen (free space of judgement)794. In the UK this free space exists 
since the duty of loyalty still depends on good faith of the director (s 172 CA) and the 
duty of care on the care ‘that may reasonably be expected’ (s 174 (2a) CA) although the 
‘subjective plus’ of the director in s 174 (2.b) CA reigns in this freedom somewhat. In the 
Dutch approach the Hoge Raad distinguishes between the behavioural norm, i.e. ‘proper 
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fulfilment of the task assigned’ and the liability norm, i.e. ‘serious reproach’ (Timmerman, 
2009).
In order to evaluate the three systems along the ‘fundamentals’, section 4.3.2 formulated 
four questions to be answered after the previous analysis.
(1) do all three legal systems adhere to the same fundamentals?
Essentially they do, although some fundamentals may not apply to a specific legal person 
and the details may differ amongst legal systems.
(2) which of the fundamentals are omitted?
Lacking fundamentals are those of transparency for the association and foundation 
forms. In the UK information on charities is available on request from the Charity Com-
mission whilst that on IPSs is available from the FSA. In Germany and the Netherlands 
information on associations and foundations is often not publicly available. The inside/
outside division is lacking for the eV and Stiftung in Germany, since the old-fashioned 
right to annihilate agreements based on unauthorized representation is still in the law. 
UK law is far ahead as regards the non-mandatory fundamental although Dutch law and 
German GmbH law provide for flexibility through the articles. The pluralism of interests 
concept is strictly arranged in wording and structure in Germany and to a far extent in the 
Netherlands, whilst the UK relies mostly on directors’ standards.
(3) which fundamentals are to be detected elsewhere?
The analysis did not detect a new ‘fundamental’ in the UK or German legal system.
(4) is a difference in fundamentals mirrored by a difference in legal strategies or manda-
tory monitoring mechanisms respectively?
Less structure and less mandatory law in the UK seems to be compensated by more 
explicit directors’ duties and more supervisory agencies (e.g. Takeover Panel and FSA; CIC 
regulator; Charity Commission).
4.11 WHICH LEGAL SYSTEM MOnITORS BEST?
Despite the EU harmonization efforts each legal system still has its own peculiarities. 
An objective full coverage of all legal persons resulting in a ‘monitoring ranking’ is not 
possible since one also has to consider the peculiarities of the country and its culture. 
What follows is a thorough analysis-based, but in the end intuitive evaluation.
The Dutch system relies in principle on shareholder/member rights to appoint directors, 
to adopt the annual accounts, to release directors from liability, to appoint an auditor or 
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to alter the rules of the game. Directors’ free space is restricted by a GM, SB and works 
council veto on specific issues and standards of care and loyalty owed to the legal person 
and the members. Easy court access to the OK is the general coping stone besides some 
court (Rb) intervention competences, especially for the stichting.
The German system is principally inclined towards supervision either by a mandatory 
SB (AG; eG may abandon if ≤ 20 members; GmbH if DrittelbG or MitbestG applies), by a 
works council, or by State authorities (a ‘check at the gate’ for all legal persons, especially 
the Verein and Stiftung and supervision ex post for the Stiftung). Directors’ free space is 
enlarged by the BJR (Arag/Garmenbeck) and restricted by a GM, SB and works council 
veto on specific issues. The GM determines the rules of the game, but its rights are oth-
erwise somewhat curtailed. In the AG they are restricted by law; in general the GM lacks 
a mandatory right to appoint EDs; or in AG or eV to adopt the annual accounts. However, 
the Holzmüller/Gelatine doctrine goes beyond Dutch law where it grants the GM a right 
to veto fundamental, deeply intervening decisions with a similar effect as an amendment 
to the articles. There is no mandatory list of SB rights except for supervision and audit-
related tasks. Standards of care in the AktG, GmbHG, GenG, HGB (for Kaufmann) and BGB 
(for Gesellschafter) and a duty of loyalty in the HGB are owed to the members.
The UK system principally grants members freedom to organize their legal person. The 
principal focus of company law is to limit directors’ free space. This is done on the one 
hand by a thorough and detailed system of directors’ duties either in the CA (for Plc, 
Ltd, CIC) or in common law. On the other hand the law assigns to the GM a mandatory 
right to veto a list of transactions between directors and the legal person. Obviously 
the UK legislator does not believe in mandatory supervision through NEDs or a works 
council. The whistle-blowing system (PIDA) is in that sense indeed a stranger. However, 
apparently this system needs some outside supervision. For the listed Plc, there are the 
Takeover Panel and the FSA. Since the FSA determines the Listing Rules and the Code, it 
has a stronger position than its peers in the Netherlands or in Germany. Moreover, the 
law grants the FSA (for IPS), the CIC Regulator (for CIC) and the Charity Commission (for 
charities e.g. the CIO) impressive inspection, supervision and monitoring competences.
This analysis, just like the one on the Timmerman fundamentals, is not conclusive. There 
is no ‘best monitoring system’. This fits in with Jungmann’s (2006) conclusion that both 
the German and the UK systems are effective means of control. None of the systems has 
applied all the theoretical findings economists come up with. One determines ‘monitor-
ing’ aspects in the structure and legal strategies, and ‘bonding’ aspects in the directors’ 
duties. The legislator has obviously tuned in to the needs of each particular legal person 
and the circumstances it has to cope with in society. Apparently every system builds 
its own monitoring framework and achieves its own equilibrium. Remarkable though is 
the relative lack of internal mandatory supervision in the UK corporate system and the 
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relative overweight of external supervisors in a system that is proud to see ‘the division 
of powers as between the boards and the shareholders (..) as a matter for private ordering 
by the members of the company rather than something to be specified mandatorily in the 
companies legislation’ (Davies, 2008: 366).
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EnDnOTES
1 With ‘corporate law’ this thesis refers to corpus in Latin, i.e. to the law on legal persons. The term 
is used interchangeably with ‘company law’. It would be wrong to assume that a ‘company’ 
should be a profit-oriented institution, as the UK Companies Act 2006 (CA) shows. Although 
‘corporate law’ is the US term and ‘company law’ is British, e.g. ‘corporation’ is found in s 
323, 1173 CA and ‘body corporate’ in s 16(2), 1173 CA. The Dutch word ‘corporatie’ has no 
legal meaning and is exclusively assigned to a housing society in an association or founda-
tion form.
2 Davies (2010: 3 footnote 6) points out that companies must register in England and Wales, Scot-
land or Northern Ireland. ‘There is no such thing, technically, as a ‘British’ or ‘UK’ company, 
even if the Companies Act 2006 now applies across all three jurisdictions.’
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3 Which is forbidden for the private company: s 755 CA.
4 Kraakman et al. (2009: 37) define a legal strategy as a generic method of deploying substantive 
law to mitigate the vulnerability of principals to the opportunism of their agents. Davies does 
not define the concept, but takes a more neutral stand by speaking of strategies available for 
the regulation of agency relationships.
5 Davies’ (2010) figure 1 (p. 113) which is the same as the Davies’ (2002) figure 1 (p. 120), refers 
to the, still forthcoming in 2002, figure of Kraakman et al. (2004: 23) which is at present in 
2009: 39, without discussing the differences. Kraakman et al. do not refer to Davies’ figure.
6 See on this chapter 6.
7 Timmerman, 2009: 5.
8 Timmerman, 2009: 10: nos. 2, 3, 5, 7, and (nascent) 10.
9 Timmerman, 2009: 10: nos. 1, 4, 6, 8, and (nascent) 9.
10 This is the legal translation of the economic approach of internal monitoring given in 3.5.1.
11 Dutch company law directs itself in s 2:8 BW to “those who are concerned with the company 
through the law or the articles”. This implies that executive directors (EDs), non-executive 
directors (NEDs), shareholders, depositary receipt holders, usufructuaries and security hold-
ers of shares with voting rights (Van der Heijden / Van der Grinten, 1992: 245) and holders 
of profit-sharing notes (De Monchy and Timmerman, 1991: 50) are subject to company law 
as well.
12 Dutch law lists company organs in s 2:78a BW for specific purposes. It cannot be interpreted 
as a general definition.
13 Andenas and Wooldridge, 2009: 39. The articles of association of Heineken N.V. of 11 May 
2009 distinguish between the Shareholders’ Meeting and the Shareholders’ Body. The lat-
ter is the company organ. This thesis does not make this distinction since this would not 
contribute to the analysis.
14 The idea is that a works council’s primary concern is with the enterprises, and not with the le-
gal person. It is an academic debate (De Monchy and Timmerman, 1991: 51; Van der Heijden/
Van der Grinten, 1992: 246; Van Schilfgaarde/Winter, 2009: 25-26). On the one hand: the 
works council is established in the WOR, not in the BW; the legislator never meant to apply 
e.g. the general rules of s 2:14-16 BW to the WOR; the works council may litigate against the 
legal person e.g. s 2:158(8) BW and s 36(2) WOR. On the other hand: the works council may 
recommend a nominee for a NED position in the structured NV; e.g. s 2:101 and 2:135 require 
information to be sent to the works council; s 2:158 (12) BW requires approval of the works 
council; a proposal to give the right to speak to the works council in the GM is pending in 
Parliament (31877).
15 This may change into a liability to creditors in a situation of near financial distress; see chapter 
5.
16 On the intriguing relationship between company law and securities law see for example: Hi-
jink, J.B.S., 2006, Vennootschapsrecht en effectenrecht: een aanzet tot een afbakening (Boom 
Juridische uitgevers, Den Haag).
17 Kroeze et al, 2005: 6 and Davies, 2008: 13 and p. 82.
18 S 2:64 BW means: section 64 of Book 2 of the Dutch Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek).
19 s 2:66(2) BW.
20 s 2:64(2) BW: the Dienst Justis of the Minister of Justice screens the financial and criminal 
antecedents and the intentions of the incorporators. Based on this information the ‘verklar-
ing van geen bezwaar’ (vvgb; certificate of no objection) is obtained or denied. This ex ante 
government clearance of s 2:64(2) BW is expected to be replaced shortly by a continuous 
screening ex post through the Handelsregister and other data. At present, government clear-
ance is also required for an amendment to the articles, s 2:125(2) BW. See on the status of 
the proposal: Annex 2 under 4.
21 See s 2:64 BW; the articles may contain a lock-up provision for registered shares: s 2:87-87a 
BW.
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22 A one-tier system is de facto possible in the Netherlands, as e.g. Fortis NV, Reed Elsevier NV, 
Unilever NV, and the Dutch Code (DC IV.3) show. A proposal to enable a one-tier system also 
de iure is pending in Parliament (31763). See on the status of the proposal: Annex 2 under 3.
23 Rechtspersonen, artikel 153 BW, defends on historic grounds that if the issued share capital 
is over €16 million, the company qualifies to be structured in any case, independently of 
whether the reserves are positive or negative. Van Schilfgaarde/Winter (2009: 417) agrees 
and adds that the criteria should be calculated based on the fair value of the assets.
24 s 2:153(2), 154(1) BW.
25 In the structure regime the SB basically has two extra competences: to appoint the EDs (s 2:162 
BW) and to approve EB decisions related e.g. to the issue or listing of debenture or shares; 
to investments to an amount of over 25% of equity; to important acquisitions, cooperation-
agreements or reorganization; to proposals for an amendment to the articles (s 2:164 BW). 
Mitigation means that s 2:162 BW, prescribing the appointment of EDs by the SB, does not 
apply (s 2:155, 155a BW). It remains a GM competence.
26 An exemption (s 2:153(3) BW) is e.g. granted by law if the ‘structure NV’ is a subsidiary of a 
structure SE, NV, BV; or if the ‘structure NV’ is merely a holding structure that controls and 
finances its subsidiaries, while the majority of employees works outside the Netherlands. 
Mitigation (s 2:155, 155 a BW) is possible e.g. if the company is a subsidiary of a foreign 
multinational company; or if it is a joint venture (both unless the majority of employees 
works in the Netherlands); or if the company has a sole owner, who is a natural person, or a 
foundation, or an association.
27 The law also provides for an exemption through a request to the Minister of Justice (s 2:156 
BW).
28 s 2:157 BW.
29 s 2(1) WOR.
30 s 35b WOR.
31 s 2:391(5) BW and the ‘Besluit van 23 december 2004’ (Staatsblad 2004, 747) as changed by 
‘Besluit van 10 december 2009’ (Staatsblad 2009, 545). The explicit mention in the BW to a 
corporate governance code dates from 2008 (31508). The Hoge Raad incorporated the con-
tent of the Dutch Code in Dutch company law when ruling in HR 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 178 
(Bank of America/VEB and ABN AMRO, r.o. 4.8) that the DC contains ‘the in the Netherlands 
accepted corporate governance views’, to be applied in interpreting the ‘reasonableness and 
fairness principle’ of s 3:12 and 2:8 BW. Moreover the Hoge Raad ruled there that the DC 
also contains requirements for proper management as meant in s 2:9 BW. The DC is also 
incorporated in s 5:86 Wft where it requires disclosure from institutional investors regarding 
their adherence to the DC.
32 A proposal to raise the threshold from 1% to 3% is pending in Parliament, Kamerstukken II 
2008/09, 32014. This only concerns the NV.
33 s 2:118 BW. See also 2:117b BW which refers to the date of ownership.
34 s 2:118a(2) BW permits the trustee to restrict, exclude or withdraw a mandate given to a non-
depositary receipt holder to vote in the case: (a) of a hostile bid; (b) of a blockholder of over 
25%; (c) that the exercising of the voting rights were essentially against the interests of the 
company. In IV.2 however the DC requires a non-restricted mandate in any case.
35 Bearing the famous TCI letter of 20 February 2007 to ABN AMRO in mind, a threat to seek 
publicity on the matter may already work more than adequately.
36 s 2:14-16 BW.
37 s 2:447-455 BW.
38 The size-criteria are:
company small (2:396) medium (2:397) large (2:394)
total assets (2:396 (1.a)) ≤ €4,4 million > €4,4 and ≤ €17,5 > €17,5 million
net turnover (2:377(6)) ≤ €8,8 million > €8,8 and ≤ €35 > €35 million
employees (average) < 50 < 250 ≥ 250
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 A company is ‘small’ or ‘medium’ if two out of three of the criteria apply on two successive 
balance sheet dates (s 2:396(1), 2:397(1); for new companies s 2:398(1) BW). The disclosure 
criteria are given in s 2:396 for ‘small’ and s 2:397 BW for ‘medium’ companies. This system 
applies to the NV, BV, coöperatie; and to a vereniging or a stichting maintaining an enterprise 
with a two-year consecutive annual turnover of at least 4,4 Mio (s 2:360(3) BW) unless the 
vereniging or stichting is already obliged by another specific law to adequate disclosure. See 
on public disclosure: De Jong and Nieuwe Weme (2006), Taelemans and Huybrechts (2008) 
and Hendrikse (2010).
39 s 2:396(9) BW.
40 s 2:398(3a) BW.
41 s 5:25m and 25o Wft. The AFM should send copies to the Handelsregister (s5:25o(4) Wft). The 
AFM holds an on-line freely accessible register of these data.
42 s 5:70 jo 1.1 Wft.
43 See for the specific requirements: s 2:335(2) BW. A proposal is pending in Parliament to make 
this procedure more efficient: see Annex 2 under 1.
44 See s 2:107(2) BW, s 9 EU-Directive no. 2007/36 of 11 July 2007 and HR July 2010 (ASMI) 
r.o. 4.6. The latter explicitly mentions that every shareholder has the right to ask questions 
and that the company should answer these. However, the right to obtain ‘all the desired 
information’ is a GM right.
45 s 2:120(1) BW on majority and s 2:120(2) BW on quorum; exceptions e.g. 2:132(2), 133(2), 
134(2) BW.
46 s 2:143 BW.
47 s 2:132(2) and 142(1) BW.
48 s 2:142(2) jo 133 BW.
49 s 2:158 BW contains the appointment procedure in the ‘structure NV’ which is partly default 
law (s 2:158(12) BW). The SB recommendation may be rejected by a majority. A new recom-
mendation would be required (s 2:158(9) BW).
50 s 2:158(5) BW.
51 For one-third of the NED positions, the SB is obliged to recommend the works council 
nominees (s 2:158(6) BW). If the SB does not agree with the works council nominee, it could 
request the OK to validate its objection. If the OK agrees, the works council is entitled to a 
new nomination (s 2:158(7) BW).
52 s 2:158(9) BW. If the GM vetoes, but with less than one-third of the issued capital, a (new) EGM 
is to be organized. In this new EGM, the qualified majority requirement is dropped.
53 e.g. Klaassen, 2007: 44.
54 Which will not be easy to accomplish. See Rechtspersonen, art. 158, aant. 15. The impression 
that s 2:158(9) jo (12) in any case requires GM involvement would be wrong.
55 s2:161(2) BW. The law specifies the conditions as well as the criterion the court has to apply.
56 Van Schilfgaarde/Winter (2006: 349) and Van der Heijden/Van der Grinten (1992: 654) posit 
that the articles may restrict the competence of the GM to decide on liquidation. Although De 
Monchy and Timmerman (1991) do not mention such a possibility, this restriction is indeed 
found, see e.g. the articles of Brunel International N.V. of 8 June 2009, s 22.
57 Logically, the decision to declare bankruptcy would belong to this array of rights. However, 
the declaration of bankruptcy is assigned to the GM by default rule (s 2:136 BW) and for a 
‘structure NV’ the decision is subject to the approval of the SB, 2:164(1.h) BW.
58 E.g. the articles of Brunel International N.V. of 8 June 2009, s 5(2), 8(1) and 22. See for the legal 
doctrine on the matter: Klaassen, 2007: 33 and 137-144, 148-152 e.g. arguing a contrario on 
s 2:101(4) BW and on the text of 2:317(3) BW. In this author’s view the court may lift such a 
requirement in the articles based on s 2:8 BW if a refusal to co-operate would definitely not 
meet the requirements of reasonableness and fairness. Similarly: Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 
319.
59 HR 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 178, LJN: BA7971, r.o. 4.7.
60 Medium and large companies have to appoint an auditor, s 2:396(7) BW. Listed NVs should 
always appoint an auditor (s 2:398(3a) BW). For the size-criteria: fn. 38.
226 Chapter 4
61 s 2:107(1) BW.
62 The articles may entitle an organ to give general suggestions on specific areas, s 2:129(4) BW.
63 s 2:149 referring to 2:9 and 2:138 BW for EDs. See also 2:150 for NEDs and s 2:139 for EDs.
64 Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 243-244.
65 s 2:140(2) BW.
66 s 2:141 BW requires (1) ‘all the information necessary for the execution of its task’ and (2) 
information on the ‘outline of the strategy, on general and financial risks and on the control 
and monitoring system of the company’.
67 This is in accordance with principle II.1 of the DC. In best practice II.2 however, the DC re-
quires SB approval of the strategy. Are the supervision of the HR and the approval of the DC 
identical? It is hard to imagine that a NED of a company will remain seated if he is not able 
to subscribe to the strategy the EDs proposed/determined and that the other NEDs subscribe 
too. What would be the position of EDs if the SB were to disagree with a newly proposed 
strategy by the EB? If structured, approval of the strategy may de facto be a mandatory 
monitoring right of the SB after all because of its right to dismiss EDs. Otherwise, the EDs 
may remain seated and the NEDs should resign.
68 s 2:161(2) BW. The law specifies the conditions as well as the criterion the court has to apply.
69 See footnote 25.
70 s 2:129(1) BW.
71 s 25 WOR.
72 s 30 WOR. It should be noted that the WOR uses a peculiar definition of an ED (‘person 
who directly exercises the highest authority in managing employees within an enterprise’). 
Especially in the case of more enterprises within one legal form the question might arise 
whether an EB member is to be considered an ED for this enterprise (Van Schilfgaarde/Winter, 
2009: 266; idem Vink/Van het Kaar).
73 s 2:107a(3;4) BW from 1 July 2010.
74 s 2:134a/144a BW from 1 July 2010.
75 s 2:135(2,3) BW from 1 July 2010.
76 See s 2:158(6) and (12) BW and above under ‘General Meeting (GM)’.
77 s 2:158(4) BW from 1 July 2010.
78 s2:161(2) BW. The law specifies the conditions as well as the criterion the court has to apply.
79 s 2:333f BW.
80 to the company (s 2:9) or to third parties (s 2:138, 139, 149, 150 BW).
81 s 2:9, 138(3), 139, 149, 150 BW.
82 s 2:129 and 130 BW.
83 s 2:57(2), 140(2), 250(2). The literature argues that the same applies for SBs established for 
associations and foundations. Another approach in the articles is felt to be contradictory to 
the nature of Dutch company law.
84 See HR 13 July 2007, JOR 2007, 178, r.o. 5: ‘It also applies in this case that in the performance 
of their duties the executive board shall put first and foremost the interests of the company 
and the enterprise connected therewith and should in deciding take into account the in-
terests of all concerned, amongst which those of the shareholders.’ See also Annex 2 sub 3 
(proposal 31763) which adapts s 2:9 new accordingly.
85 See: Timmerman, L., 2007B, Company law and the Dutch Supreme Court, Ondernemingsrecht 
3.
86 See s 3:12 BW for the approach to find and define these requirements.
87 s 2:146 BW first sentence. If there is a conflicting interest and if the default rule has not been 
disabled in the articles, the consequence based on s 2:130 BW is improper representation 
by the company, and the nullity of the legal act/agreement. The third party is protected 
however if he did not know, and could not have known, of the conflicting interest (HR 11 
September 1998, NJ 1999, 171 (Mediasafe II). See Kroeze et al. 2005: 111-114. The literature 
on recent developments: Schwarz, C.A., 2008, Tegenstrijdig belang in beweging; enige actuele 
ontwikkelingen in rechtspraak en wetgeving, Tijdschrift voor Ondernemingsbestuur p. 74-
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82.; Blanco Fernández, J.M., 2008, Tegenstrijdig belang en de Hoge Raad, Ondernemingsrecht 
p. 416-428.
88 s 2:146 BW second sentence.
89 See Annex 2 under 3 (s 2:129/239(5) new) and DC II.3.3.
90 See DC II.3.4.
91 Spectacular examples are the Guus Hiddink affair and the Bouwfonds-real estate affair.
92 Although non-listed companies often neglect this duty, it seldom comes to a penalty or a 
court sentence (see chapter 8).
93 By the Chamber of Commerce: s 2:19a BW.
94 Banks, clearing institutions, financial providers and the like, as defined in s 1:1 Wft. They are 
not necessarily listed.
95 See s 5:2, 5:3 Wft.
96 See the Wet Toezicht Financiële Verslaggeving (Wtfv) and s 2:448(2) jo 447(2) BW.
97 See s 2:14-16 BW; s 131 BW; s 2:19-22 BW (at the request of the OM or ‘an interested party’). 
Also: Van der Ploeg (2010: 233).
98 Timmerman, 2007B sub 11. See s 2: 161-161a BW; s 2:344 BW. A request can only be awarded 
if there appear to be sound reasons to doubt that the policy of the legal person is correct, 
Van der Ploeg (2010: 251) and s 2:350(1) BW.
99 See s 3:8, 3:9 and 3:10 Wft and the ‘Besluit prudentiële regels Wft’; and s 4:9, 4:10, 4:11 and the 
‘Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële ondernemingen Wft’.
100 s 2:345(2) BW; or for an ‘annual report procedure’ in the public interest, s 2:448(1.b) BW.
101 See s 2:297(1) BW.
102 And it may be a direct and mandatory monitor where it reacts directly to changed circum-
stances, for instance in the s 2:391(5) BW proposal to incorporate the DC or in the one-tier 
proposal. See also: Annex 2.
103 Other laws, e.g. the Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) and Umwandlungsgesetz (UmwG) as well as the 
employee participation laws mentioned in s 96 AktG and discussed below, contain relevant 
company law as well.
104 s 23(5) AktG.
105 s 1(1) AktG.
106 s 2 AktG. See s 42 AktG.
107 s 4 AG.
108 s 29, 36, 41 AktG. On the Handelsregister: s8 HGB.
109 s 38 AktG. See for the necessary preliminary research (Gründungsprüfung): s 33-35 AktG.
110 s 23(1) AktG.
111 s 23(3.2) AktG.
112 s 7 AktG.
113 And the share premium, if any in full: s 36a(1) AktG.
114 See e.g. s 110(3) AktG. See also Klaassen, 2007: 65, fn. 345.
115 The EB should consist of at least two (natural, s 76(3) AktG) people if the issued share capital 
exceeds €3 million, unless the articles determine otherwise (s 76(2) AktG). On the require-
ments for EDs see: s 76(3) AktG.
116 And must be a multiple of three, s 30, 95 AktG unless the MitbestG applies (see text). On the 
specific requirements for NEDs see s 100 AktG which mentions a – conditional - maximum 
number for NEDs of 10 NED positions in companies; and a two-year waiting term in principle 
before an ex ED can become a NED.
117 See s 96 and 103(4) AktG and the laws referred therein. Of these, the Montan-Mitbestim-
mungsgestz (for Montan companies, i.e. coal and steel producing companies), the Mitbestim-
mungserganzungsgestez (holding companies in coal and steel), the SE-Beteiligungsgesetz (for 
SEs) and the Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer bei einer grenzüberschreiten-
den Verschmelzung (cross-border mergers) will be left out of consideration.
118 s 1(1) DrittelbG contains some nuances for family-owned companies.
119 See s 4(1) DrittelbG. The first two labour NEDs should be employees (s 4(2) DrittelbG.
120 s 4(4) DrittelbG.
228 Chapter 4
121 s 33 MitbestG.
122 This means six NEDs each, if the AG employs less than 10,000 employees, up to 10 each 
above 20,000 (s 7 MitbestG).
123 s 9 MitbestG.
124 s 15 MitbestG speaks of a leitender Angestellter.
125 s 7(2) MitbestG.
126 s 29(2) MitbestG.
127 s 27 MitbestG.
128 This means: any institution, whatever its legal form, with the exception of e.g. governmental 
institutions, s 130 BetrVG.
129 s 1 BetrVG.
130 For every 3,000 employees more, another two members: s 9 BetrVG.
131 s 15(2) BetrVG.
132 s 27 BetrVG.
133 s 38 BetrVG; e.g. 11 members if the institution has 9,000 employees.
134 Some of the articles in the AktG discern between a listed and a non-listed AG, e.g. s 110(3) 
AktG. Based on the name of the law that introduced this difference, one speaks of a ‘small 
AG’ (see Klaassen, 2007: 65). The general organization form however, is identical to both.
135 s 161 AktG.
136 s 131(1) AktG.
137 s 131(3) AktG.
138 s 132 AktG.
139 Glozbach, 2008: 158 stresses that the subject may not concern management issues (s 119(2) 
AktG). However, it is permitted to demand a meeting on the grounds of dismissal of board 
members and to deal with management issues in the context of this agenda item (p. 159).
140 s 122(3) AktG. Glozbach, 2008: 159 writes that the ‘kann’ from the text of the law is a de facto 
‘must’ unless the condition mentioned in the previous footnote is present.
141 s 133 AktG, e.g. s 179(2) AktG.
142 s 134 (1) AktG.
143 s 148 AktG, introduced on 1 November 2005 by the UMAG.
144 s 103(3) second sentence AktG.
145 s 325 HGB. For small and medium-sized companies: s 326 and 327 HGB. A listed company is 
always ‘large’: s 267(3) jo 264d HGB. See footnote 158.
146 Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1290-1292 for all GM competences.
147 s 176(1) AktG
148 s 101(1), 103(1) AktG.
149 s 101(1) AktG, s 5, 12 DrittelbG, s 9, 23 MitbestG.
150 s 101(1) for co-determination and 101(2) AktG for shareholders, the latter up to max. one-
third.
151 s 172 AktG.
152 s 119 AktG. The provisions of the AktG are mandatory, see 23(5) AktG. Not all provisions are 
listed in s 119, as figure 4.3 indicates. For the full scale of GM competences, see Klaassen 
(2007): 56.
153 This is clear from s 76(1) AktG ‘unter eigene Verantwortung die Gesellschaft zu leiten’ and 
from s 119(2) AktG ‘über Fragen der Geschäftsführung kan die Hauptversammlung nur 
entscheiden, wenn der Vorstand es verlangt’.
154 See for a comparative analysis of the issue between the Netherlands, the UK and Germany: 
Klaassen, A.G.H., 2008, Het goedkeuringsrecht van artikel 2:107a BW in rechtsvergelijkend 
perspectief, Ondernemingsrecht 16, 568-577.
155 BGH, 25.02.1982, BGHZ 83, 122. From r.o. 2c: “Zwar steht es, soweit das Gesetz nichts anderes 
bestimmt, grundsätzlich im Ermessen des Vorstands, ob er nach § 119 Abs. 2 AktG eine Ents-
cheidung der Hauptversammlung herbeiführen will, um seine Verantwortlichkeit zu mindern 
(§ 93 Abs. 4 Satz 1 AktG). Es gibt jedoch grundlegende Entscheidungen, die durch die Außen-
vertretungsmacht des Vorstands, seine gemäß § 82 Abs. 2 AktG begrenzte Geschäftsfüh-
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rungsbefugnis wie auch durch den Wortlaut der Satzung formal noch gedeckt sind, gleichwohl 
aber so tief in die Mitgliedsrechte der Aktionäre und deren im Anteilseigentum verkörpertes 
Vermögensinteresse eingreifen, daß der Vorstand vernünftigerweise nicht annehmen kann, 
er dürfe sie in ausschließlich eigener Verantwortung treffen, ohne die Hauptversammlung 
zu beteiligen. In solchen Fällen verletzt der Vorstand seine Sorgfaltspflicht, wenn er von der 
Möglichkeit des § 119 Abs. 2 AktG keinen Gebrauch macht (vgl. Barz in Großkomm. AktG 3. 
Aufl. § 119 Anm. 7 a. E.; Timm, Die AG als Konzernspitze, § 16 D S. 175 ff.).”
156 s 179a AktG. Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1914 speak of a ‘sale of assets squeeze-out’.
157 BGH 26-04-2004, BGHZ 159, 30 from r.o. III.2.a.cc: “Danach kann eine im Gesetz nicht aus-
drücklich vorgesehene Mitwirkung der Hauptversammlung bei Geschäftsführungsmaßnah-
men des Vorstands nur in engen Grenzen, nämlich dann in Betracht kommen, wenn sie an die 
Kernkompetenz der Hauptversammlung, über die Verfassung der Gesellschaft zu bestimmen, 
rühren und in ihren Auswirkungen einem Zustand nahezu entsprechen, der allein durch eine 
Satzungsänderung herbeigeführt werden kann.”
158 This refers to disclosure criteria given in s 267 HGB. These criteria are:
company small (267.1) medium (267.2) large (267.3)
total assets ≤ €4,840,000 in between > €19,250,200
turnover ≤ €9,680,000 in between > €38,500,000
employees (average) ≤ 50 ≤ 250 > 250
 A company is small if two out of three of the criteria apply on two succeeding balance sheet dates 
(s 267(4) HGB). Only medium and large companies have to appoint an auditor, s 316(1) HGB. 
A listed company is always ‘large’: s 267(3) jo 264d HGB.
159 s 264d HGB.
160 s 120(4) AktG. See Meier-Wagenaar, 2010.
161 s 111(1) AktG: ‘überwachen’.
162 Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1205 (‘Beratung is die präventive Kontrolle des Vorstands’); German 
Code, Foreword: 1.
163 See Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1201.
164 s 90(1 and 3) AktG.
165 s 84, 87. German law has explicit provisions for downgrading rewards if the circumstances 
so require: s 87(2) AktG.
166 s 84-87 AktG, s 30-33 MitbestG. S 31(2) MitbestG requires a 75% majority in the SB for an 
EB nominee.
167 s 84(3) AktG. For the Arbeitsdirektor the provisions of 30-33 MitbestG apply.
168 s 103(3) AktG: ‘wenn in dessen Person ein wichtiger Grund vorliegt.’
169 s 111(4) AktG, second sentence.
170 s 111(4) AktG, first sentence.
171 Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1211.
172 32 MitbestG.
173 s 88 AktG, Wettbewerbsverbot.
174 s 114 AktG.
175 Lutter and Hommelhof, 2009: 1268.
176 s 171(2) AktG.
177 s 172 AktG.
178 s 112 AktG jo s 2:146 BW.
179 s 111(2) in fine AktG; s 119(1.4) AktG; s 318(1) fourth sentence HBG. Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 
1210 describe this as the ’Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag mit werkvertraglichem Charakter’.
180 s 87(1 and 2) AktG.
181 s 110(3) AktG. Maitland-Walker, 2008: 370: ‘Quarterly board meetings are the rule’. Schmidt 
and Lutter, 2008: 1206 plea for a higher frequency in times of crisis.
182 s 42, 61 BetrVG.
183 s 2(1) ‘unter Beachtung der geltenden Tarifverträge’; also: s 72 (2), 80 BetrVG.
230 Chapter 4
184 s 31 BetrVG.
185 s 74 BetrVG.
186 s 80 BetrVG.
187 s 90 BetrVG.
188 s 92 BetrVG.
189 s 102 BetrVG.
190 s 111 BetrVG.
191 s 99(2) BetrVG. S 102 BetrVG provides for co-determination in the case of lay-offs. The 
employer may dismiss regardless of the opinion of the works council. However, this opinion 
plays a role in the subsequent trial.
192 s 87, s 90 BetrVG.
193 s 98 BetrVG.
194 s 94 BetrVG.
195 s 95 BetrVG.
196 s 94(2) BetrVG.
197 s 102, 103 BetrVG.
198 s 74 BetrVG.
199 s 76 BetrVG.
200 i.a. s 80(1) BetrVG.
201 s 102(1) BetrVG.
202 s 90(2) BetrVG.
203 s 111 BetrVG.
204 s 92, 92a BetrVG.
205 s 96(1) and 98(3) BetrVG.
206 s 54 BetrVG.
207 s 42, 43 BetrVG.
208 s 86a BetrVG.
209 s 5, 12 DrittelbG; s 9, 18, 23 MitbestG.
210 s 76(1), 78(1) AktG.
211 GC 3.2.
212 e.g. s 76(1), 77, 78(1), 108(1), 112 AktG; s 33(2) MitbestG.
213 Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1067; Stöber, 2004: 172.
214 s 93, 116 AktG. Near financial distress, this criterion is valid as well: s 92(2) AktG. The 
Sorgfalt criterion stems from s 276 BGB (to avoid intent and negligence) and the higher 
exigency of s 347 HGB (Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen Kaufmanns). See Lang/Weidmüller (2006) 
comm. s 34 no. 13-15.
215 s 90(4), 131(2) AktG: ‘den Grundsätzen einer gewissenhaften und getreuen Rechenschaft.’ In 
line with this general association law is the Berichtspflicht, stemming from 713 jo. 666 BGB.
216 s 93 AktG second sentence: ‘Eine Pflichtverletzung liegt nicht vor, wenn das Vorstandsmit-
glied bei einer unternehmerischen Entscheidung vernünftigerweise annehmen durfte, auf der 
Grundlage angemessener Information zum Wohle der Gesellschaft zu handeln.’ Schnidt and 
Lutter, 2008: 1063 explain that ‘zum Wohle der Gesellschaft’ must be understood as ‘wenn 
Entscheidungsmasstab das Unternehmensinteresse and der Erhaltung des Bestandes, der 
Förderung der nachhaltigen Rentabilität und der Steigerung des nachhaltigen Unternehm-
enswertes ist.’
217 BGH 21.04.1997, BGHZ 135, 244 (ARAG/Garmenbeck) r.o. II.2.b (partially): (..) ‘dem Vorstand 
bei der Leitung der Geschäfte des Gesellschaftsunternehmens ein weiter Handlungsspielraum 
zugebilligt werden muß, ohne den eine unternehmerische Tätigkeit schlechterdings nicht 
denkbar ist.’
218 s 93(1) third sentence, 116 AktG. ‘Verschwiegenheitspflicht’, violation is a reason for dis-
missal (s 84(3) AktG, 626 BGB) and a criminal offence (s 404 AktG). Also: Schmidt and Lutter, 
2008: 1067.
219 s 93(2) in fine, 117(2) second sentence AktG.
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220 s 93(2) last sentence AktG, inserted in German law on 5 August 2009. See: Meijer-Wagenaar, 
I., 2010, Het Duitse ‘VorstAG’: een voorbeeld voor de Nederlandse wetgever of niet?, Onder-
nemingsrecht 10/11, 453-456.
221 s 242 BGB. ‘Die Plicht der Gesellschaft loyal zu dienen und das Interesse der Gesellschaft zu 
wahren’, Schmidt und Lutter, 2008: 1064.
222 Schmidt, 2002: 593: ‘Vielmerhr geht es um eine allgemeine Abwägung und Begrenzung mit-
gliedschaflicher Interessen und Befugnisse.’
223 Schmidt, 2002: 1035-1036.
224 See sequentially: s 88, 93(1) second sentence, 93(1) third sentence AktG; 4.3 DC (5.5 DC). 
Schmidt, 2002: 595-599 and Schmidt and Lutter, 2008: 1064.
225 s 93(2) first sentence AktG and Andenas and Wooldridge, 2009:310. See on the effect of 
GM approval s 93(4) first sentence (release from liability) and of SB approval s 93(4) second 
sentence AktG (no release).
226 company: s 93(2) first sentence, (4), (5) and s 117 AktG; shareholders: 147, 148 AktG; third 
parties s 93(5) last sentence, 280(1), 311(3) AktG; and 823(2) BGB. See also: s 89(1) jo. 31 BGB.
227 s 316(1) jo. 318 HGB. See footnote 158.
228 s 1 KStG (Körperschafsteuergesetz).
229 s 5(9) KStG. See also: 51-68 AO (Angabeordnung). Von Hippel, 2010: 205-210.
230 s 335(1.1) HGB.
231 Bundesarbeitsgericht BAG, Urteil vom 7. 12. 2006 - 2 AZR 400/ 05.
232 Davies, 2008: 14.
233 s 3-5, 58 CA. Davies (2008: 15) quotes a number of 11,500 in March 2006.
234 s 3-5, 59 CA. Davies (2008: 15) quotes a total number of registered companies of over 2 
million in March 2006.
235 s 58 CA and s 33 (3 and 4) Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) 
Act 2004 (further: CA 2004) and Davies, 2008: 84. On 19 October 2009 3,172 CICs were 
registered.
236 Unless the law or the articles specify otherwise, s 31(1) CA.
237 These Parliamentary resolutions may be subject to a negative resolution procedure, e.g. s 
19(5) CA, or to an affirmative resolution procedure, e.g. s 82(5) CA. S 1288-1292 CA explain 
these procedures.
238 s 4(2) and 5(1) CA; see also 3 CA and Davies, 2008: 18 fn. 79.
239 The law says ‘p.l.c.’, s 58(1) CA. However, Plc is common. See also for names and abbrevia-
tions: s 65-74 CA and regulations of the Secretary of State based on these sections.
240 s 7 CA.
241 s 4(2) CA.
242 See s 16 CA; also 7, 13, 14 CA. This is an administrative, rather than a judicial procedure, 
Davies, 2008: 95. A Plc needs a ‘trading certificate’ as well, s 761 CA.
243 s 14 CA. See also s 4(2.b) CA as to registration as a public company.
244 s 763 CA.
245 s 586, 761 CA.
246 s 385 CA defines. Recently The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulation 2009 introduced 
‘traded companies’ meaning companies quoted on a regulated market in an EEA (European 
Economic Area) State (360C CA).
247 e.g. Part 13, Chapter 5 CA, on the appointment of an ‘independent assessor’ on polls taken 
(s 343 CA).
248 Davies, 2008: 62’remarks on the issue: ‘This is not stated explicitly in the Act, but it is rather 
an assumption upon which the Act is drafted, too obvious to be worth stating.’
249 s 20(1.b) CA. There are Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares, for Private 
Companies Limited by Guarantee and for Public Companies. See SI 2008 No. 3229 The Com-
panies (Model Articles) Regulations 2008, Schedules 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
250 s 154, 155 CA. The requirement of a natural person is met if the office of director is held by 
a natural person as a corporation sole or otherwise by virtue of an office.
251 s 112, 301 CA.
232 Chapter 4
252 s 271-280 CA.
253 e.g. s 450(1) CA.
254 Unlike Dutch company law, see footnote 12. UK law thinks in terms of output i.e. resolutions 
at meetings’: CA 2006 Part 13.
255 e.g. s 168, s 188 (2.A) and 492(1) CA.
256 The ‘shop-stewards’. See Andenas and Wooldridge, 2009: 419. The s 42 of the Employment 
Relations Act 2004 based Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 
(ICER 2004) provide for either a negotiated (s 7-17) or a standard (s 20) information and 
consultation procedure of employee representatives starting from undertakings employing 
50 employees in the UK. The basis forms the EU Information and Consultation Directive 
(European Parliament and Council Directive 2002/14/EC of 11 March 2002). This procedure 
cannot be considered as a company organ.
257 Council Directive 94/95/EC of 22 September 1994.
258 s 4(1) Council Directive 94/95/EC of 22 September 1994.
259 The CA speaks of ‘quoted companies’ e.g. in s 385CA. In this thesis ‘quoted’ and ‘listed’ are 
used as identical terms.
260 It is soft law as the UKC has no statutory status. However the UK Listing Rules (LR) – based on 
s 73A(2) and 101 FSMA 2000 - require disclosure of the extent to which the listed companies 
have complied to the UKC and to give reasons for areas of non-compliance. S 46A of the 
Fourth Directive on annual accounts formulates a similar requirement. See Davies, 2008: 405 
and 492; also Hopt, K.J., and P.C. Leyens, 2004, Board models in Europe - recent develop-
ments of internal corporate governance structures in Germany, the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy, European Company and Financial Law Review 2004, 135-168.
261 LR 9.8.6(5) and (6). The sanctions for non-compliance are extensive (Davies, 2008: 405).
262 s 942 CA. The Panel and Code have a statutory basis in Part 28 CA (s 942-991) (Davies, 2010: 
141).
263 s 19, 20 CA. See also BERR, Companies Act 2006, Private company information, November 
2007: 6 no. 13.
264 s 227-229 CA.
265 See s 431, 432 and Davies, 2008: 395. Moreover, the LR 9.4.1 requires approval of the 
employees’ share scheme or long-term incentive scheme by an ordinary resolution of the 
shareholders of the listed company at a general meeting before it is adopted. The Large and 
Medium-Sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008/410 only 
require disclosure of aggregated remuneration figures, for all companies unless small (see s 
412 CA and Davies, 2008: 383, 388).
266 s 498(4) CA.
267 s 304(2) CA.
268 s 338(3) CA.
269 s 284(4) CA. See Davies, 2008: 412.
270 s 260-269 CA.
271 s 261(1) CA.
272 s 994-996 CA.
273 s 2:452 CA.
274 s 384(1.a) CA. Also 384(2.a) CA.
275 s 974 CA gives the definition.
276 s 979-982 CA.
277 s 983-985 CA.
278 s 111(2) IA. Davies, 2008: 1060.
279 s 996(2.e) CA.
280 s 336 CA, to be held roughly within the first year half. This meeting, before which the com-
pany’s annual accounts and reports are to be laid, is also known as ‘the accounts meeting’ 
(s 437)3; 439(6)).
281 s 319A through The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulation 2009. In the related con-
sultation report it is said by some that a similar obligation exists in common law and by 
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others that by now it is made clear under which circumstances the board may refuse an 
answer. The consultation paper and the Regulations are available at http://www.berr.gov.
uk/files/file48662.pdf.
282 s 282, 283 CA.
283 One will do for a one-man company: s 318(1) CA.
284 s 168 CA. The Model Articles for Public Companies provide in s 20 for appointment of 
directors by directors and by the GM.
285 See also: Davies, 2008: 375.
286 s 21-22 CA.
287 s 22(4) CA.
288 Davies, 2008: 1059.
289 Davies, 2008, p 1061. See s 895-901 and for the similarity with mergers s 900(1) CA.
290 s 598 CA.
291 LR 10.1.4.
292 A “Class 1” transaction: a transaction exceeding in assets, profit, consideration or capital 25% 
of that of the acquiring listed company (LR 10.2.2).
293 LR 10.5.1.
294 Davies, 2008: 376 and 986; Rule 21.1(a) and 37.3 of the Takeover Code.
295 s 414(1); 419(1); 422(1) CA.
296 s 423 CA; s 437(1) CA.
297 Seen as a consequence of s 437-438 CA. See Davies, 2008: 756.
298 s 475 (1.a) jo 477, 478(a) CA. Moreover, there are no exemptions for Plcs on reporting or filing 
requirements: 384(1.a: small) and 467(1.a: medium-sized) CA. However, see for ‘dormant 
companies: s 480 CA.
299 Davies, 2008: 396.
300 Davies, 2008: 366.
301 s 3 of both the Model Articles.
302 Davies, 2008: 370, citing case law on the matter.
303 s 4(1) of both the Model Articles. See Davies, 2008: 371.
304 Davies, 2008: 371, 390.
305 Pettet, 2001: 204.
306 The competence of the EWC is limited to matters concerning the Community-scale under-
taking.
307 s 1(1) Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 September 1994.
308 see footnote 256.
309 s 7(1) ICER (2004).
310 ‘undertaking’ means a public or private undertaking carrying out an economic activity, 
whether or not operating for gain (s 2 ICER (2004).
311 s 2(1.f) Council Directive 94/95/EC of 22 September 1994.
312 s 21 ICER (2004).
313 s 20(3) ICER 2004.
314 UKC A.1 Main principle.
315 Also called the unitary board principle: UKC A.4 Main principle.
316 UKC A.1 Supporting principles.
317 UKC B.1. Supporting principles.
318 UKC A.2.
319 UKC A.4 Main and Supporting principle.
320 Institute of Directors, The revised combined code, Fact sheet. Found on www.iod.com/policy.
321 s 40 CA.
322 s 3 Model articles for public companies.
323 See also this thesis, section 4.6.3.3.
324 s 17 CA.
325 s 173 CA.
234 Chapter 4
326 s 175 CA. See Davies, 2002: 183, 186. For a full explanation of the topic: Davies, 2008: 
559-574.
327 s 175(4.b;5;6) CA.
328 s 179 CA.
329 s 170 (4), 178; contrary 180 CA.
330 See Davies, 2008: 480-482: ‘Such ad duty will certainly arise where, on the facts, the direc-
tors place themselves, as against shareholders individually, in one of the established legal 
relationships to which fiduciary duties are attached, such as agency.’
331 s 13(2) CA.
332 Directive 2006/43/EC (OJL157/87,9.6.2006), ‘Audit Directive’.
333 Davies, 2008: 60; 789.
334 458 CA.
335 s 1060-1120 CA. On the notice: s 1113(3) CA.
336 Davies, 2008: 749:”and just over a million pounds was raised in late filing penalties in 2005-
2006.”
337 s 448 CA. See Davies, 2008: 749: “This is a good example of the link between limited liability 
and public financial disclosure.”
338 See on the LR s 73A FSMA and Davies, 2008: 59; and on this Code: s 119 FSMA and p. 1113.
339 See Davies, 2008, e.g. p 59; Chapter 30.
340 The Panel has been designated as the supervisory authority to carry out certain regulatory 
functions in relation to takeovers under the EC Directive on Takeover Bids (2004/25/EC). Its 
statutory functions are set out in and under Chapter 1 of Part 28 of the Companies Act 2006 
(www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk).
341 s 2:456-462 CA. Davies, 2008: 746. The FRC seeks to ensure that the annual accounts of pub-
lic companies and large private companies comply with the requirements of the Companies 
Act 2006 and applicable accounting standards. The FRRC reviews accounts for compliance 
with the law and accounting standards. Anyone can make a complaint to the FRRC; member-
ship is not necessary (www.frc.org.uk).
342 e.g. s 98 (application to cancel resolution on re-registration of a public limited as a private 
limited); s 125 (application for rectification of the register of members); s 260 (derivative 
claim); s 306 (to order a meeting); s 317 (application not to circulate members’ statement); s 
452 (duty to file accounts and reports is not complied with); s 456 CA (application in respect 
of defective accounts or reports)
343 s 1156 CA.
344 This goes in three levels (Schmidt, M., 2005, “Whistle Blowing” regulation and accounting 
standards enforcement in Germany and Europe - an economic perspective, International 
Review of Law and Economics 25, 143-168. from the employer, a legal adviser, or the Minister 
of the Crown, even to third parties (i.a. the media) if the employee has informed his employer 
once before (s 43G PIDA) provided e.g. he acts in good faith, he reasonably believes that the 
information disclosed, and any allegation contained in it, are substantially true; and, in all 
the circumstances of the case, it is reasonable for him to make the disclosure.
345 Governance, February 2007 issue no 160 p. 3 reports that at that moment nine FTSE compa-
nies did not have a NED.
346 The free space for directors in UK law becomes evident from s 3 Model Articles: “Subject to 
the articles, the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for 
which purpose they may exercise all the powers of the company.”
347 s 171 AktG.
348 Davies, 2008: 82.
349 s 2:177 BW.
350 This will change shortly. See Annex 2 under 4.
351 s 2:175 BW.
352 A proposal to enable a one-tier system for the BV is pending in Parliament (31763). See 
Annex 2 sub 3.
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353 See for the criteria: s 2:263, 264 BW. Exemption or mitigation is provided for in s 2: 263, 265, 
265a BW or can be requested from the Minister of Justice (s 2:266 BW). Voluntary adoption 
is arranged in s 2:267 BW. See also footnote 25.
354 s 2:335-343 BW. Since it has to be brought before the district court, with the possibility 
of appeal, it may take long before a final verdict has been reached. See Annex 2 sub 1 for 
pending changes on the issue.
355 s 2:206, 207 BW.
356 However, Pres. Rb. Leeuwarden, 17-09-2008, LJN BF1056, pronounced an opposite judgment 
based on the Parliamentary history.
357 s 2:245 BW.
358 s 2:220(1) and 228(5) new. The requirement to hold an annual AGM may be lifted, if all 
potential participants have agreed, s 2:238(1) new.
359 s 2:242(1) and 252(1) new.
360 s 2:238(3) new; s2:204c will be dropped.
361 s 2:256 will be dropped and replaced by a no-decision rule for the conflicting director. See 
Annex 2 under 3.
362 e.g. s 25, 51a(3) GmbHG.
363 s 1, 2 GmbHG.
364 s 2(1) GmbHG; see also s 3.
365 s 4 GmbHG.
366 For obligations before the establishment of the GmbH, parties themselves are jointly and 
severally liable (s 11(2) GmbHG).
367 s 7, 11 GmbHG; art 8 HGB.
368 s 13 GmbHG.
369 s 9c GmbHG. According to Maitland-Walker (2008) the GmbH is less complicated to form 
than an AG.
370 s 5 GmbHG.
371 s 15(1) GmbHG.
372 s 8(1.3) jo 16(1), 40 GmbHG.
373 s 5(1), 7(2) GmbHG.
374 s 26, 27, 28 GmbHG.
375 s 5a GmbHG. A company based on 2a and 5a GmbHG should not contain GmbH (or in full) but 
UG (Haftungsbeschränkt) (or in full), s5a(1) GmbHG, due to the Gesetz zur Modernisierung 
des GmbH-Rechts und zur Bekämpfung von Missbräuchen (MoMiG) from 23 October 2008. 
See on this: Verbrugh, M.A., 2008, De herziening van het GmbH-recht in een concurrerende 
omgeving. Het wetsvoorstel MoMig, Ondernemingsrecht 10/11, 401-406.
376 s 2(1a) and 5(2) GmbHG. Formally, the minimum capital should be paid in full (s 5a (2)), but 
this may be as much as €1 (s 5a(1).
377 s 5a(3, 5) GmbHG.
378 s 5a(4) GmbHG provides that if the company increases its issued capital (Stammkapital) then 
the special provision of s 5a i.e. to use UG (haftungsbeschränkt) in the name instead of GmbH 
does not apply. This conversion is not mandatory: Lutter and Hommelhof, 2009: 242.
379 s 2(1a) GmbHG requires only one director in the case of an UG (haftungsbeschränkt).
380 s 6, 35 GmbHG.
381 s 6(2) GmbHG. The section also lists the incompatibilities for an ED.
382 s 48 GmbHG.
383 s 52 GmbHG.
384 s 51a GmbHG.
385 s 51b GmbHG.
386 s 50(1) GmbHG.
387 s 50(2) GmbHG.
388 s 47(2) GmbHG.
389 s 47(1) GmbHG. Exceptions to this rule may be made in the law (e.g. s 53(2)) and the articles.
390 s 48 (2) GmbHG.
236 Chapter 4
391 s 47(4) GmbHG. Schmidt, 2002, takes the view that shareholders are prohibited from voting 
in any case where a conflict of interests arises. Lutter and Hommelhof, 2009: 1010 are more 
precise and describe a number of cases where the director should not vote.
392 s 325 HGB.
393 s 34 GmbHG.
394 Schmidt, 2002: 1058.
395 s 46; also s 45(2) GmbHG.
396 s 38(1) GmbHG and whoever the appointer is: this may be the GM (s 46(5)) or another organ, s 
45(2) GmbHG. However, see 38(2) for restrictions. Claims may result from a service contract 
that may, and may not, have been closed with the director.
397 s 45(1), 48 GmbHG.
398 Schmidt, 2002: 1069.
399 s 1(1.3) DrittelbG.
400 s 25(1.2) MittbestG.
401 s 52(1) GmbHG.
402 s 52(1) GmbHG and s 111(1) jo. 111(4) AktG. See: Andenas and Wooldridge, 2009: 303.
403 Andenas and Wooldridge, 2009: 305.
404 s 1(1.3) DrittelbG and s 1(1) and 6(1) MitbestG.
405 s 25 MitbestG; see also 30-33 MitbestG.
406 s 1(1) DrittelbG.
407 s 35(1) and 35(2) GmbHG. See for limitations on the power of representation: s 37 GmbHG. 
Andenas and Wooldridge, 2008: 301.
408 s 43(1) GmbHG: ‘die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichen Geschäftsmannes.’ The quoted translation is 
from Andenas and Wooldridge, 2008: 301. Other translations are possible, e.g. ‘the diligence 
of an orderly businessman.’ For payments in a situation of near financial distress the director 
may be personally liable: s 64 GmbHG.
409 Lutter and Hommelhof, 2009: 1010; Schmidt, 2002: 1079 with hesitation.
410 s 242 BGB.
411 Lutter and Hommelhof, 2009, comprise a duty to avoid conflict of interest and to refrain 
from using corporate opportunities under this Treuepflicht: 1263.
412 s 181 BGB. This also applies to sole owners: s 35(4) GmbHG.
413 s 5(1) GmbHG.
414 s 43a; s 30(1) GmbHG.
415 s 43(2) GmbHG. A claim expires after five years (4). For NEDs: s 52(3) GmbHG. See Andenas 
and Wooldridge, 2008: 301. For the duty of indemnification of incorporators: s 9a-9c GmbHG.
416 s 47(4) GmbHG.
417 s 4(1) CA. It may not issue shares to the public s 755 CA.
418 Davies (2008: 9 fn. 34) quotes a number of guarantee companies of 40,000 in 1998.
419 s 3 CA. See Davies, 2008: 8, 9, 18 fn. 79, 82.
420 s 59(1) CA.
421 s 60(1.a) CA. See about other exemptions: s 60-63 CA.
422 For the differences between a Plc and a Ltd: Maitland-Walker, 2008, p954-955.
423 e.g. s 439, 440; Part 13 Chapter 5 CA.
424 e.g. s 437, 438; Part 13 Chapter 4 CA.
425 e.g. s 270, 485 CA.
426 Part 20 Chapter 2 CA.
427 s 270(1) CA.
428 s 336 CA a contrario. See Davies, 2008: 415 fn. 15.
429 s 154, 155 CA. The requirement of a natural person is met if the office of director is held by 
a natural person as a corporation sole or otherwise by virtue of an office. If there are more 
directors, at least one should be a natural person.
430 s 301 CA. See also: Chapter 2 Part 13 on ‘written resolutions’. Davies, 2008: 415.
431 s 20(1.b) CA. There are Model Articles for Private Companies Limited by Shares and for 
Private Companies Limited by Guarantee.
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432 Davies, 2008: 416.
433 s 281(1.a), Chapter 2 Part 13. Every company must keep records comprising those resolu-
tions. The same applies to a sole member Ltd (s 355, 357 CA).
434 s 291, 292 CA. 5% of the members is sufficient. They may require a statement of not more 
than 1,000 words on the matter to circulate in addition (s 292(3-5) CA).
435 Thus not of members voted. See: s 288(4,5), 289, 296(4) CA. Davies, 2008: 417.
436 s 288(2) CA.
437 Previously 10% and 5% only under specific circumstances: Davies, 2008: 442.
438 See s 475, 485. ‘Small’ refers to disclosure criteria given in s 382, 383, 465 CA. These criteria 
are:
company small (382.3) medium (466.4) large
total assets ≤ £3,260,000 in between > £12,900,000
turnover ≤ £6,500,000 in between > £25,900,000
employees (average) ≤ 50 ≤ 250 > 250
 A company is small if two out of three of the criteria apply on two succeeding balance sheet dates 
(s 382 CA). For a parent company, the CA introduces ‘gross’ figures (before set-offs and 
inter-company eliminations) which are not reported here (see s 383(4,6) CA). The accounts 
to be filed depend on being small or medium-sized: s 441 CA. See also: Davies, 2008: 749.
439 s 476 CA.
440 s 18(1.b) jo 20 ICER 2004.
441 s 2:396(6) BW and ‘Besluit van 28 augustus 2008’ (Besluit fiscale waarderingsgrondslagen).
442 Until 1989 it was a sub-form of the association (coöperatieve vereniging). S 2:53a BW deter-
mines that Titel 2 Boek 2 BW on associations is fully applicable to co-operatives, except for 
the ban on profit-distribution (s 2:26(3) BW) and the prohibitive rule in the association on 
certain contracts (s 2:44(2) BW).
443 Or causes to be conducted to that end, s 2:53(2) BW.
444 s 2:53 jo 26 BW.
445 s 2:54(2) BW. Chapter 8 reveals this is quite often not the case. The label coöperatief is 
protected (s 2:63 BW).
446 s 2:54-56 BW.
447 s 2:39 BW.
448 See on the possibility of a de facto one-tier system in the ordinary regime, and on the impos-
sibility for the ‘structure coöperatie’: Galle, R.C.J., 2007, De bestuurlijke inrichting van de 
moderne coöperatie. Coöperaties van A t/m Z, in G.J.H. van der Sangen, R.C.J. Galle, and P.J. 
Dortmond, eds.: De coöperatie, een eigentijdse rechtsvorm (Boom Juridische uitgeverij, Den 
Haag). The present proposal to enable a one-tier system also de iure, pending in Parliament 
(31763), does not apply to coöperaties.
449 s 2:63b, 63c BW. See Staatsblad 2004, 370 and 405.
450 The main differences are: (1) equity capital is lower; (2) not the SB, but the GM appoints the 
EDs; (3) in the appointment procedure of NEDs (a) the GM, works council and EB may nomi-
nate candidates (s 2:63f(4)); (b) a de facto right of recommendation for the works council, 
which is the default rule in the structure NV and BV, does not exist.
451 s 2:63d BW.
452 s 2:63e BW.
453 See www.cooperatie.nl.
454 s 2:19(1.d) BW a contrario.
455 Others are: (1) the different required equity amounts for the ‘structure’ forms; (2) the nomi-
nation right of the EB in s 2:63f(4) BW; (3) the lack of a recommendation right for NEDs, albeit 
by default, for the works council (s 2:158(6) BW); (4) the lack of a provision on dismissal of 
the SB identical to the ‘structure NV/BV’ (s 2:161a/271a BW). One might argue that the char-
acter of a coöperatie requires that the right to appoint EDs in any case belongs to the GM.
238 Chapter 4
456 Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007, pp. 173, 248. Their argument is that the relationships between GM, 
EB and SB in a company and a co-operative are similar.
457 s 2:37(3) jo 57a(1) BW.
458 s 2:63f(5-10) BW.
459 Again, the view of Klaassen, A.G.H., 2009, Geldt het goedkeuringsrecht van art. 2:107a BW 
ook voor de AVA van een BV?, Ondernemingsrecht 1, 45-48. that the GM always has a right 
of approval if the structure of the legal person of the company is at stake could prove useful. 
The conflicting interest provision of s 2:27 BW, to be discussed below, is relevant as well.
460 p. 314, 318, 356.
461 p. 263.
462 p. 376.
463 see footnote 58.
464 See s 2:43(3) BW and Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 356.
465 s 2:48(2) BW.
466 s 2:57(6) BW.
467 p. 185, 189.
468 Albeit balanced: if the SB and GM or works council have a different opinion on the suitability 
of a nominee, the OK decides (s 2:63f(8) BW).
469 Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 189.
470 s 2:9, 2:57(2), 2:50a jo. 2:53a BW.
471 s 2:47 BW is identical to 2:146 (second sentence), and s 2:57(4) to that of 2:146 (first sentence). 
See on the matter from the viewpoint of the coöperatie: Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 234-236.
472 See Annex 2 under 3.
473 s 2:19(1.d jo 2) BW.
474 The co-operative is an association with a special object. Therefore, s 20-79 BGB (Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch) on the association (Verein) may be relevant as well (Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 
1, comm. no. 9-10).
475 s 18 GenG. Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s18 no. 4 lists where the articles may diverge 
from the law.
476 s 1 GenG. Lang/Weidmüller (2006) s 1, comm. nos. 26-40; for a catalogue of types of co-
operatives, nos. 42-59.
477 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) etc. s 1, comm. no. 89; see also s 5 comm. no. 7 and s 13 comm. no. 
4.
478 A registered co-operative may be ordinary or mitbestimmt, i.e. governed by the Mitbestim-
mungsgesetz (see below), in which case the EB is chosen by the SB instead of by the GM.
479 See: s 10-11a; 156-161 GenG. Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 10 no. 1.
480 s 11a GenG.
481 s 13 GenG.
482 s 17 GenG.
483 s 3 GenG.
484 s 4 GenG .
485 s 80 GenG.
486 See on the mandatory content of the articles s 5-9; 18 GenG. Lang/Weidmüller (2006) lists on 
p. 239 the permitted deviations from the GenG.
487 s 2; 6 (3); 22a GenG.
488 Provided for in s 19 GenG, although the articles may determine otherwise (s 20-21a GenG).
489 s 9(2) jo. 24(2) GenG. The membership requirement does not apply to an Arbeitsdirektor, s 
33(3) MitbestG.
490 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 9 GenG, comm. no. 14.
491 s 24(2) GenG. This does not change when co-determination applies. In practice, the SB usu-
ally appoints the hauptamtliche EBs, whilst the GM appoints the nicht hauptamtlichen (see 
4.6.2.3), Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 24 no. 38.
492 s 9, 36, also: 37 GenG. If the DrittelbG applies, then the articles should fix the number at 
a multiple of three, s 1 (1.5) DrittelbG. In that case some GenG provisions do not apply, 
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according to s 1(3) DrittelbG, e.g. the membership requirement of s 9(2) GenG for employee 
representatives.
493 s 9(1) and s 24(2) GenG.
494 s 9(1) GenG. Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 9 no. 8.
495 s 9, 43 GenG.
496 s 43a GenG.
497 s 1(1.5) and 1(3) DrittelbG; s 1(1.1) jo. 6(1,2,3) jo. 25(1.3) MitbestG.
498 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 18 no. 5.
499 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 18 no. 4 p. 239.
500 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 18 no. 37. More on the Treuepflicht: pp. 250-256.
501 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 18 no. 49, pp. 256-257. See for the obligations concerned: 
no. 50. Generally a majority of 90% is required: s 16(3) GenG.
502 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 43 no. 31-42.
503 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 43 no. 32.
504 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 43 no. 38, explaining e.g. that the regulation of s 131 AktG 
cannot simply be applied due to the different relationship a member has with an eG.
505 s 43(2) and (3) GenG.
506 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 51 no. 27 lists a number of circumstances that may lead 
to a nullity.
507 s 27(1) GenG; Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 43 comm. no. 3.
508 s 48(1) GenG.
509 s 48(3) GenG.
510 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) comm. s 48 no. 4.
511 s 24 GenG for EDs; s 36 GenG for NEDs. And unless the co-determination rules apply.
512 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 24, comm. no. 47, 49.
513 s 36(3) GenG; Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 36, comm. no. 42.
514 s 24 (3); 36 (3) GenG.
515 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) s 24 comm. 50 p. 305 (referring to 87 AktG); s 36 comm. 34 p. 435.
516 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 43 comm. 9.
517 s 16 GenG.
518 s 15 GenG.
519 s 27(1) GenG. See Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 15 no. 11.
520 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 43 no. 10; s 27 no. 19, 20.
521 s 57(5) GenG.
522 s 38(1) second, third, fourth sentence GenG.
523 s 57(2 and 3) GenG.
524 s 38(3) GenG; Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 38 no. 30.
525 s 38(1) first sentence GenG.
526 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) s 36, comm. no. 5, p 424.
527 Lang/Weidmüller (2006) s 38 comm. no. 1, 3-27. A list of SB obligations is presented by 
Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 38 no. 29a.
528 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), s 38, comm. no. 1: 464; s 41, comm. no. 15.
529 s 57(4) GenG.
530 s 58(4) GenG.
531 s 38(1) last sentence GenG.
532 s 1(5) DrittelbG. It would not be logical if this would not apply in a MittbestG situation.
533 s 36(2) GenG.
534 s 24, 27 GenG.
535 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 27 no. 2.
536 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 27 no. 26, 30.
537 s 33 MitbestG.
538 s 24(3) GenG. Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 24 no. 28-32.
539 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 24 no. 31.
540 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm s 27 no. 26, 33; s 34 no. 39-40; s 48 no. 4.
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541 s 34(1) GenG.
542 s 34(1) GenG: “die Sorgfalt eines ordentlichten und gewissenhaften Geschäftsleiters einer 
Genossenschaft.”
543 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 34 no. 23.
544 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 34 no. 19, 47.
545 s 34(1) last sentence GenG. See Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. no. 96-106.
546 Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s 24 no. 65.
547 s 34(2) GenG.
548 s 34(4) GenG, this is not the case if their decisions rest (only) on SB approval.
549 s 34(5) GenG.
550 s 53-64c GenG and s 336-339 HGB.
551 s 11(2.3) and 54(1) GenG. Also: s 54a, 64b GenG.
552 s 63-63g, 64a GenG.
553 s 63g GenG.
554 s 64 GenG.
555 s 53 GenG: if Total Assets are below €2 Mio, the examination should take place every two 
years; annual accounts, annual report and financial administration only for eGs with TA over 
€1 Mio and turnover over €2 Mio.
556 See Chapter 5 of: Starting a co-operative, Cabinet Office of the 3rd sector and Co-operatives 
UK, downloaded January 2010.
557 s 1(2.a. and 2.b.) IPSA.
558 s 1(2.b) IPSA and FSA, Mutual Societies Application Form, April 2008: 9 (available from: www.
fsa.gov.uk).
559 s 2(1) IPSA; s 16 IPSA for cancellation of registration if the number has been reduced below 
3 respectively 2; and s 19(2) IPSA for the secretary’s involvement.
560 s 1(1) jo. 74 (1) IPSA. Registered societies to be found in the FSA Mutuals Public Register. The 
registration function is separate from the FSA’s role as regulator of the financial services 
industry in the UK, as provided for by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
and the statutory instruments made under FSMA.
561 s 2(1.b) IPSA. See also s 9-15 and Schedule 1 (‘matters to be provided for in the society’s 
rules) of the law.
562 See: FSA, Mutual Societies Application Form, April 2008, available from: www.fsa.gov.uk.
563 See also s 1(3) IPSA: A co-operative society does not include a society with the object of mak-
ing profits mainly for the payment of interest, dividends or bonuses on invested, deposited 
or lent money.
564 FSA, Mutual Societies Application Form, April 2008, pp. 8-9 (available from: www.fsa.gov.uk).
565 s 3 IPSA.
566 s 6 (1) IPSA. See the other subsections for lower maximum amounts. The Co-operative Group 
has shares of £1 each.
567 s 5(2) and 5(5) IPSA.
568 s 74 IPSA 1965.
569 Secretary s 2.1.b; GM 5.3.a and 50.2, 74; .an officer 41,44 62 74; manager 43; receiver 43 IPSA 
1965. Remarkably, the system provides in Schedule 1 under 6 for a two-tier system with a 
committee and managers.
570 See Mutual Societies Application Form available from the FSA website www fsa.gov.uk.
571 s 4-6 FIPSA 1968.
572 Over 2008 The Co-operative Group had a turnover of £10,435.2m and a Profit before pay-
ments to and on behalf of members of £217.6m. At 10 January 2009 it employed 82,359 
persons (Annual Report and Accounts: 35 and 45). As at 6 January 2010 the Group employs 
123,000 people, has 3 million members and around 4,900 retail outlets according to its 
website.
573 This distinction will be relevant to a court assessment of the level of care and skill expected 
in the event of a negligence claim (Mills and Snaith, 1997).
574 The Co-operative Group, Annual Report and Accounts: 27.
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575 s 214(4) IA 1986 describes this test as a reasonably diligent person having (..) the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out 
the same functions as are carried out by the director in relation to the company.
576 Davies adds to this quote: “(which, for the time being, we are equating with the best interests 
of the shareholders). “
577 s 41 IPSA and Schedule 4.
578 s 43 IPSA.
579 s 64; see also 61-68 IPSA.
580 s 39 IPSA. To be sent before 31st March.
581 See s 19 FSMA. Mutual societies such as building societies and credit unions come under 
FSA’s regulatory jurisdiction as defined in the FSMA because they are authorized to conduct 
financial services business.
582 s 44(4) IPSA.
583 s 47(2) IPSA.
584 s 48 IPSA.
585 s 49(1) IPSA. If the society has over 1,000 members, 100 members is sufficient.
586 s 4(6 and 7), 4A(5.b) and 9C FIPSA 1968.
587 Electronic information available is basic. Annual returns and accounts are not electronically 
available. See for the procedure the FSA website, at ‘Mutual Societies Public Records section’ 
(seen 22 April 2010).
588 See section 4.2 of Mutuals AR 30, pp. 10-12 available from the FSA website www fsa.gov.uk. 
Some other categories such as (most) Housing Associations and societies which are or which 
have subsidiaries do have this obligation irrespective of the thresholds (s 4A(3) FIPSA 1968). 
See for the thresholds: s 4A FIPSA 1968 and s 2 of The Friendly and Industrial and Provident 
Societies Act 1968 (Audit Exemption) (Amendment) Order 2006, 2006 No, 265.
589 The accountant’s report must state whether, in the opinion of the qualified auditor making 
the report (1) the revenue account and the balance sheet are in agreement with the books 
of account kept by the society, (2) the accounts comply with the IPSA 1965 and the FIPSA 
1968, and (3) the financial criteria to refrain from a full audit have been met. See FSA, Mutual 
Societies Annual Return: 11.
590 s 3A(3 and 5), s 4A(2) and 9A FIPSA 1968. This vote must be held annually in each accounting 
period a society wishes to disapply.
591 s 4(5.b) FIPSA 1968.
592 See HMRC CTM40505 which also specifies the differences with companies.
593 s 2 CCBSA.
594 s 3 CCBSA.
595 s 11(2.3) and 54(1) GenG.
596 Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 19.
597 s 2:26 BW.
598 s 2:27-30 BW. Van der Ploeg (2010) calls these informal associations. They cannot obtain 
registered goods; directors may be held personally liable for the debts of the association. 
This thesis focuses on associations with full competence.
599 An association with full legal competence has to be registered in the Handelsregister; if it 
has only restricted legal competence, which means that it cannot inherit or obtain registered 
goods (e.g. real estate), it is (only) allowed to (s 2:29, 30 BW; s 6 Hrgw).
600 This leaves the legal status in the open and it may make the ‘person’ difficult to retrieve.
601 s 2:48(2) BW.
602 Which may exist, see a contrario s 2:19(1.d) BW.
603 See s 2:360(3) BW. The net turnover of €4,4 million should be attained during two consecutive 
years, and not be interrupted during two consecutive years. The requirement to apply the 
accounting and disclosure rules of Titel 9 of Boek 2 BW is lifted if the association concerned 
is legally obliged to follow similar rules (Hendrikse, 2010).
604 s 2:447-455 and 345 BW respectively. For an inquiry in case of a vereniging or a stichting also 
at least 50 employees are required (s 2:344(b) BW).
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605 s 2:49(4) jo 48(1) BW. See also s 2:50 BW, which assigns the right to inspection copies only to 
members of a ‘360(3)’ association.
606 s 2:48(2) BW.
607 Proof of some attention for larger associations is provided by the delegated membership 
regulation in s 2:39 BW as well as the mention of NEDs in s 2:48 BW.
608 Dijk/Van der Ploeg, 2007: 247 on s 2:47, 48 and 57 BW. Also Van der Ploeg 2010: 245.
609 Directors’ behaviour guiding norms s 2:131, 138, 139, 149 and 150 BW do not apply to a 
Corporation Tax (VpB) exempt vereniging (s 2:50a BW).
610 Handelsregister as of March 2007.
611 s 4:78 Awb.
612 s 2(1.e) jo s 4 VpB.
613 s 2:344(b) BW.
614 2:346(a) BW.
615 s 2:345(2) BW.
616 s 2:19(1.d jo 2) BW.
617 s 25; 40 BGB. Galle, 1998: 173. Otherwise: Von Hippel, 2010: 201.
618 Ein auf Dauer angelegter, korperschaftlich organisierter Zusammenschluss von Personen zu 
einem gemeinsamen Zweck (Beuthien and Gummert, 2009: 27; Schmidt, 2002: 668).
619 s 56 BGB requires seven members for Eintragung; and s73 BGB provides for withdrawal of 
legal personality if the number of members is under three. Stöber, 2004: 9.
620 There is also an association concept in public law This is broader, but as this law (Vereinsge-
setz) is directed at the abuse of the freedom of association, as laid down in s 9 Grundgesetz, 
this is not relevant to our topic.
621 s 21, 22 BGB.
622 s 54 BGB. See Schmidt, 2002, p 667. Since this thesis studies only legal persons, the nicht-
rechtsfähige Verein is not the object of study.
623 There are approx. 600 Vereinsregister in Germany which in 2010 registered around 600,000 
e.V.s (Von Hippel, 2010: 200).
624 s 21 jo 65 BGB.
625 s 65 BGB.
626 Schmidt, 2002: 667. See on the wirtschaftlichen Verein: Schmidt, 2002: 667-675. On the 
Verein with subsidiaries: Schmidt, 2002: 671. Often the articles contain a provision such as: 
‘Der Zweck des Vereins is nicht auf einer wirtschaftlichen Geschäftsbetrieb gerichtet’, which 
is a copy of the text of the law (s 21 BGB). Schmidt, 2002: 677 deems this inadequate.
627 s 22 BGB.
628 e.g. on disclosure requirements: Beuthien and Gummert, 2009: 34, 35.
629 Schmidt, K., 2002, Gesellschaftsrecht (Carl Heymannns Verlag, Köln)., Beuthien, V., and H. 
Gummert, 2009, Münchener Handbuch der Gesellschaftsrechts, Band 5, Verein, Stiftung 
bürgerlichen Rechts (Verlag C.H. Beck, München).
630 s 56, 59(3) jo 73 BGB.
631 s 43 BGB: (1) in the case of behaviour contrary to the law; (2) if a nichtwirtschaflicher Verein 
pursues economic objects; or (3) if a wirtschaflicher Verein pursues other objects than stated 
in the articles.
632 s 43 BGB.
633 s 26, 32 BGB.
634 Beuthien and Gummert (2009) p 477.
635 s 25 BGB.
636 s 37 BGB. Also: 36 BGB.
637 s 32(2) BGB.
638 s 35 BGB.
639 s 705 BGB: to co-operate in the common goal.
640 s 242 BGB: to perform in good faith.
641 Galle, R.C.J., 1998, De vereniging in het Duitse recht, Stichting & Vereniging 169-173.
642 s 30 BGB.
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643 s 34 BGB.
644 Schmidt, 2002: 696.
645 s27(3) jo. 666 BGB.
646 s 131 AktG.
647 s 14(2) jo. 713 jo. 666 BGB. Schmidt, 2002: 629 and 1749.
648 s 27(1) BGB.
649 s 27(2) BGB.
650 s 32(1) BGB.
651 s 33 BGB.
652 s 40 BGB.
653 s 41 BGB.
654 s 32(1) BGB which by default goes for the EB (s 28(1) BGB). Note that ‘majority’ is interpreted 
as the majority of the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ votes. Abstentions do not count (Schmidt, 2002: 695).
655 See Schmidt, 2002: 693 and s 665 BGB.
656 e.g. s 42(2) BGB.
657 s 28(1) jo. 32(1) BGB.
658 Schmidt, 2002: 688.
659 Fremdorganschaft, Schmidt, 2002: 688.
660 s 26(2) BGB and s 70 BGB.
661 Also 4.4.2.3. Von Hippel, 2010: 211-213 denies the existence of specific rules regarding the 
duty of loyalty for nonprofit companies in Germany but mentions rules against self-dealing 
and of obedience.
662 s 708 BGB. Critically: Schmidt, 2002: 705, 1743.
663 s 31a, 276, 277 BGB. Lang/Weidmüller (2006), comm. s34 no. 13-15.
664 s 58 BGB.
665 s 31a BGB.
666 Stöber, 2004: 475-481; Von Hippel, 2010:201-202, 216.
667 s 140, 141 AO.
668 s 5 EstG.
669 Vogelbusch, 2008: 1. See 1,2 HGB for Kaufmann and 238 HGB for bookkeeping provisions.
670 Preferably as a limited by guarantee: see Davies, 2008: 8.
671 Davies, 2008: 10-11, 20.
672 s 33 (3 and 4) CA 2004.
673 s 6(1.a) CA. Note that a company limited by guarantee and having a share capital may become 
a CIC, but may not be formed as such (s 6(1.b) CA).
674 The CA mentions the CIC in the sections: 2(1.b); 6; 58(3); 59(4); 1087(1.j); 1154(2.c); Schedule 
2, Part 2, s 59.
675 s 6 (2) CA. Also: 32(5) CA 2004. See for detailed regulation: Statutory Instrument 2005 No. 
1788 The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005.
676 s 32(1) and s 35(2) CA 2004. An object stated in the memorandum should pass the same 
test ( s 35(3) CA 2004). The Regulator decides: s 36(4) and (5) CA 2004. S 4 of Statutory 
Instrument 2005 No. 1788, The Community Interest Company Regulations 2005 rules ‘an 
activity is to be treated as not being an activity which a reasonable person might consider is 
an activity carried on for the benefit of the community if, or to the extent that, a reasonable 
person might consider that that activity benefits only the members of a particular body or 
the employees of a particular employer.’
677 See www.cicregulator.gov.uk, “List of CICs registered”. On 16 October 2009 3,172 CICs were 
registered.
678 s 26(3.a) CA 2004.
679 s 30(1) CA 2004. And in that case after the Regulator’s consent: see part 6 of SI 2005 No. 1788 
e.g. s 17(5.a). Also: de Jongh, Schild and Timmerman in Eijsbouts et al 2010: 228.
680 s 30 CA 2004. Part 6 of SI 2005 No. 1788 gives detailed regulations on the matter.
681 s 27-29 CA 2004.
682 s 36(4 and 5.b) CA 2004.
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683 s 14-16 CA.
684 s 28(3) CA 2004.
685 s 29 CA 2004.
686 s 41-51 CA 2004.
687 s 42 CA 2004.
688 s 43 CA 2004.
689 Which cannot be dismissed by the company, s 45(7) CA 2004.
690 s 47 CA 2004.
691 s 49 CA 2004.
692 s 50 CA 2004.
693 s 48 CA 2004.
694 s 41 CA 2004. The director, manager, and property-related powers may only be used under 
circumstances defined in s 41(3), e.g. misconduct or mismanagement.
695 s 34(1) CA 2004. Also: part 7 of SI 2005 No. 1788. Available for members: s 29 SI 2005 No. 
1788.
696 s 34(4) CA 2004.
697 s 34(2) Ca 2004.
698 see SI 2005 No. 1788.
699 s 2:286(1) BW, or in a will, s 2:286(2) BW.
700 s 2:285 BW.
701 s 2:301 BW.
702 s 2:286(4.a) BW.
703 s 2:300(2,3) BW. See on the voluntary SB also 4.7.1.2.
704 s 2:293-295 BW. Often, the EB is competent to amend the articles. The mandatory rule of s 
2:293 BW that an amendment to the articles has to be passed by a notarial deed and is to be 
deposited at the Handelsregister is only a small safeguard against abuse.
705 Directors’ behaviour guiding norms s 2:131, 138, 139, 149 and 150 BW do not apply to a 
Corporation Tax (VpB) exempt stichting (s 2:300a BW).
706 s 2:291(2) BW.
707 See on tax issues: Van der Ploeg, 2010: 234-235.
708 s 2:20, 295, 297 and 298 BW.
709 s 2:298(1.b and 3) BW.
710 s 2:296 jo 294, 295 BW.
711 s 2:20 BW.
712 This citation comes from de Meijer (2005) p. 384 and is taken by her from the report of the 
‘Enquêtecommissie opsporingsmethoden’. Also: Van der Ploeg, 2010: 251.
713 s 2:295 BW.
714 s 2:301 BW.
715 s 2:294(1) BW.
716 s 2:344(b) BW.
717 s 2:346(c) BW. See on this: Hendrikse (2010: 62) who shows that such agreements are actually 
closed.
718 s 2:347 BW. The request is only admitted if the requirements of 2:347 and 349 BW are 
adhered to.
719 s 2345(2) BW.
720 See e.g. the letter of the Commissie Vennootschapsrecht of 17 September 2010, available on 
the internet (www.rijksoverheid.nl/...commissie-vennootschapsrecht...stichtingen/advies-
inzake-publicatieplicht-stichtingen.pdf). Also G. van Solinge, Symboolwetgeving tegen foute 
stichtingen, Ondernemingsrecht 2010, 13, 519-520.
721 The website of the Bunderverband Deutscher Stiftungen.
722 Die Stiftung ist eine juristische Person, die zur Verwirklichung bestimmter Sonderzwecke 
geschaffen ist und nicht aus einem Personenverband besteht.
723 Beuthien and Gummert, 2009: 1124 no. 122.
724 s 80 BGB.
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725 s 80, 81 BGB. A Stiftung may be established in a will as well: see s 81(1) last sentence, s82(2), 
s 83 and s 84 BGB. If its Stiftungsgeschäft is inadequate, it should be completed by ‘die 
zuständige Behörde des Landes’ (the competent Authority).
726 s 82 BGB.
727 s 85 BGB.
728 See the text of s 80(2) BGB. Schmidt, 2002: 312 speaks of a ‘sorgfältigen Uberprufung’. Von 
Hippel (2010: 202) states that the registration is not discretionary. However, he considers it 
indeed a form of preventive supervision (216).
729 The approving authorities regularly require an amount of €100,000 (Von Hippel, 2010, 202).
730 Schmidt (2002: 1177) is firmly negative on the matter, while Beuthien and Gummert (2009,V: 
1098) are affirmative. Von Hippel (2010: 203) mentions the existence of ‘unselbständige 
Stiftungen’.
731 Beuthien and Gummert (2009) 1086, 1114. A dependent foundation is in fact a legal relation-
ship between the donor and the executor.
732 For over 90% of all foundations. Ultimo 2009 Germany counted 17,372 civil-law foundations 
(www.stfiftungen.org).
733 Schmidt, 2002: 174. A ‘Stiftung’ may take another legal form: e.g. the Robert Bosch Stiftung 
is a GmbH.
734 These distributions endanger the tax exemption if they exceed one-third of the distributions: 
58(5) AO. Rawert, P., 2001, Die Stiftungsbegriff und seine Merkmal, in K.J. Hopt, and D. Re-
uter, eds.: Stiftungsrecht in Europa (Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln).:’Zulässig soll eine Stiftung 
nur dann sein, wenn sie ihr Zweck nicht lediglich in reinen Unterhaltsleistungen erschöpft (..)’ 
(p. 119). According to Von Hippel (2010: 200) both the Verein and Stiftung are subject to the 
non-distribution constraint.
735 Otherwise: Schmidt, 2002: 175.
736 s 26, 86 BGB.
737 s 87 (1) BGB and State laws. Beuthien and Gummert (2009) V p. 1093: etwaige Verletzung oder 
Gefahrdung des Stftungszwecks.
738 s 3(1) UmwG.
739 s 124, 161-167 UmwG.
740 s 191(1) UmwG.
741 s 86 BGB.
742 s 86 does not mention s 40 BGB.
743 s 86 jo. 28(1) BGB.
744 s 86 jo. 26 BGB. See also 4.7.2.2 since the law refers in s 86 BGB to the sections on the Verein.
745 s 86 jo. 26(2) BGB. And although s 86 does not refer to s 70 or 68 BGB, according to Hof (2001) 
p. 310 the restriction may only be called upon if the opposing party knew about it: Hof, H., 
2001, Stiftungen im deutschen Recht, in K.J. Hopt, and D. Reuter, eds.: Stiftungen im Europa 
(Carl Heymanns Verlag, Köln).
746 s 86 jo. 30 BGB.
747 s 242 BGB. See also 4.4.2.3.
748 s 86 jo. 27(3) jo. 666 BGB. The reference to s 664-670 BGB does not apply to public founda-
tions.
749 s 31a BGB jo s 86 BGB (new).
750 Von Hippel, 2010: 218.
751 s 238 HGB; also s 140, 141 AO.
752 Pearce and Stevens, 2006: 479 report the existence of 189,531 registered charities by 2005.
753 s 1(1.a) Charities Act 2006.
754 s 2(1) Charities Act 2006.
755 s 2(1.b) and s 3 Charities Act 2006. See on this ‘public benefit test’ p. 529-538 of Pearce 
and Stevens, 2006, and p. 121-124 of Webb, C., and T. Akkouh, 2008, Trusts law (Palgrave 
MacMillan, Basingstoke).
756 s 2(2) Charities Act 2006.
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757 s 2(4) Charities Act 2006. Further on this: Webb and Akkouh, 2008: 110-121 and Pearce and 
Stevens, 2006: 488-515.
758 As chapters 7, 8 and 10 Charities Act 2006 show.
759 See www.charity-commission.gov.uk/publications/cc22.
760 Davies, 2008: 8.
761 See: www.charity-commission.gov.uk/registration on Charitable Incorporated Organization 
(CIO). Dual registration means: to the Companies House (the registrar of the CA) and the 
Charity Commission.
762 If ‘CIO’ is not part of the name, either in full or in abbreviated form, then the fact that a 
CIO is a CIO should be stated in all outgoing documents. Schedule 7 Charities Act 2006, s 
69C(3/5/1).
763 Chapter 8 Charities Act 2006 and Schedule 7 e.g. s 69A(25). It is a body corporate upon the 
registration of the CIO in the register of charities, 69F(2). Dual obligations do not exist.
764 Three sets of Regulations are necessary: the General Regulations; the Insolvency and Dis-
solution Regulations and the Charity Tribunal (Amendment Order).
765 Schedule 7 Charities Act 2006 s 69E(1). The CIO should be established exclusively for chari-
table purposes.
766 Schedule 7 Charities Act 2006 s 69F(2). There is no minimum income registration threshold 
for CIOs.
767 Schedule 7 Charities Act 2006, 69A(5). A trust cannot have members, an unincorporated 
association by its nature does. The consultation document on the CIO proposes two model 
constitutions. One is for the ‘association’ type of charity (has a membership as well as a 
trustee body) and the other is for the ‘foundation’ type (the only members are the trustees).
768 Schedule 7 Charities Act 2006 s 69B(2.b).
769 Schedule 7 Charities Act 2006 s 69A(6).
770 www.charity-commission.gov.uk/registration on Charitable Incorporated Organisation (CIO) 
under ‘What are the advantages of being a CIO’?
771 The consultation of the Office of the Third Sector (OTS) and the Charity Commission on 
the detailed legal framework for CIOs is closed on 10 December 2008. See on the similarity: 
Davies, 2008: 20. According to the Charities Commission CIOs will have to comply with the 
other additional responsibilities outlined in the Charities Act 2006 and the CIO Regulations.
772 Also: s 54 Charities Act 1993. S 41 (duty to keep accounting records)
773 s 7 Charities Act 2006 sub 1B.
774 s 7 Charities Act 2006 sub 1C(2).
775 A charitable company with an annual income of more than £500,000 or of more than £250,000 
if its assets exceed £3.26 million must have a professional audit. An accountant’s report will 
do if the annual income is between £25,001 and £500,000 or £250,000 if the assets exceed 
£3.26 million. If the income is less than £25,000 and the assets are less than £3.26 million, 
no audit or accountant’s report is required. Also: Dawes (2010: 860-869, 874).
776 s 23(3) Charities Act 1992. Dawes (2010: 874) mentions the thresholds.
777 The Charities Commission may even apply those rights to ‘exempt’ charities, which are 
supervised by a ‘principal regulator’ such as the Housing Corporation, at the request of the 
principal regulator.
778 s 8 Charities Act 1993.
779 s 9 Charities Act 1993.
780 s 10 Charities Act 1993.
781 See for this ‘whistle-blowing arrangement’ s 33 Charities Act 2006.
782 See www.hmrc.gov.uk and search for Annex I- Charitable Tax Exemption. Also: s 505(1) 
Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (ICTA).
783 See www.hmrc.gov.uk and search for ‘charities and tax: the basics’ under ‘types of tax return’.
784 s 8 Charities Act 2006.
785 Klaassen (2007): 149.
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786 For example: for larger than ‘small’ legal persons. With 50 employees, it seems worthwhile to 
have the interest of all concerned (HR 13-07-2007, Bank of America/ABNAMRO and VEB, r.o. 
4.5) considered not only by directly involved EDs, but by (a) more distanced NED(s) as well.
787 e.g. s 74(3) IA.
788 e.g. s 11, 33(2) CA.
789 s 40(2.b.iii) CA.
790 s 172(1) CA.
791 An unrestricted duty to pay up may be countered by the shareholder by returning the share 
instead (s 27 GmbHG).
792 s 74(3) IA.
793 s 74(1) IA.
794 This is not a panacea: Davies (2008: 493 and footnote 54) regards Smith v Van Gorkom (1985) 
488 A. 2d 858 as an example of a ‘risk with the BJR that the courts will come to regard cases 
where the procedural standards have not been met as presumptively negligent.’
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Chapter 
5
On the role of monitoring near financial distress – a 
multidisciplinary approach
It could never have made sense to 
shower praise upon a manager whose 
company succeeds yet when it fails 
to let him blame the government or 
workers or just ‘bad luck’. (Argenti, 
1976: 2)
250 Chapter 5
5.1 InTRODUCTIOn
The previous chapters defined financial distress (chapter 2); presented the economic 
theory on monitoring in the framework of corporate governance (chapter 3); and showed 
the actual implementation of monitoring mechanisms in the law (chapter 4). This chapter 
concentrates on the role of monitoring near financial distress. Does financial distress 
require other monitoring mechanisms, a different type of monitors, or other rules? The 
approach of this chapter is multidisciplinary. Section 5.2 summarizes the results of 
chapter 2 and elaborates on these. Section 5.3 does the same for chapter 3 and focuses on 
the economic aspects of monitoring near financial distress. The legal aspects of monitor-
ing near financial distress are discussed in 5.4. The feedback of these results to the model 
on the outcome of financial distress presented in chapter 2 figure 2.1, follows in 5.5. It 
presents a model on the role of monitoring near financial distress. From these economic 
and legal analyses as well as from the redrafted model in 5.5 section 5.6 presents research 
directions. It provides the connection with the empirical part of this thesis laid down in 
the chapters 6, 7 and 8. Section 5.7 concludes.
5.2 FInAnCIAL DISTRESS
A firm is in financial distress if there is a non-trivial probability that the legal person 
will not be able to pay its debt within the terms of payment. This is the simplified Gordon 
(1971) definition presented in 2.2.4. The essence is that default is probable. Whether 
this is caused by a shortcoming inflow, or an underestimated outflow of cash, does not 
matter. Chapter 1 showed that mismanagement is a major cause of financial distress. It 
stressed that management’s commitment, a comprehensive strategy and quick imple-
mentation are the three crucial factors for successful restructuring. Several restructuring 
approaches were presented in chapter 2. A work-out turned out to be the preferred 
solution since it is more efficient than a liquidation1.
The Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) inspired figure 2.1 in chapter 2 on the determining fac-
tors for the outcome of financial distress examined the capabilities a manager should 
have at his disposal to turn around the financially distressed company and to avoid 
bankruptcy: he should be highly motivated, highly qualified and skilled, and have the 
right personal characteristics. Moreover, during the turn-around process he should often 
‘re-invent’ himself as well as ‘his’ corporate policy. One wonders what economic and legal 
mechanisms exist to achieve that.
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5.3 MOnITORInG nEAR FInAnCIAL DISTRESS: An ECOnOMIC 
APPROACH
This section takes a closer look at the economic highlights on monitoring (5.3.1) and 
relates these subsequently to financial distress in 5.3.2 and corporate failure in 5.3.3. 
Section 5.3.4 concludes.
5.3.1 Economic highlights on monitoring
Chapter 3 aimed to explain the role of monitoring in the broader perspective of the total 
corporate governance concept. Some of the relevant issues were:
1. a company is a nexus of contracts. Directors and shareholders contract with each 
other through the company just like labour, banks, suppliers and customers do;
2. by definition, every contracting partner has a different utility function. E.g. directors 
and companies do not necessarily have the same goal. This is the agency problem that 
exists between parties that contractually rely on each other to realize an object;
3. the director, as the ‘specialized manager’, represents the company. In order to guide 
the director to function solely in the interests of the company that appointed him, the 
company has to put properly structured contracting and monitoring mechanisms in 
place;
4. one cannot expect that a director, as a representative of the company, would opti-
mally structure and monitor his own position in the interests of the company. Alchian 
and Demsetz (1972) therefore ask: Who will monitor the monitors? Their reply: the 
residual claimants! According to the theory only the parties that have interest in the 
residual will abstain from free-rider behaviour and will be effective monitors;
5. in structuring the contract, the company, represented by its residual claimants, acts 
wisely by aiming to align the director’s interests with its own;
6. in monitoring directors, the company, represented by its residual claimants, has to 
ensure that monitors maintain their objectivity. Appointment or even selection of 
monitors by the CEO should therefore be avoided. Monitors’ proximity to the execu-
tive management, i.e. in terms of independency, should be transparent. Objectivity is 
best guarded by ‘real’ outside monitors;
7. monitoring comes with a cost. It is efficient only as far as it reduces the whole of the 
agency costs;
8. the decision process in the company should separate management (responsible for 
initiation and implementation) and control (responsible for ratification and monitor-
ing) of decisions if possible;
9. in order to shield against agency-infected, inadequate or corrupt monitors, external 
monitoring mechanisms organized by the markets and by the government are a nec-
essary monitoring supplement.
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The mode of implementation of these issues will depend i.a. on the size of the company, 
the requirements of the markets and the alertness of the government and legislator. At 
any rate the focus in the internal monitoring theory is on the residual claimant. The idea 
is that all contracts will be adhered to by the company (Davies, 2006: 305), and that the 
residual claimant, i.e the shareholder (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972) or as the case may be 
the member or the beneficial owner, receives what is left. Does this conclusion hold in 
situations of near financial distress? This is the subject of the next section.
5.3.2 Monitoring near financial distress: an economic analysis
Indeed, as long as there is cash and financial obligations are met, not many external 
parties will bother to monitor and most will free ride on the internal monitoring efforts. 
However, in situations of near financial distress this monitoring behaviour will change for 
all primary parties concerned: shareholders, creditors, employees and directors (Davies, 
2006; Eidenmüller, 2006). In one thing they can unite: none of them wants the company 
to fail (Argenti, 1976: 174). In their reasons and their approach to solve financial distress 
they differ.
Shareholders
In situations of near financial distress equity has almost vanished, and so has the share-
holders’ value. As a result the focus of shareholders has shifted from guarding their 
wealth to ‘gambling’ on new corporate opportunities in an attempt to re-establish their 
equity position (Davies, 2006; Lennarts, 2006: 5; Eidenmüller, 2006: 243). These are often 
high-risk adventures. However, since equity has vanished, these corporate opportunities 
are de facto financed by creditors. In other words: shareholders’ risk is externalized to 
the creditors.
Creditors and employees
This externalization of risk (Davies, 2010: 89) concept implies that in situations of near fi-
nancial distress the true residual claimants are not the shareholders but the non-secured 
creditors, i.e. the employees and the trade creditors (Davies, 2006: 307, 337; Armour, 
Hertig and Kanda, 2009: 122) The secured creditors take the first bite of the estate, 
employees and trade creditors go for the residual. This economic approach explains why 
investors, banks, suppliers or customers regularly have their ‘own’ non-executive direc-
tor (NED) appointed to the board; or why employee-nominated NEDs or works councils 
have a voice in the management of the company. Creditors and employees may be the 
actual residual claimants in the end since there is usually nothing left for the sharehold-
ers2. They suffer losses on their claims on accounts payable or wages; on commercial 
guarantees or on pension; on the value of their commercial portfolio; on job security and 
ultimately on their job economic security. Thus, in situations of near financial distress 
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creditors and employees will evaluate whether continuation or liquidation is the relatively 
advantageous solution.
Directors
From their jobs directors derive income, perks, wealth, status and reputation. Their aim is 
to maintain or improve this situation. In situations of near financial distress their wealth 
in terms of shareholder value vanishes whilst their risk of liability claims increases. As a 
result they may decide to leave the company (Gilson, 1989). However, this is not always 
feasible and there may still be enough for them to achieve within the company (Davies, 
2006: 308). Generally directors will go for the turn-around of the company and try to 
avoid bankruptcy (Grossman and Hart, 1982: 131). Thus, directors should continue what 
they are paid for and presumably good at. For executives this is: to manage, reorganize 
and eventually turn around the company. As Adriaanse (2006) explains, they should start 
(1) to stabilize the current situation of the company and stop the cash-drain; then (2) 
analyse its problems and look into its perspectives for the longer term, culminating in 
a turn-around plan; (3) re-position the company in its markets according to the turn-
around plan; and finally (4) reinforce the capabilities of the firm through e.g. restructur-
ing its finance, management and corporate policy.
For non-executive directors this turn-around process implies extensive monitoring, 
supervising and providing of advice or other available resources e.g. access to networks. 
Monitoring in this phase is especially important, since (1) reorganization is a precarious 
process with a low fault tolerance; (2) directors and shareholders may have an incentive 
to take a gamble (Eidenmüller, 2006: 240) or go for a dirt profit; and (3) the additional re-
sources of non-executive supervisors/monitors may be decisive factors in a turn-around 
process. Jungmann (2006: 473) reflects on the additional value of monitoring:
Of course, we can hardly say that outsider directors, non-executive directors, inde-
pendent directors, etc. or competent, well paid, full-time working members of the 
supervisory board have a degree of foresight and wisdom that makes them, in any 
case, superior to the executive directors or members of the management board. Both 
groups can be wrong in their decisions; both might take too many risks and thus lead 
the company into a period of financial distress. Thus, neither integrating the monitors 
into the decision-making process nor strengthening the role of those involved in the 
decision-making process as monitors would automatically bring an end to business 
failures. However, an enhanced level of control would reduce the probability of mis-
takes that occur at the managerial level remaining undetected. Consequently, there is 
an increased chance that wrong or harmful decisions can be corrected and that injury 
to creditors, shareholders, employees and the general public can be reduced.
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Thus, whilst the EDs have to take the initiative and have to come up quickly with a plan 
and solutions, one important task of monitors is to reduce the chance of managerial 
mistakes during the process.
5.3.3 Monitoring near financial distress: a corporate failure analysis
Another angle to the subject of monitoring near financial distress is presented by the 
corporate failure analysis by Argenti (1976), Richardson, Nwankwo and Richardson 
(1994), Bollen, Mertens, Meuwissen, Raak and Schelleman (2005) and Ooghe and De 
Prijcker (2008). They essentially arrive at a similar result. They discern three (Argenti) 
or four (the other authors) types of failure processes, defined by Ooghe and De Prijcker 
(2008) as type 1: an unsuccessful start-up; type 2: an ambitious growth company; type 3: 
a dazzled growth company; and type 4: an apathetic established company. Without going 
into the details of their analyses, they all conclude in one way or another that manage-
ment is at the origin of most problems. Argenti (1976: 179) presents a ‘company survival 
kit’. On the specific issue of management composition he remarks:
When starting a business, avoid taking into partnership only people with the same 
knowledge as yourself – a top team composed of all talents helps to ensure that none 
of the complexities of the modern world outwits you. Indeed, any unbalanced top team 
in any company is a clear warning of trouble in store. In particular (..) take a strong 
finance man into the top team. Avoid putting people on the board who do nothing, 
say nothing, know nothing and do not even care. (..) Above all, make sure that when a 
company grows beyond a certain point (..) that one-man rule is gradually diluted. Or 
that an autocrat is supervised by someone who represents the interests of people not in 
the executive hierarchy but outside the company – shareholders or banks or customers 
or the community. Many supervisory devices are possible (..). An independent chairman 
is an excellent concept.
Similarly, Richardson, Nwankwo and Richardson (1994: 10) aim to improve the manage-
rial ability to spot inappropriate leadership as a prerequisite to deciding what to do 
about it. Moreover, Bollen et al. (2005: 48) conclude that an important reason for busi-
ness failures is the lack of adequate checks and balances within a company’s corporate 
governance system regarding e.g. shareholder rights, the position and role of supervisory 
boards (and non-executive directors in a one-tier system), management compensation, 
disclosure and transparency. And Keough (2008) describes serious management mistakes 
in his ‘Ten commandments to business failure’. Thus, also from the failure analysis angle, 
monitoring of directors is key to diminish the risk of mistakes, to promote the orderly 
checks and balances in the company, and eventually to avoid financial distress.
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5.3.4 Concluding remarks on economic aspects of monitoring near financial 
distress
Economic theory shows that company monitoring is important to protect the residual 
claimholders against expropriation by the management. Moreover, monitoring, either by 
shareholders in smaller sized companies or by NEDs on order of the shareholders in 
larger companies, could reduce the probability of undetected mistakes. From this point 
of view, monitoring is essentially a shareholder’s interest. Since the residual claim of 
shareholders decreases in situations of near financial distress, they tend to lose their 
interest in the company or to gamble on its future. However, in situations of near finan-
cial distress unsecured creditors and employees come into play as residual claimants. 
Then monitoring essentially becomes a creditor’s interest. It would be unwise to replace 
shareholder-monitors by creditor and employee appointed monitors in situations of near 
financial distress, since in order to be a good monitor one needs to be acquainted with 
the company and its management for some time. Consequently it would be wise to apply 
both groups of residual claim holders as monitors long before financial distress and to 
merge their different interests in ‘the interests (or the success) of the company’ as the 
law actually does.
5.4 MOnITORInG nEAR FInAnCIAL DISTRESS: A LEGAL APPROACH
This section begins with the findings of chapter 4. In 5.4.2 it takes a closer look at the 
legal provisions aimed at influencing directors’ behaviour in situations of near financial 
distress. The effects of the law on shareholders’ behaviour in such situations form the 
subject of 5.4.3. Section 5.4.4 focuses on legal provisions relating to the monitoring of 
directors in situations of near financial distress. Section 5.4.5 concludes.
5.4.1 Legal highlights on monitoring
Chapter 4 studied how the law implemented mandatory monitoring mechanisms in the 
company. It showed that:
1. company law confers in specific cases legal personality to what is essentially a con-
tract or a legal act (one recognizes the economic concept of a nexus of contracts);
2. the legal organization of a legal person differs according to the legal system and the 
specific needs of the type of legal person concerned. In most situations, management 
is exclusively conferred to executive directors who have the highest authority (albeit 
not necessarily the ultimate authority) in the legal person. As a result,
3. the rights of shareholders or members are often curtailed by the law and by the 
articles;
4. internal monitoring through non-executive directors is seldom mandatory; and
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5. an ‘organic’ employee consultation system lacks in some legal systems;
6. in the absence of close supervision, the corporate legal system relies on imposing 
restrictions on executive directors’ behaviour through the formulation of directors’ 
duties;
7. inadequate monitoring, either by equals in the collegial board, or by other organs, 
may in specific circumstances lead to personal liability of EDs or NEDs;
8. the ex ante external mandatory regime often suffers from a lack of material checks 
(most checks are purely formal); the ex post external mandatory regime suffers from 
a time lag between the omission or mistake and the action by the external monitor, if 
any. Court interference remains important throughout all legal systems.
Probably as a consequence of the importance attached to the company characteristic 
of centralized and specialized management (Davies, 2010: 12), chapter 4 showed that 
executive directors are relatively free in performing their tasks and that mandatory 
monitoring is often rather poorly arranged for. The risk of abuse, and possibly financial 
distress, is waiting around the corner. However, as the economic analysis showed, in 
situations of near financial distress the focus of a director’s interests should shift from 
those of the company3, as discussed in chapter 4, to those of the creditors (Nolan, 2001; 
Davies, 2006; Van Eeghen, 2006A; Ribstein and Alces, 2006; Olaerts, 2007; Armour et al. 
2009: 209). Hence, the law provides for additional regulations, e.g. personal liability of 
directors, to be discussed in the next section.
5.4.2 Legal provisions influencing directors’ behaviour in situations of near 
financial distress
In situations of near financial distress, executive directors (EDs) would prefer to go 
on as usual (Lennarts, 2006) Once the market knows, the going-concern value of the 
firm declines sharply (Eidenmüller, 2006: 243). Therefore private companies regularly 
decide to forego mandatory disclosure, which happens quite often (de Jong and Nieuwe 
Weme, 2006) as e.g. chapter 8 shows for private limited companies and co-operatives in 
the Netherlands. Consequently the law steers executive directors’ behaviour through a 
standards strategy in order to protect corporate creditors when financial distress nears 
(Armour et al. 2009: 134). It sanctions these provisions by an ascending and cumulating 
directors’ liability and monitoring intensity of the company on the road to bankruptcy, as 
figure 5.1 shows for the Netherlands. Initially (phase 1), a healthy company has to cope 
with the basic standards of a collegial board, reasonable and fair behaviour of concerned 
parties and the primacy of the interests of the company. Depending on the size of the 
company the law prescribes some mandatory monitoring mechanisms such as a works 
council, an SB and public disclosure of the annual accounts. However in phase 2, once 
the company rides in the teeth of the wind, directors may additionally come across an 
inquiry procedure, a dismissal, a liability claim from the company or even a directors’ 
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disqualification measure taken by a court, all resulting in heavy reputational damage. 
Unlike in phase 2, financial problems gradually become predominant in phase 3. From 
three years before bankruptcy a director risks above the previous measures an extra per-
sonal liability to the estate for apparent mismanagement, a risk that may only materialize 
once the bankruptcy is there (phase 5). Phase 4 depicts the financial distress situation. It 
normally starts a few months before bankruptcy. Creditors originating from this period 
may hold ‘knowing’ directors personally liable, once the company is in default. Transac-
tions concluded in this period may be declared null and void afterwards if the transac-
tion is ‘undervalued’ as in the UK or ‘Paulianeus’ as in the Netherlands and disturb the 
paritas creditorum4. It should be noted that while the measures in figure 5.1 may have a 
monitoring and disciplining effect on the road to bankruptcy, they will often actually be 
effectuated once the bankruptcy has been declared and the director or his D&O insurance 
company is the only one who may offer redress.
Chapter 4 studied the ‘normal-type’ company, indicated in figure 5.1 as a healthy com-
pany or a ‘phase 1 company’. The next subsections analyse the sanctions and monitoring 
mechanisms of the phases 2 - 5 of figure 5.1 towards bankruptcy with a focus on the 
Netherlands.
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5.4.2.1 Reputational damage (phase 2)
In phase 2 the company, still in apparent health, faces difficulties with shareholders or the 
trade union. This may result in a request for an inquiry procedure before the Enterprise 
Division of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (4.4.1.5) or in an expel or resign procedure 
in a closed NV or a BV (4.4.1.2). In search of a solution to its problems the company may 
dismiss a director and even sue him if his mismanagement was seriously reproachable 
(4.4.1.3)5. The latter does not happen very often since it adds new reputational damage 
to the company.
Moreover, a court may disqualify a director. This approach is particularly successful in 
the UK. The idea behind the UK Company Directors Disqualification Act (CDDA) is to 
have more serious and compliant directors once they know that they may be wiped out 
from job opportunities if they take the legal requirements too lightly. The UK court may 
disqualify a director as soon as he is convicted of an indictable offence in connection 
with e.g. the promotion, formation, liquidation or striking-off of a company6; or where 
it appears that a director has been persistently in default in relation to provisions of the 
CA requiring any return, account or other document to be filed with, delivered or sent 
to the registrar7. The court will issue a disqualification order if it is satisfied that the 
conduct of a person as a director makes him unfit to be concerned in the management 
of a company. Schedules 1 and 2 to the CDDA8 contain the criteria for unfitness9. An 
application for the making of a disqualification order may be made by the Secretary of 
State, the official receiver, the liquidator, a member or a creditor10. Enforcement in the UK 
is very intensive and 100 times more common than a private suit against directors of an 
insolvent company11 (Armour et al. 2009).
Directors’ disqualification in the Netherlands is a rather unexplored area12, with only a 
provision for foundation directors in civil law13; provisions for the screening of direc-
tors in general14 and of the financial sector in the Wft15; a general but seldom applied 
additional penalty to deprive a person of his right to perform a profession e.g. being a 
director, for certain offences in criminal law16; and a recent law not yet in force to widen 
the application of the latter17 (Doorenbos, 2008). De Jong and Nieuwe Weme (2006: 98) in 
their government commissioned study on the compliance of the duty of public disclo-
sure conclude to an intensification of criminal sanctions and plea for new and additional 
administrative sanctions.
German law disqualifies persons from being an executive director in specific cases18, 
notably after a conviction for failure to file for insolvency in time (Insolvenzverschlep-
pung)19 and some other insolvency-related criminal offences20. This thesis abstains from 
a discussion of criminal measures against abuse in financial distress situations.
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5.4.2.2 Personal liability for apparent mismanagement (phase 3 and 5)
In phase 3 the problems of the company gradually become predominantly of a financial 
nature. Here Dutch law has a typical, successful legal approach. It urges directors to 
scrutinize their behaviour long before bankruptcy, since during bankruptcy a Dutch 
administrator may sue the EDs and NEDs for ‘apparent mismanagement’ in a period 
going back three years. If the administrator is able to prove that this ‘manifestly improper 
performance of duties’ over the past three years was plausibly an important cause of 
the bankruptcy, EDs, NEDs and a shadow director may be held personally liable to the 
estate for the entire deficit in bankruptcy21. The burden of proof is on the administrator. 
The court may mitigate the liability22. This provision applies basically to all Dutch legal 
persons23.
This unique Dutch procedure is especially successful since non-compliance with the 
Dutch mandatory rule for EDs to conduct a proper administration and to disclose through 
the Handelsregister in a timely manner24 may easily lead to personal liability under this 
provision. In the event of bankruptcy, the law qualifies non-compliance with this ad-
ministration and public disclosure rule as mismanagement and presupposes it is the 
cause of the bankruptcy, unless the director proves the contrary25. As a consequence of 
the collegial board principle each director is at risk of being sentenced to pay up jointly 
and severally the bankruptcy deficit26 unless he proves ‘that the improper performance 
of his duties is not attributable to him and that he has not been negligent in taking 
measures to prevent the consequences thereof’27. This includes the NED who knew of the 
deficiency and did not act properly to seek redress (HR 28 June 1996, NJ 1997, 58, Bodam 
Jachtservice).
5.4.2.3 Personal liability to creditors (phase 4 and 5)
In phase 4 typically, a director risks personal liability ‘for net increases in losses to credi-
tors resulting from the board’s negligence or fraud to creditors when the company is, 
or is nearly, insolvent’ (Armour et al. 2009: 134). The British ‘fraudulent trading’ and 
‘wrongful trading’ concepts are common examples. Fraudulent trading28 happens if in 
the course of the winding up of a company ‘it appears that any business of the company 
has been carried on with intent to defraud creditors of the company or for any fraudulent 
purpose’. The wrongful trading rule29 holds that if a director knew or ought to have 
concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company could avoid going 
into insolvent liquidation30, the court, on the application of the liquidator, may declare 
that that person is to be liable31 to make such contribution to the company’s assets as the 
court thinks proper:
• unless that director took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the 
company's creditors as he ought to have taken, and
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• unless the directors’ behavior has been that of a reasonably diligent person having 
both
 o  the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of 
a person carrying out the same functions as are carried out by that director in 
relation to the company, and
 o  the general knowledge, skill and experience that that director has.
Thus, trading whilst insolvent is not by itself either a criminal offence or a civil wrong 
(Davies, 2006: 314). From the moment a director32 should have felt that ‘insolvent liqui-
dation’ was inevitable, UK law requires that he ought to have taken every step with a view 
to minimising the potential loss to the creditors. According to Davies (2006) and Hirte, 
Knof and Mock (2008) this will often imply the decision to initiate formal insolvency 
proceedings. The ‘should have felt’ and ‘ought to have taken’ are judged by the court 
on the ‘duty of care plus’ (4.4.3.3) basis. However, if the de facto insolvent company is 
not formally put into insolvent liquidation ‘the section 214 machinery will not operate’ 
(Davies, 2006: 321). Directors thus seem to be able to escape liability if they appoint an 
administrator out of court, to which they are entitled33. A countervailing power in this 
respect form the common law developments regarding directors’ duties to take account 
of the interests of creditors34, which can be invoked in all insolvency proceedings. Ac-
cording to Davies (2006:327-329)
The modified directors’ duty exposes directors to personal liability if they embark on 
overly risky projects in the vicinity of insolvency, and in consequence the downside of 
potential projects (..) becomes of relevance to their decision making.
The Dutch version of the wrongful trading rule seems more fine-tuned. Contrary to the 
British rule, only applicable if the company has gone into insolvent liquidation, the Dutch 
wrongful trading rule formulated in HR 6 October 1989, NJ 1990, 286 (Beklamel) ap-
plies to a range of actual financial distress situations (Van Eeghen, 2006A: 17-95). HR 
8 December 2006, JOR 2007/38 (Ontvanger/Roelofsen) formulated the rule as follows:
(a) in general, a director only then acts illegitimately towards a creditor and is conse-
quently, along with the company, personally liable if he acted towards the creditor in 
a sufficiently seriously reproachable manner e.g. with regard to his duty to manage 
properly as mentioned in s 2:9 BW; which is specifically the case
(b) if a director closed a transaction whilst he knew or reasonably ought to have concluded 
that there was no prospect that the company would neither meet its obligations nor 
would offer redress, unless the director is able to make it plausible that he cannot be 
reproached for the injury (this is the original ‘Beklamel’ ruling); or
(c) if a director effectuated or accepted that the company did not meet its obligations 
whilst his role in that decision shows such carelessness in respect of the creditor that 
this justifies a case of serious reproach35.
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German law has a different focus in wrongful trading situations. It recognizes two criteria 
for instituting insolvency proceedings for a legal person: actual or imminent illiquidity 
(Zahlungsunfähigkeit)36 which is a cash-flow test, and overindebtedness (Überschul-
dung)37 which is a balance sheet test, i.e. the liabilities exceed the assets. The civil focus 
orders executive directors to reimburse the company for payments made after they rec-
ognized the (imminent) illiquidity or the overindebtedness unless the payment has been 
made with due care38. In specific cases e.g. a not-permitted payment as mentioned in the 
previous sentence, creditors unable to receive payment from the company may pursue 
this claim to the executive directors personally as long as no insolvency proceedings are 
pending39.
A specific personal liability to creditors is created by the Dutch Collection of State Taxes 
Act (Invorderingswet 1990). It obliges a company to inform the tax authorities if it is 
not able to pay its tax debt in time, and to provide them with necessary proof40. The law 
provides for joint liability of executive directors if the company has not paid its taxes and 
this non-payment is a plausible consequence of ‘manifestly improper management’ in 
a period up to three years before the non-payment41. However, if the executive director 
did not inform the tax authorities of the company’s inability to pay, he is liable and the 
burden of providing proof to the contrary is on him42.
5.4.2.4 Annihilation or avoidance of transactions (phase 4 and phase 5)
Unlike the previous measures (5.4.2.3) that focussed on creditor relief, annihilation or 
avoidance direct at restoring the previous position. In the Netherlands generally, based 
on the actio Pauliana, any damaged creditor could declare any non-compulsory transac-
tion null and void if both parties to the transaction knew that violation of creditors’ 
rights of redress would be its consequence43. Specifically, an administrator in bankruptcy 
may declare any non-compulsory transaction null and void if both parties knew that 
infringement of creditors’ rights would be its consequence44. The burden of proof is laid 
upon the other party to the transaction if the transaction was concluded less than a year 
before the bankruptcy date45. Payments of claims due may be declared null and void 
by the administrator in bankruptcy in the case of a conspiracy between the debtor and 
creditor or if the creditor knew that a petition for bankruptcy had been filed46.
In similar cases UK law recognizes an ‘undervalue transaction’. This is a gift, a transaction 
without consideration or a transaction with significant difference in the value of the 
consideration47 within two years from insolvency48. The court may ‘by such order as it 
thinks fit’ restore the company in its previous position49. A similar fate meets an attempt 
to conduct ‘preferential transactions’ – resulting in a particular creditor being placed in 
a better position50. Similarly, in HR 22 December 2009, NJ 2009, 273, ABN AMRO/Van 
Dooren q.q. III, the Hoge Raad ruled in r.o. 3.10 that a bank in considering a request for 
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additional secured credit from a financially distressed firm has to analyse the financial 
figures of the company with the risk of bankruptcy and consequential infringement of 
other creditors’ rights in mind. If the administrator can prove that the bank did not, the 
mortgage and pledge arrangements can be declared null and void. In the same line of 
thinking Davies (2006: 307) argues that the law should not provide recovery to creditors 
who have consented to embark on an overly risky project. Thus, UK law as well as the 
Dutch HR ruling guides directly the behaviour of the creditor.
5.4.2.5 Concluding remarks on influencing directors’ behaviour in situations of near 
financial distress
Figure 5.1 shows in ascending and cumulating order the various legal measures that 
may influence director’s behaviour on the road to bankruptcy. A director seems well-
instructed by the law to avoid bankruptcy and if unavoidable, to structure it correctly. 
The higher the phase in the pyramid, the more chance of a personal liability claim. With 
it comes an increasing monitoring structure and intensity: to the court and individual 
shareholders in phase 2 are added creditors in phase 4 and the bankruptcy court and the 
administrator in phase 5.
5.4.3 Legal provisions influencing shareholders’ behaviour in situations of near 
financial distress
Liability may even extend to shareholders if they have been deeply involved in the 
management of the subsequently distressed company. This involvement may have had 
the character of a shadow directorship51; or it may have brought a duty of care for the 
creditors’ interests as a consequence of the company structure52. Moreover, Dutch law 
solves the liability issue of shareholders once in a while by identifying the legal person 
and the natural person (or other company) behind it and holding them both liable53. 
The concept of ‘piercing the corporate veil’, meaning that shareholders under certain 
circumstances can be held liable for the company’s debts or other liabilities, known in the 
USA and the UK but only so in extreme circumstances as such does not apply in Dutch 
law (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991; Armour et al. 2009; Davies, 2010: 32).
Rules restricting asset distribution to shareholders bite after insolvency as well (Lennarts, 
2006: 8-17). As long as the company meets its obligations, not many people will care 
about e.g. dividend payments or even the reduction of capital. However, as soon as the 
company becomes insolvent and an illegitimate asset distribution to shareholders is 
discovered, shareholders and/or (executive) directors may be held personally liable for 
reimbursement54.
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5.4.4 Legal provisions relating to the monitoring of directors in situations of near 
financial distress
A ‘light’ legal provision on the monitoring of directors in situations of near financial dis-
tress is the legal provision to call an EGM as soon as ‘the net assets of a public company 
are half or less of its called-up share capital (..) to consider whether any, and if so what, 
steps should be taken to deal with the situation55.’ Although the provisions originate 
from the Second EEC Directive on Company Law56 a similar provision exists for the GmbH 
and eG57. Another ‘light’ provision is in Dutch tax law, where it obliges a company that 
is not able to pay its taxes when due to inform the tax authorities immediately and 
to provide them with subsequently requested information (see 5.4.2.3). Both provisions 
imply an intensification of the monitoring of directors.
When financial distress nears, the law sometimes creates a new outside monitoring 
mechanism of the board. Exemplary is the UK ‘nominee’ in case of a company voluntary 
arrangement (CVA)58 or the ‘bewindvoerder’ if a Dutch company files for suspension of 
payments. From that moment on, the ‘bewindvoerder’ and the board can only conclude 
contracts together59. French law provides two pre-insolvency procedures for preventive 
reasons: (1) the alert procedure (procédure d’alerte) where an auditor uncovering facts 
likely to compromise the continuity of the business may, if his efforts to redress fail – in 
the end – inform the president of the Tribunal de Commerce60; and (2) the mandat ad hoc 
where at the request of the debtor, the president of the commercial court could appoint 
a mandataire ad hoc, determining his purpose and the duration of his mission61. The 
mandataire ad hoc works under confidentiality62. One could consider the Court appoint-
ment of a ‘stille bewindvoerder’ (undisclosed administrator) at the request of the debtor 
before bankruptcy, which the commissie Kortmann proposes should be part of the new 
Dutch insolvency law, to be a late stage monitor as well.
Chapter 1 argued that ‘suspension of payments’ often leads to bankruptcy. There is no 
information as to the effect of the other measures mentioned.
5.4.5 Concluding remarks on legal aspects of monitoring near financial distress
Reading through the legal provisions influencing directors’ behaviour in situations of 
near financial distress, these could very well make directors anxious about liability. This 
however would not be right: bona fide directors should have nothing to fear from (Dutch) 
law (Kroeze, 2005: 9). The overview showed that all the legal systems under review pro-
vide rules and standards protecting creditors in situations of near financial distress. 
However, one may argue that these measures (1) apply at a very late stage (Davies, 2006: 
313) and (2) do not have any positive influence on the fate of the company63. Moreover, 
(3) they do not necessarily encourage directors to improve their management decisions, 
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whilst (4) the limited wealth of shareholders/directors often inhibits the effectiveness 
of financial sanctions (Eidenmüller, 2006: 244). Legal monitoring measures relating to 
situations of near financial distress such as in France can only be effective if there is no 
immediate time constraint, no publicity and sufficient manoeuvring space for financial 
reorganization. In practice these conditions are difficult to meet.
5.5 MOnITORInG nEAR FInAnCIAL DISTRESS: A MULTIDISCIPLInARY 
APPROACH
What do we have: chapter 2 showed that a turn-around or a work-out is a complicated 
process. Chapter 3 stressed the surplus value of monitoring. Chapter 4 showed that in 
the law the specialized management feature generally prevails over mandatory monitor-
ing requirements. The previous sections showed that economists promote monitoring 
by residual claimants as a panacea against expropriation by the management and for 
improvement of management decisions. Due to the ever-existing possibility of financial 
distress, all residual claimants should have a right to monitor. Remarkably, the law, 
implicitly or explicitly, influences directors’ behaviour in situations of near financial 
distress mainly through personal liability. Could the economic concept of monitoring 
have a role in the law as well?
5.5.1 The analysis of Argenti
Argenti (1976; 1986A; 1986B) analyses that failure is not an event but a process which 
evolves in four sequential phases64. In phase one there are either (1.a) management defects 
e.g. an autocratic CEO, a weak CFO, the available skills are primarily of a technical and not 
of a general executive nature, or directors do not participate; or (1.b) systems defects e.g. 
ineffective budgetary control, inaccurate costing systems or poor cash-flow planning; 
or (1.c) change defects i.e. poor response to change or the company is significantly old-
fashioned. In this phase the company appears to be in good health. However:
the first signpost pointing down the path to failure, years ahead, is the autocrat.(..) His 
great strength is that when he says ‘jump’ the whole company jumps; marvellous – 
until he tells them to jump in the wrong direction. (Argenti, 1986A).
In phase two it actually happens, only it goes undetected. Management makes one of the 
three mistakes that is going to lead directly to failure (Argenti, 1986B). These are either 
(2.a) overtrading which occurs when a company expands faster than its capital base, 
or (2.b) embarking on a project that is too big which, if it goes wrong, will bring down 
the company, or (2.c) allowing too high gearing ‘which leaves no room for manoeuvre 
should a stroke of bad luck occur’. Autocrats tend to wave away financial restrictions; 
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they neither reckon with the risk that the project is not going to succeed nor with bad 
luck. Once one of these mistakes has been made, the company will enter the third phase 
in which the signs and symptoms of failure begin to appear:
So here at last we find the financial symptoms which most people regard as the first 
indications of failure – of course we know now that they are among the last. (Argenti, 
1986B)
The third phase shows (3.a) deteriorating ratios and Z-scores, or in order to avoid that: 
(3.b) creative accounting, which may occasionally be fraudulent but often some re-
arrangements on the balance sheet may be sufficient, or (3.c) non-financial signs such as 
a cut of capital expenditures; directors who are getting indecisive, start reducing the size 
of orders to their suppliers; a suffering product quality; discounting selling prices and 
falling market share. Phase four is marked by the actual insolvency.
Writs start flying, staff begin to resign, and rumours spread. Finally the dreadful day 
arrives (Argenti 1986B).
In short, most corporate failures find their origin in phase one: in management defects, 
in system defects or in change defects. In order to diminish financial distress monitoring 
should focus on these defects.
5.5.2 Towards a model to diminish financial distress
Now refer to figure 5.2. It is essentially the same figure as figure 2.1 with the head-
ing ‘determining factors for the outcome of financial distress’. Argenti’s management 
defects, system defects and change defects are all related to the two boxes mentioned in 
the lower half of the figure: the MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR and CORPORATE POLICY 
boxes. So, what should be done in order to avoid the defects is to improve the quality of 
these boxes. This improvement is sought by adding monitoring mechanisms to each of 
these two boxes in figure 5.2. In one way or another, and depending on e.g. the size of 
the company, outside and essentially independent monitoring mechanisms should be 
organized around these two boxes to avoid the ultimate devastating effect of Argenti’s 
defects. For large companies one could think of more than one ED, thus establishing 
a collegial board; of an SB with a creditor and an employee voice; of a works council; 
of an internal auditors department; or of a better equipped or more experienced audi-
tor. For smaller companies less formal mechanisms will often do, such as an advisory 
board; a family council; a regular discussion with an industry consultant, a banker, or 
an accountant or an auditor; and meetings with employee-representatives. As has been 
concluded in 3.6, in order to remain efficient, management should not lose to monitors 
much of its discretionary power to direct the company. However, as long as monitoring 
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reduces the whole of agency costs i.e. reduces the residual loss for a larger amount than 
the monitoring investment, the company is better of.
The working of the MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR box can be improved through either 
the implementation of a monitoring mechanism, or, if there is such a mechanism, by a 
more adequate monitoring structure; by searching for better monitors; or by putting 
enough monitors in place i.e. by adding a monitoring organ or a director. Monitoring 
is preferably implemented by relative outsiders, since insiders may suffer from tunnel 
vision, or from autocratic leadership. Executives/insiders should be forced to hear the 
advice of these outsiders, either by law, by the articles and company resolutions, or by 
covenants with lenders, investors and interest groups. Since they are specialized agents, 
the decision should remain mostly theirs. And since these measures intend to create 
figure 5.2: measures to counteract the occurrence of Argenti’s financial distress causing defects 
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Figure 5.2: measures to counteract the occurrence of Argenti’s financial distress causing defects
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a balanced governance structure, management decisions will improve at least with the 
bottom line that the risk to overlook aspects will be diminished.
The working of the CORPORATE POLICY box can be improved though new external 
resources for the board. These may be new experience, know-how and networks originat-
ing from (more or better) NEDs on the (supervisory) board. In smaller companies these 
resources may come from industry consultants, from colleague-entrepreneurs or from 
banks or investors. These resources may improve company policy, strategy, corporate 
governance and even operations. A works council or some form of co-determination may 
ameliorate an important aspect of corporate policy, labour relations. Tying employees to 
the company may avoid strikes and promote more flexible production processes such 
that e.g. in the early 2009 crisis, KLM pilots were inclined to do ground-personnel work. 
Better transparency and accountability show you have nothing to hide; make you clearly 
present the choices you have made and the reasons for them; and ensure that surprises 
and angry stakeholders are avoided if things turn out wrong. The advantage being that, 
if things do go wrong and the company nears financial distress, directors do not lose 
precious time in appeasing shareholders, creditors and employees, and can instead start 
working directly on constructive turn-around solutions within an adequate monitoring 
structure.
5.5.3 A legal implementation of the model
Would there be a place for such a monitoring concept in the law? Chapter 4 already 
showed that the law actually provides for monitoring mechanisms. As it is, it seems that 
private investors are well protected through the regulated capital market in NVs, AGs 
and PLcs. Moreover, the UK heavily protects investors in charities and other investments 
for the benefit of the public, in order to vest confidence in this market. However, protec-
tion of private investments outside the regulated capital market is often rather thin e.g. 
depending on the size and legal form of the company.
A plea for new mandatory monitoring provisions in the law would be politically sense-
less; economically inefficient since mandatory law often cannot cope with the specific 
circumstances of the company; and therefore legally almost impossible. On the other 
hand, monitoring has its advantages over the legal measures discussed earlier this 
chapter. Whilst disqualification and liability are remedies of an ex post nature and need 
outside parties e.g. a court or an administrator to apply, monitoring is an ex ante and 
primarily internal remedy with efficiency advantages in terms of time, costs and un-
certainty. Although both may add to the quality of company management in their own 
way, ensuring an appropriate monitoring structure for the company to start with would 
seem wise. If monitoring does not work out as predicted because it is either not in place 
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at all, or inadequately designed or inappropriately implemented, then the existing legal 
standards may well fill the gap.
It seems that the open norm that directors should pursue the belang van de onderneming 
/ the success of the company / the Wohle der Gesellschaft leaves room for a solution. 
Would this duty not require ‘the implementation and actual application of a tailor-made 
monitoring structure in the company’ as one of the important tasks for a director? Such 
a requirement would neatly fit into corporate law since the first principle of the DC starts 
with the phrase: ‘The management board and the supervisory board are responsible for 
the corporate governance structure of the company’ and the Hoge Raad ruled – for Dutch 
listed companies – that these principles fill in the open norms of s 2:8 and s 2:9 BW65. The 
UKC (A.1) requires every company to be headed by an effective board. This finding is vi-
sualized in figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 adds a new bottom-line criterion to the pyramid, derived 
from economic theory and embedded in the duty of care: at any rate and in any company 
directors are obliged to implement and actually apply a monitoring structure tailored to 
the needs of the company. This is the conclusion of the theoretical multidisciplinary part 
of this thesis. It is based on the economic analysis of chapter 3 which showed the impor-
tance of monitoring; on the perceived relative lack of mandatory monitoring mechanisms 
in chapter 4; on the apparent lack of ex ante measures in situations of near financial 
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distress as found in chapter 5; and on the Ooghe and Waeyaert model. One may argue 
that this kind of obligation already exists, since (1) UKC (C.2) prescribes that ‘The board 
should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems’; (2) DC (II.1.3) 
contains that ‘The company shall have an internal risk management and control system 
that is suitable for the company’; (3) through a broad interpretation of Hoge Raad dicta66 
this best practice may already apply to all legal persons by means of s 2:9 BW; and (4) 
Dutch NV and BV law67 provides for an EB duty to inform the SB in writing on ‘the essence 
of the strategy, the general and financial risks and the control systems of the company’ 
thus implying that control systems should be present. However, the above presented 
general duty as an element of the ‘proper management’ obligation has the advantage of 
being clear and generally applicable, i.e. to all types of companies / legal persons, and 
that it requires a working, tailor-made system instead of just reporting on it.
5.6 RESEARCH
The previous analysis is induced from the economic and legal analysis. The addition 
of the two boxes in figure 5.2 gives rise to the formulation of seven groups of research 
questions on monitoring near financial distress:
(1)  on the influence of the ‘monitoring / supervision mechanism’ through the MAN-
AGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR box on the company
(2)  on the influence of an ‘adequate monitoring structure’ through the MANAGE-
MENT/ENTREPRENEUR box on the company
(3)  on the influence of ‘better monitors’ through the MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR 
box on the company
(4)  on the influence of ‘enough monitors’ through the MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR 
box on the company
(5)  on the influence of ‘NEDs and external resources’ through the CORPORATE POLICY 
box on the company
(6)  on the influence of ‘works council and labour relations’ through the CORPORATE 
POLICY box on the company
(7)  on the influence of ‘transparency and accountability’ through the CORPORATE 
POLICY box on the company.
The influence of these to be investigated measures of the two added boxes on the MAN-
AGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR box respectively the CORPORATE POLICY box is hardly mea-
surable since these are rather ‘black boxes’ and, if at all, presumably not by an economist 
but by a psychologist. However, it ís possible to skip the MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR 
box respectively the CORPORATE POLICY box altogether in the analysis and to analyse 
whether a direct relationship can be discovered between the measures proposed in the 
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added boxes and the status of the company i.e. financially distressed or not. This is what 
the chapters 6, 7 and 8 do68.
Chapter 6 departs from a structural, agency theory based orientation. It researches for 
Dutch listed financially distressed companies and a control group of listed companies 
the relevance of the shareholders’, non-executives’ and employees monitoring rights (re-
search questions group 1, 6 and 7 above), the issue of the adequate monitoring structure 
in terms of board size, insider/outsider ratio, independency of the board and financial 
expertise on the board (research questions group 2 and 4) and the monitoring output 
(research questions group 3).
Chapter 7 explores for Dutch listed bankrupt and control companies the relevance of 
the quality of the supervisors in terms of the personal characteristics and resources they 
bring about as well as the relevance of board diversity to the issues mentioned (research 
questions group 3 and 5).
Chapter 8 researches for Dutch non-listed BV’s, coöperaties, verenigingen and stichtingen 
the influence of monitors on the likelihood of financial distress (research questions group 
1); the influence of the number of directors, as well as certain of their characteristics, on 
the likelihood of financial distress (research questions groups 3 and 4); and the issue 
of adherence to the obligation of financial disclosure (research questions group 7). It 
discusses a Hansmann (1996) inspired theory on the difference of monitoring character-
istics between for-profit legal forms on the one hand and nonprofit legal forms on the 
other hand.
5.7 COnCLUDInG REMARKS
Section 5.1 formulated three questions: Does financial distress require other monitoring 
mechanisms, a different type of monitors, or other rules? Starting from figure 3.5 the 
chapter upholds the importance of monitoring for any company. For small companies 
however, formal mechanisms are not feasible and informal monitoring mechanisms 
should be organized. As for the different type of monitors, the chapter showed that 
creditor and employee originating monitors have a countervailing function against the 
tendency of excessive risk-taking by directors and shareholders in situations of near 
financial distress. One may tend to answer the third question, on the necessity of other 
rules, in the affirmative, since the law does indeed provide for numerous provisions to 
guide directors’ behaviour in situations of (near) financial distress. However, from the 
analysis it seems that those extra rules are essentially either existing rules or rules de-
rived from existing principles. Maybe it is not the extra rules, but the explicit warning of 
personal liability that makes the real difference in situations of (near) financial distress.
271On the role of monitoring near financial distress – a multidisciplinary approach
However, from the theoretical analysis of chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 the model developed in 
this chapter derives the necessity of monitoring mechanisms to counteract the occur-
rence of management defects, system defects or change defects since these may cause the 
financial distress of the company (Argenti, 1986B). The legal consequence of this model 
is this thesis’ recommendation to consider the implementation and actual application 
of a tailor-made monitoring structure in the company as part of the director’s duty to 
conduct proper management. The chapter subsequently formulated research questions 
on the actual execution of these monitoring mechanisms. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 make these 
research questions operational in hypotheses and test them on Dutch data.
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EnDnOTES
1 Provided the market is transparent and market parties invest, which proves the Pareto optimal-
ity of the proposed informal restructuring.
2 In a debtor-oriented bankruptcy system, shareholders may squeeze out a reimbursement or 
a reduced shareholder interest in the negotiating process. In a creditor-oriented system, 
shareholders may claim the residual, if any, e.g. s 2:23b BW.
3 Or, depending on one’s view of the true nature of the company, on that of the shareholders.
4 s 3:277 BW.
5 The new s 2:216(2,3) BW (see Annex 2) holds directors jointly and severally liable to the BV if 
they agreed to pay out dividend, knowing or reasonably having to have known that thereafter 
the BV would become insolvent. See also footnote 53.
6 s 2(1) CDDA.
7 s 3(1) CDDA. ‘Persistent’ means three or more convictions in five years (s 3(2) CDDA).
8 based on s 6, 9 CDDA.
9 Examples of the most commonly reported conduct are: (1) allowing the company to continue to 
trade when it was unable to pay its debts; (2) failure to keep proper accounting records; (3) 
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failure to prepare and file accounts or make returns to Companies House; and (4) failure to 
submit returns or pay the Crown any tax due (www.insolvency.gov.uk).
10 s 16(2) CDDA. See also: de Jong and Nieuwe Weme, 2006: 107.
11 Administrators, liquidators and receivers are obliged to report to the Insolvency Service any 
matters coming to their attention which suggest unfitness: s 7(3, 4) CDDA and Davies, 2010: 
93 footnote 66.
12 See the report of NCSR, 2009, available on www.overheid.nl under 31386 ek-H. It mentions (p. 
76) 132 cases for the period 1995-2009.
13 s 2:298 BW.
14 s 2:64(2)/175(2) BW. This system will shortly change into a system of continuous screening of 
the Handelsregister. See Annex 2 under 4.
15 s 3:8-3:10 Wft.
16 s 28(1.5) Sr.
17 See Annex 2 under 2 (Kamerstukken II 2007/08, 31386, no. 1-2 especially on s 349 Sr).
18 s 76 AktG; s 6 GmbHG.
19 s 76(3.a and b) AktG and 6(3.a and b) GmbHG jo s 15a InsO. These are inserted in 2008 in the 
law by the MoMiG. See: Lutter/Hommelhof, 2009, comm. s 6 no 22 p. 256.
20 s 76(3.c-d) AktG and s 6(3.c-d) GmbHG.
21 For ED: s 2:138/248 BW. Shadow director: s 2:138/248(7) BW. NED: s 2:149/259 BW.
22 s 2:138/248(4) BW.
23 s 2:50a (association), 2:53a (coöperatie), 300a BW (stichting). For stichting and vereniging: only 
if subject to corporation tax (VpB; see 4.7.1.2).
24 s 2:10 and 394-398 BW.
25 This is in short what s 2:138/248 BW is about. For additional literature see: Olaerts, 2007:169; 
Bossema-de Greef, P., and R.J. Versteeg, 2009, Bestuurdersaansprakelijkheid ex artikel 2:248 
lid 2 BW: past and present, Tijdschrift financiering, zekerheden en insolventierechtspraak 83-
86; Brink-van der Meer, J.E., 2009, Artikel 2:138-248 BW: Een loterij? Recente ontwikkelingen 
in jurisprudentie, Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht 5, 145-155; Andel, W.J.M. van, 2010, Hoe 
crisisbestendig is art 2:138/248 lid 2 BW?, Tijdschrift voor Insolventierecht 1, 1-3.
26 s 2:138/248(1) BW; mitigation is possible, see subsection (4).
27 s 2:138/248(3) BW.
28 s 213 IA 1986.
29 s 214 IA 1986. See on this: Davies, 2006: 316-327; Olaerts, 2007: 229.
30 Insolvent liquidation means that ‘the assets of the company are insufficient for the payment of 
its debts and other liabilities and the expenses of the winding-up’ (s 214(6) IA). However, in 
determining whether the company has no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquida-
tion, courts use a cash flow test (Davies, 2006: 319).
31 Additionally, ‘wrongful trading’ may cause prosecution (s 218 IA) or directors’ disqualification 
(s 10 CDDA) for a maximum period of 15 years.
32 A ‘director’ includes a ‘shadow-director’ (s 214(7) IA) meaning ‘a person in accordance with 
whose directions or instructions the directors of the company are accustomed to act’ (s 
251(1) CA).
33 Davies, 2006: 323 and s 22, 27, 29 Schedule B1 to the IA. Davies argues that this is understand-
able since administration focuses on the rescue of the company, for which good cooperation 
with the former directors will often be necessary (2006: 324).
34 Davies, 2006: 327-329 defends the existence of this duty but he seems to support ‘the major-
ity view (..) that this duty is not in fact owed directly to creditors, but is an extension of 
directors’ duties as traditionally understood and so is a duty owed to the company’. Even 
stricter on this ‘development’: Ribstein, L.A., and K.A. Alces, 2006, Directors’ duties in failing 
firms, (University of Illinois College of Law). See on the related impact of the Credit Lyonnais 
bank Nederland NV v. Pathe Communications Corporation decision of the Court of Chancery 
of Delaware, December 30, 1991 (especially no 34) also Lennarts, 2006: 20. However, Assink, 
2007: 83-93 explains that the Delaware Supreme Court still attains to the primacy of the 
interests of the shareholder.
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43 s 3:45-47 BW.
44 s 42 Fw.
45 s 43 Fw.
46 s 47 Fw.
47 s 238(4) IA.
48 s 240(1.a) IA.
49 s 238(3) and 241 IA. Also: 423-425 IA.
50 s 239, 240, 241 IA.
51 s 2:138/248(7) BW and HR 23 November 2001, NJ 2002, 95 (Mefrigo); s 251 CA.
52 HR 21 December 2001, NJ 2005, 96, (Sobi/Hurks II); HR 11 September 2009, NJ 2009, 565 
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HR 27 February 2009, NJ 2009, 318 (Stichting Waaldijk 8/Aerts q.q.) r.o. 3.2.2.
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Van Schilfgaarde/Winter (2009: 93) for a solution. In the UK: s 831-846, 847 (consequences) 
CA. In Germany: s 30, 64 GmbHG.
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Van der Heijden/Van der Grinten (1992:544) calls it a ‘shot in the dark’.
56 Article 17 of the Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976.
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58 s 1, 2 IA 1986.
59 s 228 Fw.
60 s L234-1 Code de commerce.
61 s L611-3 Code de commerce.
62 s L611-15 Code de commerce.
63 Such as the US Chapter 11 has (Davies, 2006: 315).
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Chapter 
6
Relevance of the agency theory to monitoring near 
financial distress: an empirical approach
Separation of the management and 
control of decisions contributes to the 
survival of any organization where 
the important decision managers do 
not bear a substantial share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983: 309)
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6.1 InTRODUCTIOn
The previous chapters described the economic theory and legal practice of monitor-
ing. Chapter 5 developed a theoretical model on monitoring near financial distress. 
This chapter aims (1) to formulate testable monitoring-related hypotheses based on the 
agency theory described in chapter 3 and the research model developed in 5.6; and (2) 
to test these hypotheses on data for financially distressed Dutch companies listed on 
the Dutch stock exchange in the period 1993-2003. Section 6.2 presents an overview 
of previous research relevant to the topic. From there it develops testable monitoring 
related hypotheses within the framework of the model developed in chapter 5 and within 
the constraints of the available data. Section 6.3 describes the data. Section 6.4 explains 
the applied research methods. The results are reported in 6.5. Section 6.6 concludes and 
discusses the results.
6.2 THEORY AnD HYPOTHESES
This section examines the empirical research relevant to the subject and formulates the 
hypotheses that will eventually be tested in 6.5. There is relatively little research done on 
the relevance of the agency theory to near financial distress. Leading studies are those 
of Gilson (1989), Daily and Dalton (1994), Gales and Kesner (1994), Daily (1995), Elloumi 
and Gueyie (2001) an Parker, Peters and Turetsky (2002). Because of this relative lack 
of material the discussion below also considers studies on the neighbouring topic, i.e. 
the relationship between the agency theory (or corporate governance in general) and 
firm performance. Financial distress is, arguably, a binary firm performance measure: it 
distinguishes between a ‘sustainable’ and a ‘non-sustainable’ financial situation of the 
firm without considering the different performance levels within the categories. Research 
on financial distress is important as the reason why firms succeed or fail is perhaps the 
central question on strategy (Porter, 1991: 95). Brennan (2006: 591) stresses the impor-
tance of this kind of research to clarify the role of boards.
6.2.1 Approach to the theory
The agency theory shows, as explained in 3.3.1.1, that the agent is to be thoroughly 
monitored by the principal or by a supervisor in his name, in order to avoid expropriation 
(Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Applied to the Dutch 
two-tier system this implies that the agent is to be monitored by its equals (Fama, 1980) 
as well as by the supervisory board (SB). Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) considers the 
(supervisory) board principally as an instrument for safeguarding equity finance (Wil-
liamson, 1988: 571). Thus, for an agency-theory and TCE-economist the SB primarily has 
a monitoring and a disciplining role. Chapter 4 showed the legal organization of this role. 
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This chapter aims to test statistically the relationship between monitoring and financial 
distress in terms of monitoring rights, monitoring structure and visible monitoring output. 
Such a test is only possible if companies differ amongst each other i.e. if there are either 
different mandatory regimes e.g. the ‘ordinary NV’ and the ‘structure NV’ or if mandatory 
rules lack e.g. on the number of executive directors (EDs) and non-executive directors 
(NEDs).
The relevance of the monitoring rights regime for financial distress is tested for the 
characteristics ‘structure NV’ (6.2.2.1) and ‘share certificate NV’ (6.2.2.2). The monitoring 
structure could not be tested on the existence of a SB or a works council since they 
existed in nearly all the firms. However, it can be measured in terms of the number of 
EDs and NEDs (6.2.2.3) as well as in terms of (a) the insider/outsider directors ratio in 
the company, (b) the presence of independent NEDs and (c) the presence of financially 
experienced NEDs (6.2.2.4). Board structure is a potentially important predictor of a 
company’s financial performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Daily and Dalton (1994A) and 
Aziz and Dar (2006) conclude that governance structures do contribute to the incidence 
of bankruptcy beyond financial and size considerations. Monitoring output is generally 
kept secret and therefore immeasurable. However, this study incorporates board turn-
over (6.2.2.5) as an indicator of effective control (Jungmann, 2006: 435).
6.2.2 Hypotheses
This section discusses agency theory related characteristics of the firm in terms of moni-
toring rights (6.2.2.1 and 6.2.2.2), monitoring structure (6.2.2.3 and 6.2.2.4) and visible 
monitoring output (6.2.2.5) in situations of near financial distress. Every discussion ends 
with the formulation of a testable hypothesis.
6.2.2.1 Supervisory board rights
A listed Dutch NV may be an ‘ordinary NV’ or a ‘structure NV’, the latter either man-
datorily, mitigated or voluntarily (see chapter 4). In a structure NV the SB (1) appoints 
the EDs1, (2) it has to ratify EB decisions listed in the law and the articles, and before 
2004, when the law was changed, the SB (3) appointed the non-executive directors (NEDs) 
through co-option and (4) it adopted the annual accounts. The competences (3) and (4) 
are at present assigned to the shareholders. However, during the period under investiga-
tion the SB in the structure NV held all four competences which made it definitely a more 
powerful monitoring organ than the SB in the ordinary NV. According to the model in 
chapter 5, more powerful monitoring reduces the chance of financial distress.
Research by Van Ees, Postma and Sterken (2003) and Cuijpers, Moers and Peek (2004) 
claims that the co-option feature hinders the alignment of SB and shareholder interests. 
280 Chapter 6
Although this may clearly hinder optimization of shareholder interests, one cannot rea-
sonably suppose that this lack of alignment has a negative effect in situations of near 
financial distress. The SB will look after the interests of the firm as it legally should do, 
and after its own interests e.g. in terms of reputational damage. The SB will undoubtedly 
do its utmost to avoid financial distress by means of the rights assigned to it. The first 
hypothesis therefore reads:
H1: being a “structure NV” is negatively related to financial distress.
6.2.2.2 Shareholder rights
In the near past the shares of many Dutch NVs were under “certification”. This system 
means that all or a large quantity, often a majority, of the shares of an NV are held by 
a trust (Stichting Administratiekantoor) which in turn offers listed tradable depositary 
receipts (certificaat van aandeel) without voting rights but with full dividend rights. De 
Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley (2005) showed that this loss of voting right has a 
significant negative impact on Tobin’s Q, commonly indicated as the Dutch discount2. 
In the wave towards more shareholders’ rights, this certification of shares was largely 
abolished3 during the early 2000’s, but for the research period it was (and in fact for a 
number of listed companies e.g. ING NV it still is) relevant. Certification means in practice 
that one shareholder, the Administratiekantoor, holds the majority of the votes present 
at the general meeting (GM). The Administratiekantoor presumably monitors the firm in 
one-on-ones with the EB. Normally it will vote for the EB proposals. Donker, Santen and 
Zahir (2009) report evidence of a negative relationship between the percentage of the 
votes a trust holds and the likelihood of financial distress. However, Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) and Short and Keasey (1999) find a non-linear relationship between firm 
performance and managerial ownership. Management aligns with shareholders’ interests 
if its own share in the company is either small or large; in between it entrenches i.e. 
‘divides and rules’ in its own and not (necessarily) in shareholders’ interests. One may 
speculate whether the share of the Administratiekantoor is to be added in this respect to 
that of the management.
This research focuses on the curtailing of shareholders’ rights by ‘certification’ and 
therefore researches only whether a firm has listed tradable depositary receipts. Neither 
theory nor evidence indicates an a priori clear direction of the argument. Therefore the 
hypothesis reads:
H2: “certification” of shares is not related to financial distress.
H1 and H2 relate to monitoring rights of the SB and the shareholders respectively. The 
following two sections focus on the monitoring structure.
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6.2.2.3 Board size
During the research period, Dutch company law prescribed the two-tier system for a firm 
with NEDs4. The minimum number of EDs – and of NEDs if a SB has been installed – is 
one, unless in a ‘structure NV’ where the SB is mandatory and the minimum number of 
NEDs is three5. The monitoring structure is initially determined by the number of EDs to 
monitor the EB and the number of NEDs to monitor the SB and EB. If there is only one 
ED internal monitoring of the EB cannot take place since one cannot monitor oneself. 
Usually there will be more EDs. Moreover, in practice the Dutch SB often meets with the 
EB. In terms of the one-tier system one could maintain that the insider directors who are 
employed by the firm meet with the outsider directors who are not. Such meetings are to 
some extent comparable with board meetings in the one-tier system, e.g. chairmanship 
(not the CEO), strategy, policy and monitoring issues to be discussed. They differ from 
one-tier meetings on e.g. voting rights at the meeting since the ED has none, on the lack 
of operational issues on the agenda and on (in most cases) frequency. In order to compare 
as much as possible with international literature, this chapter focuses not only on the 
size of the SB as the organ the law delegates monitoring to, but also on the size of the 
EB since EDs monitor each other, and on that of the de facto board (executive board plus 
supervisory board, EBSB) since this is an important monitor as well.
The law defines a minimum number of directors and leaves it at that. What is the optimal 
number? A lot of research exists especially on the one-tier board (further: the board). 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argued that the size of the board may inhibit a meaningful 
dialogue.
When a board has more than ten members, it becomes more and more difficult for 
them all to express their ideas and opinions in the limited time available. This contrib-
utes to the expectation (..) that directors are not supposed to voice their opinions freely 
and frequently (p. 65).
In fact, they conclude, the norms of behaviour in most boardrooms are dysfunctional. 
Ten years later, Epstein, Jones and Roy (2002: 7) made a similar assertion. Whilst Lipton 
and Lorsch (1992) opted for a board size limited to a maximum of ten, favouring eight 
or nine, Jensen (1993), on similar grounds (he calls it ‘board culture’: 863), advised a 
maximum of seven or eight (p. 865). Baker and Gompers (2003: 574) reported for 1,116 
companies around their IPO a board size of six (mean and median), while the vast major-
ity of the boards numbered between four and seven. Yermack (1996: 186) reported for 
a panel of major (Forbes-500 listed) US companies a mean and median board size of 
twelve. It should be noted that although US firms are on average four times bigger than 
Dutch companies, the Dutch boards are on average two-thirds the size of US boards (Van 
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Ees, Postma and Sterken, 2003). It may be concluded that boards grow degressively with 
the size of the firm.
There is some empirical information on the relationship between board size and per-
formance. Yermack (1996) concludes that small boards are more effective. He reports 
an inverse association between firm value and board size. Andres, Azofra and Lopez 
(2005), in a sample of 450 companies from ten countries, found a negative relationship 
between firm value and board size6. They concluded that the disadvantages with regard 
to communication, flexibility and coordination7 outweigh the potentially better manager 
control as a result of a larger board (p. 208). Van Ees, Postma and Sterken (2003) reported 
for the Netherlands that the size of the EB has no impact, and that of the SB a negative 
impact on performance. Beiner, Drobretz, Schmid and Zimmerman (2004), however, did 
not find a significant relationship between board size and firm valuation. They concluded 
that their sample of Swiss firms with a median one-tier board size of six seemed in fact 
to have chosen their board size optimally: depending on and varying with the underlying 
environment in which they operated.
The predominant negative relation from the empirical evidence between size and perfor-
mance allows for the following three hypotheses:
H3a: the number of EDs is positively related to financial distress
H3b: the number of NEDs is positively related to financial distress
H3c: the total number of directors is positively related to financial distress.
 H3a and H3b allow for the peculiarities of the Dutch two-tier system, whilst H3c facilitates 
comparison with international results.
6.2.2.4 Structural board characteristics
The monitoring structure issue discussed in the previous section was the size of the 
executive and supervisory board. The monitoring issue of this section concerns the 
structural composition of the boards in terms of (a) the distribution of insider/outsider 
directors, (b) independence of, and (3) financial expertise on the supervisory board. Fama 
(1980), Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993) argue that a higher proportion of outsider/
independent directors on corporate boards would result in more effective monitoring by 
boards and limit managerial opportunism. As a result corporate governance codes e.g. 
the Dutch Code III 2; UK Code B.1; and German Code 5.4 (further: DC, UKC and GC) stress 
the need for independent NEDs and financial know-how on the board. The times when a 
NED ‘was generally chosen by the CEO and expected to do little or nothing other than to 
attend a reasonable number of board meetings and, (..) broadly, to do as the CEO wished’ 
(Davies, 2008: 402) are over, at least for listed companies. On outsiders and independence, 
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the UKC prescribes ‘Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairman, should comprise NEDs determined by the board to be independent. A smaller 
company should have at least two independent NEDs’ (B.1.2). In Germany, ‘the SB shall 
include what it considers an adequate number of independent members’ (GC, 5.4.2). The 
DC accepts a maximum of one non-independent NED on the board (DC, III.2.1).
Results of empirical studies on the issues are unclear. Monks and Minow (2004) report 
a steadily increasing number of outsiders on the board. Daily (1995 p. 1049) showed 
that successful reorganizations are characterized by a board which is 65% outsider 
dominated. It is not clear whether it is the absolute number of outsiders rather than 
the proportion of outsiders that matters (Gales and Kesner, 1994: 276). Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) found in their meta-analysis of 54 studies no evidence 
of a link between insider-outsider ratio and company financial performance. Van Ees, 
Postma and Sterken (2003) even reported a negative relationship between the increased 
involvement of outsiders and corporate performance in Dutch firms8. However, manage-
ment knowledge and business relations of the board of directors can be highly useful for 
both the running and the control of the company (Hopt and Leyens, 2004: 164). Thus, the 
insider/outsider ratio evidence results in a neutral hypothesis:
H4a: the insider/outsider ratio of directors is not related to financial distress
As regards the non-independence issue, Klein (1998) convincingly showed the impor-
tance of non-independents on the board. Becht, Bolton and Roëll (2005: 23) report that 
the findings concerning the effects of independent directors are mixed9. Boone, Field, 
Karpoff and Raheja (2007) found that larger firms have larger and more independent 
boards. Since the control companies are generally larger (table 6.9) one can expect the 
control sample to show a more independent board. Therefore, the hypothesis reads:
H4b: the incidence of non-independent NEDs is positively related to financial distress
Another essential SB characteristic is financial expertise (Jensen, 1993). At present the 
UKC (C.3.1) as well as the DC (DC III.3.2) require the presence of financial expertise on the 
board. Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009) find that financial expertise is positively associated 
with board independence. Therefore the hypothesis reads:
H4c: the incidence of NEDs with financial expertise is negatively related to financial 
distress.
H3 and H4 derived in the last two sections relate to the monitoring structure in the com-
pany. The following section focuses on the monitoring structure.
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6.2.2.5 Board turnover
The last agency theory related issue to be tested is the visible monitoring output i.e. 
director turnover. For the Dutch two-tier system this is to be separated in ED and NED 
turnover.
Most of the literature concerns the American one-tier system. There, the evaluation of 
the senior management of the company is one of the important responsibilities of the 
board. Especially outside directors have a specific role in this process because inside 
directors’ careers are more tied to the CEO’s (Weisbach,1988). Outside directors have 
a reputational incentive (Fama and Jensen, 1983) to do so. It signals their competence 
to the market. Weisbach (1988) found that firms with outsider-dominated boards are 
significantly more likely to remove the CEO on the basis of performance than firms with 
insider-dominated boards. The overall number of resignations between the two board 
types did not differ (p. 454). Gilson (1989) was among the first10 to study the relationship 
between management turnover and financial distress. He observes (p. 241):
Several types of corporate policy decisions seem likely to be influenced by the personal 
costs that managers incur if their firms default on their debt. To avoid these costs, 
managers will rationally favour investment and financing policies that reduce the 
probability of financial distress.
Gilson (1989: 242) concluded that managers’ default-related losses are significant. He 
proxies these losses by turnover of senior managers (CEO, president, and chairman of the 
board). Of all the financially distressed firms 52% experienced a senior level management 
change, whilst for not distressed but highly unprofitable firms this figure was only 19% 
(p. 246). None of the departing managers held a senior management position in another 
exchange-listed firm during the next three years (p. 242). Gilson’s (1989) goal was to show 
that managers do incur personal costs when their former firms enter financial distress. 
Or vice versa: his research also implies that a high turnover of managers in a certain year 
might be a herald of financial distress. Gilson (1989) describes the relationship between 
performance and management turnover as follows:
There is evidence that less profitable firms show higher turnover, consistent with firms’ 
poor performance being blamed on managers. (..)Financial distress will independently 
engender higher turnover if an increased probability of default conveys negative infor-
mation about managerial performance beyond that conveyed by low profits. (p. 256).
The first relationship can be characterized as ex post and the second as ex ante. Gilson’s 
(1989: 260) results, as those of Yermack (1996), Lausten (2002), Parker, Peters and Turetsky 
(2002) and Jostarndt and Sautner (2008), show a significantly higher turnover just before 
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a firm defaults. Daily (1995) describes the years immediately preceding a bankruptcy as 
typically tumultuous. On the one hand, this could be the result of a voluntary decision 
of the director to leave the sinking ship in order to avoid the legal, reputational and 
financial risks of bankruptcy (Daily, 1995: 1042; Gales and Kesner, 1994: 279). On the 
other hand directors might be looking for a scapegoat and sacrifice a CEO or another 
executive to show their decisiveness (Weisbach, 1998; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; 
Walsh and Seward, 1990). Dismissal is the most meaningful task for those entrusted with 
managerial control (Jungmann, 2006: 431). Parker, Peters and Turetsky (2002) report that 
after CEO change, bankruptcy is twice as likely. It may be a warning of financial distress.
Since the two-tier system recognizes two boards, the EB monitoring itself and the SB 
monitoring the EB and itself, directors’ turnover is tested from three angles:
H5a: executive board (EB) turnover is positively related to financial distress
H5b: supervisory board (SB) turnover is positively related to financial distress
H5c: (total) board turnover is positively related to financial distress.
6.3 DATA
This section describes the collection of the data. It explains the problems met and decisions 
taken during the process. It subsequently discusses the research period, rights-related 
data, the board-related data and the financial data. The sampling method is explained in 
6.3.6. The section concludes with a general data analysis in 6.3.7. The focus is on data for 
years t = -2 and t = -3 (t = 0 is the year in which financial distress actually happens) as 
for bankrupt companies especially financial data for t = -1 is often unavailable.
6.3.1 The research period
This research is on listed Dutch NVs that became financially distressed in the period 
1993-2003. This period is chosen because it is a complete economic cycle as figure 6.1 
shows. The Dutch economic cycle indicator (CPB-conjunctuurindicator) shows the actual 
development of the GDP volume in relation to the trend (CPB, 2008). The lowest points 
in figure 6.1 are in 1993 and 2003, with in between a period of growth followed by a 
downturn around 2000. Thus, the period 1993-2003 is a complete economic cycle.
6.3.2 Rights-related data
If a company is a ‘structure NV’ (variable name: STRUCTURED11), this implies that the SB 
has more and the shareholders have fewer rights than in the ordinary NV. If the shares 
of a company are under certification (CERTIFICATION) shareholders’ rights are even more 
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curtailed. The data is derived from the annual accounts, REACH12 or the Handelsregister, in 
that order.
6.3.3 Board-related data
As the Netherlands has a two-tier system, data is collected on the size of the EB (EB), 
the SB (SB) and the de facto total board (EBSB). Thus the insider/outsider ratio can be 
calculated since in the Dutch legal system the EB by law consists of insiders and the 
SB of outsiders. As for the independency of directors, all EDs are non-independent by 
definition since they are employed by the firm. Therefore, this variable is only measured 
for the SB. A NED is deemed independent if he, or his wife, partner or family member in 
the second degree, has not been employed by the company in the past five years; does 
not receive personal benefits from the company; has not had a business relationship 
(consultancy, counsel, banker and the like) in the year previous to the appointment; is not 
or does not represent a 10% shareholder; and is not an ED of a company in which an ED of 
the company he supervises is a NED (cross-directorship)13. For financial expertise the RA 
title (AUD), representing an education at university level as certified public auditor (CPA), 
is the proxy measure. Other reliable and complete data on financial expertise was not 
available as full disclosure of experience of NEDs was not required at the time. Directors’ 
turnover data contains the number of leaving executive (DEB) and non-executive direc-
tors (DSB) as well as their total (DEBSB).
Data is (in order of preference) derived from the annual accounts, the Handboek voor di-
recteuren en commissarissen14, REACH, the Handelsregister, the WMZ15 register, journals 
and in the last resort from reliable internet sources.
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Table 6.1 : composition of the control sample and the financially distressed sample over the years 
 
year distressed firms control sample 
 
(1) 
code 1 
(2) 
code 2 
(3) 
total 
(4) 
% 
(5) 
code 0 
(6) 
% 
(7) 
1993 7 1 8 15.4 22 14.8 
1994 0 1 1 1.9 3 2.0 
1995 1 0 1 1.9 3 2.0 
1996 2 0 2 3.8 5 3.4 
1997 1 0 1 1.9 3 2.0 
1998 1 0 1 1.9 3 2.0 
1999 1 1 2 3.8 6 4.0 
2000 2 5 7 13.5 20 13.4 
2001 7 2 9 17.3 26 17.4 
2002 9 3 12 23.1 35 23.5 
2003 1 7 8 15.4 23 15.4 
total 32 20 52 100 149 100 
Code 0: a control sample company (a company not coded 1 or 2) 
Code 1: a company in bankruptcy, suspension of payments, default or (qualifying for) suspension of listing 
Code 2: a company with three years of sequential losses. 
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6.3.4 Financial data
Based on the current literature e.g. Ohlson (1980), Hill et al. (1996) and Pompe and Bil-
derbeek (2000) four financial control variables are chosen, which relate to size, leverage, 
profitability and liquidity. For size this study applies LNTA, the natural logarithm of total 
assets (TA) in millions of Euro. CETA, the leverage variable, is the quotient of common 
equity (CE) and TA. It measures de facto the opposite of leverage: solvability, which of 
course does not influence the results. Pompe and Bilderbeek (2000) show that the best 
measure of income is NITA, the quotient of net income (before extraordinary items; NI) 
and TA. As a measure of liquidity they advise CASHVV (total cash flow divided by all 
liabilities). Financial data is retrieved from Thomson Worldscope and, in the case of non-
availability, from the annual accounts.
6.3.5 Industry data
The data is classified according to the CBS-Standaard Bedrijfsindeling 2008 (SBI 2008), 
based on the Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté 
Européene (NACE). The first two digits of the SBI 2008 are identical to those of NACE 
and of the UN International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities 
(ISIC). This thesis discerns the economic activity of the companies at the highest descrip-
tion level, called section16. The data is retrieved from REACH17.
6.3.6 Sampling method
The earlier definition of financial distress of 2.2.4 as the existence of a non-trivial prob-
ability that the legal person will not be able to pay its debt within the terms of payment has 
to be made operational. In line with Hill, Perry and Andes (1996: 63), Gilson (1989) and 
Mumford (2003) this study considers a company to be in financial distress if (1) it went 
bankrupt, was granted suspension of payments or qualified for suspension of listing 
(code 1) or (2) if it suffered at least three years of unintended18 sequential losses (code 2).
Of all the companies listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange for three or more years 
during 1993-2003, 57 became financially distressed. Of these, 34 went bankrupt, were 
granted suspension of payments or qualified for suspension of listing (code 1). For two 
out of these 34 companies it was impossible to retrieve data. The other 23 companies 
of the sample suffered at least three years of unintended sequential losses (code 2). 
A company with that record normally faces serious financial difficulties. Of these 23 
cases, two companies were excluded as they did not meet the additional requirement of 
a three-year listing19 before the situation of distress. This requirement was formulated in 
order to have sufficient data. One foreign company was excluded as it does not have to 
comply with Dutch company law. As a result the financially distressed sample consists 
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of 32 bankrupt and 20 otherwise financially distressed companies. Table 6.1 shows the 
composition of both the financially distressed and the control sample.
As Zmijewski (1984) showed, this type of research mostly works with a matched-pairs 
control sample in order to study the differences between a financially distressed and 
a ‘normal’ non-distressed company, further referred to as a ‘control’ company. A 
matched-pairs approach presupposes the availability of comparable companies in in-
dustry and size in the control sample to match with those of the distressed sample. Since 
the Netherlands is a relatively small country, these (listed) comparable companies are 
often lacking. There is no match for bankrupt companies such as Fokker (aviation); DAF 
(heavy trucks); Homburg (meat processing); Verto (ropes); Tulip (computer assembly); 
UPC (cable-network); KPN Quest (data storage). This makes a matching approach rather 
tricky. Therefore the choice has been made to report the results based on a ‘complete’ 
control sample as explained below in the text, and to present the ‘as-good-as-it-gets’ 
matched-pairs results in Annex 3 and Annex 4. Moreover, Zmijewski (1984: 80) argues 
that the resulting bias ‘does not appear to affect the statistical inferences or overall clas-
sification rates.’
The ‘complete’ control sample used in the chapters 6 and 7 consists of 149 companies 
listed for five or more years during 1993-2003. The five-year criterion is set in order to 
have stable and well-organized companies in the control sample. If a company merged 
or de-listed after two years of consecutive losses it fell out of the control sample because 
Table 6.1: composition of the control sample and the financially distressed sample over the years
year distressed firms control sample
(1)
code 1
(2)
code 2
(3)
total
(4)
%
(5)
code 0
(6)
%
(7)
1993 7 1 8 15.4 22 14.8
1994 0 1 1 1.9 3 2.0
1995 1 0 1 1.9 3 2.0
1996 2 0 2 3.8 5 3.4
1997 1 0 1 1.9 3 2.0
1998 1 0 1 1.9 3 2.0
1999 1 1 2 3.8 6 4.0
2000 2 5 7 13.5 20 13.4
2001 7 2 9 17.3 26 17.4
2002 9 3 12 23.1 35 23.5
2003 1 7 8 15.4 23 15.4
total 32 20 52 100 149 100
Code 0: a control sample company (a company not coded 1 or 2)
Code 1: a company in bankruptcy, suspension of payments, default or (qualifying for) suspension of listing
Code 2: a company with three years of sequential losses.
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this merger or delisting could indicate financial distress. In the case of a merger between 
listed companies, either the new or the merged company could qualify for the control 
sample. Banks, insurance companies, investment funds, real estate funds and foreign 
companies were excluded from the study (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Companies 
from the control sample were proportionally and randomly assigned over the years ac-
cording to the percentage of financially distressed companies in each year. As a result 
the percentages of table 6.1 column 7, indicating the percentages of control companies 
assigned to a given year, are almost identical to those of column 5, indicating the per-
centage of financially distressed companies in each of the 11 years under research. Due 
to data shortage, a 100% identical distribution could not be organized.
6.3.7 General data overview
Table 6.2 presents a first glance at the monitoring rights, monitoring structure, and 
monitoring output related data. The statistical analysis follows in section 6.5. For now it 
is striking that the control sample firms are predominantly ‘structure NVs’ with larger, 
less often fully independent boards suffering considerably less directors’ turnover than 
their financially distressed equals.
Table 6.2: an overview of the NED rights, shareholders’ rights, board size, board composition and 
board turnover related data for the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch 
companies from 1993 to 2003, based on data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event 
occurred.
control sample distressed sample full panel
number percentage number percentage number percentage
number of observations 298 74 104 26 402 100
rights-related:
structure NV (STRUCTURED°) 186 62 40 38 226 56
certificaat (CERTIFICATION°) 92 31 26 25 118 29
board- related:
total board (EBSB) > 9 76 26 18 17 94 23
total board (EBSB) < 5 32 11 15 14 47 12
fully independent board (DEPDM) 139 47 63 62 202 50
financial expert on the SB (AUDDM) 36 12 15 14 51 13
board turnover related:
total director turnover (DEBSB)> 2 23 8 20 19 43 11
total director turnover (DEBSB)= 0 140 47 39 38 179 45
° Based on research on t = -2.
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6.4. METHOD
This section explains the statistical and econometric methods applied in this study. The 
explanation restricts itself to the aim of the method applied. The theoretical underpinning 
of the various methods applied may be found in statistical and econometric handbooks, 
e.g. Studenmund (2001), Rijken Van Olst (1974).
6.4.1. Panel analysis
Panel analysis means an analysis of the data for different frames, in this case for the time 
frames t = -2 and t = -3. It allows for comparison of results and for the detection of an 
evolutionary pattern. The time frame t = -1 is lacking since bankrupt companies seldom 
disclose the results of their last year.
6.4.2. Data descriptives and analysis of mean and distribution
Data descriptives as minimum, maximum, mean and median, standard deviation are im-
portant to signal mistakes or omissions in the data or to control for outliers. A difference 
in mean and median indicates a skewness of the distribution of the data. In a normal 
distribution, the average of all observations (mean) and the middle observation (median) 
are equal. The skewness can be shown by a measure or through graphs or box plots, but 
the observation in a table of mean, median and standard deviation is deemed sufficient 
for the purpose. If mean and median differ unacceptably20, the normal distribution pre-
sumption cannot hold and the t-test cannot be used to analyse the differences of mean 
between the samples. Moreover, in order to run a t-test, the variables should be of a scale 
nature. Quite a lot of the variables applied in this study are of a categorical, more specific: 
of a dichotomous, also called: dummy, nature. In these cases where a normal distribution 
cannot be presupposed, or the variables are not of a scale nature, non-parametric tests 
should be applied. Of these, the Mann-Whitney test (the result of which is the z-value 
in the tables) is applied to test whether a variable is equally divided over the control 
sample and the financially distressed sample. The null hypothesis is that the variable is 
equally divided over both samples. The Mann-Whitney test requires ordinal variables. 
However, a dichotomous, or dummy, variable can be considered ordinal (Rijken Van Olst, 
1974). If the categorical variable has more than two categories, a Pearson χ²-test tests the 
relationship with another variable. The null hypothesis is that the distribution of the one 
variable is independent of the other. The t-values are only reported in the tables if the 
variables are indeed normally distributed and of a scale nature.
291
Relevance of the agency theory to monitoring near financial distress:  
an empirical approach
6.4.3 Correlation and multicollinearity
A correlation table shows whether dependent variables are related. It should be thoroughly 
analysed since the nature and strength of the relationships is interesting information in 
itself and it may determine the model specification as well. One of the assumptions of the 
classical model of econometrics is that no explanatory variable is a perfect linear function 
of any other explanatory variable(s) (Studenmund, 2001: 90). If this assumption is fully 
or partly violated, perfect or imperfect multicollinearity is at hand and one may have to 
adjust the model, although this will not always be necessary (Studenmund, 2001: 265). At 
first, it is important to detect relationships between explanatory variables. For categori-
cal, also called nominal variables there is the Pearson χ² test. The null hypothesis is that 
the variables are independent. If they are not, a contingency coefficient is calculated, to 
indicate the strength of the relationship. An example of such a coefficient is Cramérs V, 
where 0 ≥ V ≤ 1; V = 0 means no relationship, V = 1 a perfect relationship. For ordinal 
variables, including dichotomous variables, Spearman’s rho decides on the relationship 
(-1 ≥ ρ ≤ 1). For a perfect positive (negative) linear relationship ρ = 1 (-1); ρ = 0 signi-
fies the absence of a relationship. For scale variables the Pearson correlation coefficient 
r determines the relationship question. The determination coefficient (r²) signifies the 
percentage of variance explained. Then, if the contingency coefficient > 0.75 or if the 
correlation coefficient r > 0.8 (the numbers are somewhat arbitrary), this indicates21 
multicollinearity and one should critically rethink the model to be tested (Studenmund, 
2001: 256, 258).
6.4.4 Control variables
Bankruptcy is essentially a financial problem. An approaching bankruptcy is visible in 
almost every dimension of a firm’s position (Pompe and Bilderbeek, 2005). Therefore 
financial variables should always be added in a logit analysis of financial distress. These 
variables are called control variables, because without financial variables each regression 
analysis on the subject would be meaningless. A proper study in this field should also 
consider the effects of the industry of the company (Hill, Perry and Andes (1996); Moss-
man (1998); Andres, Azofra and Lopez (2005). The industry classification is a categorical 
variable, which is applicable in a logit analysis.
6.4.5 Hypothesis testing
Economic theory and empirical literature determine the formulation of the hypotheses 
in section 6.2. The actual hypothesis tested is always that dictated by statistical theory: a 
null hypothesis which states that there is no relation, and an alternative hypothesis which 
states that there is a relation irrespective of the direction of this relation. The outcome 
of this test can either support (‘non-rejection’) or falsify (‘rejection’) the formulated 
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hypothesis. A theoretically more correct approach would have been to formulate two 
hypotheses for each issue: a null hypothesis that there is no relation or no difference 
and an alternative hypothesis that a variable is negatively or positively related to another 
variable or larger or smaller on one sample than in the other (Studenmund, 2001: 115). In 
order to ameliorate the readability of this thesis this is avoided. However, all hypotheses 
are tested two-tailed which means that no specific direction of the result is tested in 
order to cover results in another direction than expected as well.
6.4.6 Logit analysis
The analysis results in the presentation of a regression model, wherein independent vari-
ables calculate the likelihood of financial distress. Note that regression cannot confirm 
causality; it can only test the strength and direction of quantitative relationships involved 
(Studenmund, 2001: 8). Below two types of regression analyses are presented: univariate 
and multivariate regression. The univariate regression shows whether the dependent 
and the independent variable are related. The multivariate analysis shows the regression 
results of a specified model with several independent explanatory variables.
Financial distress is treated as a binary situation. Therefore, the model should only 
have an outcome 0 or 1 for the financially distressed state of the company. This can be 
achieved through a special form of logarithmic regression, logit analysis. Logit analysis 
estimates the logit = ln (p/(1-p)) as the dependent variable, wherein p is the chance of 
financial distress. From:
(1) ln (p/(1-p)) = α + β1X1+ β2 X2 + β3 X3 + β4 X4+ ε = z
where p = the chance of distress, follows:
(2) p/(1-p) = e z, or
(3) p = 1 / (1 + e –z),
it is clear that 0 > p < 1.
Logit analysis is essentially a regression analysis with a binary dependent variable 
(Studenmund, 2001: 442). Ohlson (1980: 112) showed logit analysis to be superior to 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA), as used by Altman (1968) and many others. And 
although Aziz and Dar (2006) find that MDA has been used more often than logit analysis 
in bankruptcy prediction research over the period 1968-2002, they also show that the 
predictive accuracy in logit is higher overall. This study therefore applies logit analysis.
293
Relevance of the agency theory to monitoring near financial distress:  
an empirical approach
6.4.7 Prospective analysis
With the logit analysis to be performed in section 6.5.9 comes a ‘classification table’ which 
confronts the ‘observed’ values with the ‘predictions’ by means of the model and reports 
a ‘percentage correct’ and an ‘overall percentage correct’ of the prediction. However, this 
‘overall percentage correct’, sometimes indicated as ‘classification accuracy’ or ‘overall 
predictive accuracy’ (e.g. Aziz and Dar, 2006), is a disturbing figure since it adds up the 
accurate classification in two categories, i.e. the distressed and the control sample. Thus, 
this figure has no meaning for one of the categories. This thesis therefore presents both 
classification figures by means of the Type I error and the Type II error (Studenmund, 
2001:116). The Type I error occurs if the null hypothesis is rejected when it is true. The 
Type II error occurs if the null hypothesis is not rejected when it is false. Remarkably 
economists often omit to define the null hypothesis (Altman (1968), Collins and Green 
(1982), Holmen (1988), Aziz and Dar (2006). In this case the null hypothesis should be: 
the company is not financially distressed i.e. it is a ‘control sample company’ since this is 
the normal type of company. The Type I error stands for a control sample company erro-
neously classified as a financially distressed company, also called: a False Positive. Here, 
positive means: a ‘hit’ i.e. a financially distressed company. The Type II error stands for a 
financially distressed company erroneously classified as a control company, also called: 
a False Negative. Here, negative means: classified in accordance with the null hypothesis 
i.e. as a non-financially distressed company. For banks a thus defined Type II error has 
a more serious effect than a Type I error: by missing a customer as a consequence of a 
Type I error the bank suffers opportunity costs, whilst a Type II error jeopardizes the 
total amount the customer has borrowed. Note that this logic reasoning leads to a Type I 
and Type II definition opposite to the current literature from Altman (1968) to Aziz and 
Dar (2006); and in line with Bollen, Mertens, Meuwissen, Raak and Schelleman (2005).
6.5 RESULTS
This section reports the statistical results of the various tests applied. In accordance with 
the state of the art, the tables report only those results with asterisks that are statistically 
significant at a p < 0.001 (***) level of reliability; at a 0.001 ≤ p < 0.01 (**) level of reli-
ability; and at a 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05 (*) level of reliability. The tables do not show p-values. 
An often reported higher p-value (0.10 ≤ p ≥ 0.05) is indicated with an (ª) in the table.
6.5.1 Supervisory board rights
As described in chapter 4 and in 6.2.2.1, under the ‘structure’ regime the SB had some 
very strong rights, at least in the period under research. Due to data restrictions, the 
analysis is on the t = -2 panel only. Table 6.3 shows that whilst the majority of control 
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sample companies is structured (93 out of 149, or 62.4%), the majority of financially 
distressed companies is not. Only 20 out of 52 financially distressed companies (38.5%) 
are ‘structure NVs’. This may be due to the small size of financially distressed companies, 
or to their rapid growth, as the conversion into a ‘structure NV’ always lags behind22. 
From the results of the Mann-Whitney test in the last column it becomes clear that the 
distribution of the structured variable is significantly different over the samples. Finan-
cially distressed companies are significantly less often a ‘structure NV’ at the 0.1% level.
6.5.2 Shareholders’ rights
The incidence of certification influences shareholders’ rights. Without certification, 
shareholders have fewer impediments to exercise their rights. Due to data restrictions, 
the analysis is on the t = -2 panel only. Table 6.4 shows that a minority of control sample 
companies is certified (46 out of 149, or 30.9%). The same goes for financially distressed 
companies. Only 13 out of 52 financially distressed companies (25%) are certified, even 
less than the percentage for the control group. The low z-value from the Mann-Whitney 
test implies that there is no difference in distribution of the variable, meaning that the 
samples do not statistically differ significantly on the issue.
Table 6.3 : An analysis of the SB rights related ‘structured’ variable for the control sample and the 
financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on data for t = -2 
before the financial distress event occurred.
control sample financially distressed sample difference in 
distribution
(|z-value|)
variable number min
(max)
incidence
as % sub-sample
number min
(max)
incidence
as % sub-sample
t = -2
STRUCTURED 149 0 62.42 % 52 0 38.46 % (4.23)***
(1) (1)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
STRUCTURED dummy variable indicating the application of the ‘structure’ regime to the company.
Table 6.4: An analysis of the shareholders’ rights impeding ‘certification’ variable for the control 
sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on 
data for t = -2 before the financial distress event occurred.
control sample financially distressed sample difference in 
distribution
(|z-value|)
variable number min
(max)
incidence
as % sub-sample
number min
(max)
incidence
as % sub-sample
t = −2
CERTIFICATION 149 0 30.87 % 52 0 25.00 % (1.13)
(1) (1)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
CERTIFICATION dummy variable indicating the certification of the shares of the company.
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Table 6.5: An analysis of the board size related variables for the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 
before the financial distress event occurred.
board variable control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = −2
EB 149 1 2.99 1.62 52 1 2.83 1.82 (1.24)
(10) (3) (9) (2)
SB 149 2 4.90 1.94 52 2 4.27 1.88 (2.29)*
(13) (5) (10) (4)
EBSB 149 3 7.89 3.08 52 3 7.10 3.18 (2.07)*
(21) (7) (18) (6)
EBLNTA 149 0.19 0.54 0.24 52 0.13 0.64 0.35 (1.77)ª
(1.52) (0.50) (1.81) (0.61)
SBLNTA 149 0.40 0.90 0.27 52 0.25 0.99 0.42 (1.07)
2.84 0.88 2.50 0.90
EBSBLNTA 149 0.69 1.44 0.38 52 0.61 1.64 0.65 (1.87)ª
3.55 1.39 4.00 1.58
t = −3
EB 149 1 3.01 1.52 52 1 2.83 1.75 (1.18)
(8) (3) (8) (2)
SB 149 2 4.89 2.01 52 2 4.29 1.82 (1.99)*
(14) (5) (11) (4)
EBSB 149 3 7.91 3.06 52 3 7.12 2.89 (1.86)
(18) (7) (17) (6)
EBLNTA 149 0.17 0.58 0.28 52 0.14 0.68 0.56 (0.69)
(1.68) (0.52) (3.78) (0.57)
SBLNTA 149 0.39 0.93 0.28 52 0.37 1.00 0.42 (0.50)
2.26 0.91 2.28 0.97
EBSBLNTA 149 0.64 1.50 0.44 52 0.67 1.68 0.82 (0.80)
3.76 1.40 5.67 1.53
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
EB the number of members of the executive board (EDs) at year-end
SB the number of members of the supervisory board (NEDs) at year-end
EBSB the total number of members of the executive and supervisory board (directors) at year-end
MBLNTA EB divided by the natural logarithm of totals assets (TA)
SBLNTA SB divided by the natural logarithm of totals assets (TA)
EBSBLNTA EBSB divided by the natural logarithm of totals assets (TA).
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6.5.3 Board size
Table 6.5 presents a description of the data and the results of the tests on the difference 
in distribution (Mann-Whitney) for board size related variables. A t-test is not allowed 
since the distribution of the data is skewed. Each panel starts with the absolute numbers 
of directors. In median terms, the number of EDs (EB), NEDs (SB) and of total directors 
(EBSB) is larger by one person in the control group. The total number of directors in 
the control sample is eight (mean) respectively seven (median). This is in line with the 
number advised by Jensen (1993) and found by Baker and Gompers (2003) for IPO firms 
in the USA (see 6.2.2.3). The results of table 6.5 show a statistically significant difference 
in distribution of NEDs at the 5% level: there are fewer NEDs on distressed boards and 
fewer directors (t = -2 only). However, for the analysis of the number of directors the size 
of the company may play a role. A large company obviously needs more directors than a 
small one. Yermack (1996) and Andres et al. (2005) therefore took the logarithm of board 
size into account as well. This method reduces the differences between board sizes, but 
the (not-reported) results proved essentially identical to the results for the size numbers.
Intuitively it would be better to relate board size to firm size and to connect this with 
the finding of a degressive board size mentioned in 6.2.2.3. This results in three new 
variables wherein board size is divided by the natural logarithm of size (LNTA): EBLNTA 
for the EB, SBLNTA for the SB and EBSBLNTA for the ‘total board’. Indeed, table 6.5 shows 
a higher mean and median for these standardized board-size variables in the financially 
distressed sample, albeit only significantly different for EBLNTA and EBSBLNTA for t = -2 
at the 10% level. Note that here, as in the following tables, the high standard deviations 
are remarkable. This means that the spread of the results is large and that the mean 
should be interpreted cautiously.
6.5.4 Structural board characteristics
Table 6.6 presents the results of the structural characteristics insider/outsider ratio, 
SB independence and SB financial expertise. The table shows only z-values since the 
distribution of all variables is skewed. Table 6.6 shows that the control group SB in t = -2 
is statistically significantly more often not fully independent (DEPDM) at the 5% level and 
that the percentage of non-independent NEDs on the control sample board is then higher 
at the 10% level. These results do not show in t = -3. However, the figures show a move-
ment in the distressed sample from t = -3 to t = -2 towards fewer non-independents 
on the SB: DEPDM falls by 3.8% point and the average DEPPERC by 1.6% point. Neither the 
insider/outsider ratio nor the financial expertise variable shows a significant difference 
between the samples. The latter may have to do with the relatively low incidence of 
12-14% of RAs on the SB.
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6.5.5 Board turnover
This study defines board turnover as EDs leaving the EB respectively NEDs leaving the 
SB, for whatever reason. The latter choice is made because a truly objective classification 
of reasons for resignation is not deemed possible (Jungmann, 2006: 442). As financially 
distressed companies’ directors are generally younger (results presented in chapter 7) 
than the control group, it can be expected that these firms show less retirements. So, a 
bias might occur towards more ‘resignations’ in the control group. 
Table 6.6: An analysis of the structural SB characteristics ‘insider/outsider ratio’, ‘SB-independence’ 
and ‘SB financial expertise’ for the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch 
companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress 
event occurred.
board variable control sample financially distressed sample difference in 
distribution
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = −2
EBRATIO 149 0.17 0.37 0.11 52 0.14 0.39 0.13 (0.31)
(0.67) (0.38) 0.67 (0.38)
#DEP 149 0 0.89 1.09 52 0 0.85 1.56 (1.54)
(4) (1) (8) (0)
DEPPERC 149 0 18.58 22.07 52 0 14.37 22.65 (1.67)ª
(100) (12.50) (88.89) (0)
DEPDM 149 54.36% 52 38.46 % (1.97)*
AUDDM 149 12.08% 52 13.46 % (0.26)
t = −3
EBRATIO 149 0.14 0.37 0.11 52 0.17 0.38 0.15 (0.17)
(0.67) (0.38) 0.71 (0.34)
#DEP 149 0 0.87 1.11 52 0 0.87 1.50 (0.92)
(4) (1) (7) (0)
DEPPERC 149 0 18.05 22.22 52 0 15.96 23.81 (1.03)
(100) (11.11) (87.50) (0)
DEPDM 149 51.68 % 52 42.30 % (1.16)
AUDDM 149 12.08 % 52 15.38 % (0.54)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
Of the dummy variables DEPDM and AUDDM only the incidence as a percentage of the relevant sample and 
the z-value is reported.
EBRATIO the number of executive directors as fraction of the total number of directors
#DEP the number of non-independent NEDs on the SB at year-end
DEPPERC the percentage of non-independent NEDs on the SB at year-end
DEPDM  dummy variable indicating the presence of one or more non-independent NEDs on the SB at 
year-end
AUDDM  dummy variable indicating the presence of a CPA (Registeraccountant, RA) on the SB at year-
end.
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The definition of the variables in table 6.7 is both absolute as the number of leaving 
directors on the EB (DEB), on the SB (DSB) and on the total board (DEBSB) as well as 
relative vis-à-vis the number of directors at year-end on the EB (EBTO), on the SB (SBTO) 
Table 6.7: An analysis of board turnover variables for the control sample and the financially distressed 
sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before 
the financial distress event occurred.
turnover 
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference in 
distribution
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = −2
DEB 149 0 0.51 0.70 52 0 0.94 1.17 (1.88)ª
(4) (0) (4) (0)
DSB 149 0 0.47 0.72 52 0 0.71 0.85 (2.04)*
(3) (0) (3) (1)
DEBSB 149 0 0.98 1.07 52 0 1.65 1.70 (2.34)*
(6) (1) (6) (1)
EBTO 149 0 20.63 41.28 52 0 39.65 57.70 (1.82)ª
(400) (0) (300) (0)
SBTO 149 0 10.61 18.08 52 0 22.04 34.12 (2.41)*
(100) (0) (150) (10.56 )
EBSBTO 149 0 13.39 20.42 52 0 26.57 31.26 (2.91)**
(200) (10) (125) (20.00 )
t = −3
DEB 149 0 0.37 0.70 52 0 0.54 0.94 (1.13)
(3) (0) (5) (0)
DSB 149 0 0.45 0.85 52 0 0.71 1.21 (1.18)
(5) (0) (6) (0)
DEBSB 149 0 0.82 1.20 52 0 1.25 1.72 (1.40)
(6) (0) (8) (1.00)
EBTO 149 0 15.50 37.10 52 0 30.22 76.76 (1.27)
(300) (0) (500) (0)
SBTO 149 0 8.71 16.03 52 0 19.44 33.57 (1.50)
(100) (0) (150) (0)
EBSBTO 149 0 10.21 14.47 52 0 21.63 36.90 (1.78)
(62.50) (0) (200) (10.00)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
DEB the number of members of the executive board (EDs) that resigned during the year
DSB the number of members of the supervisory board (NEDs) that resigned during the year
DEBSB the total number of members of the EB and SB (directors) that resigned during the year
EBTO the quotient of DEB and EB (the number of EDs at this year’s end)
SBTO the quotient of DSB and SB (the number of NEDs at this year’s end)
EBSBTO the quotient of DEBSB and EBSB (the number of directors at this year’s end).
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and in sum (EBSBTO). This explains the rather high maximum turnover (TO) percentages 
reported. Since the distribution of all variables is skewed, only the z-value of the Mann 
Whitney test is reported in the table. Turnover of directors is, as expected, higher in the 
financially distressed group in all specifications both in t = -2 and t = -3. The differences 
between the control and the financially distressed sample are statistically significant in t 
= -2 at the 10% level for the EB related variables and at the 5% level for the SB and total 
directors-related variables. In t = -3 none of these variables prove significantly different.
6.5.6 Industry analysis
Table 6.8 presents the results of the analysis for the t = -2 panel. The first two rows 
show the division of the samples over the industry sectors. The main groups of the total 
sample are manufacturing companies (41%), followed by ICT-related companies (20%) 
and trading companies (17%). The Pearson χ² test value shows that the variables financial 
distress and industry sector are statistically significantly not independent at a 0.1% level 
of significance, or, to put it differently, that the incidence of financial distress is not 
stochastically distributed over the industry sectors. Indeed, it becomes clear from table 
6.8 that 40.4% (21 out of 52) of all financially distressed companies are in ICT business, 
twice as much as would be expected from the incidence in the total sample. The strength 
of the connection however, shown by the Cramér’s V contingency coefficient, is rather 
low and just surpasses the level of a weak relationship.
6.5.7 Financial control variables
Table 6.9 presents the results of the analysis of the financial control variables. Size (LNTA), 
income (NITA) and cash flow (CASHVV) are consistently higher for the control group 
and differ statistically significantly on all panels between the samples at the 1% level. 
Thus, size and the yearly income and cash flows are the important distinctive factors 
between the control and the financially distressed sample. Most striking from table 6.9 
Table 6.8: An analysis of the economic activity (‘industry’) of the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 before 
the financial distress event occurred.
economic activity manufacturing construction trade transport ICT services other° total
control sample 66 13 29 13 19 6 3 149
financially 
distressed
17  0  6  1 21 5 2  52
as % of total sample 41.3  6.5 17.4  7.0 19.9 5.5 2.4 100
Pearson χ² 54.51 ***
Cramer’s V 0.368
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
° Column contains industries that did not meet the requirement of the test.
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is the absence of any statistical significance of the leverage measure (CETA). Apparently, 
financial structure does not differ significantly between the groups over both periods.
6.5.8 Correlation and multicollinearity
Table 6.10 shows the correlation between the agency theory related variables as developed 
in this chapter. These variables will be applied in a regression analysis in the next section. 
The choice for these variables will be explained in the next section. Table 6.10 shows 
that a larger firm (LNTA) requires statistically significantly relatively less equity (CETA) 
and shows less cash flow (CASHVV). It is often a ‘structure NV’, it has ‘certification’ of 
shares, it has a relatively small and not fully independent supervisory board and change 
of executives happens relatively often. It is also clear that executive director turnover 
(DEB) is negatively related with leverage, income and cash flow thus: less turnover as long 
as the signs are green.
Table 6.9: An analysis of the applied financial control variables for the control sample and the 
financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = 
-2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
financial 
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = −2
LNTA 149 1.41 5.61 1.97 52 1.96 4.67 1.93 2.95**
(10.93) (5.46) (9.38) (4.32) (3.12)**
CETA 149 0.02 0.37 0.17 52 0.01 0.33 0.21 1.09
(0.92) (0.34) (0.85) (0.30) (1.60)
NITA 149 −0.11 0.07 0.06 52 −3.08 −0.15 0.50 3.19**
(0.31) (0.06) (0.27) (-0.05) (8.02)***
CASHVV 149 −0.06 0.24 0.29 52 −4.68 −0.14 0.75 3.58**
(2.68) (0.17) (0.73) (0.00) (7.57)***
t = −3
LNTA 149 1.33 5.42 1.94 52 1.05 4.68 1.87 2.42**
(10.82) (5.38) (8.82) (4.29) (2.45)**
CETA 149 0.04 0.37 0.16 52 0.04 0.39 0.21 0.69
(0.87) (0.36) (0.93) (0.34) (0.20)
NITA 149 −0.29 0.07 0.07 52 −1.58 −0.01 0.27 3.26**
(0.32) (0.06) (0.20) (-0.08) (5.88)***
CASHVV 149 −0.20 0.24 0.23 52 −4.80 −0.05 0.76 2.70**
(1.74) (0.18) (0.54) (0.00) (4.74)***
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
LNTA the natural logarithm of total assets (TA) in millions of euros (size measure)
CETA common equity (CE) divided by TA (leverage measure)
NITA net income (before extraordinary items; NI) divided by TA (income measure)
CASHVV cash flow (CASH) divided by TA (liquidity measure).
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In table 6.10 CASHVV and NITA present a correlation of 0.83. Whilst some argue that a 
correlation coefficient of 0.9 indicates multicollinearity, Studenmund (2001) suggests 0.8. 
The detected correlation is strange since the four elements of the ratios are by no means 
strictly related. The high correlation may be coincidental. At any rate this may be a case 
to apply the ‘do-nothing’ strategy of Studenmund since the literature prescribed the use 
of an ‘income’ variable and a ‘liquidity’ variable. Besides, a change of variables would not 
help very much. Alternative cash flow and income variables such as NICE (net income/ 
common equity) and CASHTA (cash flow/ total assets) show similar high correlation 
coefficients (not reported). Moreover, the aim of this chapter is not to develop a perfect 
model but to show whether agency theory related variables add explanatory power to a 
financial ratio based model.
6.5.9 Regression results
Univariate regression
The regression analysis starts with a univariate logit analysis to show the relationships 
between the agency theory related variables developed above and financial distress. 
Based on the theory and the results of table 6.11 four models have been developed. 
Their formulation is in the header of table 6.12. Model 1, the financial control model, 
contains the financial control variables on size, leverage, income and cash flow and the 
industry classification as explanatory variables of financial distress. This is the basic 
model, originating from the literature. Agency theory related variables subsequently 
adapt this model, as follows. The monitoring rights model (model 2) adds the STRUC-
Table 6.10: A correlation analysis of the agency theory related variables for the control sample and the 
financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for 
t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
  LNTA CETA NITA CASH
VV
STRUCT CERT SB
LNTA
EB
RATIO
DEPDM AUD
DM
LNTA 1
CETA −0.34** 1
NITA 0.00 0.25** 1
CASHVV −0.12* 0.49** 0.83** 1
STRUCTURED 0.15** −0.08 0.02 0.06 1
CERTIFICATION 0.10* 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.11* 1
SBLNTA −0.29** 0.22** 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.09 1
EBRATIO 0.06 −0.04 0.11* 0.04 −0.09 −0.18** −0.40** 1
DEPDM 0.17** 0.05 0.09 0.08 −0.06 −0.07 0.13** −0.06 1
AUDDM −0.01 −0.13** −0.05 −0.07 0.04 0.15** −0.02 −0.05 −0.08 1
DEB 0.22** −0.11* −0.12* −0.10* 0.00 −0.02 −0.09 0.04 0.07 −0.06
** and * indicate statistical significance at a 1% and 5% level, respectively (two-tailed).
Variables defined in table 6.11.
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TURED and CERTIFICATION variables to see if the additional SB rights or the curtailing 
of shareholders’ rights have an additional explanatory value. The monitoring structure 
model (model 3) tests whether supervisory board size (SBLNTA) and supervisory board 
structure related variables such as the ratio insiders/outsider directors (EBRATIO), full 
independence (DEPDM), and financial expertise on the board (AUDDM) have additional 
Table 6.11: Univariate regression analysis on agency theory related characteristics of the control sample 
and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel 
data for t = -2 respectively t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
model: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
variable description t = −2 t = −3
monitoring rights related
STRUCTURED structure NV −0.98** −0.98**
CERTIFICATION dummy = 1 if depository share receipt −0.29 −0.29
monitoring structure related 
board size
EB
number of executive directors (ED) −0.06 −0.08
SB number of non-executive directors (NED) −0.19* −0.18ª
EBSB number of ED + NED −0.09 −0.09
EBLNTA EB divided by LNTA (degressive size measure) 1.24* 0.68
SBLNTA SB divided by LNTA (degressive size measure) 0.85ª 0.64
EBSBLNTA EB divided by LNTA (degressive size measure) 0.82* 0.50ª
structural SB characteristics
EBRATIO number of ED as percentage of total directors 1.07 0.56
#DEP number of non-independent NEDs −0.03 0.00
DEPPERC percentage of non-independent NEDs on the SB −0.01 −0.01
DEPDM dummy = 1 if non-independent NED on the SB −0.65* −0.38
AUDDM dummy = 1 if financial expertise (RA) on the SB 0.12 0.28
monitoring output related
DEB leaving EDs in year 0.53** 0.26
DSB leaving NEDs in year 0.39ª 0.26ª
DEBSB leaving EDs + NEDs in year 0.37** 0.21ª
EBTO leaving EDs in year divided by EB end of year 0.01* 0.01
SBTO leaving NEDs in year divided by SB end of year 0.02** 0.02**
EBSBTO leaving EDs + NEDs in year div.by EB+SB end of 
year
0.02** 0.02**
financial control variables
LNTA
natural logarithm of total assets (degressive size 
measure) −0.26** −0.22*
CETA common equity divided by total assets −1.12 0.71
NITA net income (before extraordinary items) divided 
by total assets
−25.21*** −12.21***
CASHVV cash flow divided by total debt −9.84*** −4.58***
SBICAT industry classification ** **
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level. Distress = ln (p / 1-p).
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Table 6.12: A logit analysis of the financial control, and agency theory related variables for the control 
sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on 
panel data for t =-2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 2: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6STRUCTURED + 
β7CERTIFICATION + ε
model 3: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β8EBRATIO + 
β9SBLNTA + β10DEPDM + β11AUDDM + ε
model 4: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β12DEB + ε
exp. 
sign¹
t =-2 t =-3
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
financial 
variables
LNTA
− −0.40** −0.41** −0.33* −0.53** −0.16 −0.16 −0.08 −0.19
CETA − −1.74 −1.76 −2.13 −2.83 2.90 2.94 2.90 2.83
NITA − −20.60** −21.09** −22.60** −18.18** −6.80 −5.88 −7.04 −5.96
CASHVV − −2.05 −2.27 −1.40 −4.06 −5.30 −5.65ª −5.30ª −5.41ª
industry° ª ** ** ** **
 construction −18.55 −18.59 −18.55 −18.37 −19.41 −19.42 −19.73 −19.40
 trade 0.06 0.05 0.21 0.19 −0.17 −0.19 −0.27 −0.13
 transport −0.37 −0.51 −0.28 −0.40 −0.81 −0.86 −0.95 −0.73
 services 2.25* 2.28* 2.38* 2.28* 1.90* 1.91* 1.92* 1.95*
 ICT 1.83** 1.90** 1.83** 1.64* 1.89*** 1.89** 2.00*** 1.91***
 other 0.89 1.10 0.88 1.38 0.67 0.76 0.70 0.77
agency variables
STRUCTURED − −0.34 −0.26
CERTIFICATION − 0.72 0.53
SBLNTA + 1.51ª 0.82
EBRATIO + 1.41 −0.03
DEPDM − −0.54 −0.38
AUDDM + −0.31 0.58
DEB + 0.75* 0.30
constant 1.79ª 1.86ª −0.12 2.21* −0.53 −0.51 −1.60 −0.54
statistics (see text)
number of observations 201 201 201 201 201 201 201 201
Nagelkerke R² 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.43
LR statistics (χ²) 110.54*** 112.62*** 113.90*** 116.37*** 67.94*** 69.18*** 70.93*** 69.16***
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
Type II error (cut-off 0.5) 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.33 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.54
Type I error (cut-off 0.1) 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.30 0.64 0.59 0.62 0.63
Type II error (cut-off 0.1) 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
° manufacturing is the reference category.
¹ expected sign based on the previous analyses of distribution.
Distress = ln (p / (1-p)). Other variables defined in table 6.11.
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explanatory value. Finally the monitoring output model (model 4) tests the additional 
explanatory power of supervisory board output in terms of directors’ turnover. It reports 
on executive board turnover, as Gilson (1989) and Jungmann (2006) do, but the results 
on the turnover of the ‘de facto’ board are similar. It is by no means the intention of this 
section to present a new or to refine an existing prediction model of financial distress. 
This would imply another research question. The results in table 6.12 intend to show (a) 
the explanatory capacity of the standard financial control variables and (b) the additional 
explanatory value of the agency theory related variables discussed above in three differ-
ent models.
Remarkably, in table 6.12 industry is the important explanatory variable in t = -3 at the 
1% level. Thus, being an ICT or services company in t = -3 explains financial distress in 
t = 0 better than any other variable. Of the financial variables only CASHVV proves a 
statistically significant explanatory variable but only at the 10% level and not in model 
1. This implies that optimal use of debt in terms of cash flow helps in avoiding financial 
distress. This picture changes dramatically in t = -2. Now it is not the industry that 
discerns the control from the distressed sample, but individual size (LNTA) and income 
(NITA) figures of the company. The bigger and the more income per unit of assets, the 
less distress-prone the firm is. The monitoring structure (model 3) and monitoring output 
(model 4) models show that two governance variables have explanatory value: the size of 
the board and the turnover of directors. A board that is too large, expressed in man per 
unit of assets, proves explanatory for financial distress in all specifications.
One should keep in mind that regression analysis presents relationships and does not 
prove economic causality. Whether a relationship is causal should be established by 
economic theory. And even then dual causality and feed back effects (Studenmund, 2001: 
66, 463) should be kept in mind, which the statistical significance of e.g. management 
turnover as an explanatory variable indicates. Table 6.12 presents the results on the 
supervisory board (SBLNTA) since its main task is to monitor, but the results in this 
model for the executive board (EBLNTA) and the total board (EBSBLNTA), also monitors, 
are more significant, the latter even at the 5% level (not reported). The other governance 
variable of significance is the turnover of directors which is positively related to financial 
distress in t = -2 at the 5% level. Annex 3.3 provides some additional statistical analyses 
and comments on table 6.12.
6.5.10 Bankrupt companies only
The idea behind this chapter, derived from Hill et al. (1996: 61), is to compare charac-
teristics of financially distressed and other companies over the years. In the financially 
distressed sample however, two groups are collected, the bankrupt firms and the fi-
nancially distressed firms that are not bankrupt. Out of the latter, only four became 
305
Relevance of the agency theory to monitoring near financial distress:  
an empirical approach
insolvent and filed for suspension of payments or bankruptcy after 200323. The implicit 
hypothesis that both groups do not differ statistically significantly on the characteristics 
under research, has to be tested. The non-parametric test performed on the financial and 
agency theory related variables reported in table 6.13, shows a statistically significant 
difference between the bankrupt (code 1) and the other financially distressed group (code 
2) for only two variables: the leverage (CETA) and the size of the SB (SBLNTA). Indeed, 
the mean of CETA is 0.37 for code 0, 0.29 for code 1 and 0.49 for code 2 (not reported). 
So, one could conclude that bankrupt and distressed non-bankrupt firms in this respect 
originate from a different population. That CETA is significantly higher at the 0.1% level 
in the distressed non-bankrupt group than in the bankrupt group indicates that the 
former apparently has a buffer. Moreover, the code 2 group has a board size (SBLNTA) of 
approximately control group size, which provides another explanation – more efficient 
board culture – for their survival. CERTIFICATION, the insider/outsider ratio (EBRATIO) 
and financial expertise on the board (AUDDM) do not show any difference in distribution 
between the groups 0, 1 and 2 as table 6.13 shows. The significant difference in non-
independence (DEPDM) between code 0 and 2 is explained by the mean number of 0.88 
in the control sample (code 0); of 1.14 in the bankrupt sub-sample (code 1); and of 0.40 
in the distressed non-bankrupt sample (code 2; not reported). The code 2 sub-sample 
SB is apparently less non-independent. The significant difference in EB turnover (DEB) 
between code 0 and 2 is explained by the difference in mean of 0.44 (code 0), 0.70 (code 
1) and 0.80 (code 2). This signals a more effective SB for code 2 firms.
Are the regression results reported above valid then for the bankrupt subset of com-
panies? Table 6.14 presents the regression results if only the relatively small group of 
Table 6.13: An analysis of the difference in distribution of financial control, and agency theory related 
variables between the control sample, the bankrupt sub-sample, and the financially distressed non-
bankrupt sub-sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 and t 
= -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
financial 
control 
variables
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 1
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 2
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 1 and 
code 2
agency theory 
related variables
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 1
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 2
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 1 and 
code 2
LNTA ** ** STRUCTURED *** *
CETA *** *** *** CERTIFICATION
NITA *** *** SBLNTA ** *
CASHVV *** *** EBRATIO
DEPDM *
AUDDM
DEB **
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Variables defined in table 6.11.
Code 0, 1, 2 defined below table 6.1 above.
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Table 6.14: A logit analysis of the financial control, and agency theory related variables for the control 
sample and the bankrupt sub-sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel 
data for t = -2 and t = -3 before bankruptcy occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 2: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6STRUCTURED + 
β7CERTIFICATION + ε
model 3: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β8EBRATIO + 
β9SBLNTA + β10DEPDM + β11AUDDM + ε
model 4: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β12DEB + ε
exp. 
sign¹
t =-2 t =-3
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
financial 
variables
LNTA
− −0.47** −0.52** −0.39* −0.63** −0.27ª −0.30ª −0.13 −0.27ª
CETA − −5.05** −5.53** −6.98** −5.66** −1.43 −1.58 −2.34 −1.44
NITA − −9.90ª −9.82 −8.96 −8.91 −3.25 −1.22 −2.29 −3.41
CASHVV − −2.39 −2.68 −2.88 −3.74 −5.68 −6.75 −6.74 −5.64
industry° ª * * * *
 construction −18.57 −18.44 −18.60 −18.28 −18.96 −18.96 −19.42 −18.96
 trade −0.44 −0.35 −0.38 −0.21 −0.39 −0.41 −0.65 −0.39
 transport −18.21 −18.18 −17.87 −18.047 −18.66 −18.63 −18.72 −18.66
 services 1.87ª 2.20* 1.78ª 1.92ª 1.94ª 2.43* 2.39ª 1.94ª
 ICT 1.67** 1.83* 1.81* 1.60* 1.95** 2.18** 2.48*** 1.96**
 other −19.02 −18.76 −19.22 −18.652 −19.21 −19.05 −19.77 −19.23
agency 
variables
STRUCTURED
− −0.61 −0.44
CERTIFICATION − 1.19ª 1.17ª
SBLNTA + 2.50* 1.83*
EBRATIO + 0.87 −2.17
DEPDM − −0.43 −0.61
AUDDM + −0.47 0.22
DEB + 0.73* −0.05
constant 2.72* 3.02* 0.45 3.33* 0.88 0.91 −0.23 0.90
statistics
number of observations 181 181 181 181 181 181 181 181
Nagelkerke R² 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.58 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.46
LR statistics (χ²) 74.26*** 78.18*** 81.60*** 78.97*** 59.49*** 63.45*** 67.18*** 59.51***
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.05
Type II error (cut-off 0.5) 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.53 0.47 0.44 0.53
Type I error (cut-off 0.1) 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.38
Type II error (cut-off 0.1) 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.03
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
° manufacturing is the reference category.
¹ expected sign based on the previous analyses of distribution for the full distressed sample. Variables 
defined in table 6.11.
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32 bankrupt firms is taken into account. A separate correlation analysis is not reported, 
because the results do not differ from those reported in table 6.10. Each model developed 
in this chapter shows significant variables in table 6.14. The monitoring rights model 
(model 2) shows that certification which is de facto a curtailing of shareholders’ rights, 
is positively related to financial distress at the 10% level in both panels. The monitoring 
structure model (model 3) shows that a relative large SB is positively related to financial 
distress at the 5% level and on both panels, indicating that an inefficient board makes 
a firm distress-prone. The monitoring output model (model 4) shows a clear positive 
relationship between turnover and distress, but only in t = -2, indicating that that is 
apparently the moment the SB takes action.
6.6 COnCLUSIOn
Departing from the research model developed in 5.6, this chapter aimed to develop and 
subsequently test agency theory inspired hypotheses on monitoring rights, monitoring 
structure and monitoring output related governance issues. It formulated and tested the 
following hypotheses:
monitoring rights
H1: being a “structure NV” is negatively related to financial distress.
H2: “certification” of shares is not related to financial distress.
monitoring structure
H3a: the number of EDs is positively related to financial distress
H3b: the number of NEDs is positively related to financial distress
H3c: the total number of directors is positively related to financial distress.
H4a: the insider/outsider ratio of directors is not related to financial distress
H4b: the incidence of non-independent NEDs is positively related to financial distress
H4c:  the incidence of NEDs with financial expertise is negatively related to financial 
distress.
monitoring output
H5a: executive board (EB) turnover is positively related to financial distress
H5b: supervisory board (SB) turnover is positively related to financial distress
H5c: (total) board turnover is positively related to financial distress.
Tables 6.11, 6.12 and 6.14 essentially present the results.
The analysis of differences between the samples in tables 6.3 – 6.9 indicates that company 
structure, board size, non-independence and board turnover differ statistically sig-
nificantly between the financially distressed sample and the control sample. The typical 
control sample company appears to be a ‘structure NV’ with five NEDs, a relatively low 
board turnover in t = -2 and 19% non-independent NEDs on the supervisory board. The 
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financially distressed firm is statistically significantly different as regards these aspects. 
It is an ‘ordinary NV’ with four NEDs and a relatively high board turnover in t = -2 
and 14% non-independent NEDs on the supervisory board. The mean control sample 
company is larger than the distressed company.
The univariate regression results from table 6.11 answer the hypotheses.
H1 on the negative effect of the ‘structure NV’ on distress cannot be rejected since the 
univariate regression analysis shows in table 6.11 that a ‘structure NV’ is a negative ex-
planatory variable of financial distress. H2 on the neutral effect of certification on distress 
cannot be rejected since table 6.11 shows no relationship for ‘certification’. However, 
in the monitoring rights model for the bankrupt sample (table 6.14), certification ap-
peared a positive explanatory variable of financial distress at the 10% level in both panels. 
Apparently there is an, albeit rather weak, significant relationship between curtailing 
shareholders’ rights through ‘certification’ and actual bankruptcy.
The positive effects on distress of board size (H3a, H3b and H3c) cannot be rejected since 
table 6.11 shows that the number of directors per unit of assets has indeed positive 
and significant explanatory power for distress. Note that, on the contrary, the absolute 
number of NEDs on the control sample SBs is higher than in the distressed group, but 
since it is argued that this absolute number is better related to the assets of the company, 
this finding is no longer relevant. Moreover, the number of NEDs per unit of assets proves 
positively related to financial distress in the distressed (table 6.12) as well as in the 
bankrupt regression (table 6.14). This may indicate that indeed a SB that is too large 
hinders effective communication and decision-making, always essential and especially 
in situations of near financial distress.
H4a, H4b, and H4c on the effect of composition structure show that neither the insider/
outsider ratio is related to financial distress (H4a not rejected) nor the incidence of finan-
cial expertise on the SB (H4c rejected). In table 6.11 non-independence appears negatively 
related to financial distress (H4b rejected). This is interpreted as a result of a declining 
number of non-independents on the SB of financially distressed companies from t = -3 
to t = -2. It is as if the non-independents in the distressed sample have a sharper eye 
than their independent fellow-NEDs and leave the sinking ship.
The positive association of turnover with distress (H5a, H5b, and H5c) cannot be rejected 
since table 6.11 as well as the results for model 4 in tables 6.12 and 6.14 show a clear 
connection between distress and turnover, as was expected. It adds to the explanation 
of distress only in t = -2. Apparently in t = -3 there is still no such connection. This 
implies that presumably only in t = -2 directors see that dismissal is necessary, either as 
a visible output-related sign of their activity, or as a sign that they lost confidence in their 
executives, themselves, or in the company, thus trying to save their reputation.
The logit regression in models 1-4 presented in tables 6.12 and 6.14 show some additional 
explanatory value to the control variables model (model 1) by the added agency theory 
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related variables. The monitoring rights model (model 2) shows for the bankrupt sample 
that ‘certification’, i.e. curtailing shareholders’ rights, is positively related to financial 
distress. The monitoring structure model (model 3) shows that SBs that are too large have 
explanatory power for financial distress. This is interpreted as boards that are too large 
being inefficient monitors. The monitoring output model (model 4) showed that turnover 
of directors adds to the explanation of financial distress.
This research is the first agency theory inspired systematic analysis of monitoring rights, 
monitoring structure, and monitoring output related governance variables of financially 
distressed companies in the Netherlands. It adds to the literature for five reasons.
Firstly, it puts a question mark behind the much believed independency condition. The 
data show that the number as well as the percentage of non-independent NEDs on the 
control sample boards is higher than in the distressed sample. In the regression analysis 
full non-independence (or the percentage of non-independents; not reported) does not 
provide additional explanatory power. This is in line with the findings of Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson (1998).
Secondly, the control group shows larger executive and supervisory boards, which can 
be interpreted as a logic consequence of larger companies in that group. If standard-
ized for size, it appears from model 3 that large boards are an explanatory variable for 
financially distressed companies. This result could be interpreted as a warning to avoid 
boards that are too large compared with the boards of similar companies. The one with 
the smaller board could very well be the more effective one, which is in line with the 
literature (Yermack, 1996; Van Ees et al. 2003).
Thirdly, the predominant importance of financial variables and industry variables on 
the prediction of financial distress and the small additional contribution of governance 
variables is striking. The industry variable seems related to the period under research. 
In the 1993-2003 period it was the ICT and to a lesser extent the services industry that 
showed most financial distress. However, in another era, take 2010, this could very well 
be construction or expensive consumer goods and services. In predicting, it is important 
not to forget this changing picture (Grice and Dugan, 2007).
Fourthly, the one-tier system based results on board size and independence seem to fit 
in with the two-tier results presented here. Moreover the research shows positive effects 
of the powerful supervisory board in the ‘structure-NV’. Because the sample remains 
small compared to US research, new European research should concentrate on more 
countries, thus creating larger data sets.
Fifthly, although Altman (1993), Van Amsterdam (2004) and Adriaanse (2005) showed 
that the quality of management is key in situations of near financial distress, the agency-
related factors presented in the chapter and the differences therein between both samples 
are auxiliaries in judging the company’s perspectives.
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The results confirm the agency theory since (1) the supervision structure, board size and 
directors’ turnover prove to be statistically significantly differently distributed between 
the samples; and (2) these variables are significant explanatory variables for financial 
distress in the univariate analysis.
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EnDnOTES
1 Only for the full, mandatory regime.
2 One finds ‘Dutch discount’ e.g. in: (1) Staatssecretaris van Financiën J. Wijn on 25 January 
2005 at the Dutch Financial Club lunch in New York; (2) D. Swagerman, E. Terpstra: Trends 
in Dutch executive compensation, Management, Vol. 14, 2009, 2: 62; (3) Financial Times 30 
November 2006. It indicates lower share prices as a consequence of specific Dutch gover-
nance measures in general, of which ‘certification’ (depositary receipts without voting rights) 
is one.
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3 Several companies have withdrawn certification by themselves or after pressure from share-
holders. In October 2004 s 2:118a BW was created, which enables certificate holders to vote, 
except in times of a take-over battle. The Dutch Code pleads for an unlimited voting right 
(IV.2).
4 Note that a SB is only manadatory if the NV is structured: see 4.4.1.1.
5 s 2:158 (2) BW.
6 So did recently: Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) for Iran and O’Connell and Cramer (2010) for 
Ireland.
7 To which can be added: decision-making; see Beiner, Drobretz and Zimmerman (2004: 354).
8 This may have to do with their rather peculiar definition of an outsider, being a board member 
who holds board positions at other companies (p. 48).
9 Dalton et al. (1998) in their meta-analysis find no relationship. Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) 
report for Iran that the presence of outside directors strengthens the firms’ performance. 
O’Connell and Cramer (2010) find a significant association between firm performance and 
the percentage of NEDs on the board.
10 Gilson (1989) cites two earlier studies (p. 248) with smaller samples and less turnover.
11 The variable names are between brackets.
12 REACH is an electronically available database (ultimately) published by ReedElsevier.
13 This is the definition of DC III.2.2. Although the DC did not apply in the research period, the 
definition facilitates an objective distinction between the NEDs.
14 A Dutch guide for data on directors. Taken as close as possible to the year the data were 
needed for.
15 Wet Melding Zeggenschap (WMZ), a former Dutch law, at present part of the Wft, that required 
shareholders passing certain thresholds, like 5%, to register this at the Authority Financial 
Markets (AFM).
16 Regulation (EC) No 1893/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, s 2.
17 As REACH only presents the actual industry classification, some companies that merged later 
on are at present categorized as financial companies. These categorizations were changed to 
the original industry activity.
18 Unintended: if a company predicted a long period of losses in its IPO prospectus, it was 
excluded from the sample (Crucell N.V.).
19 Measured by being quoted at year-end.
20 A skewness measure (not reported in the tables) indicates whether the difference is acceptable 
or not. The distribution of the data in this research is more often than not skewed.
21 It is an indication; a low r by no means proves otherwise, as variables could be acting together 
(Studenmund, 2001: 236).
22 S 2:154 BW: three years.
23 These are: RT Company NV, at present Vivenda Media Group NV (suspension of payments); 
DICO NV, DVRG NV and Innoconcepts NV.

Chapter 
7
Relevance of the resource dependence theory on 
monitoring near financial distress: an empirical 
approach
The key to organizational survival is 
the ability to acquire and maintain 
resources.
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 2)
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7.1 InTRODUCTIOn
With reference to the theoretical model on monitoring near financial distress developed in 
5.6, this chapter aims (1) to formulate testable monitoring-related hypotheses based on 
the resource dependency theory; and (2) to test these hypotheses on data for financially 
distressed Dutch companies listed on the Dutch stock exchange in the period 1993-2003. 
Whilst chapter 6 analysed the relationship between monitoring and financial distress 
in terms of monitoring rights, monitoring structure and visible monitoring output, this 
chapter concentrates on the actual supervisory board composition in situations of near 
financial distress. The key question is whether the availability of resources on the super-
visory board and whether the board’s diversity in composition influence the likelihood 
of financial distress. This kind of research has not been done before. Section 7.2 explains 
the resource dependence theory and examines previous research. Based on these earlier 
findings and within the constraints of the available data, it develops testable hypotheses. 
Section 7.3 describes the data. Section 7.4 explains the applied research methods. The 
results, based on data for financially distressed Dutch companies listed on the Dutch 
stock exchange in the period 1993-2003, are reported in 7.5. Section 7.6 concludes and 
discusses the results.
7.2 THEORY AnD HYPOTHESES
7.2.1 The resource dependence theory
Chapter 1 showed that a company has to adapt continuously to changes in its general and 
immediate environment. Chapter 3 indicated that non-executive directors (NEDs) have a 
control, service and strategy role in this process (Zahra and Pearce, 1989: 303). Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) argue that how an organization learns about its environment, how it 
attends to it, and how it selects and processes information to give meaning to its environ-
ment, are all important aspects for the survival of the company. From this posit they de-
veloped what is currently called the resource dependence theory. Their hypothesis is that 
formal organizations use their boards of directors as vehicles for co-opting important 
external organizations with which they are interdependent through nomination of their 
senior management as NEDs on their boards. In short, the resource dependence theory 
points out that in addition to the board roles of monitoring and disciplining developed 
in the agency theory, NEDs have resource- related board roles: (1) providing legitimacy 
or bolstering the public image, (2) access to complementary expertise, knowledge, advice 
and counsel, valued resources, information, (3) access to capital, (4) facilitation of inter-
firm commitments, (5) linking to important stakeholders or other important institutions, 
(6) aiding in the formulation of strategy or other important company decisions, and (7) 
aiding in transitions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978: 2; Fama and Jensen, 1983: 313; Dalton, 
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Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998: 273; Gales and Kesner, 1994: 272; Zahra and Pearce, 
1989: 303; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 385-386; Goodijk, 2006: 22; Goodridge, 2007). 
Daily (1995: 1052) deems such access to external resources— otherwise often unavailable 
for the company— as potentially critical for financially distressed firms.
These resource-related board roles are directly related to the legal advisory (i.e. service/ 
expertise/ counsel) role of NEDs. The firm’s resource bundle is critical to its path depen-
dency (Kor, 2003). With the increasing uncertainty of firm environments, new important 
resources need to be secured e.g. international know-how and female representation 
(Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva, 2007: 548). These subjects form part of a broader theme 
of board diversity which is often embedded in a resource dependence approach since 
diversity touches the variety of resources a company can rely on. Diversity could be 
defined as broad as diversity with respect to demographic attributes (Pelled, 1996: 616) 
or as narrow as the percentage of women or minorities on the board of directors (Carter, 
Simkins and Simpson, 2003: 36). Modern agency theorists favour board diversity as well 
as they believe that a greater diversity of opinions and interests on the board should keep 
managerial discretion within proper bounds (Francoeur, Labelle and Sinclair-Desgagné, 
2007). A more diverse board might be a more activist board because outside directors 
with non-traditional characteristics could be considered the ultimate outsider (Carter et 
al, 2003: 37). In short, one could expect from the theory that more resourceful NEDs are 
less likely to oversee managerial mistakes which could lead to financial distress and that 
they will react more adequately once financial distress is at hand.
7.2.2 Hypotheses1
This section develops hypotheses on monitoring near financial distress based on the re-
source dependence theory. It starts with personal characteristics such as age, nationality, 
gender, education and independence of NEDs as these may be important in delivering the 
board role. These characteristics prepare the ground for the pure resource dependence 
related hypotheses on network and workload of the NED, developed subsequently.
7.2.2.1 Age
The literature on diversity categorizes age as a highly visible characteristic with low job-
relatedness (Pelled, 1996: 617). However, Zahra and Pearce (1989: 307) and Kang, Cheng 
and Gray (2007) mention age as one of the relevant characteristics in their study on NEDs. 
Kor (2003) and Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva (2007) apply age as a control variable. Age is 
relevant because it is a proxy for experience. Their correlation is significant at the 0.1% 
level (Kor, 2003). Experience is an important part of board capital (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003: 386). Board capital determines the maximum effect that can be expected from 
monitoring. Age surely is an ambiguous measure for experience but since it is impos-
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sible to measure relevant experience in one single variable, it is the best proxy available. 
Other possible measures of experience, such as the number of present directorships or 
present workload, do not necessarily proxy experience better since these reflect present 
performance and not historical experience. That is why this research takes the factors 
experience, network and workload into account separately. Since it is envisaged here that 
more experience, thus more supervisory board capital, provides better monitoring, the 
experience covering hypothesis reads:
H1: the incidence of older (for: more experienced) NEDs is negatively related to financial 
distress.
7.2.2.2 Nationality
Although nationality appears to become an important dimension of board diversity 
(Ruigrok et al. 2007: 546) in the American literature the ethnic background is a more 
common feature of corporate governance research than nationality. Carter et al. (2003: 
37) mention the argument that people with different gender, ethnicity or cultural 
background might ask questions that would not come from NEDs with more traditional 
backgrounds and could therefore be better monitors. Milliken and Martins (1996: 407), 
however, conclude that diversity in ethnic background may initially have negative effects 
in individual and group outcomes. Once a certain level of behavioural integration has 
been reached the benefits of diversification might be obtained. Ruigrok et al. 2007: 547 
conclude on nationality that a foreigner on the board on the one hand brings different 
perspectives, skills and knowledge, but on the other hand different values, norms and 
understanding that may influence the effectiveness of communication. Moreover, for-
eigners often lack know-how of the legal and accounting system2. Li and Harrison (2008) 
suggest that national culture can have strong effects on corporate governance. Van Veen 
and Elbertsen (2008) show that in the Netherlands the level of nationality diversity is the 
highest in Europe. Since the accumulated effect of the contradictory aspects of foreign 
nationality of a NED is unclear, the neutral hypothesis reads:
H2: the incidence of non-national NEDs is not related to financial distress.
7.2.2.3 Gender
Burgess and Tharenou (2002: 40) and Carter et al (2003: 36) list a number of reasons why 
women are needed on company boards. These are: (a) increased diversity of opinions in 
the boardroom, (b) strategic input, (c) influence on decision-making and leadership styles, 
(d) providing female role models and mentors, (e) improving company image, (f) women’s 
capabilities and availability, (g) insufficient competent male directors and (h) ensuring 
“better” boardroom behaviour. For all these arguments their paper quotes further re-
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search. Thus, greater gender diversity is generally believed to be good for the company 
since it improves the potential monitoring quality of the board (Carter et al. 2003: 36). 
And although Farrell and Hersch (2005) explain that greater gender diversity may simply 
be the firm’s response to outside or inside pressure on the matter, the hypothesis tests 
whether gender is indeed a valuable resource factor for NEDs in avoiding financial distress:
H3: the incidence of female NEDs is negatively related to financial distress.
7.2.2.4 Education
Another critical resource of a NED is education. Why else would students strive for a 
scholarship in one of the Ivy-league universities or are their alumni in high demand? 
Universities impart knowledge, develop analytical and psychological skills, and convey 
experience from case studies. This improves a person’s monitoring capabilities. Edu-
cational background is one of the NED characteristics mentioned by Zahra and Pearce 
(1989: 307). D’Aveni (1990: 129), Daily and Dalton (1994: 1609) and Ruigrok, Peck and 
Tacheva (2007: 551) use education to capture the quality of a firm’s board. In the Dutch 
two-tier system the question should rather be whether better education of a NED ensures 
better monitoring of a NED; and whether a higher than average educational level of a 
supervisory board lowers the likelihood of financial distress. The relationship of better 
monitoring through higher-educated NEDs is hypothesized as:
H4: the incidence of better educated NEDs is negatively related to financial distress.
7.2.2.5 Independence
A non-independent NED is a priori not in the best position to monitor since his judgement 
is not objective and his ties to the firm and the CEO may inhibit prompt and adequate 
measures (Daily and Dalton, 1994). However, his knowledge of the company can be 
considered as a precious resource. Klein (1998) showed that it is important to have non-
independents on the board. Harris and Shimizu (2004: 779) consider non-independent 
directors necessary to contextualize the rich external perspectives of outsider directors. 
A non-independent NED is resourceful, has the most knowledge of the firm of all the 
NEDs and often feels personally committed to the firm. Since boards in the Netherlands 
are collegial forums, decisions will usually be taken by unanimity. In times of distress 
one could even imagine that NEDs play safe and follow the advice of the knowledgeable 
former insider or otherwise non-independent NED. Thus, non-independence may be a 
positive as well as a negative characteristic when monitoring financial distress, which is 
hypothesized as follows:
H5: the incidence of independent NEDs is not related to financial distress.
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7.2.2.6 Network
The network of NEDs is key in the resource dependence theory since, to a large extent, it 
determines their resources. Part of that network is formed by ‘interlocking directorates’ 
or ‘multiple directorships’ which means that an ED or a NED occupies an ED or NED posi-
tion in one or more other firms as well. As expressed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 161):
Interlocking directorates3 (..) are one form of a more general tendency to manage 
the environment by appointing significant external representatives to positions in the 
organization. (..) this is a strategy for accessing resources, exchanging information, 
developing inter-firm commitments and establishing legitimacy.
Haunschild and Beckman (1998: 817) stress that such multiple directorships are valuable 
sources of information that are inexpensive, trustworthy and credible. More in general, 
interlocking directorates provide channels of communication and conduits of informa-
tion between the firm and external organizations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003: 387). They 
serve to reduce the transaction costs of dealing with uncertainties in the environment. 
Harris and Shimizu (2004: 791) report a favourable effect of busy NEDs on key strategic 
decisions. The hypothesis connecting a resourceful network through better monitoring 
and advice with less likelihood of financial distress therefore reads:
H6: the incidence of multiple-director NEDs is negatively related to financial distress.
7.2.2.7 Workload
Workload is a fiercely debated topic in resource dependence literature. Clearly, the re-
sources a NED gains from being exposed to various challenges from numerous director-
ships and other jobs may make him ‘overboarded’: too busy to meet all the requirements 
attending his responsibilities properly (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). While Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) argue that such NEDs have too little time to carry out their duties, Harris 
and Shimizu (2004) find that overboarded directors are important sources of knowledge, 
enhance acquisition performance and are an important complement for a board. In the 
analysis of Hambrick (1987: 90) time is only a sub-factor. Some may have more time 
than others, but, as Harris and Shimizu (2004: 793) observe, busy directors are busy for 
good reason – they are good contributors. That is why Kiel and Nicholson (2006: 544) 
object to this line of research: it is conceptually the wrong level of analysis and it neglects 
the various systemic benefits of multiple directorships. Instead, boards and individual 
directors should regularly be evaluated to see if they can still carry out the roles expected 
of them. One wonders whether in situations of near financial distress (a) there is time 
to execute this evaluation, (b) if a firm can permit to lose NEDs on those grounds just at 
that very moment, and (3) if ‘overboarded’ NEDs really have the opportunity to invest the 
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extra time needed. Intuitively one would hypothesize that in situations of near financial 
distress a firm is better off with a non-overboarded NED:
H7: the workload of NEDs is positively related to financial distress.
7.3 DATA
This chapter uses the same dataset as chapter 6. Section 6.5 comprises a full description. 
The dataset contains seven NED characteristics. These are age, nationality and gender, 
which are inborn resources, and education, independence, network and workload, which 
are acquired resources. Of these, age, network and workload are scale variables, educa-
tion is an ordinal variable and the other three are categorical variables (dummies). This is 
important to note for a proper statistical analysis.
7.3.1 Age
The annual reports, the Handelsregister and the Handboek voor directeuren en commis-
sarissen provided the data on the age of NEDs.
7.3.2 nationality
It is not always simple to determine the nationality of a NED. People may have a double 
nationality. They may be born under Dutch rule in what is now Indonesia or Surinam. 
People may have petitioned for another nationality. Nationality data may simply not be 
available, which might be the case for some NEDs for the earlier years of this research. 
Nationality, if at all available in the Handelsregister, is not electronically retrievable. How-
ever the place of birth is registered. So, if nationality was not mentioned in the annual 
reports or elsewhere, the NEDs not born in the Netherlands were classified as foreigners.
7.3.3 Gender
Gender was not a topic in the period under review in the Netherlands. Especially for 
the earlier years of this research ‘gender’ is difficult to retrieve since first names or 
photographs of directors were not a regular part of the annual report, as they presently 
are. After checking and double checking various sources, the dataset is probably in order. 
As there were only 51 females out of 1,904 NEDs in the research period one should not 
attach much value to the results presented on the issue.
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7.3.4 Education
By education this study means an academic master’s degree, a doctorate4 or a professor-
ship. This is debatable, since a bachelor’s degree or other training may be just as useful. 
However, the common use of the degrees mentioned in the Netherlands in connection 
with one’s name made it relatively easy to collect the data. Most annual reports provide 
this information, as does the Handboek voor directeuren en commissarissen. However, this 
is a cultural phenomenon. Whilst Germany has a similar habit, in English and American 
annual reports this information is less readily available, if at all. It has been attempted 
to complete this data for non-Dutch nationals through directories and internet sources, 
such as alumni yearbooks, but altogether the data on the education of non-Dutch nation-
als may be negatively biased. The results should therefore be interpreted cautiously.
7.3.5 Independence
As in 6.3.3 a NED is deemed independent if he, or his wife, partner or family member in 
the second degree has not been employed by the company in the past five years; does 
not receive personal benefits from the company; has not had a business relationship 
(consultancy, counsel, banker and the like) in the year previous to the appointment; is 
not or does not represent a 10% shareholder; and is not an ED of a company in which an 
ED of the company he supervises is a NED (cross-directorship)5. Data is derived from the 
annual accounts, the WMZ6 register and journals.
7.3.6 network
By network this research means the number of non-executive directorships the NED 
has in NVs or BVs . Data is derived from the annual reports and the Handboek voor 
directeuren en commissarissen. Each NED position is supposed to be of equal value in 
terms of network. However, the chairman position (President-commissaris) counts twice, 
since he is exposed to external contacts, e.g. with investors, banks, potential merger and 
acquisition parties, considerably more than other NEDs, if they are at all. Other important 
network positions, e.g. a non-executive directorship of an orchestra, a museum or of 
other important associations or foundations, have not been taken into account, since this 
data is unreliable7.
7.3.7 Workload
To determine the workload of a NED, not only is his network in terms of NED positions 
important, but also whether he has a regular job. Job data is derived from the annual 
reports, the Handboek voor directeuren en commissarissen and personal websites of 
the NEDs concerned. If this job was described as executive director, advisor, professor, 
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Member of Parliament, or if it was of a professional nature e.g. lawyer or auditor, it is 
classified as a full-time equivalent (FTE) which means it takes 1,800 hrs a year. This is 
arbitrary since part-time jobs exist more and more. Moreover NEDs may occupy director-
ships in foundations or associations, often of an honorary nature, which may, at least 
incidentally, take up a lot of a time as well. These posts have not been taken into account 
Table 7.1: an overview of the NED resources for the control sample and the financially distressed 
sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the 
financial distress event occurred.
 
control sample distressed sample full panel
number percentage number percentage number percentage
numbers:
number of companies 298 74 104 26 402 100
number of NEDs 1,459 77 445 23 1,904 100
number of leaving NEDs ª 137 65 74 35 211 100
increasing size of SB (t = -2)ª 26 17 12 23 38 19
decreasing size of SB (t = -2)ª 23 15 15 29 38 19
NED inborn resources:
age
 > 60 744 51 155 35 899 47
 < 50 149 10 107 24 256 13
nationality (non-Dutch) 225 15 115 26 340 18
gender (female) 37 3 14 3 51 3
NED acquired resources:
education
 academic master’s degree 1,030 71 269 60 1,299 68
 Mr. (Dutch; = LL.M) 217 15 60 13 277 15
 Ir. (Dutch; = MSc) 235 16 48 11 283 15
 Drs. (Dutch; = MA or MSc) 252 17 72 16 324 17
 other (MA and/or MSc) 79 6 35 8 114 6
 PhD 97 7 26 6 123 6
 Professor 150 10 28 6 178 9
independence 1,197 82 356 80 1,553 82
network
 > 4 NED positions 533 37 124 28 657 34
 1 NED position 347 24 165 37 512 27
FTE (holds a full-time job) 659 45 274 62 933 49
workload 1 > 1 665 46 276 62 941 49
workload 2 > 1 728 50 287 64 1,015 53
Variables are explained in the text.
ª A statistical analysis of leaving NEDs in situations of near financial distress is found in 6.5.5. The 
increase or decrease of the SB number is not related to financial distress (results not reported).
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since the data is not complete by any means, and estimating the time involved would 
have been possible only with an unacceptable degree of subjectivity.
7.3.8 General data overview
Table 7.1 provides a first glance at the data. Most figures do differ substantially between 
the samples. Only gender is equally divided over both samples. Education shows an 11% 
difference on the incidence of academic degrees. However, the division over the various 
educational categories does not seem very different. Section 7.5 researches the statistical 
significance of these differences.
7.4 METHOD
The techniques applied in this chapter are essentially identical to those already described 
in 6.4 and applied in chapter 6. One technique, the use and calculation of a diversity 
indicator, is new and is introduced in 7.4.1. Section 7.4.2 explains the two approaches to 
the data applied in this chapter.
7.4.1 Diversity indicator
A diversity indicator quantifies the diversity of a certain characteristic within a group, 
e.g. the supervisory board (SB). For scale variables, e.g. age, network and workload, the 
standard deviation is an appropriate diversity measure. A large standard deviation (σ) 
indicates more variety than a small one, as its definition shows:
 σdj = √ 1/n ∑ (xi – x) 
2
 where d = the characteristic under research
 i = NED i
 j = the firm
 n = the number of NEDs on the SB
 x i = the value of the variable for NED i on board j
 x = the average value of the variable on the SB.
For ordinal and categorical variables the standard deviation is meaningless and other 
indicators are necessary. One of these7 is the Blau-indicator8 as applied by Van Ees, 
Hooghiemstra, Laan and Veltrop (2007) and Tacheva (2007). The definition9 is:
 Blau dj = 1 - ∑ (xij /nj ) 
2
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where x ij = the number of NEDs with category i on board j.
If a variable may have values 1, 2 and 3 and there are three NEDs on the SB, the Blau-
indicator varies between 0 (all the NEDs in the same category), 0.44 (two NEDs in one 
category) and 0.66 (all the NEDs in a different category). If the group is very large, the 
Blau-indicator will asymptotically tend towards one. For an SB of 10 with all the NEDs in 
a different category, the Blau-indicator is 0.90. If it concerns a dichotomous variable, the 
Blau-indicator does not discern between the 70% male and the 70% female situation. For 
an SB of 10 people both calculated Blau-indicators are 0.42. This shows that the average 
value provides additional valuable information.
7.4.2 Two approaches to the data
The hypotheses and data relate to financially distressed and control companies and their 
NEDs. Two research angles are possible here: the supervisory board and the individual 
NED. The supervisory board is a legal organ of the company. NEDs decide within the 
framework of the SB. This research angle focuses on the resources of the SB in terms of 
average and diversity vis-à-vis the situation of the company. This angle will conclude 
with a logistic regression with the diversity and the average characteristic variables as 
explanatory variables in 7.5.9 and 7.5.10.
The second research angle centres on the individual NED characteristics. The individual 
characteristics determine the efficiency and effectiveness of the SB. Would it be pos-
sible to detect a certain profile of NEDs for the financially distressed and for the control 
sample? What kind of people are attracted by potentially financially distressed compa-
nies, or: what kind of people are selected by potentially financially distressed companies? 
An analysis of the difference of means (t-test) or, if the data distribution is skewed or 
the data is not scaled, the difference of the distribution (Mann-Whitney test) of these 
individual NED characteristics over all the NEDs during t = -2 and t = -3, may give an un-
derstanding of the relevance of certain NED characteristics in avoiding financial distress.
7.5 RESULTS
The variables below with a –NED extension relate to the NED database of 1,904 NEDs. 
Variables with a –DIV extension are company-based and present a diversity measure of 
the characteristic within the SB. Variables with an –AV extension show the averages for 
the SB on a company basis. Although the average is not a diversity measure as such, it 
distinguishes clearly between a 70% male or 70% female situation, which the Blau- indica-
tor used as a diversity measure does not ( see 7.4.1). Moreover, the average allows the 
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attaching of value to the ‘level’ of a characteristic, i.e. the average number of network 
positions of the NEDs on the SB, instead of (only) their diversity.
7.5.1 Age
The AGENED variable shows the age of a NED. It is defined as the event year less the year of 
birth of a NED, less two or three, since it is the company two or three years before the event 
that is the research object. The AGEAV shows the average age of the NEDs on the SB. The 
AGEDIV variable measures the diversity of age in the SB, expressed in the standard devia-
tion of the board’s age. Table 7.2 presents the results on the age of the NEDs. Since the AGE 
variable as well as the AGEDIV variable have a normal distribution (not reported), both the 
t- and z-values are shown. It shows that control group NEDs are statistically significantly 
older by (almost) four years in the mean and median. The results on the average age on 
the SB (AGEAV) confirm this result. The diversity in age (AGEDIV) provides less significant 
results. Apparently the diversity in age is overall not so (very) different between the groups, 
which implies that generally all NEDs on control boards are older and thus more experi-
enced, and all NEDs on distressed boards somewhat younger and less experienced.
Table 7.2: An analysis of the age of NEDs and of the age diversity of the SB for the control sample and 
the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for 
t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2
AGENED 730 33 59.74 7.50 222 34 56.24 8.46 5.55***
(72) (61) (74) (57.50) (5.64)***
AGEAV 149 39.33 59.30 4.79 52 40.67 56.31 5.20 3.76***
(67) (59.75) (68) (56.10) (4.19)***
AGEDIV 149 0.82 5.41 2.51 52 0.82 5.89 3.04 1.01
(12.87) (5.23) (13.80) (6.40) (1.29)
t = -3
AGENED 729 32 59.50 7.75 223 32 55.79 8.58 5.79***
(72) (60) (73) (57) (5.80)***
AGEAV 149 38.33 58.98 4.79 52 45.33 55.60 5.15 4.18***
(67) (59.75) (68) (55.43) (4.34)***
AGEDIV 149 0.82 5.63 2.64 52 0.50 6.32 3.00 1.58
(15.33) (5.39) (13.80) (6.82) (1.99)*
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
AGENED the age of a NED at t = -2 and t = -3
AGEAV the average age of the SB
AGEDIV the diversity in age of the SB measured in terms of the standard deviation.
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7.5.2 nationality
NATNED stands for the nationality of a NED. It is a binary variable: Dutch (0) or non-Dutch 
(1). NATAV signifies the percentage of foreign nationals on the SB. The NATDIV variable, 
expressed as a Blau-indicator, signifies the diversity of Dutch and other nationalities on 
the SB. Table 7.3 presents the results on the nationality of the NEDs. Since the NATNED 
variable is of an ordinal nature, and NATAV and NATDIV are skewed (not reported), only 
the z-values are reported. Table 7.3 shows that the financially distressed sample has 
statistically significantly more foreign NEDs than the control group at the 1% level. The 
same goes for foreign nationals in terms of average and diversity on the SB, albeit on 
levels varying between 1% and 10%.
7.5.3 Gender
GENNED stands for the gender of a NED. It is 1 if the NED is female. GENAV signifies the 
percentage of women on the SB. The GENDIV variable, expressed as a Blau-indicator, 
signifies the diversity in gender on the SB. Table 7.4 presents the results on the gender 
of the NEDs. Since the GENNED variable is of an ordinal nature and GENAV en GENDIV 
are skewed (not reported), only the z-values are reported. Table 7.1 already showed a low 
percentage of women on the boards. It may therefore not be surprising that the results in 
table 7.4 on the gender variable are by no means significant.
Table 7.3: An analysis of the nationality of NEDs and of the nationality diversity of the SB for the 
control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, 
based on panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(| z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2
NATNED
730 16% 222 27% (3.88)***
NATAV 149 13% 52 22% (1.82)ª
NATDIV 149 0.00 0.12 0.19 52 0.00 0.18 0.22 (1.80)ª
(0.50) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00)
t = -3
NATNED 729 15% 223 24% (3.21)**
NATAV 149 12% 52 21% (2.33)*
NATDIV 149 0.00 0.11 0.19 52 0.00 0.18 0.21 (2.06)*
(0.50) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
NATNED a dummy variable being 1 if the nationality of a NED is not Dutch
NATAV the average value of the dummy variable over the SB
NATDIV the Blau-indicator on the diversity in nationality of the SB.
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7.5.4 Education
The education level of NEDs is reported in nine categories: no academic degree, LL.M. 
(Dutch: mr.), MSc (Dutch drs: mainly economics or business school), MSc (Dutch ir.: tech-
nical), registered auditor (RA), two master’s degrees, a foreign degree, PhD and professor. 
PhD degrees include honorary degrees, since the origin of the degree is not always clear. 
Table 7.5 presents the results of the Pearson χ² test. The variables academic education 
and financial distress are statistically significantly not independent at a 0.1% level of 
significance. Or, to put it differently, the various education levels are not stochastically 
Table 7.4: An analysis of the gender of NEDs and of the gender diversity of the SB for the control 
sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on 
panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2 
GENNED
730 3% 222 3% (0.08)
GENAV 149 2% 52 3% (0.23)
GENDIV 149 0.00 0.03 0.10 52 0.00 0.04 0.12 (0.23)
(0.50) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00)
t = -3
GENNED 729 2% 223 4% (0.90)
GENAV 149 2% 52 4% (0.47)
GENDIV 149 0.00 0.03 0.09 52 0.00 0.05 0.14 (0.72)
(0.44) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
GENNED a dummy variable being 1 if a NED is female
GENAV the average value of the dummy variable over the SB
GENDIV the Blau-indicator on the diversity in gender of the SB.
Table 7.5: An analysis of the academic education level of NEDs for the control sample and the 
financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = 
-2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
academic level no degree LL.M MSc (ec) MSc 
(tech)
RA two 
degrees
foreign 
degree
PhD professor total
control sample 429 218 234 252 34 24 21 97 150 1,459
financially 
distressed
176 60 48 72 18 11 6 26 28 445
as % of total 
sample
31.8 14.6 14.8 17.0 2.7 1.8 1.4 6.5 9.4 100
Pearson χ² 29.24 ***
Cramer’s V 0.124
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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distributed over the NEDs in both samples. The strength of the connection however, 
shown by the Cramer’s V contingency coefficient, does not surpass the level of a weak 
relationship. Almost 32% of all the NEDs have no academic master’s degree. Thus, 68% 
of all the NEDs have an academic degree. Table 7.6 shows the distribution of the vari-
ables over the different samples. Since the DEGREENED variable is of a binary nature, 
and EDUDIV is skewed (not reported) only the z-values are reported for these. The 71% 
of control group NEDs with a master’s degree (DEGREENED) is statistically significantly 
higher at the 1% level than the 60% for the distressed sample. The normally distributed 
average degree-on-the-SB variable (DEGREEAV) confirms the picture, i.e. the availability 
of master’s degrees on the SB is significantly higher in the control sample at the 10% level 
or better. EDUDIV allows room for the subtleties of the different categories of education 
in the Blau-indicator. It varies between zero, i.e. all the NEDs are equally categorized, and 
0.84, e.g. out of six NEDs, every NED is in a different category. The diversity in education is 
higher in the control sample than in the financially distressed sample, but only at the 10% 
level in t = -3. In t = -2 there is no result. This is as expected from the figures in table 7.2.
7.5.5 Independence
In table 7.7 DEPNED stands for the non-independence of a NED. It is a binary variable. If a 
NED is non-independent it is 1. DEPAV signifies the percentage of non-independent NEDs 
on the SB. This section adds to 6.5.4 since it also analyses at a NED level, without new results, 
Table 7.6: An analysis of the academic education of NEDs and of the academic education diversity of 
the SB for the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 
1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2
DEGREENED
730 71% 222 60% (3.02)**
DEGREEAV 149 0.00 0.70 0.28 52 0.00 0.61 0.29 1.92ª
(1.00) (0.75) (1.00) (0.67) (2.00)*
EDUDIV 149 0.00 0.59 0.18 52 0.00 0.52 0.23 (1.57)
(0.84) (0.63) (0.78) (0.58)
t = -3
DEGREENED 729 71% 223 61% (2.67)**
DEGREEAV 149 0.00 0.70 0.27 52 0.00 0.62 0.27 1.95ª
(1.00) (0.75) (1.00) (0.67) (2.18)*
EDUDIV 149 0.00 0.59 0.18 52 0.00 0.54 0.20 (1.83)ª
(0.83) (0.64) (0.81) (0.62)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively
ª indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
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and it applies the Blau-indicator DEPDIV. Control firms have dependence-wise more diverse 
boards. Since the non-independence variable DEPNED is of an ordinal nature, and the AVDEP 
variable is skewed (not reported) only the z-values are calculated. The DEPDIV variable how-
ever is normally distributed and therefore the t-values are reported as well. The diversity 
(DEPDIV) as well as the average (DEPAV) in non-independence are higher in the control group 
and prove statistically significantly different only in t = -2 at the 5% respectively 10% level.
7.5.6 network
NETNED stands for the network of a NED expressed in number of NED positions plus 
chairmanships. NETAV signifies the average network of the NEDs on the SB. The NETDIV 
variable, expressed as the standard deviation, signifies the network diversity on the SB. 
Table 7.8 presents the results on the network of the NEDs. Since the NETNED, NETAV and 
NETDIV variables are not normally distributed only the z-values are shown. Table 7.8 
reports a maximum of 27 for NETNED. At one time, one NED had nine chairmanships in a 
NV and 12 in a BV, besides four ordinary NV and two ordinary BV positions. The NETNED 
and NETAV variables are statistically significantly higher in the control group at the 1% 
level over both panels. Control group NEDs occupy on average half a position more than 
their fellow NEDs in the distressed groups. The diversity variable NETDIV shows only a 
difference at the 10% level for t = -3. This indicates that generally all the NEDs in the 
control group occupy more NED positions than the NEDs on the distressed boards.
Table 7.7: An analysis of the independence of NEDs and of the independence diversity of the SB for the 
control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, 
based on panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2
DEPNED
730 18% 222 19% (0.39)
DEPAV 149 19% 52 14% (1.67)ª
DEPDIV 149 0.00 0.21 0.21 52 0.00 0.14 0.19 2.03*
(0.50) (0.22) (0.50) (0.00) (2.00)*
t = -3
DEPNED 729 18% 223 20% (0.84)
DEPAV 149 18% 52 16% (1.03)
DEPDIV 149 0.00 0.20 0.21 52 0.00 0.16 0.19 1.24
(0.50) (0.20) (0.50) (0.00) (1.29)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
DEPNED the non-independence dummy variable being 1 if a NED is non-independent
DEPAV the average value of the dummy variable over the SB
DEPDIV the Blau-indicator on the diversity in non-independence of the SB.
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7.5.7 Workload
Two workload variables are calculated. The first (WL1NED) supposes that each NV post 
and each NV chairmanship takes 100 hrs/year, and a BV post and each BV chairmanship 
50 hrs/year. These hours are added to those resulting from a regular job, if any, and 
divided by 1,800. The alternative (WL2NED) calculates the NV post and NV chairmanship 
for 200 hrs/year, and the BV post and BV chairmanship for 100 hrs/year. The 200 hrs/
year is in line with Winter and Cools (2008) and Goodridge (2007), whilst the 100 hrs/year 
is more in line with the 1990’s culture described by Lipton and Lorsch (1992). Workload 
is considered as a resource if it is well below 1,800 hrs (thus <1). In that case, a NED may 
have spare time, will be less pressed, more thoughtful and more flexible in his availability. 
WL1AV and WL2AV signify the average workload of the NEDs on the SB. The WL1DIV and 
WL2DIV variables, expressed as the standard deviation, signify the workload diversity 
on the SB. Table 7.9 presents the results on the workload of the NEDs. Since all work-
load related variables are normally distributed, the t-values as well as the z-values are 
reported. The results of table 7.9 show a consistent difference for the variables between 
Table 7.8: An analysis of the network of NEDs and of the network diversity of the SB for the control 
sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on 
panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference in
distribution
(|z-value|)
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2
NETNED
730 1 4.39 3.49 222 1 3.80 4.06 (4.12)***
(23) (4) (27) (2)
NETAV 149 1.17 4.32 1.79 52 1 3.93 2.62 (2.21)**
(13) (4.00) (12) (3.33)
NETDIV 149 0.37 2.58 1.42 52 0.00 2.52 2.14 (1.35)
(7.59) (2.36) (9.76) (2.02)
t = -3
NETNED 729 1 4.38 3.56 223 1 3.76 3.92 (3.72)***
(23) (3) (27) (2)
NETAV 149 1.20 4.30 1.77 52 1 3.69 2.28 (2.66)**
(13) (4.25) (11.25) (3.00)
NETDIV 149 0.35 2.62 1.46 52 0.00 2.46 2.14 (1.65)ª
(7.44) (2.45) (9.76) (1.95)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
NETNED  the network of the NED at t = -2 and t = -3 in terms of the number of NED positions and 
chairmanships
NETAV  the average network of the NEDs on the SB in terms of the number of NED positions and 
chairmanships
NETDIV  the diversity in network of the SB measured in terms of the standard deviation.
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the samples. The workload of NEDs (WL1NED; WL2NED) in the financially distressed 
sample is statistically significantly higher than in the control sample at the 5% level or 
better (t-test; the variable is not skewed) in each specification (100 hrs/year and 200 hrs/
Table 7.9: An analysis of the workload of NEDs and of the workload diversity of the SB for the control 
sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on 
panel data for t = -2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
board
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
|t-value|
(|z-value|)number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -2
WL1NED
730 0.06 0.68 0.48 222 0.06 0.79 0.47 3.31**
(1.64) (0.56) (1.64) (1.06) (1.75)ª
WL2NED 730 0.11 0.89 0.52 222 0.11 0.97 0.50 2.02*
(2.28) (1.11) (2.28) (1.11) (1.34)
WL1AV 149 0.07 0.68 0.26 52 0.14 0.79 0.27 2.65**
(1.29) (0.67) (1.28) (0.83) (2.88)**
WL2AV 149 0.15 0.89 0.28 52 0.28 0.97 0.29 1.80ª
(1.58) (0.90) (1.57) (0.99) (1.98)*
WL1DIV 149 0.05 0.42 0.15 52 0.00 0.36 0.21 1.76ª
(0.73) (0.43) (0.89) (0.37) (1.96)ª
WL2DIV 149 0.03 0.38 0.14 52 0.00 0.33 0.19 1.69ª
(0.60) (0.43) (0.61) (0.39) (1.58)
t = -3
WL1NED 729 0.06 0.65 0.48 223 0.06 0.79 0.47 3.50***
(1.64) (0.50) (1.64) (1.06) (2.19)*
WL2NED 729 0.11 0.86 0.52 223 0.11 0.95 0.52 2.24*
(2.28) (1.00) (2.28) (1.11) (1.77)ª
WL1AV 149 0.07 0.66 0.27 52 0.07 0.78 0.29 2.57*
(1.29) (0.67) (1.28) (0.80) (2.78)**
WL2AV 149 0.15 0.87 0.29 52 0.15 0.94 0.31 1.64
(1.58) (0.89) (1.57) (0.95) (1.81)*
WL1DIV 149 0.05 0.41 0.15 52 0.00 0.36 0.21 1.41
(0.73) (0.43) (0.89) (0.39) (1.55)
WL2DIV 149 0.03 0.37 0.15 52 0.00 0.34 0.19 1.20
(0.60) (0.43) (0.62) (0.40) (0.95)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
WL1NED the workload1 (a NED position in an NV takes 100 hrs/year) of the NED at t = -2 and t = -3
WL2NED the workload2 (a NED position in an NV takes 200 hrs/year) of the NED at t = -2 and t = -3
WL1AV the average workload1 of the NEDs on the SB in terms of full-time equivalents (FTEs)
WL2AV the average workload2 of the NEDs on the SB in terms of full-time equivalents (FTEs)
WL1DIV the diversity in workload1 measured in terms of the standard deviation
WL2DIV the diversity in workload2 measured in terms of the standard deviation.
333
Relevance of the resource dependence theory on monitoring near financial distress:  
an empirical approach
year per NED position). The average workload on the SB (WL1AV; WL2AV) is also higher 
in the distressed sample: for the 100 hrs/y variable, hereinafter also indicated as the 
‘workload1’ variable, all values are statistically significantly different at the 5% level. The 
results on the 200 hrs/y specification (‘workload2’), indeed for the period under review 
probably a rather high assumption, fall short especially on the t = -3 panel. Diversity in 
workload proves only statistically significantly different at the 10% level for t = -2, with 
a higher diversity in the control group than in the distressed group.
7.5.8 Correlation and multicollinearity
This section presents three correlation tables, i.e. for the resource dependence related 
individual NED characteristics (with extension – NED, table 7.10), for the average board 
value of the characteristics (with extension – AV, table 7.11) and for the board diversity 
on these characteristics (with extension –DIV, table 7.12). Table 7.10 shows that the age 
of a NED relates statistically significantly negatively with foreign nationality, gender, 
non-independence and workload, whilst the master’s degree and network are positively 
related. Thus, older NEDs are often male, Dutch, university educated, independent, with 
a relatively large network and a relatively low workload. Foreign NEDs are younger, 
self-made, non-independent and have a relatively small network. A degree is negatively 
related to non-independence and positively related to network and workload. That work-
load and network of a NED relate is not surprising, but the rather low coefficient is. Whilst 
table 7.10 presented a correlation analysis of NED related data, table 7.11 looks into 
board averages. It shows that a relatively large firm (LNTA) often has an older board, with 
Table 7.10: A correlation analysis (Spearman) of the resource dependence theory related variables 
for the NEDs on the boards of the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed 
Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 before the financial distress event 
occurred (N=952).
  AGENED NATNED GENNED DEGREENED DEPNED NETNED
AGENED 1          
NATNED −0.20** 1
GENNED −0.12** 0.06 1
DEGREENED 0.12** −0.42** −0.06 1  
DEPNED −0.22** 0.26** 0.06 −0.17** 1
NETNED 0.27** −0.28** −0.08* 0.27** −0.16** 1
WLNED1 −0.44* 0.05 −0.01 0.11** 0.04 0.26**
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
AGENED the age of a NED at t = -2
NATNED a dummy variable being 1 if the nationality of a NED is non-Dutch
GENDER a dummy variable being 1 if a NED is female
DEGREENED a dummy variable being 1 if a NED has an academic degree
NETNED the network of the NED at t = -2 in terms of the number of NED positions and chairmanships
WLNED1 the workload1 (a NED position in an NV takes 100 hrs/year) of the NED at t = -2
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more foreigners, and a larger network, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The average age and availability of a master’s degree are significantly positively related, 
whilst the average degree and nationality are negatively related. This is in accordance 
with the results for the individual NEDs.
Table 7.12 on board diversity shows that SBs of larger firms are statistically significantly 
more diverse in nationality, education and network at the 1% level. At the 1% level diversity 
in nationality is positively related to diversity in age and diversity in non-independence. 
Diversity in network and education are related as well. This resembles the results of the 
previous table. Multicollinearity, apart from the relationship between NITA and CASHVV 
discussed in chapter 6, does not show.
Table 7.11: A correlation analysis (Spearman) of the average of the resource dependence theory 
related variables on the boards of the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed 
Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 before the financial distress event 
occurred (N=201).
LNTA CETA NITA CASH
VV
AGE AV NAT
AV
GEN
AV
DEGREE
AV
DEP
AV
NET
AV
LNTA 1                  
CETA −0.34** 1              
NITA 0.01 0.24** 1              
CASHVV −0.09 0.44** 0.85** 1            
AGEAV 0.32** 0.01 0.15* 0.12 1          
NATAV 0.37** 0.00 −0.17* −0.18* −0.13 1        
GENAV 0.13 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 −0.07 0.08 1      
DEGREEAV 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.13 0.17* −0.34** −0.03 1    
DEPAV 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 −0.19** 0.30** 0.08 −0.22** 1  
NETAV 0.24** −0.13 0.04 0.04 0.36** −0.20** −0.01 0.31** −0.20** 1
WL1AV −0.09 0.01 −0.04 −0.05 −0.46** 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
LNTA the natural logarithm of total assets (TA) in millions of euros (size measure)
CETA common equity (CE) divided by TA (leverage measure)
NITA net income (before extraordinary items; NI) divided by TA (income measure)
CASHVV cash flow (CASH) divided by TA (liquidity measure)
AGEAV the average age of the supervisory board (SB) at t = -2
NATAV the average SB value of the nationality dummy variable being 1 if a NED is non-Dutch
GENAV the average SB value of the gender dummy variable being 1 if a NED is female
DEGREEAV  the average SB value of the academic degree dummy variable being 1 if a NED has an 
academic degree
DEPAV  the average SB value of the non-independence dummy variable being 1 if a NED is non-
independent
NETAV  the average SB value of the network of NEDs in terms of NED positions and chairmanships
WL1AV  the average SB value of the workload1 (each position takes 100 hrs/year) of the NEDs in 
terms of FTEs.
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7.5.9 Regression results
This regression section starts with a univariate analysis in order to determine whether 
the variables analysed above are in fact related to financial distress. Many of the variables 
under research appear to be statistically significantly related to financial distress. The 
gender and non-independence variables show only a relevant result for one specifica-
tion on one panel which is too weak for firm conclusions. However, age, education and 
network are indeed negatively related to financial distress, whilst foreign nationality and 
workload are positively related. The previous however is only a test and not a model. The 
Nagelkerke R2, a measure for the goodness of fit of a model (see 6.5.9) is low: between 
0.01 and 0.05 (not reported).
The full model specified above table 7.14 tests all resource characteristics in one as 
pleaded for and applied in Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva (2007). The intention is to show 
the additional explanatory value of the resource characteristics. Model 1 is the basic 
Table 7.12: A correlation analysis (Spearman) of the diversity in the resource dependence theory related 
characteristics on the boards of the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed 
Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 before the financial distress event 
occurred (N=201).
LNTA CETA NITA CASH
VV
AGE
DIV
NAT DIV GEN DIV EDU DIV DEP DIV NET DIV
LNTA 1
CETA −0.34** 1
NITA 0.01 0.24** 1
CASHVV −0.09 0.44** 0.85** 1
AGEDIV −0.06 0.04 −0.10 −0.05 1
NATDIV 0.38** −0.01 −0.13 −0.14* 0.22** 1
GENDIV 0.13 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 0.11 −0.03 1
EDUDIV 0.32** −0.08 0.06 0.05 −0.02 0.07 0.01 1
DEPDIV 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.20** 0.02 0.00 1
NETDIV 0.24** −0.11 0.05 0.01 −0.07 −0.07 0.03 0.31** −0.02 1
WL1DIV 0.09 −0.01 0.06 0.06 0.07 −0.07 −0.03 0.13 −0.01 0.14*
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
LNTA the natural logarithm of total assets (TA) in millions of euros (size measure)
CETA common equity (CE) divided by TA (leverage measure)
NITA net income (before extraordinary items; NI) divided by TA (income measure)
CASHVV cash flow (CASH) divided by TA (liquidity measure)
AGEDIV the diversity in age of the supervisory board (SB) at t = -2 (standard deviation)
NATDIV the diversity in nationality on the SB (Blau-indicator)
GENDIV the diversity in gender on the SB (Blau-indicator)
EDUDIV the diversity in education on the SB (Blau-indicator)
DEPDIV the diversity in non-independence on the SB (Blau-indicator)
NETDIV the diversity in network on the SB (standard deviation)
WL1AV the diversity in workload1 (each position takes 100 hrs/year) on the SB (standard deviation).
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model with only financial control variables and industry already presented in chapter 6 
(table 6.12). Model 5 is the resources availability model. Based on a resource dependence 
perspective it adds the average availability of the resource characteristics on the board 
to model 1 as explanatory variables. Model 6 is a resources diversity model. By adding the 
diversity in resources as explanatory variables to model 1, model 6 presupposes that di-
versity itself has a surplus value for the company. Since the ‘workload 1’ variables (those 
that calculate with 100 hrs/year for a NED position) differed statistically significantly 
more between the samples than the ‘workload 2’ variables (working with 200 hrs/year) 
the former are used in the models. Note that the –NED variables analysed in the previous 
sections cannot be applied as explanatory variables since they relate to an individual 
NED and not to (the board of) a company. Table 7.14 presents the results. Of the control 
variables, size (LNTA), leverage (CETA) and industry (services or ICT) are the significant 
explaining variables at the 5% level on panel t = -2. On the t = -3 panel industry (ICT) 
especially is a significant explaining variable. On the resources availability model (model 
5; those with an –AV extension) non-independence (t = -3) is negatively and workload (t 
= -2) is positively significantly related to financial distress at the 10% level (the result for 
workload in the t = -3 panel is just outside the 10% boundary). On the resources diversity 
model (model 6; those with an –DIV extension) the diversity in nationality is significantly 
positively related to financial distress in both panels at the 10% level. Thus, so it seems, 
financial distress can be associated with an average high workload of NEDs on the board 
as well as with a high nationality diversity of NEDs on the board.
Table 7.13: Univariate regression analysis on resource dependence theory related characteristics of 
the supervisory boards of the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch 
companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 respectively t = -3 before the financial 
distress event occurred.
model: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
variable t = −2 t = −3 variable t = −2 t = −3 variable t = −2 t = −3
AGENED −0.05*** −0.06*** AGEAV −0.11** −0.12*** AGEDIV 0.07 0.09
NATNED 0.70*** 0.60** NATAV 1.38* 1.53* NATDIV 1.44 a 1.67*
GENNED 0.04 0.39 GENAV 0.92 3.16a GENDIV 0.32 1.79
EDUNED − a − a DEGREEAV −1.05 a −1.11a EDUDIV −1.58* −1.40a
DEPNED 0.08 0.16 DEPAV −0.92 −0.42 DEPDIV −1.66* −1.00
NETNED −0.05* −0.05* NETAV −0.10 −0.18a NETDIV −0.02 −0.06
WL1NED 0.53** 0.56** WL1AV 1.68* 1.54* WL1DIV −1.96* −1.53
n = 952 952 201 201 201 201
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level
DISTRESS = ln (p/ (1-p))
other variables defined below tables 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13.
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Table 7.14: A logit analysis of the financial control, resource dependence and diversity related variables 
for the control sample and the financially distressed sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 
2003, based on panel data for t =-2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 5: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6AGEAV + β7GENAV + 
β8NATAV + β9DEGREEAV + β10DEPAV + β11NETAV + β12WL1AV + ε
model 6: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β13AGEDIV + 
β14GENDIV + β15NATDIV + β16DEGREEDIV + β17DEPDIV + β18NETDIV + β19WL1DIV + ε
exp. 
sign¹ model 1
t = −2
model 5 model 6 model 1
t = −3
model 5 model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) - AV (5) - DIV (6) (7) - AV (8) - DIV
financial variables
LNTA − −0.40** −0.42* −0.55** −0.16 −0.17 −0.25ª
CETA − −1.74 −2.31 −1.99 2.90 3.17ª 2.84
NITA − −20.60** −22.37** −19.80** −6.80 −8.55 −6.66
CASHVV − −2.05 −2.02 −2.13 −5.30 −4.98 −5.25ª
industry° ª ** ª *
 construction −18.55 −18.35 −18.72 −19.41 −19.24 −19.60
 trade 0.06 0.55 0.12 −0.17 0.10 −0.23
 transport −0.37 −0.59 −0.66 −0.81 −0.55 −0.78
 services 2.25* 2.55* 2.56* 1.90* 1.73ª 1.77ª
 ICT 1.83** 1.72* 1.64* 1.89*** 1.77** 1.74**
 other 0.89 0.97 1.14 0.67 0.75 0.66
resource variables
AGE −/+ 0.02 −0.05 −0.04 −0.00
NATIONALITY +/+ 1.10 2.69ª 1.57 2.48*
GENDER 0.17 1.19 2.62 2.19
EDUCATION −/− 0.23 −0.50 −0.86 −0.69
NON-INDEPENDENT −/− −1.40 −1.17 −2.17ª −1.28
NETWORK −/− −0.11 0.20 0.01 0.10
WORKLOAD +/− 2.60* −1.04 1.64 −0.24
constant 1.79ª −0.67 2.96 −0.53 −0.67 1.22
statistics
number of observations 201 201 201 201 201 201
Nagelkerke R² 0.62 0.65 0.64 0.42 0.48 0.45
LR statistics (χ²) 110.54*** 117.31*** 116.06*** 67.94*** 79.96*** 73.06***
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03
Type II error (cut-off 0.5) 0.27 0.25 0.29 0.54 0.56 0.54
Type I error (cut-off 0.1) 0.34 0.30 0.34 0.64 0.50 0.48
Type II error (cut-off 0.1) 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.04
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
° manufacturing is the reference category
¹ expected sign based on the previous analyses of distribution.
DISTRESS = ln (p / (1-p))
AV = average value of the resource on the supervisory board (SB)
DIV = diversity of the resource on the board (Blau-indicator or standard deviation)
Variables defined below tables 7.2-7.9 and 7.11.
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7.5.10 Bankrupt companies only
Section 6.5.10 touched on the composition of the financially distressed sample. Would 
the results presented in table 7.14 hold if the tests were performed on a bankruptcy-only 
sample? Table 7.15 shows that the code 1 (bankruptcy) and code 2 (financially distressed/
non-bankrupt) samples differ in only two factors: age and leverage (CETA). Section 6.5.10 
already explained the difference in CETA as the financial buffer that code 2 still had, 
and that was just burnt for code 1. The other difference between code 1 and code 2 
forms the average-age (AGEAV) and age-diversity (AGEDIV) variables. The average age 
is 59 (code 0), 55 (code 1) and 57 (code 2) and the age diversity 5.5 (code 0), 6.8 (code 1) 
and 5.0 (code 2). Thus the distressed non-bankrupt sample (code 2) has an older, less 
age diverse SB than code 1. The control (code 0) and bankrupt (code 1) samples differ 
statistically significantly on all factors except gender and non-independence. The GENAV 
and GENDIV variables do not show a difference between the groups, which was to be 
expected after the weak results of table 7.4. Just like the dummy variable DEPDM in table 
6.12, the average SB-dependence (DEPAV) and dependence-diversity (DEPDIV) show a 
difference between the code 1 and code 2 samples, but not between the bankrupt (code 
1) and the control sample (code 0). As explained in 6.5.10 this is due to the rather odd 
pattern the DEP variable shows. The DEPAV variable is around 18% for the codes 0 and 1, 
Table 7.15: An analysis of the difference in distribution of financial control, and agency theory related 
variables between the control sample, the bankrupt sub-sample, and the financially distressed non-
bankrupt sub-sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data for t = -2 and t 
= -3 (full panel) before the financial distress event occurred.
variables
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 1
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 2
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 1 and 
code 2
variables
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 1
significance 
of difference 
between 
code 0 and 
code 2
difference of 
distribution 
between 
code 1 and 
code 2
LNTA ** ** NITA *** ***
CETA *** *** *** CASHVV *** ***
AGEAV *** ** * AGEDIV *** **
NATAV ** NATDIV **
GENAV GENDIV
DEGREEAV * * EDUDIV ª ª
DEPAV * DEPDIV *
NETAV *** NETDIV *
WL1AV *** * WL1DIV ª ª
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
Variables defined under tables 7.2 - 7.9 and 7.11 above.
Code 0, 1, 2 defined under table 6.1 above.
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Table 7.16: A logit analysis of the financial control, resource dependence and diversity related variables 
for the control sample and the bankrupt sub-sample of listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, 
based on panel data for t =-2 and t = -3 before bankruptcy occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 5: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6AGEAV + β7GENAV + 
β8NATAV + β9DEGREEAV + β10DEPAV + β11NETAV + β12WL1AV + ε
model 6: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β13AGEDIV + 
β14GENDIV + β15NATDIV + β16DEGREEDIV + β17DEPDIV + β18NETDIV + β19WL1DIV + ε
exp. 
sign model 1
t =-2
model 5 model 6 model 1
t =-3
model 5 model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) - AV (5) - DIV (6) (7) - AV (8) - DIV
financial variables
LNTA − −0.47** −0.65* −0.81** −0.27ª −0.37ª −0.43*
CETA − −5.05** −6.49** −7.62** −1.43 −1.58 −2.31
NITA − −9.90ª −10.10ª −9.86ª −3.25 −1.34 −1.38
CASHVV − −2.39 −1.93 −1.23 −5.68 −6.67 −5.96
industry° ª *
 construction −18.57 −18.55 −18.79 −18.96 −18.91 −19.32
 trade −0.44 −0.07 −0.51 −0.39 −0.40 −0.85
 transport −18.21 −17.88 −18.23 −18.66 −18.01 −18.46
 services 1.87ª 1.92ª 2.05ª 1.94ª 2.28ª 2.08
 ICT 1.67** 1.54* 1.57* 1.95** 1.53* 1.57**
 other −19.02 −19.13 −19.14 −19.21 −19.34 −19.61
resource variables
AGE −/+ 0.01 −0.03 −0.09 0.09
NATIONALITY +/+ 3.22ª 4.90* 3.38* 3.81*
GENDER 1.93 2.45 3.97 3.30
EDUCATION −/− 1.49 0.58 0.14 −0.25
NON-INDEPENDENT −/− −0.67 −1.27 −2.12 −1.68
NETWORK −/− −0.04 0.22 0.05 0.03
WORKLOAD +/− 1.65 −0.84 0.36 −0.08
constant 2.72* 1.08 4.17* 0.88 5.79 1.30
statistics
number of observations 181 181 181 181 181 181
Nagelkerke R² 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.46 0.53 0.53
LR statistics (χ²) 74.26*** 81.29*** 82.68*** 59.49*** 69.95*** 70.14***
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Type II error (cut-off 0.5) 0.47 0.34 0.38 0.53 0.50 0.53
Type I error (cut-off 0.1) 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.39 0.32 0.30
Type II error (cut-off 0.1) 0.16 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.06
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
° manufacturing is the reference category.
Distress = ln (p / (1-p)).
Variables defined under tables 7.2 - 7.9, 7.11 above.
340 Chapter 7
whilst around 10% for code 2 (not reported). This means that the dependence diversity 
(DEPDIV) for code 2 is lower than for the codes 0 and 1.
Table 7.16 shows the regression results on the full models. Here again it shows that the 
financial control variables and the industry (ICT) are decisive explaining variables. How-
ever, striking in table 7.16 is the persistent significance of a nationality-related variable 
between the 5% and 10% level in both models. Thus, either many foreign nationals on the 
board (NATAV) or a high diversity in nationality (NATDIV) are both positively related to 
financial distress, with diversity as the slightly more important factor. Annex 4 contains 
additional statistical comments.
7.6 COnCLUSIOn
Departing from the research model developed in 5.6, this chapter aimed to develop and 
subsequently test monitoring-related hypotheses based on the resource dependency 
theory. It tested the following hypotheses:
H1:  the incidence of older (for: more experienced) NEDs is negatively related to financial 
distress
H2: the incidence of non-national NEDs is not related to financial distress
H3: the incidence of female NEDs is negatively related to financial distress
H4: the incidence of better educated NEDs is negatively related to financial distress
H5: the incidence of independent NEDs is not related to financial distress
H6: the incidence of multiple-director NEDs is negatively related to financial distress
H7: the workload of NEDs is positively related to financial distress.
The analysis of differences between the samples presented in tables 7.2 – 7.9 showed that 
all variables under research, except gender, differ statistically significantly between the 
financially distressed sample and the control sample. The NEDs on the control sample 
board in t = -2 are 60 years old, 84% Dutch, 97% male, 71% have a university degree, 82% 
are independent, they have a 4.39 non-executive director position, and a ‘workload1’ of 
0.68 FTE. NEDs on the financially distressed sample are significantly younger, more often 
foreign, less educated, somewhat less independent and have a smaller network and a 
higher workload. For a NED on the financially distressed sample in t = -2 this gives an 
age of 56, 73% Dutch, 97% male, 60% have a university degree, 81% are independent, have 
a 3.80 NED position with a median of 2, and a ‘workload1’ of 0.79 FTE.
The univariate regression results from table 7.13 answer the hypotheses.
H1 on the negative effect of age on distress cannot be rejected since tables 7.2 and 7.13 
show that being ‘younger’ and financial distress are positively related for the individual 
NED as well as for the SB. Nor should H2 on the irrelevance of nationality be rejected 
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since tables 7.3 and 7.13 show that a non-Dutch nationality and financial distress are 
positively related for the individual NED as well as for the SB. H3 on the negative ef-
fect of gender on distress should be rejected since only 3% of the NED population is 
female, the differences analysis shows no results, and therefore no meaning should be 
attached to the only significance of the average gender variable GENAV at the 10% level 
in table 7.13. Hypothesis H4 on the negative effect of education on distress cannot be 
rejected since tables 7.5, 7.6 and 7.13 show that better education and financial distress 
are clearly negatively related. Since tables 7.7 and 7.13 show that especially the diversity 
in non-independence relates negatively to financial distress at the 5% level in t = -2, H5 on 
the irrelevance of non-independence on distress should be rejected. H6 on the negative 
effect of network on distress cannot be rejected since tables 7.8 and 7.13 show that a 
larger network relates negatively to financial distress. As for workload, H7 on the positive 
effect of workload on distress cannot be rejected since tables 7.9 and 7.13 show that 
‘distressed’ NEDs have a higher workload than their equals on control boards. Moreover, 
the workload diversity in control boards is higher, thus implying more flexibility. Indeed 
this workload diversity is negatively related to distress.
The logit regression results are presented in table 7.14 for the full-distressed sample 
and in table 7.16 for the bankrupt-only sample. The resource availability model (model 
5) tests the additional explanatory power of the availability of resources on the SB. For 
the full-distressed sample, WORKLOAD is a positive explanatory variable for distress 
in panel t = -2. The NON-INDEPENDENT variable is a negative explanatory variable for 
distress but only at the 10% level. In the bankrupt-only sample, NATIONALITY proves a 
significant and positive explanatory variable for distress. The resource diversity model 
(model 6) tests the additional explanatory power of the diversity of resources on the SB. 
Both the full-distressed sample and the bankrupt-only sample show that diversity in 
nationality is a positive explanatory variable for distress. Apparently the disadvantages 
of a foreigner on the board in terms of culture and communication weigh heavier than 
the supposed advantages in terms of know-how and resources.
This is the first study that systematically explores the relationship between personal 
characteristics and resources of NEDs and financial distress. The variables age, national-
ity, education, independence, network and workload are in one specification or another 
statistically significantly different between the control and distressed samples. This 
shows that the firm’s resource bundle significantly differs between these samples; and 
this bundle influences the path-dependence of the firm (Kor, 2003). Does this ‘resource 
bundle’ influence the quality of monitoring and does it have explanatory value for the 
chance of financial distress? Logit analysis presents non-independence (t = -3) as a 
negative and workload (t = -2) as a positive explanatory variable for financial distress. 
There is one outstanding result: the presence of foreign NEDs is a positive explanatory 
variable for financial distress in both panels. Since this is not per se a causal relationship, 
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it would be too simple a statement to dissuade the appointment of foreign NEDs. How-
ever, a strong warning that with the entrance of foreigners on the board new processes 
and difficulties enter the board room seems appropriate.
Remarkably, the network hypothesis which is directly based on the resource dependence 
theory is by no means supported in the regression models. However, the univariate 
analysis shows a positive relationship for the network of an individual NED and a control 
company at the 5% level.
The results confirm the resource dependence theory as well as the quest for more diver-
sity since (1) most resource variables specified in this chapter prove to be statistically 
significantly differently distributed between the samples in average availability and/
or diversity; and (2) most variables are significant explanatory variables for financial 
distress in the univariate analysis.
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EnDnOTES
1 Part of the hypothesis development has been published in Santen, B.P.A., and A.B.M. Soppe, 
2009, NED characteristics, board structure and management turnover in the Netherlands 
in times of financial distress: a theoretical and empirical survey, Corporate Ownership & 
Control 7, 285-301.
2 The first is said to be the case with Chairman Martinez of ABN AMRO Bank (De Prooi, J. Smit, 
2006); the latter with the Chairman of the Audit Committee Fahlin in the AHOLD case (trial).
3 Pfeffer and Salancik define interlocking directorates as ‘the placing of representatives from 
environmental groups or organizations on advisory committees or boards of directors.’
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4 A doctorate degree ‘honoris causa’ is counted as a doctorate from the year it was conferred.
5 This is the definition of DC III.2.2. Although the DC did not apply in the research period, the 
definition facilitates an objective distinction between the NEDs.
6 Wet Melding Zeggenschap, a former Dutch law, at present part of the Wft, that required share-
holders passing certain thresholds, like 5%, to register this with the Netherlands Authority 
for the Financial Markets (AFM).
7 Even at present, s 2:142(3) BW requires NEDs to disclose other (former) occupations ‘in as far 
they are relevant in relation to the fulfilment of the NED position’ and other ‘commissaris’ 
positions in other legal persons.
8 Van Ees et al. (2007: 6) provide other indexes and literature.
9 The original publication: P.M. Blau, 1977, Inequality and heterogeneity, New York, Free Press, 
could not be made available to the author of this thesis.
10 Cited from Van Ees et al. 2007.
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Relevance of the agency theory and the resource 
dependence theory for non-listed companies near 
financial distress: an empirical approach
The common apex of the decision 
control system of organizations, large 
and small, in which decision agents 
do not bear a major share of the 
wealth effects of their decisions is 
some form of a board of directors
(Fama and Jensen, 1983: 311)
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8.1 InTRODUCTIOn
This chapter focuses on differences in corporate governance and resource variables be-
tween non-listed financially distressed and non-distressed legal persons. It tests agency 
theory and resource dependence theory inspired hypotheses on governance variables, 
governance structures and resources to a set of randomly selected, and therefore mainly 
small distressed legal persons and their non-distressed pairs. The sample consists of 
private limiteds (BV’s), co-operatives (coöperaties), associations (verenigingen) and foun-
dations (stichtingen). This research is unique. It adds to the literature by showing relevant 
relationships between governance and resource-related variables and financial distress. 
The chapter reads as follows. It starts with a theoretical analysis of the different types 
of legal persons under research in 8.2. This theoretical part ends in the formulation of 
hypotheses to be tested. After discussing the data in 8.3 and the research method in 8.4, 
section 8.5 presents the results for each type of legal person. The chapter ends with a 
conclusion and a discussion of the results in 8.6.
8.2 THEORY AnD HYPOTHESES
8.2.1 Theory
Hansmann (1996) shows, as explained in chapter 4, that there are basically two forms 
of legal persons: those that distribute profit and those that do not. Of the former, the 
co-operative is the root in Hansmann’s vision. The private limited company should be 
understood as a gradually developed, transaction costs saving form of a money lenders 
co-operative. One could argue that a co-operative is meant to procure the broader mate-
rial needs1 of its members, whilst the private limited company is ultimately directed at 
the financial, i.e. profit side of the firm.
The Dutch non-distributive legal forms are the association (vereniging) and the founda-
tion (stichting). The association has members and its objective is generally to defend, 
further, or achieve a common interest of the members. While this may be of an idealistic 
nature, it is often about material needs of the individual concerning interests nearby 
(a tennis court, a parking lot) or further off (ANWB, the Dutch automobile association; 
VEB, the Dutch shareholders’ association). The foundation can be used to a large degree 
to achieve the same objects, but legally it is not permitted to have members2. So any 
organizations in which members want to have a say should preferably not be organized 
as a foundation3, although amendments to the articles relating to the mandatory form as 
described in chapter 4 are allowed. Foundations therefore often strive for objects in the 
longer term and of a more idealistic nature. Where private limiteds, co-operatives and 
associations have a board and a general meeting as the two central organs, the foundation 
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has only one: the board, generally existing of highly motivated, often unpaid4 directors. 
As indicated in chapter 4, foundations are hardly supervised. Since ‘nine-eleven’ the 
Dutch government works on amelioration of the supervision of foundations since these 
could supposedly be used by terrorists for financing and organizing activities5.
This chapter aims to study the differences in governance characteristics of financially 
distressed6 and non-distressed companies of the general (co-operative) and specific 
(limited) profit-distributing form, and of the self-interested (association) or altruistic 
(foundation) non-distributing form7. The study tests the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory based insights developed in chapters 3, 6 and 7 respectively. Whilst 
the previous chapters focused on supervisory boards (SBs) and non-executive directors 
(NEDs), the companies under research in this chapter show very few NEDs. Moreover, 
especially in the BV a lot of the members are directors themselves, implying none (for 
director-100% members) or fewer agency problems. Is it permitted then to apply these 
theories to the executive directors (EDs) of these legal persons? The answer is positive for 
two reasons. First, Fama (1980) explained that managers are each others best monitors. 
From his article there is no clue that this should only be restricted to non-executive 
board members. In fact and in line with Argenti (1976) ‘the more monitors (up to a limit), 
the less chance of financial distress’, is the leading thought of this thesis. Second, there is 
no reason to hypothesize that non-alignment of interests should only be found in listed 
companies, or companies with specialized management. The agency theory applies just 
as well in nonprofit companies (Steinberg, 2010). In every firm, there will be tensions of 
material or immaterial nature between the interests of the firm and those of the execu-
tive board members since by definition their utility functions are not equal. Thus, there 
will always be tension between the legal requirement that the board should act in the 
interests of the company, whatever they may be and however they should be determined, 
and the private interests of the individual executive director. This tension is researched 
through a number of hypotheses.
8.2.2 Hypotheses
The hypotheses formulated below find their origin in literature discussed in the previous 
chapters. Not all the references are repeated. The hypotheses to be tested are essentially 
based on the agency theory and the resource dependence theory. Agency theory based 
are the hypotheses H1 to H5, which relate to the monitoring structure of the legal person. 
They read as follows:
H1: the number of directors is negatively related to financial distress
This hypothesis refers to chapter 6 that explained that directors are each others best 
monitors (Fama, 1980). If there are few directors, directors may demonstrate Icarean 
behaviour (Skeel, 2005). There are few ‘equals’ to correct them. Or as Argenti (1976: 173) 
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puts it: ‘The key cause of failure is the one-man rule. (..) No man is infallible. Eventually 
all one-man rules must fail.’ If the board is too large, it may not be efficient (Yermack, 
1996). Since the size of the board in the sample is generally in the efficient range Yermack 
described, the hypothesis is formulated to test Fama’s monitoring thesis.
H2(a-c): the number of additional control instruments is negatively related to financial dis-
tress
This hypothesis refers to the agency theory based decision process as explained in chap-
ter 3 (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Separation of decision management and decision control 
is the most effective system to align the interests of member and agent. If therefore a 
third person or body is called upon to effectuate either the management or the control of 
the decision, less financial distress would be expected. This hypothesis is tested for the 
presence of another legal person on the board i.e. the holding company or a partner, since 
one might expect a more balanced and more rational view of a legal-person-director 
since he has to consider the interests of both legal persons, sometimes in different meet-
ings (hypothesis 2.a); for the presence of NEDs (hypothesis 2.b); and for the presence of a 
manager outside the board (hypothesis 2.c).
H3(a-b): board turnover is positively related to financial distress
This hypothesis refers to chapter 6 which discussed the studies of Hermalin and Weis-
bach (1988) and Gilson (1989). Either through dismissal or through resignation for fear of 
reputational damage, financial distress may result in a relatively high outflow of directors 
in the financially distressed sample (hypothesis 3.a), whilst the inflow of new directors to 
financially distressed companies will be lower (hypothesis 3.b) than the control sample.
H4: overdue disclosure is positively related to financial distress
Chapter 1 showed that an important cause of financial distress is mismanagement. One 
of the director’s duties discussed in chapter 4 is the duty of disclosure. This chapter 
equates disclosure with the legal duty to file the annual accounts at the Handelsregister. 
Non-disclosure is an indication (even by law, s 2:138, 248 BW) of mismanagement. One 
may expect less non-disclosure (implying mismanagement) in the control group than 
in the distressed group. Experience shows that entrepreneurs often cut in costs for 
bookkeeping and auditing if distress is at hand. This hypothesis can only be tested for 
co-operatives and private limited companies, since Dutch law generally does not require 
foundations and associations to disclose.
H5: the age of the company is negatively related to financial distress
This hypothesis, also found in research of Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005), refers to the 
theorem of ‘survival of the fittest’. Out of the numerous companies started up in year 
t = 0, some will go bankrupt in year t = 1, others in t = 2 and so on. The general age 
of a control sample company will therefore grow, whilst that of a distressed company 
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will stop. Firm age may be an indication of adequate management, since the company 
apparently survived whilst others failed. Kor (2003) uses firm age as a control variable.
The following hypotheses refer to the resource dependence theory. They focus on the 
resource availability and resource diversity of EDs.
H6(a-b): experience on the board is negatively related to financial distress
This hypothesis refers to chapter 7 which tested age as a proxy variable for experience 
(Kor, 2003). This studie contains tenure as another measure for experience. Age, a mea-
sure of lifetime experience and network more than of specific company experience, will 
be measured as experience measure in hypothesis 6.a; tenure, an often used measure (e.g. 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Kor, 2003, Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja, 2007) which 
is more specifically company-related, is the experience measure applied in hypothesis 
6.b.
H 7(a-c): diversity is negatively related to financial distress
This hypothesis refers to the diversity issue discussed in chapter 7. There are strong 
scientific arguments to plea for more diversity in boards, and some results indicate a 
positive relationship with performance (Carter, Simkins and Simpson, 2003). This study 
researches three diversity variables i.e. gender (hypothesis 7.a), nationality (hypothesis 
7.b) and non-independence (hypothesis 7.c). People are ‘non-independent’ if they are 
family (surname) or form a household (address).
There is one general hypothesis based on Hansmann (1996).
H8: governance characteristics differ between the different types of legal persons.
Based on Hansmann’s (1996) theory one would expect that the results for a co-operative, 
since it is the general form of a company, and the BV would be rather similar, whilst those 
of the non-profit distributing forms would also show a strong similarity.
8.3 DATA
This section describes the collection of the data. It explains the problems met, and de-
cisions taken, during the process. It subsequently discusses the bankruptcy data, the 
governance data, the financial data and the disclosure data. The sampling method is 
explained in 8.3.5. The section concludes with a general data analysis in 8.3.6. The focus 
is on the data for the years t = -1 to t = -4 (t = 0 is the year in which financial distress 
actually happens).
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8.3.1 Bankruptcy data
In this chapter financial distress is equalled to bankruptcy and suspension of payments8, 
as no data is available on financially distressed non-bankrupt companies (as there was 
in chapter 6). The prominent source on bankruptcies and suspension of payments in the 
Netherlands is a central register on the www.rechtspraak.nl site powered by the Raad 
voor de Rechtspraak (RvR; Council for the Judiciary)9. The register (called the Centraal 
Insolventieregister; Central Insolvency Register) contains all the bankruptcy-related an-
nouncements ordered by the 19 Dutch District Courts (rechtbank). It started function-
ing around June 2000, without legal basis. Up to 2005 the data base, presently kept 
as Insolvencies Archive on the www.rechtspraak.nl site, was very flexible as one could 
search for elements in the text by choosing all of the courts or only selected courts, 
and any given period in time. Due to the protection of privacy as required by the Wet 
Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (WBP; Personal Data Protection Act), this flexible system 
was replaced on 1 January 2005 by a less easily accessible system, the present Central 
Insolvency Register. This system only allows searches on names (exact names and initials 
for natural persons; for legal persons asterisks and Boolean-operators are allowed), trade 
register numbers (for legal persons), postal codes (combined with house number) and 
some specified insolvency characteristics (related to the court’s sentence). The system 
refuses any output of more than 200 items. All these limitations seriously hinder scien-
tific research on this data base.
There are no other databases with detailed information on bankruptcies. After pressing 
‘bankruptcies’, the Handelsregister only shows the addresses of so-called bankrupt active 
companies, which the administrator has decided not to close down for the time being. 
This is a minority of bankruptcies. However, the Handelsregister does contain historical 
information on all companies, also bankrupt and dissolved ones. This information can 
only be printed and is not electronically exportable. Every February, the CBS an aggregate 
survey of bankruptcies for the past year. This information comes through questionnaires 
Table 8.1 Survey of declared bankruptcies by legal form, 2000-2009.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
institutions 83 94 100 112 127 110 124 119 124 171
companies (excl one-
man business), of which
2,538 3,239 3,985 5,123 5,140 4,973 4,104 3,470 3,716 6,824
  limited form (NV/BV) 2,284 2,975 3,725 4,709 4,616 4,434 3,645 3,189 3,416 6,318
 vof and cv 212 232 227 363 485 495 392 222 235 402
 maatschap, Ltd, Inc 42 32 33 51 39 44 67 59 65 104
natural persons, of 
which one-man business
1,877
958
2,501
997
2,686
878
3,513
1,151
4,082
1,381
4,999
1,697
4,951
1,713
4,363
1,013
3,007
795
3,564
1,045
total bankruptcies 4,498 5,834 6,771 8,748 9,349 10,082 9,179 7,952 6,847 10,559
Source: CBS and own research
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from the District Courts. This aggregate information does not fully correspond with the 
information collected from the detailed information supplied by the Centraal Insolven-
tieregister. Table 8.1 shows the CBS survey of bankruptcies in the period 2001-2009. 
It shows a sharp rise of the number of bankruptcies in 2009 to above that of 2005. 
More striking is the number of companies that went bankrupt in 2009: almost twice the 
number for 2007 and over 30% higher than the 2003 and 2004 figures. The table shows 
coöperaties, verenigingen and stichtingen on one line as institutions. Table 8.2 shows the 
results of a breakdown of the category institutions from table 8.1 in coöperaties, vereni-
gingen and stichtingen and of the limited form in BV and NV, based on the author’s own 
research by means of the Centraal Insolventieregister and the Insolvencies Archive. The 
BV-line in table 8.2 results from the deduction of the bankruptcies of NVs found in the 
insolvency registers, and the line BV and NV from table 8.1.
Remarkably not all the bankruptcies reported by the CBS could be traced in the insol-
vency registers. The subtotal for institutions in table 8.2, as calculated on the basis of 
data derived from the Centraal Insolventieregister and the Insolvencies Archive, and the 
CBS figures on institutions differs on average by 8%. This could be due to human errors 
such as input failures (the symbol ö in the Dutch word coöperatie was found in various 
forms in the Insolvencies Archive), categorization failures (is the bankruptcy of someone 
trading as a ‘limited’, the bankruptcy of a Ltd or of a private person), search-formulation 
failures (the problem of finding the right combination of Boolean operators) and report-
ing errors to the CBS. The fact that the law does not require an association (contrary to 
private limited companies, cooperatives and foundations10) to have the word ‘vereniging’ 
in its name, is another problem. An association can virtually go by any name, and as a 
consequence it will be impossible to retrieve all the associations from the insolvency 
Table 8.2 Survey of declared bankruptcies of institutions and BV and NV, 2001-2007.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
total 
bankrupt
total 
active 
2007
institutions
 co-operatives 8 10 15 16 15 18 9 91 1,850
 associations 8 5 3 7 4 3 3 33 5,720
 foundations 65 76 83 101 76 103 94 598 17,660
 subtotal 81 91 101 124 95 124 106 722
CBS institutions 94 100 112 127 110 124 119 786
CBS BV and NV 2,975 3,725 4,709 4,616 4,434 3,645 3,189 27,293 262,742
 NV 14 12 11 12 20 11 6 86
 BV 2,961 3,713 4,698 4,604 4,414 3,634 3,183 27,207
Source: CBS, Handelsregister, Santen and de Bos (2006), www.rechtspraak.nl, own research.
352 Chapter 8
registers. It might be best to interpret the difference between the CBS institutions line 
and the subtotal institutions line as being due to this ‘mention of vereniging’ problem.
8.3.2 Governance data
Data for non-listed legal persons can be derived from two sources, the Handelsregister 
and REACH. REACH is an electronically available database (ultimately) published by 
ReedElsevier. It does not contain complete actual as well as historical data on directors 
for small companies. Therefore the Handelsregister has been the source for the gover-
nance variables used in this study. It discerns agency theory and resource dependence 
theory related variables. Agency theory related variables concern the organization of the 
company and the turnover of directors. They are in sequential order of the hypotheses to 
be tested: DIRECTOR (the number of directors at yearend); DIRLPDM (a dummy variable 
for the presence of a legal person on the board11); NED (the number of non-executive 
directors); MANAGER (the number of managers outside the board); LEFT and NEW (the 
number of directors leaving and taking office during the year): DISCLDM (a dummy vari-
able for the timely disclosure of the financial data). The age of the legal person (LP AGE), 
measured from the date of registration in the register, is considered an agency variable 
as well in the sense that the institutional memory and established procedures of an older 
company could be of help in avoiding financial distress. Resource dependence theory 
related variables concern experience and diversity on the board. Both the variables DIR 
AGE (average age of directors at year-end) and TENURE (average tenure of directors at 
year-end) are some indication for experience, whilst GENDER (the number of female 
executive directors), NATIONALITY (the number of non-Dutch executive directors12) 
and DEPENDENT (the number of non-independent directors13) give specific information 
about the sort of person a director is. Data on the education of directors or on member-
ship and shareholders14 is not available. The data is presented and applied in terms of 
numbers, as e.g. has been done by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Ruigrok, Peck and 
Tacheva (2007). Since the incidence of gender, nationality or non-independence is almost 
always, if at all, one, a dummy variable as in Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) would 
not add additional information and has therefore been omitted. The effect of diversity 
on the board is measured as in chapter 7. However, the various AVERAGE and DIVERSITY 
(Blau-indicator) variables showed virtually no significant result. The results are therefore 
not reported in the tables and the text15.
8.3.3 Financial data
It appeared to be impossible to construct a full database with financial data from the 
Handelsregister for three reasons. The first reason for the lack of financial data is that 
disclosure of financial data for associations and foundations is not required legally un-
less they carry one or more businesses with an aggregate turnover of more than €4.4 
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million16. The second reason is that legal persons often do not comply with the obligation 
of disclosure17. The third reason is that if the Handelsregister indicates that financial data 
has been disclosed, the data is not always available on-line.
An effort has been made to acquire additional information on bankrupt legal persons 
through research of the District Courts files, through questionnaires (by letter and by 
email) and through telephonic interviews, but to no avail. The District Court files provide 
insufficiently standardized and complete information. Every administrator fills in the 
required report in a different way. These reports seldom contain complete information. 
This could be due to negligence of the bankrupt company if the data is not available, as 
well as that of the administrator, who is not always keen to retrieve and fill in all the 
requested details. The response to questionnaires proved insufficient as well.
Since the disclosure of BVs was relatively high, a financial database was only constructed 
for this type of legal person. The 179 data, belonging to 100 companies for three years 
(60%) and retrieved from the Handelsregister, do not contain any information on cash 
flow or result18.
8.3.4 Disclosure data
Depending on the size, Dutch law requires full or partial disclosure of annual accounts 
by all BVs and co-operatives. Associations and foundations are exempt, unless they 
exploit companies with a turnover of €4.4 million or more19. Non-disclosure is a criminal 
offence20, and in the case of bankruptcy it could lead to personal liability of the direc-
tors21. In practice though, the disclosure obligation is not well-adhered to, as table 8.3 
shows. A mere 57% of the BVs and only 34% of the co-operatives disclosed according 
to the legal obligations within 13 months after year-end (the consolidated statements 
in the last column are treated as timely as well). Around 9-10% discloses in the 14th 
month, which is important because the Hoge Raad has judged a delay of 11 days to be 
an insignificant omission22; others plea for a 14 days’23 terme de grâce. Another 13-16% 
eventually disclose after the 14th month; whilst 20% of the BVs and 41% of the coöperaties 
do not disclose at all.
Table 8.3: survey of disclosure by BVs and coöperaties of the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample, over the period t =-2 through t =-4 before the distress event.
number of 
obligations to 
disclose
no disclosure timely 14th month afterwards
consolidated at 
a higher level
BV 250  50 20% 125 50% 24 10% 33 13% 18 7%
co-operative 259 105 41%  87 34% 24  9% 42 16%  1 0%
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8.3.5 Sampling method
An analysis of board characteristics of bankrupt companies becomes more interesting 
if the results are compared with data on similar non-distressed companies. As all the 
information on distressed as well as control companies had to be retrieved manually 
from the Handelsregister at a certain cost24, decisions had to be taken on the most ef-
ficient approach to this research:
• the number of financially distressed companies to be researched was arbitrarily25 
limited to 50 by type of legal person.
• the distressed BVs were randomly chosen from the declared bankruptcies on 24, 25 
June and 1 and 2 July 2008. The distressed co-operatives were randomly chosen 
out of the 91 reported bankrupt coöperaties in table 8.2. Only 33 verenigingen went 
bankrupt during 2001-2007, another 6 could be retrieved from 2000 and from 2008, 
making the total number 39. The distressed stichtingen were randomly selected from 
the 598 reported ones in table 8.2.
• for each company in the distressed group, one similar company from the control 
group was chosen;
• a similar company means: as far as possible similar in SIC code26 on a two-digit level 
and similar in size, measured in number of employees (as financial data was mostly 
unavailable, these could not be used as size measure). The data on SIC codes and 
number of employees was furnished by REACH.
• the control group consists of a random sample out of all the non-distressed, at least 
one-year-old companies27 available from the Handelsregister.
It should be noted that the control group by no means forms a random selection of the 
sample of non-distressed companies. It is deemed more useful to compare bankrupt 
companies with similar non-distressed companies (which are chosen randomly from the 
group of non-bankrupt and ‘similar’ companies), than with a randomly selected sample 
of non-distressed companies, since size and industry may determine the organization 
form.
As the bankruptcies under research have been declared over a time span of years – with 
an exception for the BVs – the control sample could only be drawn afterwards. Since the 
aim of this research is to discover patterns, and the relevant legislation did not change, 
this procedure does not influence the results, except for one variable: the age of the legal 
person. This problem has been solved by using the average bankruptcy declaration date 
for the legal person concerned as the t = 0 for the control sample28.
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8.3.6 General data analysis
This section analyses in 8.3.6.1 the numbers of the various variables involved, to get a 
feel for the dataset. In 8.3.6.2 the industry distribution of the sample is shown.
Table 8.4: the incidence and absence of direction-related count variables in the control and distressed 
sample of Dutch BVs, coöperaties, verenigingen and stichtingen.
 
BV coöperatie vereniging stichting
number average number average number average number average
number of companies 100 100   78 100
number of observations 350 359  302 350
incidence of:
directors 546 1.56 949 2.64 1374 4.55 1040 2.97
directors/legal 
person 141 0.40  47 0.13    1 0.00   10 0.03
female directors  68 0.19 172 0.48  252 0.83  288 0.82
foreign directors  61 0.17 108 0.30   85 0.28  100 0.29
non-indep. directors  58 0.17 126 0.35   29 0.10   13 0.04
leaving directors  61 0.17  90 0.25  312 1.03  158 0.45
new directors  61 0.17  77 0.21  253 0.84  137 0.39
NEDs  50 0.14   6 0.02    0 0.00   58 0.17
managers  11 0.03  37 0.10   27 0.09   44 0.13
timely disclosure 143 0.57(a)  88 0.34(b)
absence of:
directors/legal 
person 209 0.60 317 0.88 301 1.00 340 0.97
female directors 285 0.81 209 0.58 157 0.52 187 0.53
foreign directors 309 0.88 278 0.77 259 0.86 258 0.81
non-indep. directors 292 0.83 253 0.70 276 0.91 337 0.96
female,foreign,non-
indep. 237 0.68 156 0.43 121 0.40 157 0.45
leaving directors 312 0.89 292 0.81 158 0.52 264 0.75
new directors 312 0.89 313 0.87 182 0.60 274 0.78
NEDs 329 0.94 354 0.99 302 1.00 335 0.96
managers 339 0.97 322 0.90 275 0.91 309 0.88
timely disclosure 107 0.43(a) 171 0.66(b) − − − −
age:
legal person age 10.39 8.02 27.27 10.44
director age 47.76 42.96 46.32 46.95
(a) out of 250 observations.
(b) out of 259 observations.
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8.3.6.1 Number analysis of the data
Whilst the results of various analysis techniques of the data will be shown in 8.5, table 
8.4 presents the raw data for each legal person. The second line shows the total number 
of observations available for each legal person since not every legal person existed during 
the full period t = -1 through t = -4.
The data gives rise to a few remarks:
(a) the vereniging shows the highest number of directors, as well as of female, leaving and 
new directors. Its legal persons are the oldest of the dataset. It also shows the lowest 
percentage (40%) of ‘all white, all male’ boards, to be derived from the line ‘absence of: 
female, foreign, non-indep’;
(b) BVs show the lowest number of female and foreign directors, and the highest number 
of ‘all white, all male’ boards. BV boards are the smallest of all legal persons. BVs also 
have legal persons on the board most frequently;
(c) coöperaties show the highest incidence of non-independent directors, presumably a 
consequence of the ‘man-wife’ coöperaties relatively recently established for fiscal 
reasons as can be interpreted from the ‘legal person age’ line in the table’s last row.
8.3.6.2 Industry analysis of the data
Figure 8.1 shows the division of bankruptcies over the various industries. The BIK-codes 
and number of employees were furnished by REACH. It should be stressed that, as the 
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(a) the vereniging shows the highest number of directors, as well as of female, leaving 
and new directors. Its legal persons are the oldest of the dataset. It also shows the 
lowest percentage (40%) of ‘all white, all male’ boards, to be derived from the line 
‘absence of: female, foreign, non-indep’; 
(b) BVs show the lowest number of female and foreign directors, and the highest 
number of ‘all white, all male’ boards. BV boards are the smallest of all legal persons. 
BVs also have legal persons on the board most frequently; 
(c) coöperaties show the highest incidence of non-independent directors, presumably 
a consequence of the ‘man-wife’ coöperaties relatively recently established for fiscal 
reasons as can be interpreted from the ‘legal person age’ line in the table’s last row.  
8.3.6.2 Industry analysis of the data 
Figure 8.1 shows the division of bankruptcies over the various industries. The BIK-
codes and number of employees were furni hed by REACH. It should be stressed that, 
as the input of the original data has often been done manually29, mistakes in the data 
are possible. Furthermore, questions of classification (of industry for example) bear 
subjective elements30.  
 
Figure 8.1: an analysis of the industry sectors of the financially distressed sample for the BV, the 
coöperatie, the vereniging and the stichting. 
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Figure 8.1: an analysis of the industry sectors of the financially distressed sample for the BV, the 
coöperatie, the vereniging and the stichting.
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input of the original data has often been done manually29, mistakes in the data are pos-
sible. Furthermore, questions of classification (of industry for example) bear subjective 
elements30. Since this research is intended to be done on data disclosed to the public in 
order to make the results comparable and objective, the data has not been changed (let 
alone evident typing errors). The Handelsregister as well as REACH are thus followed 
rigorously.
Figure 8.2 shows a clear emphasis on commercial activities for the BV and the co-opera-
tives; on welfare, especially health and education, related activities for associations; and 
on cultural, especially sports and specific or general interests promoting, foundations, 
each as could be expected from the original roots of the legal form. There were not many 
ICT-related bankrupt companies. In the period under review (2008 for the BV; 2001-2008 
for the other legal persons31) the highest reported incidence of bankruptcies is in the 
service sector, which includes ICT, followed by culture, welfare and trade.
8.4 METHOD
The applied methods are the same as in the chapters 6 and 7 and already explained in 
6.4. Each section contains the analysis of one type of legal person. The analysis starts 
with a correlation table, calculated through the Spearman-method as most variables are 
distributed (very) skewed and as some are of an ordinal nature. The difference between 
the samples comes next. Since the control sample is matched with the distressed sample 
in industry and size, the difference between the samples is determined by the non-
parametric Wilcoxon test. The null hypothesis in the tests is that both samples do not 
 
Figure 8.2: an analysis of the indust y sectors of the total sample of Dutch BVs, coöperaties, verenigingen 
and stichtingen.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8.5: a correlation table (Spearman) of governance variables of Dutch BVs based on the data for t = -
1 through t = -4 before the financial distress event occurred. 
 
  DIR DIR NED MAN LEFT NEW DISC BV DIR TEN GEND NAT 
DIRECTOR 1                       
DIRLPDM .01 1                     
NED .45** .06 1                   
MANAGER .04 .05 -.04 1                 
LEFT .07 .13* .25** .06 1               
NEW .20** .16** .34** .01 .77** 1             
DISCLDM .24** .00 .07 .00 .12 .13* 1           
BV AGE .15** -.14** .16** -.10 .07 .12* .25** 1         
DIR AGE .15** -.01 .04 .10 -.08 -.08 .10 .42** 1       
TENURE -.04 -.18** -.18** -.13* -.34** -.34** .06 .59** .52** 1     
GENDER .41** -.05 .02 .02 -.02 -.02 .12 -.13* -.03 -.06 1   
NATIONALITY .27** -.03 .15** .05 .13* .16** .01 .05 .02 -.25** .05 1 
DEPENDENT .52** -.08 -.11* .02 -.11* -.08 .20** .03 .11* .17** .60** -.04 
** correlation is significant at the 1% level; *  correlation is significant at the 5% level. 
DIRECTOR number of executive directors (EDs) 
DIRLPDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of (one or more) EDs that are legal persons 
NED  number of non-executive directors (NEDs) 
MANAGER number of professional managers outside the executive board (EB) 
LEFT  number of EDs that left during the year 
NEW  number of EDs that ook offic  during the year 
DISCLDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of timely disclosure in the Handelsregister 
BV AGE  lifetime of the BV 
DIR AGE  average age of the EDs 
TENURE  average years of tenure of the EDs 
GENDER  number of female EDs 
NATIONALITY number of non-Dutch EDs  
DEPENDENT number of non-independent EDs. 
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Figure 8.2: an analysis of the industry sectors of the total sample of Dutch BVs, coöperaties, 
verenigingen and stichtingen.
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differ. Finally each section presents a table with the results of a univariate regression 
between the governance variable as explanatory variable and distress. This table shows 
whether there is a relationship between distress and the variable. This relationship is not 
necessarily a causal relationship.
The results of the analysis of differences and the univariate regression analysis are 
presented over four panels: the t= -1, t= -2, t= -3, t= -4 panel. This detailed analysis 
enables detection of patterns for each legal person near financial distress.
A regression analysis on the governance data is omitted due to the lack of reliable 
financial control variables.
Table 8.5: a correlation table (Spearman) of governance variables of Dutch BVs based on the data for t = 
-1 through t = -4 before the financial distress event occurred.
 
DIR
DIR
LP NED MAN LEFT NEW
DISC
DM
BV
AGE
DIR 
AGE TEN GEND NAT
DIRECTOR 1                      
DIRLPDM .01 1                    
NED .45** .06 1                  
MANAGER .04 .05 −.04 1                
LEFT .07 .13* .25** .06 1              
NEW .20** .16** .34** .01 .77** 1            
DISCLDM .24** .00 .07 .00 .12 .13* 1          
BV AGE .15** −.14** .16** −.10 .07 .12* .25** 1        
DIR AGE .15** −.01 .04 .10 −.08 −.08 .10 .42** 1      
TENURE −.04 −.18** −.18** −.13* −.34** −.34** .06 .59** .52** 1    
GENDER .41** −.05 .02 .02 −.02 −.02 .12 −.13* −.03 −.06 1  
NATIONALITY .27** −.03 .15** .05 .13* .16** .01 .05 .02 −.25** .05 1
DEPENDENT .52** −.08 −.11* .02 −.11* −.08 .20** .03 .11* .17** .60** −.04
** correlation is significant at the 1% level; * correlation is significant at the 5% level.
DIRECTOR number of executive directors (EDs)
DIRLPDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of (one or more) EDs that are legal persons
NED number of non-executive directors (NEDs)
MANAGER number of professional managers outside the executive board (EB)
LEFT number of EDs that left during the year
NEW number of EDs that took office during the year
DISCLDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of timely disclosure in the Handelsregister
BV AGE lifetime of the BV
DIR AGE average age of the EDs
TENURE average years of tenure of the EDs
GENDER number of female EDs
NATIONALITY number of non-Dutch EDs
DEPENDENT number of non-independent EDs.
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Table 8.6: An analysis of governance variables for the financially distressed sample and the matched 
pair control sample of Dutch BVs in May 2008, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = -4 before the 
financial distress event occurred.
governance
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference 
distribution
(|z-value|)number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = −1
DIRECTOR 50 1 1.72 1.09 50 1 1.30 0.71 (3.03)**
(7) (1.50) (4) (1)
DIRLPDM 50 36% 50 54% (1.80)
NED 0 0.8 0.27 0 0.2 0.14 (1.73)
(1) (0) (1) (0)
LEFT 50 0 0.10 0.36 50 0 0.36 0.69 (2.15)*
(2) (0) (3) (0)
BV AGE 50 0.73 13.09 10.36 50 0.87 7.96 7.37 (3.16)**
(37.65) (10.56) (30.44) (5.46)
DIR AGE 50 34.53 50.33 7.66 50 27.50 45.61 9.57 (2.43)*
(70.53) (49.53) (63.56) (44.53)
TENURE 50 0.25 7.78 6.04 50 0.17 4.64 5.14 (2.56)**
(25.50) (7.04) (24.00) (2.67)
t = −2
DIRECTOR 46 1 1.70 0.92 48 1 1.35 0.76 (1.81)
(5) (1.50) (4) (1)
DISCLDM 46 70% 48 44% (2.69)**
BV AGE 46 0.89 13.12 10.16 48 0.46 7.25 7.38 (3.36)**
(36.65) (10.09) (29.44) (4.60)
DIR AGE 46 33.53 49.44 7.97 48 26.50 44.60 8.93 (2.42)*
(69.53) (48.03) (62.56) (42.50)
TENURE 46 0.25 7.78 6.07 48 0.33 4.39 4.81 (2.72)**
(24.50) (7.08) (23.00) (3.00)
t = −3
DIRECTOR 42 1 1.90 1.56 40 1 1.30 0.61 (2.28)*
(9) (2.00) (3) (1)
DIRLPDM 42 29% 40 45% (1.81)
BV AGE 42 0.96 13.27 9.89 40 0.68 7.50 7.49 (2.66)**
(35.65) (10.22) (28.44) (4.81)
TENURE 42 0.50 8.65 6.89 40 0.25 4.75 4.87 (1.89)
(32.00) (8.33) (22.00) (3.13)
t = −4
DISCLDM
40 67% 34 47% (2.00)*
BV AGE 40 0.50 12.88 9.74 34 1.08 7.65 7.56 (2.41)*
(34.65) (9.85) (27.44) (4.74)
360 Chapter 8
8.5 RESULTS
This section presents sequentially the results of the data analysis for the private limited 
company (BV), the co-operative (coöperatie), the association (vereniging) and the founda-
tion (stichting). An analysis of all the legal persons concerned is presented in 8.5.5. The 
analysis of the financial data available for BVs follows in 8.5.6.
8.5.1 Private limited companies (BV)
The analysis starts with the correlation between the governance variables in table 8.5. 
The table shows important though not alarming (see 6.4.3) correlations between LEFT 
and NEW, a rather logical relationship as leaving directors normally should be replaced; 
between DIRECTOR and DEPENDENT and between DEPENDENT and GENDER, caused by 
the number of man-wife (or largely: family) BVs ; and between TENURE, BV AGE and AGE 
DIR, presumably explained by BVs established long ago and still managed by the founder/
owner/director. Table 8.6 shows the differences in the variables between the financially 
distressed and the control sample. From the differences in mean and median and the 
relatively high standard deviations reported in table 8.6, it is clear that the distribution of 
the various variables, with the exemption of DIR AGE, is very skewed. The attributes of a 
normal distribution are thus not valid, and the reported mean has a very limited meaning 
and should be used cautiously. This goes for all the data reported in this chapter.
Table 8.6 shows that BV AGE is significantly higher for the control sample over all panels 
at the 5% level. The number of DIRECTORs and TENURE is higher for the control sample 
and statistically significantly different at the 10% level or better on the panels t= -1, -2 
, -3. The age of directors (DIR AGE) is higher in the control sample at the 5% level in t= 
-1 and -2 and timely disclosure is higher at the 5% level in t= -2 and -4. This means 
that the control sample generally is a stable firm with a stable and mature board, both 
in terms of general experience as in experience in the firm, as opposed to the financially 
distressed sample.
Table 8.7 showing the univariate relationship between financial distress and the gover-
nance variables of the BV presents similar results as table 8.6. The number of DIRECTORs, 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. Results with lower 
statistical significance than 10% are not reported.
DIRECTOR number of executive directors (EDs)
DIRLPDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of (one or more) EDs that are legal persons
NED number of non-executive directors (NEDs)
LEFT number of EDs that left during the year
DISCLDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of timely disclosure in the Handelsregister.
BV AGE lifetime of the BV
DIR AGE average age of the EDs
TENURE average years of tenure of the EDs
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their AGE and TENURE as well as the BV AGE are the predominant explanatory variables. 
Some other observations are worth mentioning:
(1) the number of leaving directors (LEFT) is significantly higher for the distressed 
group at the 5% level at t = -1, which is in line with other studies and chapter 6 which 
showed a significantly different resignation of directors in situations of near financial 
distress;
(2) a legal-person-director (DIRLPDM) is, contrary to hypothesis 2.a, more often present 
in the financially distressed sample and is, at the 10% level, statistically significantly 
connected with financial distress in the t = -1 and t = -2 panel. A suggestion comes up 
that the distressed subsidiary BV is used by the holding company to bear a huge risk or 
as a cost centre, but there is no specific proof for that;
(3) table 8.6 presents weak evidence in the t = -1 panel that the presence of NEDs is 
higher in the control group, although the result is only at the 10% level and the number 
of NEDs is very small; and finally (4) timely disclosure (DISCLDM) is closely related to the 
control sample and significantly different in the panels t = -2 and t = -4. Note that the 
legal obligation is to disclose within 13 months after year-end. Therefore no DISCLDM 
data is available for t = -1.
Thus, for the BV the governance and resource variables statistically significantly and 
negatively related throughout to financial distress are:
Table 8.7: A univariate logit analysis of governance variables on the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample of Dutch BVs in May 2008, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = -4 before the 
financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
dependent variable t = -1 t = -2 t = -3 t = -4
DIRECTOR −0.63* −0.52a −0.74* −0.43
DIRECTOR LEGALPERSON 0.74a 0.73a 0.72 0.61
NED −1.45 −0.78 −1.10 −0.98
MANAGER 1.42 −0.04 21.33 21.43
LEFT 1.01* −0.17 1.20 −0.95
NEW 0.53 −0.17 −0.75 −0.21
TIMELY DISCLOSURE − −1.08* −0.59 −0.88a
BV AGE −0.07** −0.08** −0.08** −0.07*
DIRECTORS’ AGE −0.06** −0.07** −0.05a −0.05a
TENURE −0.11** −0.12** −0.12** −0.12*
GENDER −0.40 −0.19 0.22 0.19
NATIONALITY 0.00 0.34 −0.41 −0.83
DEPENDENT −0.84 −0.87 −0.65 −0.95
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively
a signifies significance at a 10% level.
Variables defined below table 8.5.
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• the number of directors
• BV age
• directors’ age
• directors’ tenure.
8.5.2 Co-operatives (coöperatie)
The analysis starts with the correlation between the governance variables in table 8.8. 
The table shows an important though not alarming (see 6.4.3) significant correlation 
between LEFT and NEW, a rather logical relationship; between DEPENDENT and GENDER, 
indicating that most dependents are spouses; and between TENURE and CO-OP AGE, 
presumably explained by the role of the founder/director.
Table 8.9 shows the differences between the financially distressed and the control 
sample. Only z-values are reported since the variables are skewed. The age of directors 
(DIR AGE), TENURE and the presence of a MANAGER throughout all panels are statisti-
cally significantly higher for the control group at the 10% level or better. The laymen 
structure of the executive board (EB) of larger co-operatives explains the significance of 
the presence of professional managers. The number of DIRECTORs and the age of the 
co-operative (CO-OP AGE) are significantly higher in the control group at the 5% level on 
t = -1 and -2. The disclosure dummy (DISCLDM) shows that control co-operatives adhere 
better to their disclosure obligation at the 5% level.
Table 8.8: a correlation table (Spearman) of governance variables on the full sample of Dutch 
coöperaties, based on the data for t = -1 through t = -4 before the financial distress event occurred.
  DIR
DIR
LP
NED MAN LEFT NEW
DISC
DM
AGE
DIR 
AGE
TENR GEND NAT
DIRECTOR 1                      
DIRLPDM −.11* 1                    
NED .15** −.04 1                  
MANAGER .36** .05 .35** 1                
LEFT .13* −.09 .00 .07 1              
NEW .30** −.08 .03 .07 .57** 1            
DISCLDM .24** −.05 .18** .20** .03 .04 1          
CO-OP AGE .07 .01 .17** .20** .00 .02 .07 1
DIR AGE .19** −.03 .17** .14** .03 .00 .23** .34** 1      
TENURE .00 .16** .06 .15** −.24** −.26** .15* .70** .35** 1    
GENDER .11* −.10 −.05 −.12* −.17** −.03 −.03 −.16** .03 −.05 1  
NATIONALITY −.22** −.09 −.01 −.01 .00 .06 −.06 −.11* −.02 −.20** .04 1
DEPENDENT −.07 −.06 −.08 −.14** −.26** −.14** −.03 −.12* −.05 .01 .60** .01
** correlation is significant at the 1% level; * correlation is significant at the 5% level; definition of variables 
below table 8.5.
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Table 8.9: An analysis of governance variables for the financially distressed sample and the matched 
pair control sample of Dutch coöperaties from 2001 to 2007, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = 
-4 before the financial distress event occurred.
governance
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference
distribution
(|z-value|)
number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -1
DIRECTOR 50 1 2.92 1.51 50 1 2.16 1.28 (2.86)**
(8) (2) (6) (2)
MANAGER 50 0 0.18 0.39 50 0 0 (3.00)**
(1) (0) (0) (0)
CO-OP AGE 50 3.00 11.67 17.24 50 0.50 5.59 6.60 (2.70)**
(85.04) (5.04) (46.74) (4.69)
DIR AGE 50 22.71 44.71 8.88 50 25.05 42.49 7.98 (1.81)
(76.71) (44.71) (61.30) (41.43)
TENURE 50 1.33 7.78 5.55 50 0.25 3.79 2.84 (4.08)***
(26.33) (7.33) (11.58) (3.42)
t = -2
DIRECTOR 50 1 2.92 1.44 44 1 2.32 1.39 (2.19)*
(7) (2) (7) (2)
MANAGER 50 0 0.18 0.39 44 0 0 (3.00)**
(1) (0) (0) (0)
DISCLDM 50 48% 44 20% (2.89)**
CO-OP AGE 50 2.00 10.67 17.24 44 0.21 5.23 6.79 (2.07)*
(84.04) (4.04) (45.74) (4.01)
DIR AGE 50 21.71 43.93 8.84 44 24.05 41.29 8.39 (3.25)**
(75.71) (44.21) (60.30) (40.43)
TENURE 50 0.75 6.92 5.45 44 0.17 3.49 2.70 (3.35)**
(25.33) (6.63) (10.58) (2.83)
t = -3
MANAGER
49 0 0.18 0.39 39 0 0 (2.65)**
(1) (0) (0) (0)
DISCLDM 49 37% 39 23% (1.96)*
DIR AGE 49 20.71 43.93 9.46 39 27.38 40.51 8.30 (3.83)***
(74.71) (45.71) (59.30) (38.49)
TENURE 49 0.17 6.52 5.38 39 0.00 3.29 2.97 (2.97)**
(24.33) (6.42) (13.58) (2.25)
t = -4
DIRLPDM
45 11% 32 13% (2.00)*
MANAGER 45 0 0.20 0.41 32 0 0 (2.24)*
(1) (0) (0) (0)
DISCLDM 45 42% 32 25% (2.40)*
DIR AGE 45 24.71 44.60 8.45 32 26.38 40.89 8.88 (3.79)***
(73.71) (45.71) (58.30) (38.25)
TENURE 45 0.00 6.40 5.21 32 0.00 3.21 3.45 (2.93)**
(23.33) (5.92) (17.83) (2.29)
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The univariate regression results of table 8.10 show clear significant relationships be-
tween the number of DIRECTORs, TENURE and DISCLOSURE and distress over all the 
panels. Note that the legal obligation is to disclose within 13 months after year-end. 
Therefore no DISCLDM data is available for t = -1. DIRECTORS’ AGE and CO-OP AGE are 
only significantly related in two out of four panels.
Thus, for the coöperatie the following governance and resource variables are statistically 
significantly and negatively related throughout to financial distress:
• the number of directors
• timely disclosure
• directors’ tenure.
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. Results with lower 
statistical significance than 10% are not reported.
DIRECTOR number of executive directors (EDs)
DIRLPDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of (one or more) EDs that are legal persons
MANAGER number of professional managers outside the management board (EB)
DISCLDM dummy variable being 1 in the case of timely disclosure in the Handelsregister.
CO-OP AGE lifetime of the co-operative
DIR AGE  average age of the EDs
TENURE  average years of tenure of the EDs
Table 8.10: A univariate logit analysis of governance variables on the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample of Dutch coöperaties from 2001 to 2007, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = -4 
before the financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
dependent variable t = −1 t = −2 t = −3 t = −4
DIRECTOR −0.41* −0.32* −0.30a −0.44*
DIRECTOR LEGALPERSON 0.00 0.14 0.47 0.13
NED −21.22 −21.09 −21.01 −20.88
MANAGER −21.40 −21.27 −21.20 −21.08
LEFT 0.52 0.04 −0.10 0.31
NEW −0.55 −0.31 0.04 −0.22
TIMELY DISCLOSURE − −1.44** −0.94* −1.17*
COOPERATIE AGE −0.05a −0.04a −0.04 −0.03
DIRECTORS’ AGE −0.03 −0.04 −0.04a −0.05a
TENURE −0.28*** −0.25** −0.22** −0.22**
GENDER 0.17 0.48 0.68 0.28
NATIONALITY 0.44 0.41 0.43 0.26
DEPENDENT 0.21 0.49 0.88a 0.63
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively
a signifies significance at a 10% level.
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8.5.3 Associations (vereniging)
The analysis starts with the correlation between the governance variables in table 8.11. 
The table shows an important though not alarming (see 6.4.3) correlation between LEFT 
and NEW, which is rather logical.
Table 8.11: a correlation table (Spearman) of governance variables on the full sample of Dutch 
associations, based on the data for t = -1 through t = -4 before the financial distress event occurred.
DIR
DIR
LP
NED MAN LEFT NEW AGE
DIR 
AGE
TENR GEND NAT
DIRECTOR 1                    
DIRLPDM −.07 1                  
NED . . 1 . . . . . . . .
MANAGER .25** −.02 . 1              
LEFT .23** .10 . .12* 1            
NEW .37** .11 . .09 .65** 1          
ASSOCIATION 
AGE
.36** −.09 . .04 .15** .20** 1        
DIR AGE .24** .06 . .10 .12* .01 .10 1      
TENURE .06 −.10 . .08 −.34** −.42** .31** .27** 1    
GENDER .18** −.06 . .05 .10 .09 .18** .01 −.02 1  
NATIONALITY −.10 −.02 . .14* −.05 .01 −.27** −.15** −.21** −.11 1
DEPENDENT −.09 −.02 . −.10 −.02 −.03 −.14* −.04 .04 .06 .18**
** correlation is significant at the 1% level; * correlation is significant at the 5% level; definition of variables 
below table 8.5.
Table 8.12 presents the differences between the financially distressed and the control 
sample and their significance.
TENURE is in table 8.12 the only variable that is statistically significantly different 
throughout. Tenure is higher in the control sample (at the 1% level). The DIRECTOR vari-
able is significantly higher for the control sample in the t = -1 and t = -2 panel (at the 
5% level). The LEFT and NEW variables are significantly higher in the distressed sample 
(at the 5% level) in the panels t = -1 and -4, indicating more turnover in the distressed 
group.
Table 8.13 shows whether there is a relationship between the governance variables and 
financial distress. The TENURE variable is statistically significantly negatively related to 
financial distress in all the panels just like the DIRECTOR variable in t = -1 and -2. The 
LEFT and NEW variables prove positively related to financial distress in some panels. A 
meaningful result is the LEFT difference in t = -1, when obviously directors in distressed 
associations leave.
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Thus, for the vereniging the only governance and resource variable statistically signifi-
cantly and negatively related throughout to financial distress is
• directors’ tenure.
Table 8.12: An analysis of governance variables for the control sample and the financially distressed 
sample of Dutch associations from 2000 to 2008, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = -4 before 
the financial distress event occurred.
governance
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference distribution
(|z-value|)number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
number min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = −1
DIRECTOR
39 1 4.77 2.33 38 1 3.53 2.06 (2.51)*
(10) (4) (10) (3)
LEFT 39 0 0.74 1.16 38 0 1.55 1.81 (2.37)*
(4) (0) (7) (1)
NEW 39 0 0.62 0.99 38 0 1.26 2.22 (1.82)
(3) (0) (9) (0)
TENURE 39 0.50 6.86 5.30 38 0.8 4.41 3.37 (2.63)**
(22.08) (5.58) (13.92) (4.13)
t = −2
DIRECTOR
39 1 4.90 2.47 38 1 3.84 2.18 (1.99)*
(11) (5) (10) (4)
TENURE 39 0.75 6.53 4.99 38 0.17 3.91 2.80 (3.00)**
(21.08) (5.75) (12.92) (3.25)
t = −3
TENURE
39 0.67 6.94 4.86 36 0.42 3.56 2.46 (3.33)**
(20.08) (5.50) (11.92) (3.17)
t = −4
LEFT
38 0 0.53 0.80 35 0 1.14 1.87 (2.46)*
(2) (0) 6 (0)
NEW 38 0 0.47 0.86 35 0 1.14 1.70 (2.51)*
(3) (0) (6) (0)
TENURE 38 1.08 6.82 4.55 35 0.08 3.24 2.33 (3.47)**
(19.08) (5.08) (10.00) (2.58)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. Results with lower 
statistical significance than 10% are not reported.
DIRECTOR number of executive directors (EDs)
LEFT number of EDs that left during the year
NEW number of EDs that took office during the year
TENURE average years of tenure of the EDs.
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8.5.4 Foundations (stichting)
The analysis starts with the correlation between the governance variables in table 8.14. 
The table shows an important though not alarming (see 6.4.3) correlation
Table 8.14: a correlation table (Spearman) of governance variables for the full sample of Dutch 
foundations, based on the data for t = -1 through t = -4 before the financial distress event occurred.
DIR
DIR
LP
NED MAN LEFT NEW AGE
DIR 
AGE
TENR GEND NAT
DIRECTOR 1                    
DIRLPDM −.05 1                  
NED .10 −.04 1                
MANAGER .17** −.06 .40** 1              
LEFT .01 −.02 −.02 .03 1            
NEW .16** .04 .06 −.01 .63** 1          
FOUNDATION AGE .22** −.12* −.18** .03 .02 .03 1        
DIR AGE .07 .04 .07 .15** −.01 .01 .17** 1      
TENURE −.02 −.08 −.12* .03 −.36** −.34** .61** .27** 1    
GENDER .61** .05 −.03 .09 .12* .16** .18** −.11* −.11* 1  
NATIONALITY .07 −.04 −.03 .05 .06 .08 .04 −.10 −.04 .08 1
DEPENDENT .01 −.03 −.04 −.07 −.01 .04 −.03 −.05 .03 .15** −.02
** correlation is significant at the 1% level; * correlation is significant at the 5% level; definition of variables 
below table 8.5.
Table 8.13: A univariate logit analysis of governance variables for the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample of Dutch verenigingen from 2000 to 2008, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = 
-4 before the financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
dependent variable t = −1 t = −2 t = −3 t = −4
DIRECTOR −0.26* −0.20a −0.14 −0.13
DIRECTOR LEGALPERSON 21.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
NED na na na na
MANAGER −0.97 −0.54 −1.64 −1.64
LEFT 0.37* 0.01 0.17 0.40*
NEW 0.25 −0.09 0.19 0.42*
ASSOCIATION AGE −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
DIRECTORS’ AGE 0.03 0.01 0.01 −0.01
TENURE −0.14* −0.19* −0.31** −0.39**
GENDER 0.07 0.20 −0.20 0.17
NATIONALITY −0.13 0.08 −0.20 −0.10
DEPENDENT 0.03 0.23 −0.17 −0.17
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively
a signifies significance at a 10% level
na not available
Variables defined below table 8.5.
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Table 8.15: An analysis of governance variables for the financially distressed sample and the matched 
pair control sample of Dutch foundations from 2001 to 2007, based on panel data for t = -1 through 
t = -4 before the financial distress event occurred.
governance 
variable
control sample financially distressed sample difference 
distribution
(|z-value|)number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation number
min
(max)
mean
(median)
standard
deviation
t = -1
DIRECTOR
50 1 3.38 1.83 50 1 2.52 1.42 (2.74)**
(9) (3) (6) (2.50)
FOUNDATION 
AGE
50 1.00 13.35 16.39 50 0.82 7.81 8.70 (2.56)*
(89.14) (7.70) (37.57) (4.92)
TENURE
50 0.25 6.61 5.41 50 0.08 3.15 2.83 (3.83)***
(25.50) (5.04) (11.75) (2.08)
GENDER 50 0 0.98 1.08 50 0 0.66 1.12 (2.12)*
(4) (1) (5) (0)
t = -2
DIRECTOR
49 1 3.27 1.85 46 1 2.50 1.64 (2.30)*
(9) (3) (8) (2)
LEFT 49 0 0.16 0.66 46 0 0.74 1.20 (3.10)**
(4) (0) (6) (0)
FOUNDATION 
AGE
49 0 12.56 16.49 46 0.21 7.40 8.84 (2.06)*
(88.14) (6.74) (36.57) (4.55)
TENURE
49 0.00 6.56 5.18 46 0.08 3.01 2.67 (3.61)***
(24.50) (5.67) (10.75) (2.17)
t = -3
DIRECTOR
45 1 3.24 1.86 40 1 2.88 1.99 (1.81)
(9) (3) (9) (3)
FOUNDATION 
AGE
45 0 12.67 16.76 40 0.27 7.34 9.11 (2.34)*
(87.14) (7.65) (35.57) (4.47)
TENURE
45 0.00 6.34 4.97 40 0.00 2.71 2.75 (3.51)***
(23.50) (4.75) (9.75) (1.79)
t = -4
DIRECTOR
41 1 3.20 1.65 29 1 2.69 1.89 (1.85)
(7) (3) (9) (2)
FOUNDATION 
AGE
41 0 12.84 17.12 29 0.51 8.67 9.71 (1.93)
(86.14) (8.44) (34.57) (4.90)
LEFT
41 0 0.12 0.33 29 0 0.72 1.25 (2.23)*
(1) (0) (4) (0)
TENURE 41 0.08 6.59 4.97 29 0.17 3.00 2.60 (2.70)**
(22.50) (5.83) (8.75) (2.25)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. Results with lower 
statistical significance than 10% are not reported.
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between LEFT and NEW, a rather logical relationship; between DIRECTORS and GENDER, 
indicating that the number of female directors grows when the board increases; and 
between TENURE and the AGE of the foundation, presumably caused by the founder/
director.
Table 8.15 shows the differences between the financially distressed and the control 
sample. TENURE, the number of DIRECTORs and the FOUNDATION AGE are higher in 
the control sample and statistically significantly different throughout. TENURE at the 
1% level, DIRECTORs at a gradually declining level from 1% to 10% and FOUNDATION 
AGE declines from 5% to 10% in panel t = -4. LEFT, the number of directors leaving, is 
significantly higher in the distressed group in the panels -2 and -4 at the 5% level. The 
GENDER variable indicates in the t = -2 panel a statistically significant higher number of 
women in the control group.
Table 8.16 reports the univariate logit regression results. These reflect the results from 
table 8.15 although they are somewhat less strong in terms of level of significance.
Table 8.16: A univariate logit analysis of governance variables for the control sample and the financially 
distressed sample of Dutch stichtingen from 2001 to 2007, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = -4 
before the financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
dependent variable t = −1 t = −2 t = −3 t = −4
DIRECTOR −0.33* −0.26* −0.10 −0.17
DIRECTOR LEGALPERSON 0.71 0.78 0.84 21.58
NED −0.24 −0.15 −0.06 −9.77
MANAGER −0.29 −0.11 −0.06 0.39
LEFT 0.35 0.88* 0.16 1.09*
NEW 0.37 0.44 0.23 0.39
FOUNDATION AGE −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a −0.02
DIRECTORS’ AGE −0.01 −0.02 −0.03 −0.02
TENURE −0.22** −0.24*** −0.26** −0.26**
GENDER −0.90* −0.30 0.02 −0.04
NATIONALITY −0.13 0.35 0.33 −0.01
DEPENDENT 0.00 1.21 0.84 0.36
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively
a signifies significance at a 10% level.
DIRECTOR number of executive directors (EDs)
LEFT number of EDs that left during the year
NEW number of EDs that took office during the year
FOUNDATION AGE lifetime of the foundation
TENURE average years of tenure of the EDs
GENDER number of female EDs.
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Thus, for the stichting the only governance and resource variable statistically significantly 
and negatively related throughout to financial distress is
• directors’ tenure.
8.5.5 All the legal persons
This section analyses all the previous results in one table in order to discover com-
mon characteristics in the patterns. Table 8.17 presents all the statistically significant 
univariate regression results of the previous sections. One variable appears in each panel 
for each legal person: TENURE, remaining significant throughout at the 5% level. The 
number of DIRECTORs is a statistically significant explanatory variable for all the legal 
Table 8.17: A survey of the statistically significant results of the univariate logit analysis of governance 
variables for the control sample and the financially distressed sample of Dutch BVs, co-operatives, 
associations and foundations over 2001-2008, based on panel data for t = -1 through t = -4 before the 
financial distress event occurred.
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1(variable)
dependent variable legal person t = -1 t = -2 t = -3 t = -4
DIRECTOR BV −0.63* −0.52a −0.74* −0.43
co-operative −0.41* −0.32* −0.30a −0.44*
association −0.26* −0.20a −0.14 −0.13
foundation −0.33* −0.26* −0.10 −0.17
DIRECTOR 
LEGALPERSON
BV
0.74a 0.73a 0.72 0.61
LEFT BV 1.01* −0.17 1.20 −0.95
association 0.37* 0.01 0.17 0.40*
foundation 0.35 0.88* 0.16 1.09*
NEW association 0.25 −0.09 0.19 0.42*
TIMELY DISCLOSURE BV – −1.08* −0.59 −0.88a
co-operative – −1.44** −0.94* −1.17*
LEGAL PERSON AGE BV −0.07** −0.08** −0.08** −0.07*
co-operative −0.05a −0.04a −0.04 −0.03
foundation −0.04a −0.04a −0.04a −0.02
DIRECTORS’ AGE BV −0.06** −0.07** −0.05a −0.05a
co-operative −0.03 −0.04 −0.04a −0.05a
TENURE BV −0.11** −0.12** −0.12** −0.12*
co-operative −0.28*** −0.25** −0.22** −0.22**
association −0.14* −0.19* −0.31** −0.39**
foundation −0.22** −0.24*** −0.26** −0.26**
GENDER foundation −0.90* −0.30 0.02 −0.04
DEPENDENT co-operative 0.21 0.49 0.88a 0.63
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively
a signifies significance at a 10% level.
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persons, but not in each panel. Its relevance generally declines over time from the 5% 
level. DISLOSURE proves significantly different for the BV and the co-operative since only 
these two have a mandatory disclosure obligation.
For three legal persons the variables AGE LEGAL PERSON (rather predominant) and num-
ber of leaving directors (LEFT; in specific panels only) prove significant. The directors’ age 
(DIR AGE) is significant for two legal persons in some panels. New directors (NEW), legal 
person director (LPDIRDM), GENDER and DEPENDENT are significant in specific panels 
and only for one legal person.
The ‘for-profit’ legal forms (BV, co-operative) five times (DIRECTOR, DISCLOSURE, LP 
AGE, DIRECTOR’S AGE, TENURE) out of 10 show the same significant variables in one or 
more time frames. The ‘nonprofit’ forms only show this three times (DIRECTOR, LEFT, 
TENURE). For one of both ‘for-profit’ and ‘nonprofit’ legal forms, only four variables 
present significant time frames: DIRECTOR, LEFT, LP AGE, TENURE. There is no apparent 
‘clustering’ of variables over both groups. Moreover, an analysis of the collective data 
per panel for all legal persons has been considered. The risk of generalizing is that one 
finds statistically significant results for this ‘full panel’ that do not have any meaning for 
a specific category of legal persons. Therefore, and because of the differences in size and 
industry between the samples, such results would in fact be useless. The presentation of 
table 8.17 keeps the results were they belong, tied to a specific legal person.
8.5.6 Financial data analysis (BV)
The data only permitted the construction of a financial data base for the BV. As all BVs 
from the sample are small, they did not report figures on turnover, profit or cash flow. 
Moreover, since disclosure always lags behind and not all companies existed or adhered 
to their legal obligations during the three years under review (t = -2 though t =-4) only 
176 data sets could be retrieved. Table 8.18 presents the results. The CR and QR variables 
are added to the analysis, as they may be considered a liquidity measure (Ohlson, 1980). 
The data analysis of table 8.17 leads to the conclusion that the quality of the data is 
disputable. All variables are very skew.
A minimum leverage of -15 or -17 is imaginable if CE = -1 and TA = 15 or 17, but a mean 
CR of 10 and a max of over 200 may indicate a negligent filling in of the required form 
instead of reality. That LNTA does not prove statistically significantly different at the 5% 
level may not come as a surprise, since another size indicator, the number of employees, 
is used as a sample variable. The other variables though prove statistically different at 
the 0.1% level.
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A correlation analysis (not reported) has been executed. All correlation coefficients are 
acceptable, except the r > 0.9 between CR and QR, due to the fact that many BVs do not 
report inventories (separately). The results of a performed regression analysis are not 
reported, since no variables proved statistically significant.
8.6 COnCLUSIOn
This chapter aimed to study the differences in governance characteristics of financially 
distressed and non-distressed companies in the BV, coöperatie, vereniging and stichting 
form. What do the results say about the hypotheses? They were:
H1: the number of directors is negatively related to financial distress
H2(a-c):  the number of additional control instruments is negatively related to financial 
distress
H2a: the additional control instrument being a legal person;
H2b: the additional control instrument being a supervisory board;
H2c: the additional control instrument being a manager outside the board.
H3(a-b): board turnover is positively related to financial distress
H3a: measured in terms of leaving directors;
H3b: measured in terms of newly appointed directors.
H4: overdue disclosure is positively related to financial distress
Table 8.18: An analysis of financial variables for the control sample and the financially distressed 
sample of Dutch BVs in May 2008, based on panel data for t = -2 through t = -4 before the financial 
distress event occurred.
control sample financially distressed sample
difference distribution
(|z-value|)
financial
variable
number min mean standard number min mean standard
(max) (median) deviation (max) (median) deviation
LNTA 94 1.48 5.99 1.42 81 −0.36 5.47 1.98 (1.78)
(10.57) (5.91) (10.34) (5.57)
CETA 94 −15.30 −0.11 1.77 82 −17.86 −0.72 2.41 (4.52)***
(0.99) (0.17) (1.00) (-0.13)
CR 91 0 10.11 29.00 83 0 4.79 26.44 (5.03)***
(217) (1.70) (235) (0.77)
QR 91 0 9.97 29.03 83 0 4.57 26.47 (5.65)***
(217) (1.46) (235) (0.53)
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively. Results with lower 
statistical significance than 10% are not reported.
LNTA the natural logarithm of total assets
CETA common equity divided by total assets
CR current ratio (current assets divided by short-term obligations)
QR quick ratio (current assets less inventories divided by short-term obligations).
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H5: the age of the company is negatively related to financial distress
H6(a-b): experience on the board is negatively related to financial distress
H6a: measured in terms of age;
H6a: measured in terms of tenure.
H 7(a-c): diversity is negatively related to financial distress,
H7a: measured in terms of female directors;
H7b: measured in terms of directors born outside the Netherlands;
H7c: measured in terms of non-independent directors.
H8:  corporate governance characteristics differ between the different types of legal 
persons.
The analysis of differences between the samples presented in tables 8.6, 8.9, 8.12 and 8.15 
showed that for each legal person a number of variables differ statistically significantly at 
the 10% level or better between the financially distressed sample and the control sample 
in one or more panels. TENURE in any panel is significantly different (16 out of 16 pan-
els); the number of directors (DIRECTOR: 11 out of 16); the disclosure dummy (DISCLDM: 
5 out of 6); firm age (10 out of 16); directors’ age (DIR AGE: 6 out of 16) and the number 
of directors left (LEFT: 5 out of 16) are other prevalent statistically different variables.
The univariate regression results from tables 8.7, 8.10, 8.13 and 8.16 summarized in table 
8.17 conclude on the hypotheses. Of the agency-oriented hypotheses, H1 on the negative 
effect of the number of directors on distress cannot be rejected since a higher number of 
directors decreases the chance of financial distress. The hypotheses on the negative ef-
fect of additional control instruments (H2 (a-c)), such as a legal-person-director, a NED or a 
professional manager, on distress should be rejected since neither a legal person-director 
nor the presence of a NED or a manager is negatively related to financial distress. In fact, 
for the BV the legal-person-director is positively related to distress.
The positive relation between leaving directors and distress, hypothesis H3a, cannot be 
rejected. The results show support in five panels for this hypothesis of directors leaving 
in situations of near financial distress. However, hypothesis H3b on the positive relation 
between incoming directors and distress should be rejected as only one panel shows 
a significant explanatory value in newcomers. Since distressed BVs and co-operatives 
disclose significantly less timely than their control sample equals, H4 on the positive 
relation between overdue disclosure and distress cannot be rejected. Finally, age of the 
legal person may be considered as a sign of good governance since H5 on the negative 
effect of the age of a legal person on distress is supported for all legal persons except 
the vereniging.
The results on the resource availability and resource diversity hypotheses show that the 
hypothesized negative effect of experience on distress (H6(a-b) ) cannot be rejected since 
tenure is negatively related to financial distress overall. Directors’ age appears to relate 
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only to the BV and the coöperatie. H7 (a-c) on the negative effect of diversity on distress 
should be rejected. The diversity related hypotheses H 7(a-c) show few results, either in the 
form of an analysis of their number or in that of an average (ratio) or diversity (Blau-
indicator) approach. Apparently the boards of the legal persons under review did not dif-
fer significantly in these respects. The negative relationship between gender and distress 
(stichting) and the positive result between non-independence and distress (coöperatie), 
both in only one panel, are not impressive.
The Hansmann (1996) inspired hypothesis H8 presuming different values for corporate 
governance and resource variables between the for-profit and the nonprofit legal forms 
cannot be rejected based on tables 8.4 and 8.17. Legal persons do appear to differ 
randomly in governance and resource characteristics between each other. However this 
result is not statistically supported, since the different samples cannot be compared due 
to the difference in industry over all the samples.
This is the first systematic research on the effect of governance and resource related 
variables on the likelihood of financial distress for non-listed legal persons. The research 
shows first and foremost that the control sample firms have more directors with a lon-
ger tenure and better adherence to disclosure requirements. For three out of four legal 
persons, the control firms are older as well. These findings are irrespective of industry 
or size. The results fit in with earlier research by Van Amsterdam (2004) and Adriaanse 
(2005) who stressed the importance of the quality of management. In addition to the 
financial reports and management information of a specific legal person under research, 
the above discerned governance and resource variables can be considered tools for 
qualifying the personal impression of the account manager, auditor or lawyer on the 
quality of the management. A legal person established some time ago, with a board that 
is not too small and which has a certain tenure, that adheres visibly to legal obligations 
is apparently less prone to bankruptcy than its opposite.
Since the sample is small and the control sample method may lead to results that are only 
relevant for the industry sectors concerned, new research on larger databases, preferably 
in a European context, is necessary to confirm the relevance of the discerned variables.
The non-rejection of H8 may indicate the reason of existence for each of the different 
legal persons. Apparently each of them works within a different corporate governance 
framework which may be caused by different requirements of the legal person and its 
environment.
The results confirm the agency theory and resource dependence theory since (1) a higher 
number of executive directors i.e. better monitoring; less leaving directors i.e. monitoring 
output; and timely disclosure i.e. visible bonding prove to be statistically significantly dif-
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ferently distributed agency variables between the control and distressed samples of most 
of the legal persons; (2) longer tenure and older directors i.e. more experience prove to be 
statistically significantly differently distributed resource dependence variables between 
the control and distressed samples of most of the legal persons; and (3) these variables 
are significant explanatory variables for financial distress in the univariate analysis.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Argenti, J., 1976, Corporate collapse: the causes and symptoms (McGrawHill, London).
Boone, A.L., L.C. Field, J.M. Karpoff, and C.G. Raheja, 2007, The determinants of corporate board 
size and composition: an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 85, 66-101.
Carter, D.A., B.J. Simkins, and W.G. Simpson, 2003, Corporate governance, board diversity, and 
firm value, Financial Review 38, 33-53.
Fama, E., 1980, Agency problems and the theory of the firm, Journal of Political Economy 88, 
288-307.
Fama, E.F., and M.C. Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and 
Economics 26, 301-325.
Gilson, S.C., 1989, Management turnover and financial distress, Journal of Financial Economics 
25, 241-262.
Hansmann, H., 1996, The ownership of enterprise (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Mass.).
Hermalin, B.E., and M.S. Weisbach, 1988, The determinants of board composition, The Rand 
Journal of Economics 19, 589-606.
Kor, Y.Y., 2003, Experience-based top management team competence and sustained growth, 
Organization Science 14, 707-719.
Ohlson, J.A., 1980, Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy, Journal of 
Accounting Research 18, 109-131.
Pompe, P.P.M., and J. Bilderbeek, 2005, The prediction of bankruptcy of small- and medium-
sized industrial firms, Journal of Business Venturing 20, 847-868.
Ruigrok, W., S. Peck, and S. Tacheva, 2007, Nationality and gender diversity on Swiss Corporate 
Boards, Corporate Governance 15, 546-557.
Skeel, D.A., 2005, Icarus in the boardroom (Oxford University Press, New York).
Steinberg, R., 2010, Principal-agent theory and nonprofit accountability, in K.J. Hopt, and T. 
Von Hippel, eds.: Comparative corporate governance of non-profit organizations (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge).
Yermack, D., 1996, Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal 
of Financial Economics 40, 185-211.
EnDnOTES
1 At least in the Netherlands (s 2:53(1) BW); the German co-operative may also be targeted at 
immaterial needs.
2 s 2:285(1) BW.
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3 An alternative is e.g. to appoint all the ‘members’ as directors or to organize an annual meeting 
of donors and attribute advisory competences to this meeting.
4 Payment is not forbidden, as it is in the British Charities Act, unless the articles provide for it.
5 No real evidence is published on the matter, and cases started by the OM are all lost. See: Santen 
and de Bos (2006). See for the legal developments on the issue Annex 2.
6 In this chapter financial distress is equalled to bankruptcy or suspension of payments, as only 
this data can be retrieved (see further 8.3.1).
7 Distribution means: distribution to members (or related parties). So says s 2:26(3) BW directly 
and so should s 2:285(3) BW be understood (Van Dijk/ van der Ploeg, 2007). But lower con-
tribution, in order to decrease the accumulated reserves of an association, or payment of 
directors when general or specific services are rendered, provided that the rates are reason-
able, is permitted.
8 All but two legal persons in the distressed sample were eventually declared bankrupt. The two 
exemptions were associations. Their suspension of payments was relieved after a composi-
tion.
9 The RvR is established by law (s 84 Wet Rechterlijke Organisatie; Wet RO, Judiciary (Organiza-
tion) Act) in order to facilitate the administration of justice (s 91 RO). The duty to keep 
the central bankruptcy register has been assigned to the Raad voor de Rechtspraak by an 
Algemene maatregel van bestuur (Amvb; Order in Council) of 24 November 2005.
10 See s 2:27(4.a) BW; s 2:177(2) BW; s 2:54(2) BW; s 2:285(4.a) BW.
11 Permitted by law in s 2:11 BW. Not all legal systems have a similar liberal regime, e.g. in France 
a directorship by a legal person is forbidden.
12 Foreign is defined as: born outside the Netherlands. The Handelsregister contains only infor-
mation on the place of birth, not on nationality.
13 Non-independent is defined as: the existence of a family relationship in the first or second 
degree (surname) or a common household (address data).
14 The Handelsregister does disclose only if a private limited company has only one shareholder.
15 For each legal person the average variables GENAV (average female), NATAV (average foreign 
nationality) and DEPAV (average non-independent) and the diversity variables GENDIV 
(diversity on gender), NATDIV (diversity on nationality) and DEPDIV (diversity in non-
independence) were calculated for each time frame. Of these 96 calculations only 5 showed 
a difference in distribution between the non-distressed and the bankrupt sample at the 
10% level (Wilcoxon). Out of these 5 three proved significant, again at the 10% level, in a 
univariate analysis: GENDIV1 for the stichting (negative sign); DEPAV1 and DEPDIV1 for the 
BV (negative sign).
16 See s 2:360(3) BW.
17 The obligation of disclosure is in s 2:394-397 BW. The civil sanction to be applied by an 
interested party is mentioned in s 2:394(7) BW, whilst the criminal sanction, which is not 
applied very often, is in s 1(4) WED.
18 According to the requirements of s 2:397(7) BW.
19 s 2:360(3), 394-398 BW.
20 s 1 under 4 WED.
21 s 2:138, 248, 53a jo. 50a BW.
22 HR 11 June 1993, NJ 1993, 713 (Brens q.q./Sarper); and see s 2:248(2) last sentence BW.
23 The AG under HR 2 February 1996,NJ 1996/406. In this case the HR judged (a) 17 days too late 
too long to be considered ‘an insignificant omission’, but (b) a potentially pardonable omis-
sion as it is of a ‘restricted duration’, depending on the arguments to be brought forward by 
a director.
24 Between €2.50 and €9.00 per company. For companies with a legal person as a director, more 
data had to be retrieved. The age of the company could only be determined after retrieval.
25 As there are four types of legal persons to be researched, times 50 financially distressed and 
50 control (two times 39 for associations), this adds up to 378 printed data sets. In fact a 
lot more data was retrieved, as it was often impossible to check beforehand whether the 
retrieved company suited all of the criteria mentioned further on in the text.
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26 To be precise: the SIC-code used was the BIK-code (the Bedrijfs Industrie classificatie code of 
the the Handelsregister). From 1 June 2009 this BIK-code has been replaced by the Standaard 
Bedrijfsindeling (SBI 2008; Standard industrial classification). For the presentation of the 
results this replacement did not have any consequences.
27 The control group consists of active and non-active companies. A choice for only active 
companies would have implied a bias, as financially distressed companies could have been 
active or non-active (this information cannot be retrieved – at least not electronically - after 
bankruptcy).
28 Obviously, some control sample legal persons were established after this average date. For 
them, the age is set at the actual number of years in existence.
29 This also applies to most of the data used in this thesis.
30 It is for example unclear why the Vereniging tegen bekkenproblemen (association against pel-
vic problems) is assigned BIK classification 91 (interest) and the Samen strijden tegen astma 
association (fighting asthma together) BIK classification 85 (health). A re-classification on 
the basis of the name of the association would give an outcome as debatable as the original 
classification of the Handelsregister as found in REACH.
31 The exact periods will be shown in the sections devoted to the specific legal persons.
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9
Summary, concluding remarks and recommendations
What we should seek to do, then, is 
to allow the one-man full rein when 
he is right but hold him in when he 
is wrong. Of course, we do not know 
when he is going to be wrong but we 
can give him full rein until he has 
built up a socially significant orga-
nization and then, whether he will 
go on being right or not, rein him in. 
We have to bottle the genie. (Argenti, 
1976: 173)
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9.1 SUMMARY
This thesis studies the role of monitoring near financial distress. The first and theoretical 
part attempts to answer the following questions:
• What is financial distress?
• Which options does a financially distressed company have?
• What is the role of monitoring from an economic perspective?
• What monitoring devices did the legislator put in place?
• Are there any specific requirements for monitoring near financial distress?
Chapter 1 embeds the research question. It starts by analysing the damage society suffers 
from bankruptcy. In the words of Argenti (1976: 2)
corporate collapse has always brought fearful mental pain to proprietors and entre-
preneurs and managers and to their families. It has always meant that employees lose 
their jobs, shareholders lose their savings, creditors lose cash and future business. The 
customer is deprived of the product. The local community may be plunged into despair.
A survey of recovery studies shows that the recovery rate after bankruptcy for ordinary, 
non-secured creditors could range between a mere average of 7.5% in the Netherlands 
and 37.61% or more in the USA. For Dutch society as a whole, non-payment of debt due 
to bankruptcies of legal persons takes annually as much as 0.39% of annual GDP, let 
alone the costs of unemployment expenses and lay-offs at suppliers on the negative and 
efficiency gains on the positive side. A range of studies on the role of management e.g. 
Altman (1968), Argenti (1976), van Amsterdam (2004), Adriaanse (2005), Bollen, Mertens, 
Meuwissen, Raak and Schelleman (2005), Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) concludes that 
management errors are at the root of many of the bankruptcies researched. CBS (2010) 
reports that mismanagement is a cause of 32% of bankruptcies; problems within the 
board 4%; and fraud 3%. The other 61% is due to external causes. This thesis focuses on 
one of the possibilities to diminish these management errors and problems, that is, by 
monitoring the management. Not, as Jungmann (2006: 473) rightly puts it, that ‘members 
of the supervisory board have a degree of foresight and wisdom that makes them, in any 
case, superior to the executive directors’. But, he continues, ‘an enhanced level of control 
would reduce the probability of mistakes that occur at the managerial level remaining 
undetected’. Therefore the research question is
What is the role of monitoring near financial distress from an economic and legal 
perspective?
Chapter 2 discusses the definition of and possible solutions to financial distress. Af-
ter dropping some of the non-essential elements of the definition of Gordon (1971) 
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it defines financial distress as the existence of a non-trivial probability that the legal 
person will not be able to pay its debt within the terms of payment. However, for empiri-
cal purposes this definition needs to be made operational and for example be confined 
to bankruptcy. The chapter presents an Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) and Ooghe and De 
Prijcker (2008) inspired model for strategically handling financial distress. The model 
stresses the importance of targeting the restructuring activities at the determining factor 
of financial distress and not at a symptom. Once the restructuring strategy is set, the 
actual restructuring form requires a choice between formal and informal reorganization. 
The options essentially are: (1) formal and voluntary liquidation and reorganization; (2) 
formal and involuntary liquidation and reorganization; and (3) informal reorganization 
through a ‘work-out’. A ‘work-out’ is a privately negotiated form of re-contracting in 
situations of near financial distress which has been developed over the years especially in 
the UK. A comparison between the formal and informal reorganization routes in section 
2.6 clarifies why the work-out solution is so widely applied. Provided that the market 
decides, by actually supporting the reorganization, that a work-out is the Pareto-optimal 
solution, the chapter concludes that a ‘work-out’ is the most efficient solution.
Monitoring is the subject of chapter 3. The previous chapters show that whilst man-
agement’s role is apparently crucial in running a company near financial distress, an 
attempt to improve the quality of its decisions is worthwhile, since 39% of bankruptcies 
are due to mismanagement and fraud. Would the presence of monitors contribute to 
the quality of the management’s decisions and decrease this percentage? The chapter 
subsequently analyses the role of monitoring in the governance of a company. It starts 
with the basic insight of the agency theory that the principal and the agent by defini-
tion have a different utility function (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, the proper 
performance of agents in the interests of the principal may severely be hampered by 
other factors. These are bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) i.e. every agent can cope with 
only a few alternative solutions, and information asymmetry i.e. the agent does not share 
all the relevant information with the principal (Knight, 1921; Akerlof, 1970) which may 
even result in ‘self-interest seeking with guile’ (Williamson, 1981). Proper control by the 
principals of the agent is therefore essential. Principals can be shareholders but also 
lenders, trade creditors and employees. Control, according to Jensen (1993), is a warning 
system. The control structure envelops the direction of the company. The control pro-
cess is executed through monitoring by all the stakeholders from inside and outside the 
company. Internal control mechanisms are the executive board and senior management; 
the supervisory board or NEDs in a one-tier system; the general meeting of shareholders; 
and a company secretary, a works council or even the employees, depending on the legal 
system. External control mechanisms are the input and output markets as well as various 
external monitoring authorities on special issues e.g. formation, tax, disclosure, law and 
responsible behaviour. The external auditor is the most prominent among them. These 
control mechanisms create a form of corporate democracy. In point of fact, the party 
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most interested in a well-performing monitoring structure should be management itself. 
By listening to the various signals, arguments and opinions whilst keeping in mind the 
specific interests of each monitor, the probability of mistakes will be reduced (Jungmann, 
2006) and management’s decisions will be improved. Monitoring comes at a cost. As 
long as the sum of agency costs declines, investments in monitoring are efficient. Thus, 
managers act sensibly to organize effective and efficient internal and external control 
mechanisms, adapted to the needs of the company and to be performed by effective 
monitors.
If this conclusion follows from economic theory, one wonders what the legislator has 
done with the monitoring concept. Chapter 4 explores by means of two analytical tools 
developed by Kraakman (2009), Davies (2010) and Timmerman (2009) the legal man-
datory monitoring system of the Netherlands, Germany and the UK of public limited 
companies, private limited companies, co-operatives, associations and foundations. 
After a lengthy analysis of mandatory law for these legal persons it concludes that (1) the 
law is reluctant to apply mandatory monitoring mechanisms and (2) each system finds 
its own equilibrium adapted to the specific circumstances of the type of legal person 
under review. Whilst Germany believes in co-determination and a supervisory board if 
the company employs over 500 people for all for-profit-companies and a strict regu-
lation for the Aktiengesellschaft (AG) and eingetragene Genossenschaft (eG), the Dutch 
system is somewhat more flexible and liberal in the organization of companies. Most 
flexible is the 1,300 sections counting UK Companies Act 2006 which for the internal 
organization of for-profit and nonprofit companies relies heavily on the articles each 
company has to draw up. The CA mentions neither non-executive directors (NEDs) nor 
any form of formalized labour influence. Consequently one finds in the UK rather strong 
and elaborated directors’ duties and external controlling government agencies, such as 
the FRC, the FRRP, the FSA, the Bank of England, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the 
Charities Commission, the CIC Regulator and BIS. Such agencies are less predominant in 
Germany (financial authorities and the Bundesländer for Stiftungen) or in the Netherlands 
(only financial authorities) whilst directors’ duties are less developed in these countries 
than in the UK.
Although chapter 3 concluded with the importance of internal and external monitoring, 
chapter 4 indicated that in the law the specialized management feature as constrained 
by directors’ duties often prevails over the possibility of establishing mandatory internal 
monitoring mechanisms. Would all this change near financial distress? Chapter 5 explores 
the economic and legal approach to this question. It shows that, from an economic point 
of view, shareholders and directors in situations of near financial distress may develop 
an overly risky attitude. Therefore creditors have to monitor their position continuously. 
The law assists the creditors’ position by imposing civil and criminal liability to directors 
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personally, as well as the risk of directors disqualification by a court. However, directors 
often realize the impact of these measures at too late a stage to prevent financial distress.
From the theory explored in chapters 1 to 4, chapter 5 develops a solution for earlier 
prevention and detection of the distress risk based on the theory of Argenti (1976). In 
his view it is all about avoiding the key errors in the failure process, i.e. management 
defects, system defects or change defects. This is subsequently applied to the conceptual 
failure model of Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) and Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008), already 
used in chapters 1 and 2. They discern four conceptual categories (‘boxes’) of causes of 
bankruptcy: (1) GENERAL ENVIRONMENT, (2) IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT, (3) CORPO-
RATE POLICY, and (4) MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR. The solution presented in chapter 
5 proposes implementation and actual application of tailor-made monitoring around 
the MANAGEMENT/ENTREPRENEUR box and the CORPORATE POLICY box. Such a tailor-
made monitoring structure for each legal person appears to form a solid basis in the 
‘directors’ liability pyramid’ of figure 9.1 , which was subsequently developed in chapter 
5 and ‘which presents the various stages of increasing and cumulating directors’ liability 
from a ‘healthy’ to a ‘bankrupt’ company. This pyramid idea with ‘tailor-made monitor-
ing’ at the basis leads to the formulation of a new bottom-line criterion. This criterion 
should apply not only to the legal liability rules in situations of near financial distress 
but in order to be effective, already beforehand, when the company is still in good shape. 
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Derived from economic theory and to be embedded in the duty of care as one of its 
elements, the criterion reads: at any rate and in any company directors are obliged to 
implement and actually apply a monitoring structure tailored to the needs of the company. 
Formulated and meant as an element of ‘proper management’, this obligation fits in with 
the Dutch corporate governance code and, arguably, through a broad interpretation of 
Hoge Raad dicta1, may actually already apply to all legal persons by means of s 2:9 BW.
Part 2 is of an empirical nature. Chapters 6 to 8 explore empirically whether elements 
of the monitoring structure, e.g. the number of directors or their level of education, 
differ between listed and non-listed financially distressed and ‘control’ companies; and 
whether these variables may add to the explanation of financial distress. The hypotheses 
are based on the agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the resource depen-
dence theory of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
The empirical research in chapter 6 on Dutch listed companies from an agency theory 
perspective opens with an analysis of the distribution of monitoring rights, monitoring 
structure and monitoring output related governance variables. This shows that the typical 
non-distressed, control sample company appears to be a ‘structure NV’ with five NEDs, a 
relatively low board turnover and 19% non-independent NEDs on the supervisory board. 
The financially distressed firm is statistically significantly different as regards these as-
pects. Two years before bankruptcy it is an ‘ordinary NV’ with four NEDs, a relatively high 
board turnover and 14% non-independent NEDs on the supervisory board. The average 
control sample company is larger than the distressed company. The univariate regression 
results, being a check on the one-on-one relationship between financial distress and an 
explanatory variable, show that (a) a negative i.e. opposite and statistically significant 
relationship exists between financial distress and the regime of a ‘structure NV’; a rela-
tive high number of NEDs on the board; one or more non-independents on the board 
two years before bankruptcy; and for the financial variables size, income and cash flow; 
and (b) a positive i.e corresponding and significant relationship exists between financial 
distress and a relatively high number of directors per unit of the total active; and a 
relatively high number of leaving directors. In the multivariate monitoring rights model 
‘certification’ is the only (and positively significant at the 10% level) explanatory variable 
for financial distress in the regression with ‘bankrupt only’ companies. The monitor-
ing structure model shows a positive and significant relationship in both regressions 
between financial distress and a relatively high number of NEDs per unit of the total 
active. The monitoring output model shows a positive and significant relationship in both 
regressions between financial distress and a relatively high number of leaving directors. 
Agency-related variables, e.g. the existence of an SB, board size and board turnover, 
therefore do matter.
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Whilst chapter 6 focused on monitoring rights, structure and output, chapter 7 concen-
trates on the personal and qualitative characteristics of the monitors involved as well as 
their diversity in distribution on the board. It tests the relevance of the underlying resource 
dependence theory for Dutch listed companies specifically for the relationship between 
financial distress and age, nationality, gender, education, non-independence, network 
and workload of the NED. The key question is whether the availability of resources on the 
supervisory board and whether its diversity in composition influences the likelihood of 
financial distress. The analysis of distribution reveals that NEDs on the non-distressed, 
control sample board are: aged 60, 84% Dutch, 97% male, 71% have a university degree, 
82% are independent, they have a 4.39 NED position, and a workload2 of 0.68 FTE. Two 
years before bankruptcy NEDs on the financially distressed sample are statistically sig-
nificantly younger, more often foreign, less educated, slightly less independent and they 
have a smaller network and a higher workload. The univariate regression results show a 
negative relationship between financial distress and (1) being an older NED, (2) a better 
educated NED; or (3) a NED with a larger network; and a positive relationship between 
financial distress and (4) a foreign nationality and (5) a relatively high workload. Similar 
although not identical results are found for the availability and the diversity of these 
variables on the board. The logit regression for both the resources availability model and 
the resources diversity model clearly presents that foreign nationality either as an average 
(bankrupt sample only) on the board or as a diversity measure (both samples) is a sig-
nificant and positive explanatory variable for distress. Thus, the availability and diversity 
of resources on the board in terms of age, nationality, university education, network and 
workload, are in one way or another significantly related to financial distress.
Listed companies are favourite research subjects for financial economists probably be-
cause there is so much information publicly available. Chapter 8 is on Dutch non-listed 
company forms: the private limited (BV), co-operative (coöperatie), association (verenig-
ing) and foundation (stichting). Based on the agency theory and the resource dependence 
theory chapter 8 researches the relationship between financial distress and the governance 
structure of these non-listed legal persons. Data is retrieved from the Handelsregister on: 
the number of executives, NEDs and managers; board turnover; disclosure; company age; 
directors’ age and tenure; gender, nationality and non-independence. The different legal 
forms show statistically significant differences in distribution of the variables although 
not always on the same variables. For all or for some of the legal forms involved the 
univariate regression results show a negative relationship between financial distress and 
(a) a relatively high number of directors; (b) a relatively ‘older’ legal person; (c) a relatively 
older director; (d) a director with a relatively long tenure, and (e) timely disclosure to 
the Handelsregister. A positive relationship exists between financial distress and (f) a 
relatively high number of leaving directors; and (g) if a BV is a group company. Whether 
the latter finding is due to the complexity of managing a group of companies or due to 
the BV being a cost centre of the group could not be detected.
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Thus, also in smaller legal persons, governance-related variables differ significantly 
between a control and a financially distressed sample and quite a few of them are signifi-
cantly related to financial distress.
9.2 COnCLUDInG REMARKS
Based on the literature this thesis shows that in order to improve the quality of manage-
ment decisions and thus presumably to decrease the incidence of financial distress, each 
company needs an adequate monitoring structure i.e. a monitoring structure which is 
tailor-made to the specific requirements of the company. Subsequent empirical evidence 
indicates elements of importance for the adequacy of the structure. Below, the findings 
and conclusions are reported for the following six elements: monitoring rights; moni-
toring structure; monitoring output; monitoring resources; monitoring diversity; and 
transparency and accountability.
on monitoring rights (chapters 3 and 6)
Chapter 3 indicates that on theoretical grounds NEDs are better internal monitors since 
(a) shareholders often show free-rider behaviour which is at least in the end not accepted 
on boards; and (b) NEDs have a reputational incentive to avoid and solve problems. From 
chapter 6 it appeared that weakening shareholders’ rights in favour of those of NEDs 
and strengthening the rights of the SB in the ‘structure-NV’ relates significantly to the 
absence of financial distress. One could conclude that NEDs apparently monitor better 
than shareholders – that is to say at least under the pre-2005 ‘structure-regime’.Depriv-
ing shareholders of their voting rights through tradable depositary receipts (certificering) 
and having an Administratiekantoor voting instead, appears to be a corresponding vari-
able with financial distress in one regression model, but does not show any statistical 
difference in the variable and univariate analysis. Thus, the ‘structure-regime’ seems to 
oppose, and ‘certification’ may correspond to financial distress.
on monitoring structure (chapters 3, 6 and 8)
Each legal person has an internal and an external monitoring structure. The internal 
monitoring structure consists of an executive board and other bodies such as a super-
visory board, a secretary, a works council or other bodies established in the articles. For 
small companies, Argenti (1976) argues theoretically and chapter 8 indicates empirically 
that a one-man board is more bankruptcy-prone than a board with more people. Since 
in a two-man board one may heavily depend on the other, e.g. the chief financial officer 
(CFO) appointed by the owner/director/CEO, a separate supervisory board with indepen-
dent members is theoretically preferable. Large companies should normally have NEDs of 
which the majority is independent. Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Jensen (1993) and Yermack 
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(1996) argue that one-tier boards should not be too large, i.e. the number of EDs plus 
NEDs should not exceed 8 or 9 people. Dutch boards do indeed have on average 7 to 8 
directors, as the empirical research shows. Moreover, the chapter supports the findings 
of Klein (1998) that it generally is important to have – provided that they form a definite 
minority of NEDs – non-independent NEDs on the board ‘to contextualize the rich ideas 
of outside directors’ (Harris and Shimizu, 2004). Almost all listed companies are obliged 
to have a works council. This council is in the view of the author an important part of the 
internal mandatory monitoring structure of the company. Any company with a works 
council should envisage obtaining the best return from that investment in terms of e.g. 
improvement of efficiency and labour relations.
The external monitoring mechanisms contain a similar challenge. Intuitively a director 
will not like a critical remark or question from the external auditor, from the AFM, from a 
court, or from a journalist. However, if the director were able to consider these questions 
as monitoring activities of the external monitoring mechanisms meant to prevent future 
reputational or other damage to the company, his attitude might change. The company 
gains by turning the annoyance into a challenge to improve company return in terms of 
quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the company processes concerned.
Chapter 4 shows that monitoring provisions in the law are often not mandatory. Since no 
legal person operates in a vacuum and monitoring may help to prevent mistakes, chapter 
5 concludes that the implementation and actual application of a tailor-made monitoring 
structure in the company forms one of the important elements of a directors’ duty of 
care.
on monitoring output (chapters 3 and 6)
The literature, e.g. Gilson (1989) and Gales and Kesner (1994), indicates that directors 
will leave a company near financial distress either because they are dismissed or because 
they are leaving the sinking ship. Empirical evidence of chapters 6 and 8 supports these 
insights. A high number of leaving directors is a warning signal for distress. Anyhow, one 
should consider planning and forecasting the succession of directors as part of adequate 
management.
on monitoring resources (chapters 7 and 8)
Not only the monitoring structure matters, but also the personal and qualitative char-
acteristics of the monitors involved. Age, nationality, education, network and workload 
of NEDs prove to be statistically significantly differently distributed resources over the 
control and the financial distress sample (table 7.13). Chapters 7 showed that older and 
graduated NEDs with a larger network work positively for the firm, whilst foreign nation-
ality and workload relate positively to financial distress. Company age for ‘institutional 
memory’ and experience in terms of directors’ tenure and to a lesser extent directors’ 
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age proved to be relevant as well for small companies in staying out of financial distress 
(table 8.17). Nationality of NEDs is a strong and positive explanatory variable for financial 
distress of listed companies. These are factors to take into account when selecting a NED. 
Especially foreigners should have a clear and specific surplus value on the board. Abstract 
advantages as ‘network’ and ‘know-how’ may turn out to be insufficient to outweigh the 
more formal communication processes due to cultural, language and time constraints, 
which is often the consequence of the ‘internationalization’ of the supervisory board.
on monitoring diversity (chapters 7 and 8)
The literature, e.g. Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003), Ruigrok, Peck and Tacheva (2007), 
holds that diversity is a separate factor in the explanation of the usefulness of NEDs. 
Indeed the findings of chapter 7 show that diversity in nationality is positively and sig-
nificantly related to financial distress (table 7.13). A possible explanation can be found in 
the previous paragraph. Diversity in education is negatively related to financial distress, 
and so are diversity in non-independence and workload two years before bankruptcy. 
Since diversity in these factors apparently has some importance, the selection of a new 
foreign NED is apparently risky, whilst board diversity in education, non-independence 
and workload is advisable.
on transparency and accountability (chapter 8)
In order to diminish the information asymmetry and connected risks such as moral haz-
ard or outright opportunism, as described in chapter 3, chapter 4 showed that the law 
urges directors of most company forms to inform stakeholders. Separate provisions exist 
for informing members/shareholders, NEDs, works councils, external auditors, external 
market supervisors and – through the Handelsregister and with some exceptions – the 
general public. From the results presented in chapter 8 it is clear that distressed firms 
comply significantly less with disclosure obligations than control firms. Non-disclosure 
is a warning sign.
The challenge for directors, whether they are entrepreneurs or just agents for share-
holders, in any phase of a firm is to organize and facilitate an adequate monitoring 
structure for their company and to consider these monitors as an opportunity and not as 
a threat. An opportunity since it provides access to various resources. Not a threat since 
executive directors remain the management of the company: théy initiate new ideas and 
generally théy determine the course of action. If it so happens that the law, the articles 
or resolutions compel them to consult or even convince monitors of the justification of 
a (proposed) course of action, they should interpret this as an opportunity to re-assess 
its validity. If they do not succeed in convincing the supervisory board, the bank, or the 
works council, they should admit that maybe it was not such a good plan after all. Only 
this attitude will enable them to use effectively the available resources in the various 
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internal and external monitoring mechanisms for the success of the company, that of 
their stakeholders and eventually their own.
9.3 RECOMMEnDATIOnS
To mitigate the chance of financial distress the following courses of action are recom-
mended as far as they relate to monitoring, the subject of this thesis:
to the general meeting
• avoid the one-man-rule i.e. one-executive only. If this is the only feasible option, 
surround this director with a supervisory board or a lighter non-legal based version 
‘board of advice’, or with an experienced auditor or a freelance ‘company consultant’;
• create a supervisory board or at least a ‘board of advice’ as soon as a company has a 
certain size and social impact, for both disciplinary and resource reasons;
• avoid executive boards and supervisory boards that are too large. Check the adequacy 
of your board size by comparing with similar companies in your industry;
• strengthen the monitoring role of NEDs through the articles or through GM resolu-
tions since this may strengthen the company and avoid financial distress. NEDs by law 
look after the interests of the company, whilst shareholders primarily look after their 
own.
to the general meeting and the supervisory board
• have a critical eye on executives who owe their career to the CEO. Realize that the 
collegial board character implies that executives are – or should be - each others 
monitors;
• ensure that the majority of the supervisory organ, i.e. two-thirds, consists of truly 
independent people, which means people who do not, either by formal criteria or by 
factual circumstances, have ties with the executives. Appoint knowledgeable depen-
dents for the remaining one-third;
• consider many directors leaving as a warning sign for the health of your company. If 
you do not, others will;
• know that experience (proxied by age), academic education and network on the super-
visory board are positively related to the control sample; and that foreign nationality 
and workload are positively related to financial distress;
• think hard before you diversify your supervisory board in terms of nationality. It 
complicates communication which could spoil the monitoring effectiveness of the 
supervisory board.
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to the executive board
• every executive director should consider the implementation and actual application 
of a tailor-made, effective and efficient monitoring structure in the company as an 
important element of his duty of care;
• consider the works council as a means to promote the success of the company for all 
stakeholders.
to the supervisory board
• profile your NED vacancy in terms of resources first. Start thinking of suitable candi-
dates afterwards;
• realize that although for NEDs the interests of the company come first by law, they 
may unconsciously but inevitably serve their own interests as well. This goes for every 
monitor;
• encourage diversity in education, non-independence and workload on the supervisory 
board.
to lawyers, notaries, auditors and insolvency practitioners
• urge your client-director to organize an adequate, efficient and effective monitoring 
structure in the company he is working for;
• urge your client-director to disclose to the Handelsregister as soon as possible, since 
it is a sign of being in control. Discourage the ‘strategy’ of waiting till the last moment.
to the courts
• whilst judging on the quality of management under s 2:9 and 138/248 BW, take into 
account the executive’s effort in organizing an adequate, efficient and effective moni-
toring structure in the company he is working for.
to the legislator and the government
• present positive legal stimuli for directors’ behaviour in situations of near financial 
distress. Such as:
 o  the ‘silent administrator’ presented by the Commissie Kortmann
 o  deductibility for tax purposes through box 1 or 2 of privately paid expenses for 
monitoring or restructuring in situations of (near) financial distress;
• rethink the maximum term of disclosure. At present it is 13 months in the Nether-
lands, 12 months in Germany and 9 months for a Ltd in the UK3;
• make a massive effort to improve the disclosure compliance rate. A disclosure control 
system that automatically reminds non-compliants after the legal maximum disclo-
sure term of 13 months; and produces a fine after 14 months or gives a one month 
terme de grâce if requested (and a fine if the request is not complied with) is efficient4;
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• since EDs are the principal interested parties in a successful audit, assign to NEDs, if 
available, a more conspicuous and leading role in the audit process, not only in the NV 
but also in the BV and the coöperatie;
• apply the ‘adequate monitoring structure rule’ to the vereniging and a stichting as well 
instead of the development of new rules and new legal forms;
• commission a study to compare the effectiveness of the British Charity Commission 
vis-à-vis the absolute lack of a mandatory supervision structure for a vereniging or a 
stichting in the Netherlands.
to researchers
• replicate this research for larger and/or European-wide databases;
• pay more attention to the monitoring effect of a works council;
• find out why foreign NEDs in general in the Netherlands appear to be ineffective near 
financial distress;
• design and test a model for the effectiveness of Dutch two-tier boards in relation to 
the characteristics of their members.
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393AnnEX 1
AnnEX 1 THE IMPACT OF ALL COnCLUDED DUTCH BAnKRUPTCIES
This annex shows the impact of all concluded bankruptcies on the Dutch economy, thus 
including bankruptcies of people and one-man businesses. It belongs to chapter 1, sec-
tion 1.2. The tables A1.1 to A1.3 below are identical in set-up to the tables 1.1 to 1.3 of 
chapter 1 of this thesis. The choice to restrict the figures in chapter 1 to those of legal 
persons originates from the decision made in 1.4 to study legal persons only.
Table A1.1: survey of concluded bankruptcies in the Netherlands 1992-2008 (mln euros)
year
number of 
concluded 
bankruptcies
total 
assets
of which (3) 
to secured 
creditors
net assets 
(3)-(4) total debt
total 
dividend 
paid
calculated 
recovery 
rate in 
% (3)/
(4)+(6)
overall 
recovery 
rate (CBS)
in %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1992 3,447 319.3 197.4 121.9 1,258.4 121.9 21.9  4.4
1994 5,031 287.6 157.9 129.7 1,478.1 129.7 17.6  4.6
1996 5,266 292.9 154.6 138.3 1,437.5 138.3 18.4  4.0
1998 5,098 295.2 105.4 189.9 1,647.0 189.9 16.8  6.4
2000 3,758 277.6 121.2 156.4 1,338.1 156.0 19.0  5.1
2002 3,948 203.4  82.6 120.7 1,247.5 119.3 15.3  4.3
2004 5,939 289.7  77.8 211.9 2,098.7 208.5 13.3  5.1
sub-
average 4,641 280.8 128.1 152.7 1,500.8 151.9 17.2  4.9
2006 9,119 820.0 139.0 681.0 3,789.0 680.0 20.9 13.6
2008 7,196 478.0  84.0 394.0 4,021.0 394.0 11.6  5.5
average 5,422 362.6 124.4 238.2 2,035.0 237.5 16.8  6.8
Source: CBS Statline1
Table A1.2: composition of total debt of concluded bankruptcies in the Netherlands 1992-2008 (in 
percentages)
debt categories (in percentage of total debt)
overall recovery rates by debt 
category
year
total debt in 
mln euros
estate 
handling
taxes and 
social 
security other debt
estate 
handling
taxes + 
social 
security other debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1992 1,258.4 6.7 24.4 68.9 83.2  9.6  2.5
1994 1,478.1 5.7 25.7 68.7 78.2 10.4  2.5
1996 1,437.5 7.5 30.5 62.0 79.4  7.9  2.0
1998 1,647.0 7.1 22.1 70.8 78.3 10.1  5.3
1 All the figures in these and the following tables are available online from CBS. The author is 
responsible for the presentation of the figures.
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Table A1.2: Continued
debt categories (in percentage of total debt)
overall recovery rates by debt 
category
year
total debt in 
mln euros
estate 
handling
taxes and 
social 
security other debt
estate 
handling
taxes + 
social 
security other debt
2000 1,338.1 8.8 21.4 69.8 79.7 14.4  2.2
2002 1,247.5 7.5 25.5 67.0 75.1  9.7  2.2
2004 2,098.7 7.4 23.6 69.0 70.9  7.4  4.3
sub-average 1,500.8 7.2 24.6 68.1 77.3  9.6  3.2
2006 3,789.0 7.3 24.2 68.4 73.4  8.9 15.2
2008 4,021.0 6.0 22.7 71.3 76.1  6.7  5.2
average 2,035.0 7.0 24.1 68.9 76.2  8.9  6.1
Source: CBS StatLine
Table A1.3: the impact of concluded bankruptcies in the Netherlands, 1992-2008, on the Dutch 
economy (mln euros)
year GDP total debt
total dividend paid
remaining 
debt (3)-(4)
remaining 
debt as % of
GDP (t=-2)
(5)/(2)
in mln 
euros
% to
estate
% to taxes 
+social 
security
% to
other debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1990 243,561
1992 266,472 1,258.4 121.9 57.8 24.2 18.0 1,136.5 0.47
1994 287,517 1,478.1 129.7 50.5 30.3 19.2 1,348.4 0.51
1996 319,755 1,437.5 138.3 61.7 25.1 13.2 1,299.2 0.45
1998 362,464 1,647.0 189.9 48.3 19.4 32.3 1,457.1 0.46
2000 417,960 1,338.1 156.0 60.3 26.5 13.2 1,182.1 0.33
2002 465,214 1,247.5 119.3 58.8 25.9 15.3 1,128.2 0.27
2004 491,184 2,098.7 208.5 52.8 17.7 29.5 1,890.2 0.41
sub-average 337,563° 1,500.8 151.9 55.2 23.4 21.3 1,348.9 0.40
2006 534,324 3,789.0 680.0 30.0 12.1 57.9 3,109.0 0.63
2008 595,900 4,021.0 394.0 47.0 15.5 37.5 3,627.0 0.68
average 376,495° 2,035.0 237.5 45.7 18.3 36.0 1,797.5 0.48
Source: CBS StatLine
° in the calculation of the average the last year is omitted due to the time lag assumed in column 6 (see 
text).
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AnnEX 2 PEnDInG CHAnGES In DUTCH CORPORATE LAW
This annex lists the major changes in Dutch corporate law pending in the legislation 
process and belongs to chapter 4, section 4.4 on the Dutch legal forms. It contains only 
proposals submitted to Parliament.
Annex 2.1 31 058 Flexible BV (Flex BV)
Official title: Wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpass-
ing van de regeling voor besloten vennootschappen met beperkte aansprakelijkheid (Wet 
vereenvoudiging en flexibilisering bv-recht)
Status: Pending in Senate (Eerste Kamer)
Content: This proposal contains four main issues: (1) deletion of minimum capital re-
quirement and mandatory blocking clause; (2) enhanced freedom in structure and deci-
sion; (3) new creditor protection rules; (4) adaptation of conflict rules.
The minimum capital requirement is dropped. Shares become freely transferable. Whilst 
default law (s 2:195(1) new) requires that shares should first be offered to the other 
shareholders and the articles may restrict the freedom of transfer, a transfer should not 
be made impossible (s 2:195(5) new). Shareholders do not necessarily have a voting right 
(s 2:228(5) new). The articles may contain additional liabilities for shareholders (s 2:192 
new). In addition, the proposal offers new exit arrangements (s 2:192 and 192a new). Pay-
ment in kind on shares is made easier (s 2:204a and 204b new); the restriction on transfer 
of assets from a shareholder to the company is dropped (former s 2:204c). The enhanced 
freedom in structure and decision shows in the abandonment of the duty to hold an AGM. 
It may be replaced by a resolution in writing (s 2:218 and 238(1) new). If all shareholders 
are directors and they have all signed the accounts, adoption of the financial accounts in 
the AGM is no longer mandatory (s 2:238(3) new). On the contrary, 1% may already require 
that an EGM be held (s 2:220(1) new). The meeting may be held outside the Netherlands (s 
2:226 new). The articles could arrange for the appointment of one or more directors by a 
specific category of shares (s 2:242(1) and 252(1) new).
Creditor protection regards buying shares, payment on shares and dividend payments. 
If the board of a BV decides to buy the company’s shares, directors are jointly and sever-
ally personally liable if the company’s capital is less than its mandatory reserves or if the 
board knew or reasonably should have known that after the transaction the company 
could not continue to meet its current liabilities (s 2:207 new). The latter also applies to 
the seller of the shares; compensation is excluded (s 2:207(3) new). Payments on shares 
of whatever nature (s 2:208(6) new; s 2:216 new) thus including dividends are subject to 
a similar test. A decision to pay on shares has no effect unless the board has approved it. 
The board should not approve it if it knew or reasonably should have known that after 
the payment the company could not continue to meet its current liabilities. If it does, it 
is jointly and severally liable for the deficit, just like the knowing receiver of the payment 
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to the level of the receipt. The adaptation of conflict rules consists of provisions to speed 
up the procedure and to avoid delaying tactics.
Annex 2.2 31 386 Professional disqualification (Ontzetting uitoefening beroep)
Official title: Wijziging van het Wetboek van Strafrecht, Wetboek van Strafvordering en 
enkele aanverwante wetten in verband met de strafbaarstelling van het deelnemen en 
meewerken aan training voor terrorisme, uitbreiding van de mogelijkheden tot ontzetting 
uit het beroep als bijkomende straf en enkele andere wijzigingen
Status: The law, published in Stb. 2009, 245 is not yet in force. The Eerste Kamer has 
required a final say on its implementation (Kamerstukken I 2008/09, 31 386, F).
Content: The law adds an additional penalty to certain specified crimes: the possibility of 
disqualification for certain professions, e.g. to be a director. The possibility of disquali-
fication as an additional penalty exists in s 28(1.5) Sr for ‘cases specified in the law’. This 
law specifies the penalty for (1) crimes against the public order (131-134, 137c-137g, 
147, 194, 205 Sr; these are partly new in this proposal and relate to the prevention of 
terrorist attacks); (2) financial crimes (235, 349 Sr; 69 AWR; 65 Iw).
Annex 2.3 31 763 Board and supervision (Bestuur & Toezicht)
Official title: Wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek in verband met de aanpass-
ing van regels over bestuur en toezicht in naamloze en besloten vennootschappen
Status: Pending in Senate (Eerste Kamer)
Content: This proposal is hybrid since it (1) adapts the formulation of the tasks of the 
executive board of all legal persons; (2) changes the conflict of interests provisions for 
the NV and BV; (3) enables the establishment of a one-tier board for the NV and BV; (4) 
introduces a mandatory new contract form with EDs of a listed NV; and (5) formulates 
requirements on the composition of the board and on its members for the NV, BV and 
stichting.
The adaptation in the formulation of s 2:9 (‘liability for mismanagement’) and s 
2:129/239 BW (‘interests of the company prevail’) is a codification of case law already 
mentioned in 4.4.1.3 The conflict of interests provision of the new s 2:129(6)/239(6) for 
EDs and the new s 2:140(5)/250(5) for NEDs replaces s 2:146/256 BW. It provides a duty 
for the conflicted director to abstain from the decision (process). To the GM it provides 
a right to decide by default if conflicting interests prevent the board from deciding. The 
one-tier board organized in the new s 2:129a/239a as an alternative direction model 
essentially maintains the division of tasks between EDs and NEDs as described in the text 
for the two-tier system. This also applies to the ‘structure NV/BV’ (s 2:164a/274a new). 
An exception is the new 2:134(1)/244(3) (suspension of an ED by the one-tier board) In 
the new s 2:133(3) the law prescribes that the service contract of a director (ED and NED 
in one-tier; ED in two-tier) in a listed NV is a contract sui generis, therewith bypassing 
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the protection rules of regular labour law which inhibit the proper application of the 
Dutch Code II.1.1 and II.2.8. As to the personal requirements of EDs and NEDs, the new s 
2: 132a/242a/297a requires that an ED of a large (> 2:397 BW) NV, BV or stichting cannot 
be a NED of more than two other such legal persons; or only be the chairman of one. A 
NED of a large (> 2:397 BW) NV, BV or stichting cannot be a NED of more than five such 
legal persons; a chairmanship counts twice, according to the new s 2:142a/252a/297b. 
For the large NV and BV only (not for the stichting) the new s 2:166/276 requires ‘taking 
into account as much as possible’ a balanced distribution of gender over ED and NED 
functions, with a minimum of 30% each. If the distribution is not balanced, in the annual 
report the company should account for its efforts and future plans to achieve it. These 
gender related provisions remain in force up to 1 January 2016.
Annex 2.4 31 948 Prevention of abuse of legal persons (Voorkomen en bestrijding 
misbruik rechtspersonen / vervallen vvgb).
Official title: Wijziging van onder meer Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet 
documentatie vennootschappen in verband met het vervallen van de verklaring van geen 
bezwaar (vvgb) en het verbeteren en uitbreiden van de controle op rechtspersonen met 
het oog op de voorkoming en bestrijding van misbruik van rechtspersonen (Wet controle 
op rechtspersonen)
Status: Law of 7 July 2010, Stbl 2010 280. Not yet in force.
Content: This proposal relates to government clearance ex ante for the NV and the BV.
It partly replaces the external mandatory monitoring by the formation authority on for-
mation of an NV or BV by a continuous ex post screening of directors to prevent abuse of 
legal persons.
The proposal removes all referrals to government clearance in Book 2 BW (see e.g. 
s 2:4 new; 2:64/175 new; withdrawal of 2:68/179 and 125/235; s 2:72 and 181). The 
proposal renames the ‘Wet documentatie vennootschappen’ in the ‘Wet controle op 
rechtspersonen’. In s 4 it enables the establishment of a register with data on the pro-
moters, shareholders, directors, other members with a function in the legal person, its 
representatives or other people that determine or are able to determine the policy of the 
legal person. If it is deemed necessary that the network of a person be analysed, it may 
register parents, children and grandchildren as well.
Annex 2.5 32 014 Change of thresholds (Wijziging drempelwaarden)
Official title:Wijziging van de Wet op het financieel toezicht, de Wet giraal effectenverkeer 
en het Burgerlijk Wetboek naar aanleiding van het advies van de Monitoring Commissie 
Corporate Governance Code van 30 mei 2007
Status: pending in the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer)
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Content: The proposal aims to insert an additional threshold in the Wft of 3% where 
investors have to disclose their intent with the investment. It increases the level neces-
sary to place an item on the agenda to 3% and removes the present ‘€ 50 million worth’ 
criterion (s 2:114a new).
Annex 2.6 32512 Adaptation and ‘claw back’ of bonuses (Aanpassing en 
terugvordering bonussen)
Official title:Wijziging van boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek en de Wet op het financieel 
toezicht in verband met de bevoegdheid tot aanpassing en terugvordering van bonussen 
en winstdelingen van bestuurders en dagelijkse beleidsbepalers en deskundigheidstoets-
ing van commissarissen
Status: pending in the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer)
Content: The proposal introduces a right for the organ that has determined the salary 
packages of an ED (s 2:135(3) BW) to adapt the bonus to an equitable level if payment 
were unacceptable according to the measure of reasonableness and fairness (s 2:135(6) 
BW new). Moreover, it introduces a ‘claw-back’ right to the company, to be executed by 
either the SB or the NEDs in a one-tier system, or a representative appointed by the GM, 
if the payment has been executed based on wrong information concerning the achieve-
ment – in short - of the underlying targets (s 2:135(8) BW new). A special rule is proposed 
in the case of a take-over (s 2:135(7) BW new). This proposal concerns all NVs as well as 
cooperative banks and insurance companies (s 2:53a(2) BW new) and banks in BV form (s 
2:245(2) BW new).
S 1:111 (new) Wft extends the ‘claw back’ of bonuses to the senior management of 
financial companies.
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AnnEX 3 STATISTICAL COMMEnTS On THE FInDInGS OF CHAPTER 6
This annex presents the following statistical comments on the findings of chapter 6:
Annex 3.1 Composition of the financial distress and control sample 
Annex 3.2 Composition of matched pairs
Annex 3.3 Statistical comments on table 6.12
Annex 3.4 Results on the matched pairs sample (tables 6.12A and 6.14A).
Annex 3.1 Composition of the financial distress and control sample
Table annex 3.1.1: sample of listed Dutch financially distressed companies, 1993-2003
distressed sample
number year company distress SIC number year company distress SIC
code code
1 1993 DAF NV 1 34 27 2001 Ring!Rosa 1 72
2 1993 Holland Sea Search 2 11 28 2001 Management Share 1 72
3 1993 Homburg Holding NV 1 15 29 2001 HES Beheer 2 63
4 1993 Pahlte NV 1 52 30 2001 Kon. Begemann 2 67
5 1993 Rood Testhouse 1 74 31 2001 Pharming Group 1 24
6 1993 Verto NV 1 28 32 2001
Mulderboskoop/
VRG 1 29
6A 1993 Omnium Europe 1 74 33 2002 Landis Group 1 72
6B 1993 UDG/ICA Holding 1 70 34 2002 AFC Ajax 2 92
8 1994 Wolff Handelmij 2 25 35 2002 AINO/Astra 1 72
9 1995 Wyers Beheer NV 1 51 36 2002 CSS Holding 1 72
10 1996 Koninklijke Van Besouw 1 17 37 2002
Emis 
Euromarketing 1 74
11 1996 Fokker 1 35 38 2002 Laurus 1 52
12 1997 Multihouse NV 1 72 39 2002
Koninklijke 
Textielgr. 1 17
13 1998 Tulip Computers NV 1 30 40 2002 KPN Qwest 1 64
14 1999 Ceteco Holding NV 1 52 41 2002 TIE Holding 2 72
15 1999 Koppelpoort NV /DNC 2 74 42 2002 UPC 1 64
17 2000 Baan Company NV 1 72 43 2002 Vedior 2 74
18 2000 Atag Group NV 1 29 44 2002 Versatel 1 64
19 2000 Alanheri 2 51 45 2003 Van Heek Tweka 1 18
20 2000 Burgman Heybroek 2 51 46 2003 ASML 2 31
21 2000 Dico 2 36 47 2003 BE Semic 2 31
22 2000 EVC International 2 24 48 2003 Getronics 2 72
23 2000 Scala 2 72 49 2003 Magnus Holdings 2 72
24 2001 AND Int. Publishers 1 72 50 2003 Neways 2 31
25 2001 LCI Technology 1 72 51 2003 Prolion 2 29
26 2001 Toolex International 1 29 52 2003 RTCompany 2 72
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Table annex 3.1.2: control sample of listed Dutch companies, 1993-2003
1 1993 Beers 50 87 2001 Delft Instruments 33
2 1993 Borsumy Wehry Kon 51 88 2001 DocData 22
4 1993 EHCO-KLM kleding 17 89 2001 Grontmij 70
5 1993 Gelderse Papiergroep 21 90 2001 HBG 45
6 1993 Gist-Brocades 24 92 2001 ICT Automatisering 72
7 1993 GTI-Holding 51 94 2001 ISPAT 28
8 1993 Hoogovens 27 95 2001 KLM 62
9 1993 Koninklijke Olie 11 96 2001 Kuhne + Heitz 51
10 1993 Krasnapolski 55 97 2001 Nyloplast 25
11 1993 NEDAP 33 98 2001 Nutricia ver bedrijven 15
13 1993 Nedlloyd 61 99 2001 Oce-van der Grinten 30
15 1993 Phoenix Beheer 74 100 2001 Ordina Beheer 72
16 1993 Pie Medical 51 101 2001 OPG 51
17 1993 Sphinx Kon 26 102 2001 Polynorm 29
19 1993 Weweler 34 103 2001 Porceleyne Fles 26
20 1994 Flexovit International 29 105 2002 Accell Group 35
21 1993 Groenendijk Yellowcabine 71 106 2002 Athlon Groep 71
22 1994 Kondor Wessels Groep 45 107 2002 AXA Stenman 28
23 1993 Landre & Glimmerman 51 108 2002 Bever Holding 67
25 1994 Union 35 109 2002 Blydenstein-Willink 17
27 1995 Klene Holding 15 110 2002 BolsWessanen 15
28 1995 Polygram 22 111 2002 Boskalis Westminster 45
29 1996 Giessen-De Noord Van 35 112 2002 Copaco 72
30 1996 Hoek’s Machine & Zuurstof 24 113 2002 CVG Gem Bezit 21
31 1996 Kon Beijenkorf Beheer 52 114 2002 DSM 24
32 1996 NKF Holding 31 115 2002 Eriks Holding 51
33 1996 Pirelli Tyre Holding 25 116 2002 Gucci 19
36 1997 Cindu International 24 117 2002 KPN 64
38 1997 OTRA 51 118 2002 Macintosh 52
39 1998 Smit Transformatoren 31 119 2002 Moolen Holding Van d 67
40 1998 Ommeren van 61 120 2002 Naeff 24
41 1998 Welna 25 121 2002 NBM-Amstelland 45
43 1997 Cate Koninklijke ten 17 122 2002 Nedschroef Holding 28
44 1999 Content Beheer 74 123 2002 Nutreco 15
45 1995 CSM 15 124 2002 Philips 31
46 1999 Dorp Groep van 51 125 2002 Randstad Holding 74
47 1999 Frans Maas Groep 60 126 2002 Reesink 51
48 1999 Geveke 51 127 2002 Roto Smeets De Boer 22
49 1999 Hollandia Industriële Mij 63 128 2002 Samas Groep 36
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50 1999 IHC Caland 35 129 2002 Schuitema 52
51 1993 NAGRON 70 130 2002 Schuttersveld Holding 25
52 2000 ACF Holding 51 131 2002 Simac Techniek 72
53 2000 Ahold 52 132 2002 Sligro Beheer 51
54 2000 Ahrend Groep 51 133 2002 Smit Internationale 63
55 2000 Akzo 24 134 1993 Stork 29
56 2000 AXXICON 25 135 1993 Telegraaf Holdingmij 22
57 2000 Beter Bed 52 136 2002 TNT Post Groep 64
58 1993 De Drie Electronics 31 137 2002 Unilever 15
59 2000 Draka 31 138 2002 Vendex 52
60 2000 Econosto 51 139 2002 VNU Ver Bez 22
61 2000 Elsevier 22 140 2002 Volker Stevin 45
62 1993 Free Recordshop 52 141 2002 Vredestein 25
63 2000 Gamma Holding 17 142 2003 Wolters Kluwer 22
64 2000 Goudsmit 74 144 2003 Airspray 24
65 2000 Grolsch 15 145 2003 Batenburg Beheer 45
66 2000 Hagemeyer 51 146 2003 Blue Fox Enterprises 72
67 2000 Helvoet Holding 25 147 2003 Ctac 72
68 2000 Heijmans 45 148 2003 DPA Holding 74
69 2000 Holland Colours 24 149 2003 Exact Holding 72
71 2000 Melle , van 15 150 2003 Fugro-McClelland 11
72 2000 Norit 24 151 2003 Gouda Vuurvast Holding 26
73 2000 Ubbink 25 152 2003 Heidemij 45
74 2000 Wegener 22 153 2003 Heineken 15
75 2001 Aalberts Industries 28 154 2003 Hitt 72
76 2001 Amsterdam Options Traders 67 155 2003 Internatio Muller 45
77 2001 Amsterdam Rubber 51 156 2003 Innoconcepts 74
78 2001 ARTU Biologicals 51 158 2003 KNP BT 21
79 2001 ASMI 31 160 2003 McGregor Fashion Groep 52
80 2001 Autombiel-Industrie Rotterdam 50 161 2003 Nedcon Groep 28
81 2001 Ballast Nedam 45 162 2003 Petroplus Int 51
82 2001 Bam Groep 45 163 2003 Pink Roccade 72
83 2001 Brill 22 164 2003 Seagull Holding 72
84 2001 Brunel International 72 165 2003 Twentse Kabel Holdin 28
85 2001 Cap Volmac Groep 74 166 2003 Unit 4 72
167 2003 Vilenzo International 18
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Annex 3.2 Composition of matched pairs
The small number of listed companies in Amsterdam, the lack of comparable companies 
and the lack of data for the early years hampered the matching process considerably. The 
SIC code and size were primarily leading; the specific business activities were a secondary 
criterion; and if this did not lead to a match, then a product match was sought (DAF 
and Hoogovens having steel as a connecting factor; Ajax and Gucci have leisure). Two 
years’ difference for the data of the matched companies was accepted. Table annex 3.2. 
presents the result which as regards quite a few choices is undoubtedly arbitrary.
Table annex 3.2: matched pairs of listed Dutch financially distressed and control companies, 1993-
2003
distressed sample control sample
number year company distress SIC number year company SIC
code
1 1993 DAF NV 1 34 8 1993 Hoogovens 27
2 1993 Holland Sea Search 2 11 9 1993 Koninklijke Olie 11
3 1993 Homburg Holding NV 1 15 27 1995 Klene Holding 15
4 1993 Pahlte NV 1 52 4 1993 EHCO-KLM kleding 17
5 1993 Rood Testhouse 1 74 58 1993 De Drie Electronics 31
6 1993 Verto NV 1 28 5 1993 Gelderse Papiergroep 21
6A 1993 Omnium Europe 1 74 15 1993 Phoenix Beheer 74
6B 1993 UDG/ICA Holding 1 70 10 1993 Krasnapolski 55
8 1994 Wolff Handelmij 2 25 20 1994 Flexovit Internation 29
9 1995 Wyers Beheer NV 1 51 2 1993 Borsumy Wehry Kon 51
10 1996 Koninklijke Van Besouw 1 17 43 1997 Cate Koninklijke ten 17
11 1996 Fokker 1 35 25 1994 Union 35
12 1997 Multihouse NV 1 72 38 1997 OTRA 51
13 1998 Tulip Computers NV 1 30 39 1998 Smit Transformatoren 31
14 1999 Ceteco Holding NV 1 52 53 2000 Ahold 52
15 1999 Koppelpoort NV /DNC 2 74 44 1999 Content Beheer 74
17 2000 Baan Company NV 1 72 85 2001 Cap Volmac Groep 74
18 2000 Atag Group NV 1 29 75 2001 Aalberts Industries 28
19 2000 Alanheri 2 51 48 1999 Geveke 51
20 2000 Burgman Heybroek 2 51 46 1999 Dorp Groep van 51
21 2000 Dico 2 36 57 2000 Beter Bed 52
22 2000 EVC International 2 24 55 2000 Akzo 24
23 2000 Scala 2 72 92 2001 ICT Automatisering 72
24 2001 AND Int. Publishers 1 72 131 2002 Simac Techniek 72
25 2001 LCI Technology 1 72 100 2001 Ordina Beheer 72
26 2001 Toolex International 1 29 102 2001 Polynorm 29
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Annex 3.3 Statistical comments on table 6.12
• The number of observations is 201 containing 52 distressed firms.
• R2 is in linear regression the coefficient of determination i.e. the percentage of vari-
ance in Y explained by X. In logit analysis this concept cannot be applied. Nagelkerke 
R2 originates from the desire to generalize the definition of R2 to more general models, 
for which the concept of residual variance cannot be easily defined, and maximum 
likelihood is the criterion of fit (Nagelkerke, 1991). Thus the Nagelkerke R2 is a mea-
sure for the goodness of fit of a model.
• All models perform statistically significantly better than a distribution of all observa-
tions to the control category (expressed by χ²) at the 0.1% level.
• The Type I error figure in the table is expressed as the number of False Positives i.e. 
control companies classified as distressed, as a percentage of all control companies. 
This is the opposite number of what is commonly called the specificity (1-Type I error) 
27 2001 Ring!Rosa 1 72 84 2001 Brunel International 72
28 2001 Management Share NV 1 72 88 2001 DocData 22
29 2001 HES Beheer 2 63 95 2001 KLM 62
30 2001 Begemann Koninklijke 2 67 76 2001 Amsterdam Options AOT 67
31 2001 Pharming Group 1 24 72 2000 Norit 24
32 2001 Mulderboskoop NV/ VRG 1 29 107 2002 AXA Stenman 28
33 2002 Landis Group 1 72 163 2003 Pink Roccade 72
34 2002 AFC Ajax 2 92 116 2002 Gucci 19
35 2002 AINO/Astra 1 72 146 2003 Blue Fox Enterprises 72
36 2002 CSS Holding 1 72 154 2003 Hitt 72
37 2002 Emis Euromarketing 1 74 147 2003 Ctac 72
38 2002 Laurus 1 52 129 2002 Schuitema 52
39 2002 Koninklijke Textielgroep 1 17 130 2002 Schuttersveld Holding 25
40 2002 KPN Qwest 1 64 117 2002 KPN 64
41 2002 TIE Holding 2 72 166 2003 Unit 4 72
42 2002 UPC 1 64 136 2002 TNT Post Groep 64
43 2002 Vedior 2 74 125 2002 Randstad Holding 74
44 2002 Versatel 1 64 145 2003 Batenburg Beheer 45
45 2003 Van Heek Tweka 1 18 109 2002 Blydenstein-Willink 17
46 2003 ASML 2 31 79 2001 ASMI 31
47 2003 BE Semic 2 31 124 2002 Philips 31
48 2003 Getronics 2 72 155 2003 Internatio Muller 45
49 2003 Magnus Holdings 2 72 164 2003 Seagull HoldingNV 72
50 2003 Neways 2 31 165 2003 Twentse Kabel Holding 28
51 2003 Prolion 2 29 161 2003 Nedcon Groep 28
52 2003 RTCompany 2 72 156 2003 Innoconcepts 74
404 AnnEX 3
of a test, which is the likelihood of correct prediction of the control sample. The Type 
II error figure in the tables is expressed as the number of False Negatives i.e. distressed 
companies classified as control, as a percentage of all distressed companies. This is 
the opposite number of what is commonly called the sensitivity (1- Type II error) of a 
test, which is the likelihood of correct prediction of the distressed sample.
• The cut-off point applied in the tests determines whether a calculated test value falls 
in one category or the other. In economic terms: in the standard model a company is 
predicted as a financially distressed company by the model if the likelihood of finan-
cial distress is estimated to be 50% or higher (cut-off point 0.5). However, if one were 
to use such a model as a tool to determine credit ratings, a lower cut-off value may be 
more appropriate, so that a company that is predicted to have e.g. a 30% likelihood of 
becoming financially distressed is also not given a loan. By varying the cut-off point, 
the prediction results may thus change completely. Table 6.12 therefore presents the 
Type I and Type II error not only for the standard 0.5 cut-off point but also for a 0.1 
cut-off point, thus implying a high quantity of potential risk firms in the ‘predicted 
distress’ group. The chance of missing a distressed company in the prediction will 
therefore decrease, and thus the Type II error will decline. This takes its toll in a 
deteriorating Type I error; logically some firms in the 0.1 to 0.5 range are healthy and 
are now erroneously classified as distressed (Type I error).
• The figure Annex 3.1 is known as an ROC plot (Receiver Operating Characteristic). The 
ROC stems from the signal theory and is applied in e.g. medical research (Altman and 
Bland, 1994B).
Figure Annex 3.1: ROC for model 1 and model 4 for t = -2 and t = -3
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The figures show that by reducing the cut-off values the sensitivity initially grows faster 
(1-specificity) i.e. than the specificity declines, up to a certain cut-off point. The test re-
sults are optimal where the distance between the diagonal and the plotted line is largest: 
there, the distance between a stochastical result and the test result is maximal1. Model 
4 appears superior, at least for t = -2, to model 1. Note that maximizing the specificity 
i.e. minimising (1-specificity) reduces the Type I error; and maximizing the sensitivity 
reduces the Type II error. Note further that the actual Type I and Type II errors depend on 
the prevalence of financial distress (Altman and Bland, 1994A) and are thus by no means 
figures one can compare between different samples unless their distribution is equal.
Annex 3.4 Results on the matched pairs sample (tables 6.12A and 6.14A)
Provide the logit analysis results for the same models as defined in table 6.12 and 6.14 
respectively, but now performed on the matched pair sample. Industry classification is 
lacking since the sample is matched.
A comparison of table Annex 3.4.1 and table 6.12 shows:
• for t = -2:
 o model 1: the same variables are significant as in 6.12
 o  model 2: idem
 o  model 3: SBLNTA significance at the 10% level not observed; otherwise the same 
variables are significant
 o  model 4: the same variables are significant as in 6.12.
• for t = -3:
 o  the significance of CASHVV at the 10% level as reported in 6.12 for the models 2, 
3 and 4 is not observed here.
Or: DEB, the number of leaving EDs in t = -2 proves the only significant governance 
variable of the models in the matched pairs analysis. The ‘complete’ analysis additionally 
shows in t = -2 a significance of the size of the SB (SBLNTA) at the 10% level.
A matched pairs analysis of bankrupt-only companies follows in table Annex 3.4.2. A 
comparison with the results of table 6.14 for the ‘complete’ control sample shows:
• for t = -2:
 o  model 1: LNTA and CETA remain significant, NITA is no longer significant.
 o  model 2: financial variables are equally significant. Of the governance variables, 
STRUCTURED appears significant at the 10% level and certification disappears.
1 Or as Altman and Bland (1994B, p.188) put it: ‘a test that is completely useless would give a 
straight line from the bottom left corner to the top right corner.’ The diagonal represents the 
equality between sensitivity (TP/(TP+FN) and (1 – specificity) or (FP/(FP+TN). Or in words: 
the percentage of bankrupt firms rightly predicted by the model is equal to the percentage 
of falsely predicted bankrupt firms (from the control group). Note: TP = True Positive, FP = 
false positive, TN = True negative and FN = false negative.
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 o  model 3: the same variables are significant as in 6.14
 o  model 4: the same variables are significant as in 6.14.
• for t= -3 :
 o  in the matched version STRUCTURED is the (only) significant variable, whilst in 
6.14 LNTA (in 3 out of 4 models), CERTIFICATION and SBLNTA proved significant.
Table Annex 3.4.1: A logit analysis of the financial control, and agency theory related variables for the 
matched pairs of listed Dutch financially distressed and control companies from 1993 to 2003, based 
on panel data for t =-2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred (‘table 6.12A’)
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 2: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6STRUCTURED + 
β7CERTIFICATION + ε
model 3: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β8EBRATIO + 
β9SBLNTA + β10DEPDM + β11AUDDM + ε
model 4: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β12DEB + ε
exp. 
sign¹ model 1
t =-2
model 4
t =-3
model 2 model 3 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
financial 
variables
LNTA
− −0.34* −0.33* −0.32ª −0.48** −0.18 −0.17 −0.13 −0.19ª
CETA − −1.72 −1.64 −2.13 −1.75 2.76 3.04 2.71 2.71
NITA − −16.83** −17.39** −18.94** −14.67** −2.56 −1.08 −3.61 −2.25
CASHVV − −0.80 −0.62 −0.06 −2.86 −5.05 −5.57 −5.01 −5.06
agency variables
STRUCTURED − −0.76 −0.74
CERTIFICATION − 0.80 0.89
SBLNTA + 1.23 0.75
EBRATIO + 3.37 2.12
DEPDM − −0.17 −0.17
AUDDM + −0.50 0.03
DEB + 0.75* 0.15
constant 2.61* 2.75* 0.34 3.09** 0.82 0.87 −0.79 0.82
statistics
number of observations 104 104 104 104 104 104 104 104
Nagelkerke R² 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.65 0.27 0.32 0.29 0.43
LR statistics (χ²) 49.70*** 53.09*** 91.63*** 116.37*** 23.47*** 28.04*** 25.03*** 69.16***
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.25
Type II error (cut-off 
0.5) 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.17 0.35 0.27 0.31 0.35
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
¹ expected sign based on the analyses of distribution in chapter 6 (tables 6.3 – 6.10).
Distress = ln (p / (1-p)). Other variables defined in table 6.11.
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Or: STRUCTURED, which implies that having an SB with mandatory competences ap-
pears to be a significant governance variable at the 10% level on both panels instead of 
CERTIFICATION. The size of the SB (SBLNTA) is only significant in the t = -2 panel.
Whilst the smaller samples as a result of matching result in lower LR-statistics and R2 
values, it cannot be said that the results differ largely with the results for the ‘complete’ 
Table Annex 3.4.2: A logit analysis of the financial control, and agency theory related variables for the 
matched pairs of control and bankrupt listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, based on panel data 
for t = -2 and t = -3 before bankruptcy occurred (‘table 6.14A’)
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 2: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6STRUCTURED + 
β7CERTIFICATION + ε
model 3: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β8EBRATIO + 
β9SBLNTA + β10DEPDM + β11AUDDM + ε
model 4: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β12DEB + ε
exp. 
sign¹
t =-2 t =-3
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
financial 
variables
LNTA
− −0.36* −0.34ª −0.43* −0.52* −0.18 −0.15 −0.13 −0.18
CETA − −3.65ª −3.87ª −5.87* −4.11ª −0.57 −0.39 −1.01 −0.53
NITA − −6.11 −7.00 −7.22 −4.96 2.62 −3.41 −2.59 −2.90
CASHVV − −2.61 −2.07 −2.61 −4.30 −6.00 −5.82 −6.56 −6.08
agency variables
STRUCTURED − −1.32ª −1.13ª
CERTIFICATION − 1.02 1.24
SBLNTA + 3.37* 1.50
EBRATIO + 5.10 1.40
DEPDM − 0.03 −0.25
AUDDM + −1.19 −0.23
DEB + 0.70ª 0.08
constant 3.36* 3.72* −0.52 4.03* 1.78ª 1.87ª −0.04 1.73
statistics
number of observations 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64
Nagelkerke R² 0.41 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.23 0.33 0.27 0.23
LR statistics (χ²) 23.62*** 28.99*** 31.90*** 27.89*** 12.19* 17.92** 14.33ª 12.24*
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.22
Type II error (cut-off 
0.5)
0.25 0.28
0.31
0.41 0.22 0.31 0.22 0.22
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
¹ expected sign based on the analyses of distribution for the full distressed sample in chapter 6 (tables 6.3 
– 6.10).
Variables defined in table 6.11.
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control sample. For the regressions with agency variables SBLNTA, DEB, STRUCTURED 
and CERTIFICATION appear to be the relevant variables.
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AnnEX 4 STATISTICAL COMMEnTS On THE FInDInGS OF CHAPTER 7
This annex presents the following statistical comments on the findings of chapter 7:
Annex 4.1 Statistical comments on table 7.14 
Annex 4.2 Statistical comments on table 7.16
Annex 4.3 Results on the matched pairs sample (tables 7.14A and 7.16A).
Annex 4.1 Statistical comments on table 7.14 
• The number of observations is 201 containing 52 distressed firms.
• The Nagelkerke R2, a measure for the goodness of fit of a model, proves negligible.
• All models perform statistically significantly better than a distribution of all observa-
tions to the control category (expressed by χ²) at the 0.1% level.
• The Type II error figure in the table expresses the number of False Negatives i.e. dis-
tressed companies classified as a control company, as a percentage of all distressed 
companies. If this is the mistake bankers want to avoid, then the last line of table 7.14 
presents good news. The low cut-off of 0.1 brings the type II error down to 10% and 
is subsequently lowered in model 3 (t = -2) to 6% and in model 2 (t = -3) to 4%. This 
implies that 96% of the distressed companies in the latter case are correctly predicted.
Figure Annex 4.1 shows that the ROC for model 5 gives slightly better results than for 
model 1.
Figure Annex 4.1: ROC for model 1 and model 5 for t = -2 and t = -3
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Table Annex 4.2.1: A logit analysis of the financial control, resource dependence and diversity related 
variables for the matched pairs of control and financially distressed listed Dutch companies from 1993 
to 2003, based on panel data for t =-2 and t = -3 before the financial distress event occurred (‘table 
7.14A’).
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 5: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6AGEAV + β7GENAV + 
β8NATAV + 9GRADEAV + β10DEPAV + β11NETAV + β12WL1AV + ε
model 6: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β13AGEDIV + 
β14GENDIV + β15NATDIV + β16GRADEDIV + β17DEPDIV + β18NETDIV + β19WL1DIV + ε
exp. 
sign¹
t =-2 t =-3
model 1 model 5 model 6 model 1 model 5 model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) - AV (5) - DIV (6) (7) - AV (8) - DIV
financial variables
LNTA − −0.34* −0.43* −0.54** −0.18 −0.24 −0.36*
CETA − −1.72 −2.69 −1.81 2.76 3.37 2.72
NITA − −16.83** −16.97** −15.35* −2.56 −3.52 −4.20
CASHVV − −0.80 −1.39 −1.64 −5.05 −5.90ª −3.96
resource variables
AGE −/+ 0.05 −0.05 −0.05 −0.03
NATIONALITY +/+ 1.70 3.26ª 2.39 4.05**
GENDER 0.65 0.86 4.52 4.03
EDUCATION −/− 0.13 −0.31 −0.85 −0.67
NON-INDEPENDENT −/− −0.81 −0.94 −1.97 −1.31
NETWORK −/− −0.07 0.15 0.04 0.14
WORKLOAD +/− 2.63ª −2.99 1.93 −1.08
constant 2.61* −1.01 4.82** 0.82 2.65 1.78
statistics
number of observations 104 104 104 104 104 104
Nagelkerke R² 0.51 0.55 0.56 0.27 0.41 0.38
LR statistics (χ²) 49.70*** 54.87*** 56.75*** 23.47*** 37.92*** 34.86***
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.23 0.25 0.21
Type II error (cut-off 0.5) 0.21 0.17 0.21 0.35 0.31 0.25
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
¹ expected sign based on the difference in mean in the tables 7.2 – 7.9 in chapter 7.
DISTRESS = ln (p / (1-p))
AV = average value of the resource on the supervisory board (SB)
DIV = diversity of the resource on the board (Blau-indicator or standard deviation)
Variables defined below tables 7.2-7.9 and 7.11 in chapter 7.
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Annex 4.2 Statistical comments on table 7.16
If it were important to avoid Type II errors, i.e. classifying bankrupt companies as 
‘healthy’, then model 5 (the resources availability model) adds to the prediction since it 
lowers the Type II error (cut off value 0.1) from 16% to 6% in t = -2. In the t = -3 panel 
the Type II error is 3% for the basic model and just 6% for the models 5 and 6. Lowering 
the cut-off value to 0.1 seems the right thing to do.
Table Annex 4.2.2: A logit analysis of the financial control, resource dependence and diversity related 
variables for the matched pairs of control and bankrupt listed Dutch companies from 1993 to 2003, 
based on panel data for t =-2 and t = -3 before bankruptcy occurred (‘table 7.16A’).
model 1: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + ε
model 5: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β6AGEAV + β7GENAV + 
β8NATAV + β9GRADEAV + β10DEPAV + β11NETAV + β12WL1AV + ε
model 6: DISTRESS ≈ α + β1LNTA + β2CETA + β3NITA + β4CASHVV + β5industry + β13AGEDIV + 
β14GENDIV + β15NATDIV + β16GRADEDIV + β17DEPDIV + β18NETDIV + β19WL1DIV + ε
exp. 
sign1 model 1
t =-2
model 5 model 6 model 1
t =-3
model 5 model 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) - AV (5) - DIV (6) (7) - AV (8) - DIV
financial variables
LNTA − −0.36* −0.56* −0.98** −0.18 −0.36 −0.48*
CETA − −3.65ª −5.02ª −6.93* −0.57 −0.28 −1.20
NITA − −6.11 −5.85 −5.36 2.62 −0.81 −1.48
CASHVV − −2.61 −1.72 −2.73 −6.00 −4.25 −4.76
resource variables
AGE −/+ −0.07 −0.06 −0.16 0.08
NATIONALITY +/+ 5.16* 6.24* 5.75* 5.09*
GENDER 1.59 1.19 4.65 3.61
EDUCATION −/− 1.59 1.01 −0.05 0.79
NON-INDEPENDENT −/− −2.05 −2.10 −3.71* −2.13
NETWORK −/− 0.12 0.31 0.26 0.14
WORKLOAD +/− 1.44 −4.86ª 1.11 −1.46
constant 3.36* 5.37 7.97** 1.78ª 9.61 1.30
statistics
number of observations 64 64 64 64 64 64
Nagelkerke R² 0.41 0.53 0.55 0.23 0.48 0.40
LR statistics (χ²) 23.62*** 32.18*** 34.01*** 12.19* 28.50*** 22.96*
Type I error (cut-off 0.5) 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.31
Type II error (cut-off 0.5) 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.31
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at a 0.1%, 1% and 5% level, respectively.
ª indicates statistical significance at a 10% level.
1 Expected sign based on the analysis of difference in mean in the tables 7.2 – 7.9 in chapter 7.
Distress = ln (p / (1 − p)).
Variables defined below tables 7.2 - 7.9, 7.11 in chapter 7.
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Annex 4.3 Results on the matched pairs sample (tables 7.14A and 7.16A)
Provide the logit analysis results for the same models as defined in table 7.14 and 7.16 
respectively, but now performed on the matched pair sample. Industry classification is 
lacking since the sample is matched.
A comparison of table Annex 4.2.1 and table 7.14 shows:
• for t = -2:
 o model 1: the same variables are significant as in 7.14
 o model 5: idem
 o model 6: idem.
• for t = -3:
 o model 1: as in 7.14, no variables significant
 o  model 5: CASHVV significant at the 10% level instead of CETA; no resource variable 
significant whilst NON-INDEPENDENT was in 7.14;
 o  model 6: no CASHVV significance, otherwise the same variables are significant as 
in 7.14.
Or: DIVNAT, the diversity in nationality of the SB, proves significant in both panels, just 
as in 7.14. WORKLOAD is significant in t = -2 in model 5. NON-INDEPENDENCE disap-
pears as a significant variable.
A matched pairs analysis of bankrupt-only companies follows in table Annex 4.2.2. A 
comparison with the results of table 7.16 for the ‘complete’ control sample shows:
• for t = -2:
 o  model 1: no NITA significance at the 10% level as in 7.16; otherwise the same
 o  model 5: idem
 o  model 6: idem.
• for t = -3:
 o  model 1: no LNTA significance as in 7.16; no significant variables
 o  model 5: no LNTA significance as in 7.16; NON-INDEPENDENT shows significance 
in t =-3 at the 5% level; otherwise the same
 o  model 6: the same variables are significant as in 7.16.
Or, the nationality variables AVNAT and DIVNAT remain significant in all models, as in 
7.16. Financial variables are somewhat less significant. NON-INDEPENDENCE (model 5) 
and WORKLOAD (model 6) appear significant in one out of four specifications.
Thus, the matched pairs approach essentially confirms the ‘complete’ control sample 
results.
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SAMEnVATTInG (SUMMARY In DUTCH)
Dit proefschrift gaat over de rol van ‘monitoring’ bij financiële nood van organisaties in 
de private sector. Dat zijn vaak bedrijven, maar ook verenigingen en stichtingen zijn in 
het onderzoek betrokken. De termen organisaties, bedrijven en ondernemingen worden 
hier door elkaar gebruikt. ‘Monitoring’ is het houden van toezicht in brede zin. Dat toe-
zicht kan ook het geven van advies, een waarschuwing of de goedkeuring van een besluit 
met zich brengen. Vandaar dat wordt vastgehouden aan het gebruik van ‘monitoring’. Het 
eerste en theoretische deel zoekt een antwoord op de volgende vragen:
• Wat verstaan we onder financiële nood?
• Welke mogelijkheden heeft een organisatie in financiële nood?
• Wat is de economische betekenis van ‘monitoring’?
• Welke monitoring mechanismen heeft de wetgever verplicht gesteld?
• Zijn er speciale eisen aan toezicht bij financiële nood?
Hoofdstuk 1 beschrijft de onderzoeksvraag. Het begint met de analyse van de schade die 
de maatschappij lijdt van faillissementen. Die is aanzienlijk. Op micro niveau raakt het 
ondernemers, managers en werknemers en hun gezinnen hard. Aandeelhouders maken 
verlies op hun belegging, crediteuren moeten afschrijven en raken hun klanten kwijt. De 
klant kan zijn produkt niet meer kopen. Een faillissement kan het welzijn van een hele 
streek beïnvloeden (Argenti, 1976:2). Op macro niveau blijkt op basis van gegevens van 
het CBS dat crediteuren die geen zekerheden hebben in Nederland gemiddeld genomen 
slechts 7,5% van de hoofdsom kunnen incasseren. De jaarlijkse schade veroorzaakt door 
vanwege faillissementen van organisaties niet betaalde schulden is gemiddeld vanaf 1992 
0,39% van het Bruto Binnenlands Product. De kosten van werkloosheid van werknemers 
na de opzeggingstermijn en ontslagen en onderbezettingsverliezen bij leveranciers zijn 
daar niet bij gerekend. Aan de andere kant is efficiencywinst ook niet uitgesloten, doordat 
mensen na een faillissement in een andere organisatie meer toegevoegde waarde kunnen 
hebben.
Altman (1968), Argenti (1976), van Amsterdam (2004), Adriaanse (2005), Bollen, Mer-
tens, Meuwissen, Raak en Schelleman (2005), Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) concluderen 
dat managementfouten de belangrijkste oorzaak zijn van faillissementen. Uit gegevens 
van het CBS blijkt dat mismanagement in 32% van de gevallen de oorzaak van faillis-
sement is, problemen binnen de directie in 4% en fraude in 3% van de gevallen. De overige 
61% van de faillissementen wordt veroorzaakt door externe factoren. Sommigen denken 
dat dat percentage veel lager is: een goede ondernemer kan zijn onderneming ook door 
zwaar weer laveren. Hoe dit ook zij, dit proefschrift richt zich op één van de moge-
lijkheden om managementfouten en problemen in het bestuur te voorkomen, namelijk 
door het ‘monitoren’ van het bestuur van de organisatie. Onder het ‘bestuur’ vallen de 
senior-managers en de directieleden. Niet dat, in de woorden van Jungmann (2006: 473), 
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toezichthouders beter zijn in het voorspellen van de toekomst of wijzer zijn dan het 
bestuur. Maar het is goed denkbaar dat meer controle de kans vermindert op fouten die 
op het niveau van het bestuur niet gesignaleerd worden.
Daarom is de onderzoeksvraag
Wat is de rol van ‘monitoring’ in geval van financiële nood van een organisatie vanuit 
economisch en juridisch perspectief?
Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt de definitie en de mogelijke oplossingen van financiële nood. 
Op basis van de definitie van Gordon (1971) is een organisatie in financiële nood als er 
een niet-onbeduidende kans is dat de organisatie niet in staat zal zijn om binnen de 
normale betalingstermijn aan haar betalingsverplichtingen te voldoen. Voor empirisch 
onderzoek moet deze definitie worden aangepast. Vaak wordt – en zo ook in dit proef-
schrift – het onderzoek beperkt tot faillissement. Dit hoofdstuk presenteert een op van 
Ooghe and Waeyaert (2004) and Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) gebaseerd model over de 
strategische benadering van een organisatie in financiële nood. Dit model maakt duidelijk 
dat herstructureringsactiviteiten op de oorzaak van de financiële nood moeten worden 
gericht en niet op een symptoom. Als de strategie voor de herstructurering vaststaat 
moet worden gekozen voor de vorm van reorganisatie. Dat kan zijn (1) een formele en 
vrijwillige liquidatie of reorganisatie; (2) een formele en onvrijwillige reorganisatie; en 
(3) een informele reorganisatie via een ‘work-out’. Een formele reorganisatie is geba-
seerd op de wet en kan in de Nederlandse situatie een liquidatie of ontbinding zijn of 
een faillissement. In de informele reorganisatie wordt de financiële nood opgelost door 
contracten opnieuw te onderhandelen om zodoende te komen tot verplichtingen die bin-
nen de mogelijkheden wel kunnen worden nagekomen. De ‘work-out’ is in de Verenigd 
Koninkrijk een veel toegepaste, en ook enigszins geregelde techniek. Ook in Nederland 
vinden veel informele reorganisaties plaats. Anders dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk is er 
echter geen regelgevend kader voor. Een vergelijking van de economische en juridische 
voor- en nadelen van de formele en de informele reorganisatie in sectie 2.6 laat zien 
waarom de ‘work-out’ oplossing zo vaak wordt toegepast. Mits de markt de reorganisatie 
ondersteunt en de ‘work-out’ dus een Pareto-optimale oplossing is, blijkt de ‘work-out’ 
de meest efficiënte oplossing.
‘Monitoring’ is het onderwerp van hoofdstuk 3. De vorige hoofdstukken hebben laten zien 
dat het een poging waard is om de kwaliteit van managementbeslissingen te verbeteren, 
aangezien 39% van de faillissementen wordt veroorzaakt door mismanagement en fraude. 
Zou de aanwezigheid van ‘monitors’ bijdragen aan de kwaliteit van de managementbe-
slissingen en zou zo het aantal faillissementen kunnen dalen? Het hoofdstuk analyseert 
de rol van ‘monitoring’ tegen de achtergrond van het maatschappelijk krachtenveld 
waarbinnen de organisatie functioneert.
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Het begint met het basale inzicht van de agency (agentschaps-) theorie namelijk dat de 
principaal (in eerste instantie: de aandeelhouder) en de agent (de bestuurder) per definitie 
een verschillende nutsfunctie hebben (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Principalen kunnen 
aandeelhouders zijn, maar ook banken, handelscrediteuren of werknemers. Ieder van 
deze partijen geeft de bestuurder, de agent, soms het recht en in ieder geval het vertrou-
wen om te handelen en daarbij op zijn minst ook zijn belang in het oog te houden. Een 
perfecte stroomlijning van belangen tussen agent en principaal wordt gehinderd door be-
perkte rationaliteit en informatie asymmetrie. Beperkte rationaliteit (bounded rationality) 
wil zeggen dat een agent slechts enkele uit de veelheid van alternatieve oplossingen kan 
overzien en uitwerken. Informatie-asymmetrie (information asymmetry) wil zeggen dat 
de agent niet alle belangrijke informatie deelt met de principaal (Knight, 1921; Akerlof, 
1970). Dat kan voortkomen uit gemakzucht of nonchalance, maar ook uit door eigenbe-
lang gestuurd opportunisme of bewust bedrog (Williamson, 1981). Een goede controle 
van de agent door de principaal is daarom essentieel. Controle is volgens Jensen (1993) 
een alarmsysteem. De controle structuur omhult het bestuur van de organisatie. Het con-
troleproces bestaat uit ‘monitoring’ door alle binnen en buiten de organisatie betrokken 
partijen (stakeholders). Interne controle mechanismen zijn de raad van bestuur (directie) 
en het senior management; de raad van commissarissen of de niet-uitvoerend bestuurder 
in het een-laagse (one-tier) bestuurssysteem; de aandeelhouders en de vergadering van 
aandeelhouders; de secretaris van de onderneming, een ondernemingsraad (OR) of zelfs 
de werknemers, afhankelijk van het rechtssysteem. Externe controle mechanismen zijn 
de in- en outputmarkten (arbeid, kapitaal, leveranciers, afnemers), maar ook verschil-
lende externe autoriteiten. Dit begint met de formatie-autoriteit, die met de oprichting 
van de organisatie is belast. Andere externe mechanismen zijn de externe accountant en 
de belasting-, publicatie-, financiële markten- en juridische autoriteit. Tenslotte zijn 
er vakbonden, belangengroepen, media, overheidsorganisaties en klokkenluiders. Deze 
controlemechanismen vormen tezamen een soort ‘organisatiedemocratie’.
In feite is een goede monitoringstructuur primair in het belang van het management 
zelf. Door te luisteren naar verschillende signalen, argumenten en meningen en de speci-
fieke belangen van iedere monitor goed voor ogen te houden zal de kans op fouten wor-
den verkleind (Jungmann, 2006) en zal het management tot betere beslissingen komen.
Een agency-relatie brengt kosten met zich mee: (1) er moet ‘monitoring’ van de agent 
plaatsvinden, (2) agenten moeten zich binden aan allerlei afspraken met de organisatie, 
en (3) agenten nemen vaak, vanuit de principaal gezien, sub-optimale beslissingen. In-
vesteringen in ‘monitoring’ zijn efficiënt zolang het totaal van de met de agency relatie 
samenhangende kosten erdoor vermindert, hetgeen meestal betekent dat de kans op 
sub-optimale beslissingen erdoor moet worden verkleind. Het is dus niet alleen in het 
belang van de organisatie maar ook in dat van managers zelf om een effectieve en ef-
ficiënte interne en externe controlestructuur te organiseren, aangepast aan de behoefte 
van de onderneming en uitgevoerd door effectieve monitors.
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Als deze conclusie kan worden getrokken uit de economische theorie, is de vraag wat 
het recht heeft gedaan met het concept ‘monitoring’. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft met behulp 
van twee door Kraakman (2009) en Davies (2010) enerzijds en Timmerman (2009) an-
derzijds ontwikkelde analysemethoden de monitoringsystemen in Nederland, Duitsland 
en het Verenigd Koninkrijk voor de NV, BV, coöperatie, vereniging en stichting en daarop 
lijkende rechtspersonen. Na een uitgebreide analyse van de dwingende rechten van mo-
nitors in de verschillende rechtspersonen is de conclusie dat (1) de wet afkerig is van het 
toepassen van verplichte monitoringmechanismen en (2) elk rechtssysteem zijn eigen 
evenwicht vindt aangepast aan de specifieke omstandigheden van de rechtspersoon. 
Terwijl Duitsland gelooft in de ‘meebeslissingsstructuur’ en een raad van commissarissen 
verplicht stelt voor op winst gerichte ondernemingen met meer dan 500 werknemers 
evenals een sterke regulering voor de Aktiengesellschaft (AG) en de eingetragene Genos-
senschaft (eG), is het Nederlandse systeem wat flexibeler en vrijer. Het meest flexibel is 
de 1300 bepalingen tellende UK Companies Act 2006 die voor de interne organisatie van 
profit- en non-profit ondernemingen zwaar rust op de statuten die elke onderneming 
moet opstellen. De Engelse wet noemt noch commissarissen (in de Engelse context van 
het één-laags bestuurssysteem heten die daar: niet uitvoerende directeuren) noch een 
vorm van geformaliseerde invloed van werknemers zoals de OR. De keerzijde is dat het 
Verenigd Koninkrijk strenge en in detail uitgewerkte plichten kent voor bestuurders en 
machtiger overheidsorganen voor externe controle zoals bijvoorbeeld de FRC, de FFRP, de 
FSA, de Bank of England, de Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, de Charities Commission, 
de CIC Regulator and BIS. Overheidsorganen zijn minder dominant aanwezig in Duitsland 
(uitgezonderd de Bundesländer voor Stiftungen) of in Nederland, terwijl de plichten van 
bestuurders daar weer minder ontwikkeld zijn dan in het Verenigd Koninkrijk.
Hoewel hoofdstuk 3 afsluit met het belang van interne en externe monitoring, laat hoofd-
stuk 4 zien dat in het recht niet de ‘monitoring’ centraal staat maar de inperking van de 
vrijheid van bestuurders door het opleggen van plichten. Zou dit anders worden in het 
geval van financiële nood van de organisatie? Op die vraag zoekt hoofdstuk 5 via een 
economische en juridische benadering een antwoord. Economen laten zien dat aandeel-
houders en bestuurders bij financiële nood een overdreven riskant gedrag (‘gok-gedrag’) 
kunnen vertonen. Crediteuren zullen hun eigen positie daarom voortdurend moeten 
monitoren. Het recht ondersteunt de positie van de crediteuren door bestuurders per-
soonlijk aansprakelijk te stellen als zij zich onrechtmatig jegens crediteuren gedragen. 
Ook zijn strafrechtelijke sancties mogelijk en in bepaalde gevallen kan een bestuurder 
een ‘bestuursverbod’ krijgen. Echter, bestuurders realiseren zich vaak pas de consequen-
ties van deze maatregelen als het te laat is en een faillissement onafwendbaar. Vanuit de 
theorie in de hoofdstukken 1 tot en met 4 wordt in hoofdstuk 5 op basis van het werk van 
Argenti (1976, 1986 A; 1986 B) een oplossing ontwikkeld voor het voorkomen of eerder 
ontdekken van de kans op financiële nood. De primaire fouten die tot een faillissement 
kunnen leiden moeten worden vermeden: managementfouten (de almachtige CEO), sy-
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steemfouten (geen goed overzicht over de organisatie) of veranderfouten (niet reageren 
op veranderingen in de omgeving van de organisatie). Deze stelling wordt vervolgens 
toegepast op het model uit hoofdstuk 1 en 2 dat op basis van Ooghe en Waeyaert (2004) 
en Ooghe en De Prijcker (2008) is ontwikkeld. Dit model onderscheidt vier categorieën 
(boxen) van oorzaken van faillissement: (1) de algemene maatschappelijke omgeving, (2) 
de directe bedrijfsomgeving, (3) het beleid van de onderneming en (4) de ondernemer. 
De oplossing die hoofdstuk 5 presenteert heeft ten doel om de ‘monitoring’ rond de 
laatste twee boxen, namelijk het beleid van de onderneming en de ondernemer, te ver-
beteren door de bestuurder te verplichten een op maat gemaakte monitoringstructuur in 
te voeren en te laten werken. Deze verplichting lijkt een solide basis te vormen van de 
aansprakelijkheids- en monitoring piramide (figuur 9.1), die in hoofdstuk 5 ontwikkeld 
is en die de verschillende stadia van cumulerende aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders laat 
zien op de weg van een gezonde onderneming naar een failliete onderneming.
De uit de economische theorie voortkomende en in deze piramide opgenomen gedachte 
leidt tot de formulering van een nieuwe aan ‘behoorlijk bestuur’ te stellen eis namelijk dat 
in elk geval en in elke organisatie de bestuurder verplicht is om een monitoringstructuur in 
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figuur 9.1: een bestuurdersaansprakelijkheids- en monitoringintensiteitscascade op de weg naar 
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Figure 9.1: Een op monitoring gefundeerde aansprakelijkheids piramide van bestuurders in Nederland
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te voeren en te laten werken die is aangepast aan de behoeften van de onderneming. Deze 
verplichting past in de Nederlandse corporate governance code en is, zo valt onder meer 
op grond van een brede interpretatie van Hoge Raad-dicta te verdedigen, via artikel 2:9 
BW van toepassing op alle rechtspersonen.
Het tweede gedeelte van het proefschrift is van empirische aard. De hoofdstukken 6 
tot en met 8 onderzoeken of bepaalde elementen van de monitoringstructuur zoals het 
aantal bestuurders of hun opleiding, verschillen tussen beursgenoteerde ondernemingen 
in financiële nood en een controlegroep; en of deze variabelen iets kunnen toevoegen aan 
de verklaring van deze financiële nood. De geformuleerde hypothesen zijn gebaseerd op 
de agency theorie van Jensen en Meckling (1976) en de resource dependence (kwaliteitaf-
hankelijkheids-) theorie van Pfeffer en Salancik (1978).
Het empirisch onderzoek in hoofdstuk 6 bij Nederlandse beursgenoteerde onderne-
mingen is opgezet vanuit de agency theorie en analyseert verschillen tussen en invloed 
van de monitoring rechten (verdeling tussen aandeelhouders en commissarissen), de 
monitoring structuur (grootte en onafhankelijkheid Raad van Commissarissen) en de 
monitoring output (vertrek van bestuurders en commissarissen). Uit het onderzoek blijkt 
dat de exemplarische ‘gezonde’ onderneming uit de controlegroep een structuur-NV is 
met 5 commissarissen, relatief weinig vertrekkende bestuurders en commissarissen en 
19% niet-onafhankelijke commissarissen. De in financiële nood verkerende onderneming 
verschilt statistisch significant op deze variabelen. Twee jaar voor faillissement is dit een 
gewone NV met vier commissarissen, relatief veel vertrekkende bestuurders en com-
missarissen en 14% niet-onafhankelijke commissarissen. De gemiddelde onderneming 
in de controle groep is groter dan de onderneming in financiële nood. De resultaten 
van de univariate regressie – die het rechtstreekse verband tussen financiële nood en 
een verklarende variabele onderzoekt – tonen aan dat (a) er een negatief dat wil zeggen: 
tegengesteld, en statistisch significant verband bestaat tussen financiële nood en het 
zijn van een structuur NV; het hebben van een relatief groot aantal commissarissen; of 
van één of meer niet-onafhankelijke commissarissen twee jaar voor faillissement; en de 
grootte van de onderneming, inkomen en cash flow. En verder (b) een positief, dat wil 
zeggen samenhangend, en statistisch significant verband tussen financiële nood en een 
relatief (per eenheid actief) hoog aantal bestuurders en commissarissen; en een relatief 
groot aantal vertrekkende bestuurders en commissarissen.
In de multivariate analyse blijkt van de monitoring rechten alleen certificering een po-
sitief verklarende, statistisch significante variabele voor financiële nood (althans voor de 
groep failliete bedrijven). Het monitoring structuur model toont een positief, statistisch 
significant verband tussen financiële nood en een relatief (per eenheid actief) hoog aantal 
commissarissen. Het monitoring output model toont een positief en statistisch significant 
verband tussen financiële nood en een relatief groot aantal vertrekkende bestuursleden. 
Agency-gerelateerde variabelen zoals de verdeling van zeggenschapsrechten, de grootte 
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van de raad van commissarissen en bestuurs- en commissaris wisselingen blijken in de 
nabijheid van financiële nood inderdaad van belang te zijn.
Terwijl hoofdstuk 6 zich richt op de monitoring rechten, -structuur en -output, concen-
treert hoofdstuk 7 zich op de persoonlijke en kwalitatieve kenmerken van commissaris-
sen en op de diversiteit van die kenmerken in de raad van commissarissen. Gebaseerd 
op de resource dependence theorie onderzoekt het hoofdstuk of voor commissarissen bij 
Nederlandse beursgenoteerde ondernemingen in financiële nood kenmerken als leeftijd, 
nationaliteit, geslacht, opleiding, onafhankelijkheid, netwerk en werklast verschillen met 
die in andere ondernemingen; en of deze verschillen ook aan de verklaring van de finan-
ciële nood zouden kunnen bijdragen. Het profiel van commissarissen in de controlegroep 
is: gemiddeld 60 jaar, 84% is Nederlander, 97% man, 71% heeft een universitaire opleiding, 
82% is onafhankelijk van de onderneming, met een gemiddeld aantal van 4,39 commissa-
ris-posities en een werklast van 0,68 fte. Twee jaar voor faillissement zijn commissaris-
sen in de groep met financiële nood statistisch significant jonger, vaker buitenlander, 
minder hoog opgeleid, enigszins minder onafhankelijk, ze hebben een kleiner netwerk in 
termen van commissarisposities en een grotere werklast. De univariate regressieanalyse 
toont een negatief verband tussen financiële nood en (1) een oudere commissaris, (2) een 
hoger opgeleide commissaris, of (3) een commissaris met een groter netwerk. Er is een 
positief verband tussen financiële nood en (4) een niet-Nederlandse nationaliteit en (5) 
een relatief hoge werklast. Voor de aanwezigheid en diversiteit van deze kenmerken in de 
raad van commissarissen zijn de resultaten soortgelijk.
De multivariate logit regressie analyse voor zowel het kwaliteitbeschikbaarheidsmodel 
(resource availability model ) als het kwaliteitdiversiteitsmodel (resource diversity model) 
laat zien dat niet-Nederlandse commissarissen positief en statistisch significant met 
financiële nood samenhangen.
De beschikbaarheid en diversiteit van kwaliteitskenmerken in de raad van commis-
sarissen zoals leeftijd, nationaliteit, universitaire opleiding, netwerk en werklast blijken 
inderdaad gerelateerd aan het voorkomen van financiële nood.
Beursgenoteerde ondernemingen zijn favoriete onderzoeksobjecten voor economen, 
waarschijnlijk omdat er zo veel informatie openbaar beschikbaar is. Hoofdstuk 8 richt 
zich op niet beursgenoteerde Nederlandse ondernemingen: de BV, de coöperatie, de ver-
eniging en de stichting. Met de agency theorie en de resource dependence theorie als basis 
onderzoekt dit hoofdstuk het verband tussen financiële nood en de governance structuur 
van deze rechtspersonen. De onderzochte data, gehaald uit het handelsregister, zijn: het 
aantal directeuren, commissarissen en managers; bestuurs- en commissariswisselingen; 
het al dan niet deponeren bij het Handelsregister; de ouderdom van de onderneming; de 
leeftijd van de directie en hoe lang ze bij de organisatie werken; geslacht, nationaliteit 
en onafhankelijkheid. De verschillende rechtspersonen tonen statistisch significante 
verschillen in verdeling van de variabelen tussen de controle groep en de in financiële 
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nood verkerende groep, hoewel het niet altijd dezelfde variabelen betreft. Voor alle of 
voor sommige betrokken rechtspersonen tonen de resultaten van de univariate regressie 
een negatief verband tussen financiële nood en (a) een relatief groot aantal directieleden, 
(b) een relatief oudere rechtspersoon, (c) een relatief oudere directie, (d) een directeur die 
langer in functie is, en (e) het tijdig deponeren van de jaarrekening in het Handelsregister. 
Er is een positief en significant verband tussen financiële nood en (f) een groot aantal 
vertrekkende bestuursleden, en (g) het onderdeel zijn van een groep van ondernemingen. 
Of dit laatste het gevolg is van de complexiteit van een groep ondernemingen of van 
een organisatiestructuur waarin een rechtspersoon als kostenplaats fungeert, kon niet 
worden onderzocht.
Ook in andere organisaties dan beursgenoteerde NVs verschillen governance gere-
lateerde variabelen inderdaad statistisch significant tussen een controle groep en een 
groep met ondernemingen in financiële nood. Een behoorlijk aantal van deze variabelen 
is statistisch significant gerelateerd aan financiële nood. 
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